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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of banking regulation in Nigeria. It has three main objectives : to 
explain the evolution and impact of banking regulation after independence; to discuss the 
reasons for the persistent failure of financial regulation; and to highlight the role of 
external agencies in Nigeria's financial system. 
The thesis offers a historical perspective on the developments in Nigerian banking 
regulation, but focuses mainly on the period after independence. It examines the economic 
and political theories that have influenced financial regulatory trends in Nigeria. It 
considers these theories in their political and legal context. The thesis does not embrace 
any theory in particular. Instead, its approach is pragmatic and comparative focusing on 
the interaction between legal, political and institutional factors that have influenced 
financial regulation in Nigeria. 
The study shows that the pre-liberalisation regulatory norrns were repressive and 
inefficient. It argues that banking deregulation was introduced as an economic revolution 
devoid of necessary corresponding political and legal changes. The core destabillsincy 
factors are identified as inadequate regulatory powers, political corruption, political 
instability, legal instability, policy distortions, and incongruous laws. The complicity of the 
IMF and World Bank in this process is also discussed. Financial deregulation was 
prompted by predatory politics characteristic of the Nigerian state*, yet, deregulation has 
a), gravated the country's political instability and exacerbated prebendalism. The thesis 9 
discusses policy options to break this vicious circle. 
xx 
PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
If it is recalled that about one in four black Africans or one 
in two West Africans is a Nigerian, that Nigeria is the world's 
ninth populous country and sixth largest oil exporter, and that 
the country's aggregate output of goods and services or GDP 
(at least in period of oil-centred prosperity) is greater than that 
of the rest of black Africa combined, then it is evident that the 
study of the 'Nigerian State' is of central relevance to the African 
condition ...... I 
1.1 Objectives 
In 1988, (twenty-eight years after independence), the Nigerian economy vvas both 
insolvent and illiquid, beset with high inflation, growing unemployment, a depreciating 
currency and a growing fiscal deficit. Part of the solution based on International Monetary 
Fund (INIF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) 
reports, was deregulation of the banking system. Nevertheless, thirteen years later, the 
financial sector IS in Crisis and deregulation has contributed to making the overall 
economic situation worse. 
What went wron--y', ' Was the INIF advice flawed? Was the problem with the 
implementation" With the timing? What is the role of law and has politics any relevance9 
These questions make an inquiry into the fundamental causes of the persistent financial 
and economic crises and an assessment of the efficacy of the regulatory and policy 
instruments inevitable. 
This work examines financial regulation and deregulation of the Nigerian banking 
systern focusing on the following issues Cl 
The nature and modes of financial regulation in Nigeria and ..,. -hy it was 
1. See Graf. \Villiani. D.. The Nigman State. James Currcy. Londonj 1988 ). p. xiv. 
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needed in the first place. 
2. The changes in the regulatory approach of the Nigerian banking system. 
3. The impacts of the banking regulation on the Nigerian banking system. 
4. The effects of banking deregulation. 
The following research hypotheses have been formulated to guide the analysis 
1. The nature of financial regulation of a banking system has a pnmafily significant 
influence on its efficiency, effectiveness and performance. 
2. The character and ethics of the political, social and bureaucratic classes and the 
governance structure of a nation influence and determine the nature of financial regulation 
and deregulation of the banking system. 
3. The modes of financial regulation and deregulation of Nigerian banking system were I 
repressive, corruptive, exploitative and ruinous. 
A suitable socio-political environment and conducive legal frameworks are critical pre- 
conditions for the success of a financial deregulation programme. 
The primary objective of this work is to analyse the factors which influence and 
affect the laws and policies regulating banking in Nigeria, and their influence upon the 
effectiveness of banking regulation and deregulation. In this respect, this work considers 
the Nigerian legislative, executive and judicial processes with particular reference to 
financial regulation and deregulation of banking system. 
1.2 Methodological Approach 
Economic theory offers a useful normative standard for analysing and evaluating 
law. Indeed, economics provided the intellectual foundations for financial deregulation2' 
and banking regulation shows the stamp of economic thinking3. 
See Cooter. R and Men. T.. Law And Economics. Addison-Wesley. Reading. (1997). 2nd edition. p. 2. 
3. See Posner. R.. " The Roundtable Discussion ". in Baird. D. G.. " The Future of La%N and Economics 
Looking Forward " (1997) 64 The University of Clucago Law Review, no. 4.1129 at p. 1144. 
3 
Legal and economic scholarship have made a robLISt contribUtIOn to 111C 
understanding of the interconnection between the legal and economic systems-'. Yet this 
study goes beyond the traditional confines of law and economic discipline. and rather 
embraces a pragmatic approach in reco-ý II si ni II In mition of the 'L, *ficant l1rn*tat*ons of the law and 
economic theory in analysing the issue under discourse in a highly political and legally 
unstable environment like Nigeria. In any case a purely economic approach is 
unsatisfactory to the extent that economists neulect the le-al, institutional and political 
underpinnings of the economy. 
Indeed, a leading professor of banking and finance. Charles Goodliart, confesses 
that "economists tended to take the legal underpinnings of the economy too much for 
granted"5, and added that the "effects of the rule of law on tile economy Is pervasive, but 
rarely examined in any depth by economistS"6. It may also be emphasised in the words of 
Godelier, that " it is not possible to analyse the economic sphere in all Its aspects by means 
of economic science alone., because what is econonnic is implied by the functioning of tile 
non-economic structures, which thus to some extent determine its significance"7. The 
optimum conditions for development are not " inerely economic but also psychological, 
sociological , 
legal 
....... 
4. See Epstein. Richard. A.. " LaNN and Economics : Its Glorious Past and CloudN Fulure "( 1997) 64 The 
University of Chicago Law RevicNN. no. 4. pp. 1167 -. 1174. 
ý. See Goodhart. C. A. E.. " Economics and the LaNN . 
Too Much One-Way Traffic? " (1997) 60 M. L. R. 
lat p. 2. 
Ibid.. p. 4. 
1. See Godelier. Maurice.. Rationality and lrrationilitý in Economics. Moiithl% Review Press. New York 
& London. (1972). p. 26, 
Ibid.. p. 3 1. 
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Equally, a positivistic legal approach is unsatisfactory since it is usually expository 
rather than critical, descriptive and not empifical9. Indeed, law has at least three 
dimensional rationality'O, namely, formal rationality, instrumental rationality, and 
substantive rationality. A statement of the law as it is will satisfy the formal rationality and 
a positivistic approach. The instrumental rationality however requires an inquiry into 
whether particular legal interventions have attained their intended effect, and substantive 
rationality could only be satisfied by investigating whether the particular law conforms 
with some justifying principles or ends. 
The issue of state interventionism in banking is not merely of law and its role, but 
raises "the question of the relationship of the political to the economic" I' and concerns the 
institutional frameworks which reinforces social class. Thus, the political undercurrents of 
law and its social dimensions require examination. Indeed, the ultimate premises of legal 
theory affecting banking system is political12, and law often caters for narrow coalitions 
rather than public interest13. Hence, it has been said that the conception of the state as a 
non-capitalist agent is a myth14. Quite often, law and state serve some interests, and the 
laws underpinning financial regulation and deregulation of Nigerian banking system afford 
a classic example. 
Therefore this work also examines the political, social and institutional factors that 
influence the laws governing financial regulation and deregulation in Nigeria, and analyses 
the roles of these factors on the effects of the laws. It is a core premise of this study that 
9. See Adams. John and Brownsword, Roger.. Key Issues In Contract, Buttenvorths, London. (1995, ). pp. 
1 -4. 
10. Ibid.. pp. 10 - 13. 
11. See Picciotto. Sol., "Firm and State in the World Economy ". in Faundez. J. and Picciotto. S. (eds.. ). 
The Nationalisation of, % lultmationals in Peripheral Economics. The Macmillan Press Ltd. London. 
(1978), p. 2312. 
12. See Posner. R. A., Ox-crcoming Law, Han-ard Uruversity Press. Cambridge. (1996). Third printing. p. 
8-3). 
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* 
Ibid., p. 400. 
14. See Faundc/ and Picciotto, OP. Cit., p. 2. 
the institutional efficiency and capability of the financial regulators, and the impacts of 
banking regulation and deregulation, are dependent on the legal and political 
superstructure governing the financial system and the constituent state. Thus, the roles of 
law and political system are fundamental to a balanced analysis of financial regulation and 
deregulation. It also a thesis of this work that an understanding of the basic economýic 
precepts influencing financial system is crucial to any legal analysis of the nature and 
consequences of financial regulation and reforms. 
Indeed, the appropriate laws fostering economic development in a third world 
country can neither be understood nor fashioned without " an extensive knowledge of the 
detailed facts of that particular country's social, political and economic milieu 1115. The case 
for a pragmatic study therefore becomes compelling. In embracing this methodological 
approach, we adopt the Posnerian thesis that a pragmatic "conception of legal theory is 
broad, sweeping within it matters that might be thought to belong to political or social 
theory rather than to legal theory. This breadth reflects the broadening of interests that is 
characteristics of contemporary legal scholarship" 16. 
The need for a pragmatic research in the area of financial deregulationl7 and on 
the impact of law and economiCS18has been emphasised . Seidman and Seidman have also 
concluded that "in the real world, development problems' interconnectedness dictated that 
researchers explore across disciplinary boundaries. When they did, they discovered that 
particular theories of law and the state tended to resonate with parallel social science 
theories" 19. 
15. See Seidman. A and Seidman. R. B.. State And Law In The Development Process. The Macmillan 
Press, London, (1994), p., 352. 
16* See Posner (1996). op. cit.. p. vii. 
See World Bank Policy And Research Bulletin. October-December 1997. World Bank. Washington 
D. C.. p-2. 
18. See Coase. Ronald.. " The Roundtable Discussion ". in Baird. D. G.. " The Future of Law and 
i -ersity of Chicago LaiN Review. no. 4.1129 at 1138. see Economics : Looking Forward " (1997) 64 The Unk I. I 
also Becker, Garv.. " The Roundtable Discussion ". in Baird. D. G.. ibid. p. 1149. 
19. See Seldinan and Seldinan. op. cit p. 90. 
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Accordingly, this study embraces an approach which traverses disciplines including 
law, economics, political economy, political science, history and international finance, and 
considers financial regulation and deregulation of the Nigerian banking system by 
evaluating relevant empirical evidence including indicators of macroeconomicIO and 
microeconoMiC21 performances. 
The choice of financial regulation and deregulation is based on its currency and 
topicality in international and domestic circles. The problem of banking and financial 
system has shifted to centre stage in the last two decades. Banking crises have become the 
"issue du jour"22, and the World Bank and IMF continue to devote enormous resources to 
researches on financial regulation and deregulation of the banking sector in view of the 
crises in both industrial and developing countries". Concerning Nigeria, many scholars 
including Ann Seidman (1986), Soyibo and Adekanye (1992), and Aryeetey (1997) have 
called for studies evaluating the impact of regulation on the Nigerian banking system. 
The approach of this work has not been utilised in the study of the subject-matter 
in respect of Nigeria or a country like Nigeria prior to this study. Neither has the process 
legal form of financial regulation and deregulation been analysed in its economic, political 
and historical contexts. The terms financial system, financial regulation and deregulation 
are used strictly in this work to refer only to the bankin system except as otherwise 91 
indicated. 
20 
. 
Macroeconomic indicators include rates of interest. inflation and economic groN%Ih, changes in the size 
of the federal deficit and national debt. and changes in the distribution of national Nvealth and income. 
21. itability of banking system, the scope and Microcconomic indicators include changes in the prof 
frequency of financial fallure. the magnitude of the collapse of banks and other financial institutions, 
rescue packages, efficiency rates and market intenýentions- 
22. See Fischer. Staiileý .. 
(IN4F Deputy Managing Director). I%IF Sun-ev. October 28,1996. INT , 
Washington D. C.. p. 345. 
23. See World Bank PolicN And Research Bulletin. Januan-March 1996. World Bank.. Washington D. C.. 
p. 5., See also World Bank Policy And Research Bulletin. Julý-September 
1997. World Bank. Washington 
D. C.. p. 5., IMF Sun-eý. Feb. 9.1998. INIF, Washington D. C.. . 
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1.3 Remarks on Relevant Literature and Sources 
There are very few Nigerian literature on legal aspects of financial regulation and 
deregulation of Nigerian banking systeM, 24 or on the role of law and politics in the subject 
matter. Furthermore, legal literature has generally failed to consider the economic precepts 
influencing both banking regulation and deregulation. However, there are legal studies 
examining the changes in banking laws and regulations in Nigeria. The immediate pre 
1991 banking laws have been examined by Sofola (1988), and Aderemi (1991). The 1991 
banking law reforms have received significant scrutiny from Osunbor (1992), Umezuruike 
(1992), Adeniji (199 1), and Kembi (199 1). These works suffer from common defects. 
They are mainly descriptive and doctrinal in the traditional characteristics of legal 
scholarship in West Aftica. 21 The economic, political and social fundamentals of banking 
regulation and deregulation are neglected. These defects seriously hamper their 
contributions to the debates on financial deregulation in Nigeria. Indeed, it is not 
surprising that these works find the Nigerian banking laws generally satisfactory. This 
study disagrees with these views and contends that the Nigerian banking laws require 
urgent fundamental reforms. It may be added that Uche(I 998) and Uche and Osho ( 1998) 
discuss reforms to share capital and deposit insurance of Nigerian banks, but both articles 
did not address the core issues of banking deregulation26 and they have economic 
orientation. 
24. Yerokun (1989) and Ajorno (1995) have written on legal aspects of Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) in the country. Financial deregulation is not considered. 
25. see Ghai. Yash.. " Law, Development And African Scholarship "(1987) 50 M. L. R. p. 750. 
2ý' 
, 
The core issues of banking deregulation such as interest rate deregulation, exchan-ge rate liberalisation. 
abolition of directed credit and privatisation. 
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The issue of financial liberalisation has been domýinant in the Nigenan intellectual 
and banking circleS27. Okigbo (1993) underlines politics as the greatest danger to financial 
liberalisation in Nigeria. Ojo (1994) and Soyibo (1997) advocate political reforms 
including democracy as critical to Nigerian banking deregulation. Lewis and Stein (1997) 
also demonstrate the political captivity of the Nigefian banking system, while Collier 
(1996) emphasises that the greatest problem of financial liberalisation in Nigeria is that 
those political institutions that govern economic policies are ill-suited., and advocates a 
mechanism for government restraint. Inanga (1997) and Gelb (1997) underscore the 
importance of political reforms in financial reforms in Affica. 
These works however gloss over the legal underpinnings of these problems. 
Indeed, as Seidman and Seidman (1994) assert politics and law are self reinforcing, the 
political imperatives usually become codified as legal dictates. Thus, the political problems 
are not merely actions of some misguided politicians, but very often the lawful acts of duly 
constituted authorities. Therefore, it is essential to identify the core legal dictates that 
reinforce the untoward political intervention in financial deregulation in Nigeria. These 
works fall short of this demand. 
Most recently, Umunnaehila (1996) studies bank failure in Nigeria. It is another 
insightful economic work that completely ignores regulatory, political and legal 
undercurrents. In attributing the causes of bank failure to mainly economic causes, it fails 
to underscore the role of political intervention, regulatory dysfiinctionalism, and defective 
banking laws. 
Resourceful treatises on the early banking system in Nigeria have been provided by I- 
IBRD Report (1954), Jucker-Fleetwood (1964), Brown (1966), Ekpo (1979), and Uche 
(1997). The nature of the Nigerian banking system and the effects of its regulatory and 
policy mechanisms have been critically examined 
by Okigbo (1981), Nwankwo (1980), 
27 
. The treatises 
such as Okigbo (1993). Olashore (1988). Nwankwo (1990.1991). Ojo (1992.1994). 
Soyibo and Adekanve (1992), Soylbo, (1997), and Odozi (1993,199-5) among numerous others, 
have 
assessed and evaluated financial 
dercgulation of the Nigerian banking system 
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Olashore (1988), and Onoh (1980). These works found that the Nigerian banking system 
was highly regulated and massively repressed. The works are rich in economic analysis and 
lucid, but fail to establish the nexus between the banking laws and the deleterious effects 
on both the banking system and Nigerian economy. It seems law does not matter. 
Although, the political motivations undermining the banking system are occasionally 
underscored, the fundamental role of politics in the nature, design, and implementation of 
Nigerian banking laws and regulation are neglected, while the absence of robust regulatory 
analysis is ubiquitous. 
This study in unravelling the political issues influencing financial regulation and 
liberalisation in Nigeria has benefited from the studies of Ake (1985), Joseph (1987), 
Diamond (1988), William Graf (1988) and Lewis (1996) who have found that capital 
accumulation motivates the hyperactivity of Nigerian elite in state and governance. State 
intervention provides the mechanism for accumulation, and political instability results from 
unbridled quest for political power as a means to economic wealth. Thus, Nigerian elites 
are conflict generators rather than conflict managers. 
The foregoing works provide the schematic framework for identifying the political 
incentives that underpin banking regulation and deregulation in Nigeria. They outline the 
symbiotic relationship between political instability and economic pursuits of Nigerian elite, 
and conclude like the economists that the reversal of state roles in economic spheres is 
indispensable. This study examines the law and policy of banking regulation and 
deregulation in the light of these political treatise. 
The economic underpinning of financial regulation and deregulation makes 
economic theories fundamental building blocks for this study. Indeed, the current wave of 
financial liberalisation has been largely influenced by academic writings of Professors 
Mckinnon and Shaw. The seminal works of Shaw (197' 3) and Mckinnon (1973), and 
illuminating literature that provide the theoretical framework of this work are discussed in 
the next chapter. 
I () 
This study in proposing reforms of the Nigerian banking laws and policies is 
influenced by its multidisciplinary approach to the issue of financial liberalisation and its 
comparative orientation to legal study. It has benefited from some major comparative 
works on the incidence of financial liberalisation in Latin America, America and Affica 
such as Diaz-Alejandro (1985), Veneroso (1986), Sundararajan and Balino (199 1), Husain 
and Faruqee (1994), Garcia-Herrero (1997) . Additionally, the works of OECD (1992), 
Zahler (1993), Scott and Wellon (1996), Ellinger and Lominicka (1994), Goode (1989), 
Canova (1995), Cottarelli (1993), Issing (1993), Wood (1995), and Cranston (1997) on 
banking, central banking, and financial laws and regulations in different countries of the 
World have enriched this study. 
1.4 Basic Sources 
Three basic sources of data gathering have been employed in this study namely 
primary and secondary sources, and interviewing. 
1.4.1 Primary Sources 
These have been opined as those sources that are direct, authoritative, and not 
influenced by any body's opinion28. They include about 50 Nigerian banking and related 
legislation. Foreign banking legislation in a dozen other countries was also scrutinised for 
comparative insights. The annual banking and monetary directives and policies of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) also form a substantial part of the primary sources utilised. 
The economic data were obtained from the Annual Reports of both the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) and Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). The Annual reports 
and financial publications of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World bank) also provided another reliable 
source of data. The CBN occasional publication such as ' Twenty Years of Central 
Banking in Nigeria, 1959-1979 ' afforded us a reliable source of direct information. The 
. See 
Chattcdec. Charles.. Methods of Research in Law. Old Bailey Press Ltd. Kent. (1997). p. 23) 28 
cases considered in this study are certified true copies obtained directly from the registry 
of the Failed Bank Tfibunal in Lagos since they are unreported. 
1.4.2 Secondary Sources 
These are sources which are not of a primary nature. The opinions of experts, 
books and published articles belong to this category29. This study benefits immensely from 
these sources. 
Of importance, the prolificacy of the CBN officials including the Governor, a 
Deputy Governor, and Director of Research among others, has ensured a steady flow of 
analysis through nu merous published works between the regulators and the reading 
public. These works also provide insights into the expert and personal views of key I 
officers of the CBN. This study relies on these secondary sources of high persuasion. 
Many distinguished Nigerian bankers, economists and scholars as well as their 
international contemporaries have written extensively on the Nigerian banking system and 
economy. This study tapped from these large and multifarious armouries of information. 
The publications of the CBN, NDIC, and Chartered Institute of Nigerian Bankers 
(CIBN) have proved significant sources of information and data. The Financial Institution 
Training Centre (FITC) provided a reliable source of financial information through the 
organisation of annual seminars and conferences for Nigerian banks' directors and 
executives, and consistent publication in full of the papers and proceedings of such 
specialised meetings. The bulk of the FITC publications form a significant source of this 
study's data and information. This study also relies on numerous Nigerian and international 
newspapers and magazines. The Obulletins and research publications of EMY and World 
Bank are also used. 
1.4.3 Interviews 
Fieldwork was undertaken in Nigeria between May and July 1997 for the purposes 
of gathering data and material for this study. During the fieldwork, scheduled semi- 171 
29. Loc-cit. 
I -) 
structured interviews were conducted with selected interviewees based on their 
professional roles, status, competence, expertise and experience of the Nigerian banking 
system and regulatory structure. They are individuals who occupy the centre stages of 
financial deregulation in Nigeria. Their institutions play significant roles in the financial 
sector either as the regulators or the regulated institutions. These interviewees included 
(a) Two directors of the CBN, and one senior officer of CBN. All these interviewees 
granted interviews only on strict conditions of anonymity because of the fear of political 
reprisal by the military government. Another senior official of the CBN declined interview 
even on the condition of anonymity. 
(b) Dr Wole Adewunn-ii, President , Chartered Institute of Nigerian Bankers and 
former 
Executive Director, Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). 
(c) Hon. Justice M. Ope-Agbe, Chairman, Failed Bank Tribunal, Zone 11, Lagos. 
(d) Mr Adeyemi Osinubi, Banker and former Chief Legal Officer, National Bank of 
Nigeria. 
The interviewees in group (a)furnished information and insider perspectives of the 
nature, design, and dynamics of banking regulation and deregulation. Their views are most 
revealing. Dr Adewunmi provided the insights into the perspectives of the Nigerian 
bankers as their representative. Additionally, Dr Adewunmi also offered expert opinions 
on the regulatory system having regards to his experience as the immediate past executive 
director of NDIC, one of the main banking regulatory bodies. This interviewee also 
provided some intellectual flavour and material because he is a reader in 
banking and 
finance at University of Lagos. It may also be mentioned that Dr Adewunmi was a 
former 
commissioner for finance, hence brought his knowledge of politics of 
banking and finance 
to bear on his opinion. 
Hon. Justice Ope-Agbe is the most senior judge handling criminal and civil cases 
involving failed banks. He has tried most of the celebrated cases involving Nigerian 
banking ftaudsters. His Lordship graciously provided us with information and insights into 
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the causes of bank failure based on the evidence adduced before the Tribunal in criminal 
and civil cases concerning failed banks. Mr Osinubi is a banker cum lawyer and was the 
Chief Legal Officer of the National Bank of Nigeria Plc' (the Nigerian oldest and first 
troubled bank), when the bank failed. He put his insider views on the failure of the bank 
and others, and the impact of financial deregulation on Nigerian banks at our disposal. 
These six selected interviewees provided diverse, qualitative and rich information that 
forms a significant building block of this study. 
The interviewing mechanism enabled us to assess the reliability of the information 
and evaluate the veracity of the interviewees. The sen-ii-structured nature of the interviews 
allowed us to ask questions in our preferred order, and repeat a question in different ways 
until the respondent had understood it. We were able to raise incidental questions, and 
procure answers. It also enabled us to ensure that the questions were answered personally 
by the interviewees without the influence of other persons. The non-verbal behaviours of 
the respondents were also studied. We are convinced that the interviewees provided us 
with information of utmost veracity. 
Financial and time constraints dictated the limited number of interviewees, and the 
fact that the research is based on banking regulation and deregulation which are 
predominantly structured by legislation, policies and case laws prevented us from 
employing any sociological approach. Questionnaires were not adn-iinistered because of 
time and financial constraints, and logistical difficulties. We also prefer face to face, direct 
and structure interviews with selected relevant persons to diverse, indirect and 
uncontrolled questionnaires. It is also doubtful given the political sensitivity of the subject 
-matter that responses would 
have followed such questionnaires, since they may be 
thought to have originated from the state security apparatus determined to weed out 
critics. 
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1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six parts consisting of eleven chapters. Part One 
comprises one chapter on the Introduction and Research Methodology. It gives an 
account of the research questions, hypotheses, and methodology embraced by this work, 
and underscores the broad themes of the work. 
Part Two contains two chapters on the theoretical underpinnings of this work and 
country background on Nigeria. Chapter Two analyses the concept of financial regulation 
and identifies the objectives and types of financial regulation of the bankin system. It 91 
further discusses the classical theory of financial regulation that advocates regulatory 
intervention in the banking system, and outlines a counter theory that challenged 
regulatory intervention in banking system. The principles of financial liberalisation and 
deregulation which preaches liberalisation of interest rate regulation, credit regulation and 
banking activities' restrictions are analysed. 
Chapter Three provides an insight into Nigeria from its pre-colonial era to the 
contemporary time. It underscores the political, economic, historical, constitutional, and 
social factors that influenced the founding and development of the country, and there 
effects on the present political and economic problems confronting the country. 
Part Three consists of two chapters. Chapter Four contends that the nature, mode 
and techniques of banking regulation in Nigeria during the period between 1892 and 1985 
were dictated by historical evolution of the banks and the environmental factors, the socio- 
political and economic circumstances of the country, and the theoretical influence of the 
classical theory of regulatory intervention. It argues that banking regulation 
in Nigeria 
contrary to widely held opinion was largely laissez-faire between 1892 and 
1967 which 
coincidentally marked the major part of the colonial era. 
The Nigeria banking regulation 
became obstructive and interventionist in 1968 with the political hegemony of the military 
class and the political rentier class. 
The Nigerian civil war perhaps plaved a role in the 
emergence of the interventionism. 
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Chapter Five examines the effects of the specific bankiniz . regulatory norms on the 
Nigerian banking system between 1960 and 1985. , 
(the immediate pre-deregulation 
period) in the context of the theoretical formulations of the theories of regulatory 
repression of the banking system. It discovers that the banking and related laws and 
regulations in the pre-liberalisation era when examined considering their micro and macro 
economic effects were highly repressive, inefficient, corruptive and deleterious. It further 
discovers the rampancy of financial repression through governmental borrowings and 
subordination of the financial regulator. A critical assessment of the era is undertaken in 
the closing part of the chapter. 
Part Four is composed of four chapters. Chapter Six chronicles the circumstances 
in which the IMF and the World Bank compelled the Nigerian government to adopt 
financial liberalisation policy of the banking system as a core measure of its structural 
adjustment programme. It highlights the prevarication of the Nigerian government and the 
concessions by the IMF and World Bank. A crucial point made is that the Nigerian 
government embarked on the liberalisation programme with great reluctance and without 
any serious conviction or comn-kment, and the Bretton wood institutions were aware of 
these facts. 
Chapter Seven contains an analysis of the legal, institutional and policy changes 
that underpin the banking deregulation in the periods between 1985 and 1997. The 
changes in regulatory dispensation due to changes in political regimes are underscored. It 
also contains a critical exposition of the banking legislation and policies of the banking 
system during financial deregulation, and highlights their defects, omissions and inherent 
conflicts. 
Chapter Eight analyses the consequences of financial liberalisation of the banking 
sector. It embraces some indices as gauge for measuring the effects of 
banking 
deregulation. The indices include the growth of the banks, changes in financial sa-vings, 
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level and structure of interest rate, competitiveness and efficiency of the system, profit, 
and the system's integration with the international banking system. 
Chapter Nine examines bank failure in Nigeria, the most devastating consequence 
of financial liberalisation . It describes the high magnitude of banks and financial 
institutions' failure and identifies political corruption and opportunism as well as human 
factor as the major causes of bank failure in the country. Political ineptitude and regulatory 
inertia are constant decisive factors influencing and undermining the regulatory and 
judicial responses designed to stem the tide of bank failure, and thus have aggravated the 
macroeconomic imbalance. 
Part Five is made up of one chapter. Chapter Ten entails a critical inquiry into the 
fundamental factors that undermined the banking deregulation. It also evaluates the 
mechanism of financial deregulation in the light of the prognosis of the concept and 
theory of financial deregulation. The chapter surmises that macroeconomýic instability and 
fiscal recklessness, powerlessness of regulatory agencies, political dialectics of the 
Nigerian state, and regulatory distortions and policy inconsistencies undermine financial 
deregulation. The chapter criticises the toleration of the irresponsible successive Nigerian 
government by the IMF and World Bank and advocates reater roles for political and legal 9 
considerations in the design of financial liberalisation programme. 
Part Six contains one chapter. Chapter Eleven is the conclusion. It reflects on the 
research questions raised in this work and captures its findings. It also discusses a number 
of suggestions for the reform of the critical problems of the Nigerian financial system. 
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PART 11: CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
AND DEREGULATION 
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CHAPTER 11 
FINANCIAL REGULATION AND DEREGULATION OF THE BANKING 
SYSTEM: NATURE AND THEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the nature and concept of financial regulation of the banking 
system. It also discusses the theoretical formulations underpinning the nature, mode, and 
techniques of banking regulation and deregulation . The chapter underscores the role of 
Central Bank as the main financial regulator and the problems created by political 
interference and conflict of interest in the process of financial regulation. The political 
nature of financial regulation and the pervasive influence of the political and elite interests 
in banking regulation and deregulation are also highlighted. 
The chapter contains ten sections. The first is the introduction. The second, third 
and fourth sections discuss the concept, objectives and types of financial regulation of the 
banking system. The fifth section analyses the role of Central Bank in financial regulation 
and the attendant problems, and the sixth section contains a discussion of the interaction 
between politics, law and financial regulation. The seventh section discusses the influence 
of classical theories on financial regulation. 
The counter theory that challenged and contradicted the classical regulatory 
intervention in the banking system is analysed in the eighth section. The ninth section Is 
devoted to a theoretical exposition of the concept of financial liberalisation and 
deregulation which is the remedial policy prescription for financial repression and 
regulatory intervention. It also examines the 
developments and refinements of the concept 
of financial liberalisation by various 
intellectuals. The conclusions are in the tenth section. 
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2.2 The Concept of Financial Regulation 
30 Regulation has no generally accepted definition . 
The literature is 
fragmented and specialised since regulation has an extensive scope and traverses 
the fields of econoiTfics, law, and political science. Each scholar attempts a 
definition of regulation from the intellectual microscope of his speciality. A 
general survey of literature reveals some of the attempts at unravelling the mystery 
of the term "regulation ". 
Stiglei-31 proffers one of the broadest definitions of regulation by asserting 
that "(A)s a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit ". A little earlier, Kahn32 had defined public 
utility regulation as "direct governmental prescription of major aspects of their 
structure and economic performance ......... control of entry, price 
fixing, 
prescription of quality and conditions of service and the imposition of an obligation 
to serve all applicants under reasonable conditions". 
These econometric views of regulation have been criticised for excluding 
the market setting from the definition of regulation". A panacea is provided by 
Spulber 34who posits regulation as " general rules or specific actions imposed by 
administrative agencies that interfere directly with the market allocation 
30. See Ogus, A. L and Ve1janovski, C. G., Readings in the Economics of Law and Regulation, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, ( 1984 ), p. 233. 
31 
. 
See Stigler, George J. The Theory of Economic Regulation " (1971) 2 Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science 3-21. (Spring) He identifies four principal categories of regulations procured 
from the state by the industry as direct subsidies of money, control of new entry, policies promoting 
complimentary goods and discouraging substitutes. and control of prices. 
32 
- 
See Kalin, A. E.. The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions, Cambridge, Mass: London 
(1988). 
33 
. 
See Spulber. Daniel F. . 
Regulation and Markets, The MIT Press, Cambridge. Massachusetts. 
London, England. ( 1989) p. 2 1. 
34 
. 
Ibid.. p. 37. 
2() 
mechanism or indirectly by altering consumer and firm demand and supply 
decisions " 
In his classic treatise, Nfitnick35 postulates a broad definitional perspective 
of regulation as "the intentional restriction of a subject's choice of activity by an 
entity not directly party to or involved in that activity'. He also offers a restrictive 
concept of regulation as "the public administrative policing of a private activity I 
with respect to a rule prescribed in the public interest" 36 
A criticism of the opinions of Spulber, and Nfitnick, is that their prognoses 
did not capture some vital characteristics of regulation. Both views are public 
administration biased. That regulations often emanate from other sources than an 
administrative agency, and such agency may be a party involved in the actiVitV37 ýI 
exposed the limitations of the definitions . Perhaps, these perceptions were 
influenced by their orientations. Hence, Kenneth Meier 11 has advocated a 
multidisciplinary approach to the understanding of the concept of regulation which 
he defines as "any attempt by the government to control the behaviour of citizens, 
corporations, or sub governmentS"39 
We subscribe to an all embracing and broad definition of regulation of D. T. 
Llewellyn40 as "a body of specific rules or agreed behaviour, either imposed by 
35. See Mitnick, BaM, M, The Political Economy Of Regulation: Creating, Designing and Removing 
Regulatory Forms, Columbia University Press, New York, (1980), p. 5. 
36. Ibid., p-7- 
37. For examples the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria engage in 
commercial and mortgage banking respectively even though they are the regulating authorities for these 
banking activities. 
38 
. 
Meier. Kenneth J. Regulation : Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics. St. Martin's Press. Inc. New 
York, (198-5), p. 7. 
39. Ibid. P. I- 
40. Liewellyn. D. T.. The Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institution, The Institute of Bankers. 
London. 0986). p-9. 
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some government or other external agency or self-imposed by explicit or implicit 
agreement within the industry, that limits the activities and business operations of 
financial institutions". The process of monitoring prudence or conformity to the 
regulations is characterised as supervision4l. 
The utility of this definition lies in its multidimensional and functional 
nature. It encompasses public as well as private regulations, and devoid of any 
institutional bias. Specifically, the definition centres on financial regulation that is 
the concern of this study. In the final analysis, it seems the pragmatic conclusion is 
that a regulation is what regulators do in fact. 
2.3 The Objectives of Financial Regulation 
The broad theories of regulatory origin can be classified into private or 
public interests' theoneS42. The private interest theories are subdivided into three 
sub theories namely consumer protection theory43, industry protection theory44 
and bureaucratic behaviour theory4- 'ý. On the other hand, the public interest theories 
are dominated by concerns of protecting or balancing the interests of the 
commututy or publiC46 
An alternative theory characterised as a deviation from public interest 
effects in public interest theory is the Capture theory which states that the 
41 
. 
Loc. cit. 
42. Sce Mitnick, op cit., p. 158. 
43. The Consumer protection theory concerns the protection of the consumer of the product or activiti-v 
hence the regulations are sought by the consumer or their agents. 
44. The Industry protection theoi)- entails the protection of the producers of the product or activity and 
they constitute the advocates of regulation. 
45. The bureaucratic behaviour theor)- under which regulations are demanded by the bureaucrats to 
maintain their authority or expand the spheres of their influence. 
46. Mitnick asserts that public interest in the theon- has five conceptions namely a balancing concept. a 
compromising concept. trade-off. national or social goals and particularistic. paternalistic or personal 
dictated concept. He identifies a gcneral typology of public interest definitions -which ranges from 
satisfaction of dictatorial preferences to pareto optImality. and to pluralistic aggregation of preferences. 
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regulatory mechanism is usually captured by the regulated parties so that it serves 
their interests rather than the public interest 47. 
The purport of these theories about the financial sector is that financial 
regulation is usually enacted to protect the consumers who are the depositors , or 
the regulated financial institutions themselveS48. Often regulations are designed to 
protect the financial system as a collective unit. This is the systemic intereSt49. It 
is observed that regulation rarely has the exclusive interest of consumer as its end, 
and the systemic interest is too remote to the consumer's need. In this regard, 
public interest is labelled a rhetoric, frequently invoked according to Posner" even 
where a variant of the public interest is not actually operative. In the same vein, 
regulations motivated by the specific interest of the regulated sector have been 
justified by reference to consumer interest or systemic interest . 
Most recently, Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole5l enunciate the 
representation hypothesis as the basis of financial regulation. The gravamen of the 
hypothesis is that banks and most financial institutions have natural tendency 
towards moral hazard and adverse selection52 that make their monitoring by 
depositors imperative. The monitoring function cannot however be performed by 
the depositors due to their inability, incapacity, or inadequacy, and the onerous 
47 See Mitnick, Ibid., p-9-5- 
48. See Rudolph. B. " Capital requirements of German banks and the European Community proposals on 
banking supervision " in J. Dermine ( ed. ). European Banking in the 1990s, 2nd ed. 
Oxford: BlackNN-cll. 
1993), pp. 373-385. 
9 See Llewellyn. D. T. , 
The Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institution, The Institute of 
Bankers. London, ( 1986 ). p. 11. 
50 
. 
Posner. Richard A. " Theories of Economic Regulation " (1974) 5 Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, p. 355. (Autumn). 
5 1. Mathias DeNvatripont and Jean Tirole. The Prudential Regulation of Banks. The MIT 
Press. 
Cambridge. (1994). p. 32. 
52. Adverse selection refers to a situation N%herc bankers lend to nsky customers. 
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nature of the monitoring tasks. Hence, the necessity for private or public 
representatives of depositorS53 
Another plank on which the rationalisation of regulatory intervention is 
based is the market failure theSiS54. The existence of regulation has been justified 
by the necessity of correcting certain market failures which may be detrimental to 
55 the consumers if market mechanisms were freely operative without intervention . 
A number of market failures can be identified such as the existence of 
natural monopoly and entry barrierS56, internalitieS57 like asymmetric information., 
moral hazard, costly contingencies, absence of knowledge of technicalities of 
product especially safety and quality, and extemalitieS58 indicating the wider effect 
on the public which is not contemplated by producer and consumer. In this respect, 
regulations may have corrective or redistributive effects or may affect allocatilve 
efficiency. Thus, the intermediate goals of regulation are posited as efficiency, 
safety, or equity19. The market failure argument has been challenged as inadequate 
rationalisation of governmental intervention since 
costlier than market failure60 
5 3. Ibid., pp. 3 1- 3 2. 
54. Llewellyn. D. T. , op cit.. p. 
10. 
55 
. 
Spulber. op cit., p. 21. 
government failure may be 
56 ler, S., "AnaIN-zing Regulatory Failure : Mismatches, Less 
Restrictive Alternativesý and 
. 
See Brey 
Reform", ( 1979) 92 Harvard Law Review, 547,552 - 60. 
57 
. 
Loc. cit. 
58 
. 
See Spulber. op. cit.. p. 46. 
59 
. 
See Mitnick, op cit ., 
Chapter v. 
60 
. 
See Weisbrod, "Problems of Enhancing the Public Interest - Toward a Model of 
Government Failures 
"in Wcisbrod. B. A.. Handler. J. F.. and Korriesar. N. K.. (eds. ). 
Public Interest Law. An Economic and 
institutional Analysis ( 1978 ), chapter 3. 
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The public interest, systemic interest, and market failure theses have been 
adduced to vindicate regulatory interventions in financial sector. The Campbell 
Commission6l, set up to review the financial system in Australia, espoused the 
rationale for government intervention in the financial system as efficiency, diversity 
of choice, competitive neutrality, stability of the financial system, macroeconomic 
stability, and social objectives 62. 
Financial regulations are generally StfiCt63 and technical. They are often 
directed at banks and financial institutions to ensure their safety and soundness by 
curbing competitive aggressiveness and the attendant risk. As Bain64 observed 
"the tension between the benefits of competition and the cost and risk-reducing 
advantages of size is particularly acute in the financial system, because competition 
adds to the risk of failure". 
2.4 Types of Financial Regulation of the Banking System 
Financial regulation is generally classified into two modes, namely, the 
traditional or indirect forms of financial regulation and the direct forms of financial 
regulation. The direct formS65 of financial regulation place restrictions on a specific 
type of financial institution (usually deposit banks) by limiting their freedom to 
acquire assets and liabilities. The most common direct forms of financial regulation 
include quantitative ceilings on bank credit, selective credit controls, interest rate 
regulation, and exchange rate control. 
61 
. 
AGPS. Australian Financial System. Final Report of the Committee of Enquiry (Campbell Report) . 
Australian Government Publishing Service, (1981). 
62 Ibid., p. 2. 
63 Meier. op cit.. p. 45. 
64 Bain, A. D. . 
Economics of the Financial SN-steni. Oxford. Martin Robertson. (198 1). 
65. See CBN. "Monctan- Policy in Nigeria ". CBN Briefs. Research Department. 
Series No. 9-5/03. CBN. 
Lagos. (1995). p. 2. 
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The indirect formS66of financial regulation consist of techniques which rely 
on the power of the monetary authority as a dealer in the financial markets to 
influence the availability and the rate of return on financial assets, thus affecting 
both the desires of the public to hold money balances and the willingness of 
financial agents to accept deposits and lend them to users. The major forms of 
indirect financial regulatory instruments are reserve requirements. discount rate 
and open market operations (OMO). 
Most recently. three broad categories of financial re lation have been gu 
identified67. The first category consists of rules preventing systemic risks, and is 
subdivided into two classes, namely, prudential regulation and rules relating to the 
restriction of market forces. Prudential regulation entails capital requirements, 
solvency and liquidity ratios.. and capital adequacy standards. Price regulation, 
restriction on capital flows, restrictions of banking activities and establishment are 
classified under the restriction of market forces. 
The second category encompasses norms preventing individual risks such 
as disclosure rules, minimum competence and quality requirement, and deposit 
protection schemes. The last category is made up of rules promoting systemic 
efficiency like regulation of mergers, and prohibition of cartels and restrictive 
business practices. 
2.5 Central Banks and Financial Regulation of the Banking System. 
The Central Bank of most countries acts as the main financial regulator of 
the banking system. When the first central banks were founded in Europe there 
was little consideration for their regulatory and supervisory roles in respect of the 
other banks. Instead, " initial impetus was much more basic, generally relating to 
66. Loc. cit. 
67. See OECD. Banks Under Stress. ( 1992 ). Paris. France. p. '13. 
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the financial advantages that governments felt that they could obtain from the 
support of such a bank"68. 
The adoption of regulatory and supervisory roles by central banks was 
largely evolutionary" and eventually attained primacy in their functions". The 
functionS71 of a Central Bank may be divided into macro and micro functionS72. 
The macr073 functions relate to its responsibility concerning the direction of 
monetary conditions in the economy, and the rnicro74function concerns the health 
and well-being of the banks in the banking system. It is been argued that the macro 
functions are largely grafted to the supervisory functions, hence "the central core 
and rationale for the existence and operation of a Central Bank is not necessarily to 
be found in its macroeconomic role"75. 
The crux of the matter however is that most central banks have been unable 
to perform effectively and efficiently their micro functions of regulation and 
supervision of their respective banking systems due to many factors including 
governmental rent-seeking, political interference and conflict of interest. The 
tendency of most governments to extract inflationary tax from the public through 
the printing of paper money in moment of crisis has endowed central banks with 
inherent inflationary tendencies. In the words of Hayek, "practically all 
68. See Goodhart, Charles., The Evolution of Central Banks, The MIT Press, London, (1988), p. 4. 
69. Ibid., p. 8 
70. In most developing countries, the most important task of the Central Banks was the promotion of 
money and capital markets. See Bass, S. K., Central Banking in the Emerging Countries, Asia Publishing 
House, London, (1967). p. 240. 
71. The tendency to add economic developmcnt and welfare goals to the ftinctions of a Central Bank has 
been observed in Central Banking laws drafted after 1945. see Aufficht, Hans., Comparative Survey of 
Ccntral Bank Law, Stevens & Sons. London, (1965), p. 15. 
72. See Kohn, Donald. L., " The Stability of Financial Markets : Central Bank Responsibility " in Effros, 
Robert. C.. (ed. ), Current Legal Issucs Affecting Central Banks. Vol. 2, INW, Washington, D. C., (1994). pp. 
162-164. 
73. The macro tools includc open market operations and variation of discount rate. 
74. The micro tools include discount window, regulation and supervision. and deposit insurance. 
75. See Goodhart, Charles., (1988), op. cit., p. 7 
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governments of history have used their exclusive power to issue money in order to 
defraud and plunder the people"76. 
The existence of central banks has also provided many governments with 
financial leeway for excessive monetary expansion through deficit financing, 
Direct, enforced, finance of government expenditure by the central bank was 
clearly seen as potentially inflationary, and dangerouS77. Additionally, the tendency 
of a central bank to subvert its micro functions in order to assist its government's 
financing difficulties has been identified. That some of the regulatory dictates of 
the central bank can impinge on the efficiency of the banking system is 
demonstrated as thus - 
when the tax base and ability to borrow from the general public 
remains low, the enforcement of high (and rising ) required cash 
and liquidity ratios, in order to mop up what would otherwise 
amount to an excess currency issue, must be seen as a tax and 
additional burden on the banking system. Such burdens and taxes, 
in the form of high-required reserve ratios, together with the imposition 
of restriction on what interest rates can be charged and offered, the 
direction of credit through central directives, and other limitations 
on the free competitive development of the banking system, all tend to 
hinder the efficient long-term structural development of the financial 
systeM78. 
The close affinity between central bankers and politicians, and direct 
political control of central banking have instigated enquiries into the political 
incentives underlying micro functions of the central bank in regulating the banking 
system. Benston79 argues that the principal reason for bank regulation is taxation 
76. See Hayck. F. A., " Choice in Currency: A Way to Stop Inflation ". (1976) The Institute of Economic 
Affairs. Occasional Paper 48, p. 16. 
77. See Goodhart. C. A. E., The Central Bank And The Financial System, Macmillan Press Ltd. London, 
(1995), p. 212. 
78. See Chakravartv Report quoted in Goodhart. C. A. E. ibid.. pp. 211-212. 
79. See Benston. Gocrgc J., "Does Bank Regulation Produce Stability? Lessons from the United States " in 
ig: Chaos or Order?. Macni'llan. Caple. Forrest. and Wood. Geoffrev. E. (eds. ) Unregulated Bankin I 
London, p. 228. 
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by government authorities of seigniorage80, and most banking regulation "is 
imposed to redistribute wealth to those with political power"81 . He also submits 
that "with the exception of deposit insurance, most regulations [on financial 
services] are not useful except for those who benefit from constraints on 
competition"82. 
The inflationary bias of government and its revenue motives in banking 
regulation have instigated demands for independent central bank83. A proffered 
solution to the inflationary bias of the government is the endowment of the central 
bank with a clear mandate to reach price stability84. The central bank must also be 
insulated from political pressure and possessed considerable discretion in the 
determination and operation of monetary policy. A number of measures to 
minimise political interference in routine central banking functions has been 
suggested including direct accountability of central bankers to the parliament85, 
specific rules guaranteeing central bank independence86 and imposition of legal 
restraint on central bank credit to governmentV 
Cranston argues that limiting the central bank credit to the government 
"acts as a brake on the latter's budgetary policies, and encourages economic I 
rectitude"88. Indeed, comparative studies have provided evidence of close link 
between the central bank's legal basis and the degree of monetary stability 
811. Seigniorage means a profit made by issuing currency and claimed bY the government as a prerogative. 
81. Ibid.. p. 229. 
82. See Bcnston, George. J.. quoted in Goodhart. C. A. E., (1995)p. 453. 
83. See Cottarclli. Carlo.. Limiting Central Bank Credit to the Governmcnt. Theory and Practice, IMF. 
Washington D. C.. (1993) p. 3. 
84. See Cranston. Ross.. Pnnclplcs of Banking La%%. Clarendon Press. Oxford, (1997), pp. 125-126, 
85. See Goodhart. C. A. E.. (1995) op. cit p. 69. 
86. Specific niles relating to the composition. appointment and duration in office of central bankers. 
salan', termination. and control of policy instruments. 
87. See Leone. A., " Effectivcness and Implications of Limits on Ccntral Bank Credit to the Government 
in P. Downesand R. %Iaez-Zadch (cds. ). The Evolvin., -, Role of Central Banks. INIF. Washington 
D. C.. (1991). 
88. See Cranston. op. cit.. P. 1. )0. 
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achieved". There is also evidence that in some countfies the average rate of 
inflation has been lower with an independent central bank90. 
2.6 Politics, Law and Financial Regulation 
It has been asserted by a legal scholar that the social and economic 
significance of central banking statutes and banking laws, " lies in the fact that they 
are legal means which are employed, or are to be employed, to attain economic 
ends "91. This assertion which confirms the role of the bulk of financial laws as 
tools for economic purposes, however ignores the political ends and class interests 
which financial and monetary laws quite often serve. 
Indeed, as Benston92 eloquently contends banking laws and regulations are 
dorninated by political redistributive considerations. The leading law and 
economics scholar, Richard Posner93 echoes this contention by submitting that the 
ultimate premises of law are political. In this Posnerian thesis, "political, self- 
interested, traditional, habitual ..... "94 considerations play significant roles in the 
content, character and formulations of laws and regulations. This thesis provides 
an insight into the dominance of political undercurrents in financial regulation and 
deregulation. 
A perspective from this law and economics thesis is that it is utterly naive 
to perceive banking and financial statutes as public interest motivated. Rather "the 
interest -group theory of politics in the version revived by economists has taught 
us that the legislative process often caters to the redistributive desires of narrow 
coalitions, and in so doing, disserves any plausible conception of the public 
89. See Issing. Otmar., " Central Bank Policy - Goals and Reality ". in Arestis, Philip.. (ed. ) Money And 
Banking Issues for the Twenty-First Century. Essays in Honour of Stephen F. Frowen. Macnullan Press 
Ltd. (1993). 2nded.. p. 51. 
90. See Cuk-icrnian. A.. Central Bank Strategy. Credibility and Independence : Theon- and Evidence, 
Cambridge. Mass: MIT Press. (1992). chaps 19 - 23. 
91. See Atifficlit, Hans.. op. cit. p. x. 
92. See Benston. George. J.. in Capic et al. op. cit., p. 228. 
93. See Posner, Richard.. Overcoming Law. (Han'ard University Press, Cambridge. 1995) p. 83. 
94.1b I d. p. 3 7. 
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interest"95. This thesis is corroborated by Seidman and Seidman, who reveal that in 
developing countries the legal orders are utilised by political leaders "not in the 
public but in their own interest"96. The laws in these countries augment "wealth 
1197 and privilege for a few and poverty and oppression for most 
The roles of politics and class interests in banking laws require an 
understanding of the political and social configuration of the country that is the 
object of study. This study embraces some core political theories which have been 
employed by political and social scientists in their studies of Nigeria. The first set 
of theofies is prebendalism98 and clientelism". Joseph'00 has employed these 
concepts to explain the centrality of persistent struggle to control and exploit the 
offices of the Nigerian state. An important point that emerges from Joseph's 
analysis is that all the laws of the Nigerian state including the banking and financial 
laws are prebendalised. 
Most recently, Lewis'01 underscores a transition of the Nigerian state from 
prebendalism towards predation, the consolidation of avaricious dictatorship. This 
second theory of predation emphasises the abandonment of diff-used clientelism and 
weak institutional frameworks by Nigerian governments for "more arbitrary and 
debilitating control by a single ruler" 102. This theory is apposite to the nature of 
'5. Ibid. p. 400. 
96. Seidman Ann and Seidman R.. p. 2. 
97. Ibid. p. 4. 
litical offices are captured and utilised for 98. Prebendalism typifies a political behaviour under which po, I 
the personal benefit of the office holders and their support groups. 
99. Clientelism underscores the patron-client ties which underlie the relationship between the off-ice 
holders and their supporters on the basis of ethnic. regional and religious identities. 
WO. See Joseph. Richard. A., Democracy And Prebendal Politics in Nigeria, The rise and fall of the 
Second Republic. Cambridge University Press. Canibridge, (1987), p. I 
1() 1. See Le%% is. Peter.. From Prebendalisin to Predation : the Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria, 
1996) 1 The Journal of Modern Affican Studies. Vol. 34. p. 79 at p. 80. 
02. Loc. cit. 
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financial regulation and deregulation in Nigeria because the shift into predatory 
politics is reflected in the banking and financial laws of the country. 
Another political concept of interest is the demonstration of the elitist role 
in the promotion of state interventionism in economic activities including the 
banking sector as a mechanism for generating econornic power through political 
power. This elitism is reflected in financial and banking laws with predominant 
orientation towards regulatory interventionism. However, this elite role has its own 
contradiction since the wealth, status, power, and patronage attributable to state 
interventionism instigated intense struggle for power with attendant political and 
legal instability'03. Nigerian financial laws and structures reflect these 
contradictions and instability. 
2.7 Financial Regulation and Regulatory Interventionism: Theoretical 
Underpinnings 
The importance of the banking system as the bedrock of the total economy has 
made it particularly susceptible to actions of governmental authorities "in the form of 
laws, decrees, regulations and by more direct participation, such as government 
ownership"104. Cameronl()ý laments that no other sector of the economy except foreign 
trade had been subject of massive intervention like the banking system. He characterises 
the intervention as "so broadly, so consistently, and with such telling effect -usually 
bad" 106 
The original policy underpinning the regulation of the banking system was financial 
107 restriction The kernel of financial restriction is the encouragement of financial 
103. Loc. cit. 
104. See Cameron. R. (ed. ). Banking And Economic Development - 
Some Lessons of HistorN,. Oxford 
University Press, Inc.. U. S. A.. (1972). p. 8. 
Loc. cit. 
106. Loc. cit. 
107. See FrN, Maxwell. J. , 
Money, Interest. Atid Banking In Economic Development, The John Hopkins 
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institutions and financial instruments from which government can extract enormous 
seigniorage, w. e discouraging the emergence of private bond and equity market since 
seignorage cannot be easily expropriated from these markets 108 
Financial regulation which restricts market forces has not emerged from a vacuum. 
It has been influenced by a panoply of economic and monetary precepts which have played 
large roles in framing financial regulation'09. The banking laws and regulations are merely 
the mechanisms for transmitting monetary axioms into legal and regulatory norms since 
financial regulatory measures on the banking system are "normally effected through 
legislation and regulations "110 
It is therefore important to examine the economic precepts which underline the 
banking regulation and deregulation. These economic theories provide the analytical tools 
for scrutinising financial regulations and assessing their economic consequences. Indeed, 
Ve1janovskil" contends that an efficient system of regulation could only be devised by 
first obtaining a thorough knowledge of the financial market and its economic purpose and 
effects. 
This study discusses the major influential theories but focuses on the Mckinnon- 
Shaw hypothesis as its main tool of analysis. This hypothesis is relevant to the Nigerian 
situation since the country has undergone regulatory changes based on its precepts. The 
Nigerian financial system also encapsulates the contradictions in the implementation of the 
Mckinnon-Shaw theoretical prognoses. 
Univusity Press. Baltimore and London J1991). p. 14. 
108. Sec Fry ( 199 1). Ibid.. 
109. See Velianovski. Cento.. " Introduction in Charles Goodhart. John Kay. Kate Mortimer. and 
AndrcN%- Duguid.. Financial Regulation or Ovcr-Regulation?. (The Institute of Economic Affairs. 
London. 1988) p. 7. 
See Adcni. p. A. 0.. " Recent Development in the Legislation And Regulations Governing the 
Establishments and Administration Of Banks In Nigeria " in Advanccd Law and Practice Of Banking In 
Nigeria. (Financial institutions Trainino Centre, Yaba, Lagos. N gcr'a. 1991). p. 41. 
See Vc1janovski, C.. op. cit. p. 7. 
2.7.1 Classical theories of Regulatory Interventionism w 
The traditional / conventional monetary linchpin of financial regulatory 
intervention has been variously characterised as neo- classical, neo - keynesian, wealth 
view, wealth view keynesian or monetafistl 12. All these conventional thoughts have been 
categorised as classical theories of regulatory interventionism in this work as a convenient 
tag for a broad representation of their common theoretical tenor. 
These classical theories are traceable to the influential works of eminent 
economists such as Lord Kevnes113, James Tobin114 Harry JohnsonI15, Robert 
MundelI116, and Levarhi and PatinkinI17, Although, there are patent differences of 
opinions among the scholars, a common theme of regulatory restriction of financial and 
monetary operations is discernible. 
The central plank of the classical monetary philosophy is the substitutability of 
money and capital in the portfolios of wealtholders. According to the thesis, economic 
groups like households allocate their wealth between money and productive capital assets. 
Where the return on capital is higher relative to money, the ratio of capital to money in 
112. See Shaw, Edward. S.. Financial Deepening in Economic Development, Oxford University Press. 
New York, London. (1973), chapter 2, see also Mckinnon, Ronald. 1. , Money 
And Capital in Economic 
Development. The Brookings Institution Washington. D. C., (1973). chapter 5. 
113. See Keynes. J. Maynard, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money'. London: 
Macmillan, (1936)-. see also Keynes. J. Maynard. A Treatise on Money. London: Macmillan. (1930). 
114 pp. 671 See Tobin. James. " Money and Economic GroNNIh ", (1965) 33 (4) Econometrica. -684. 
(October), see also Tobin, James, " On the Efficiencyof the Financial System ". (1984) 153 
Lloyds Bank Review pp. 1- 1 -5. (July ). 
115. Sec Johnson. Harry. G. ," 
Money in a Neo-Classical GroN,. Ih Model", in Essays inMonetary 
Economics. Han-ard University Press. Cambridge: Mass. (I 967). pp. 143-178. 
116. See Mundell. Robert. A. ." 
Gro%Nlh. Stability. and Inflationary Finance ". (1965) 73 (2) Journal 
of Political Economy. pp. 97-109. (April). 
117. See LcN-han'. David and Don Patinkin. "The Role of Money in a Simple Gro%ýIh Model ". (1968) 
58 (3) American Economic Review. pp. 71 'ý -753. (September). 
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household portfolio will be larger. Thus, there will be higher capital / labour ratio, higher 
productivity, increased per capital income, and accelerated economic growth. The 
converse is represented as a truism. Hence, a higher return on money relative to capital 
will induce greater demand for real cash balances in the portfolio of wealthholders and 
discourage investment in productive capital. In the circumstances, Tobin advocates 
reducing the return on money to increase welfare. 
This view also justifies the existence of inflation as a mean of promoting new investment 
since continuous price inflation reduces the perceived yields on money to induce private 
wealthholders to acquire real assets instead of cash balances . It also condones the 
extraction of inflation tax by the governments so that the proceeds can be uttlised for real 
capital formation 118. 
The academic expositions of these schools provide the intellectual bases for some 
restrictive regulatory measuresl 19 like interest rate ceilings, variable reserve requirements, 
and compulsory holdings of government bonds that are the main thrust of financial 
regulation in both developed and developing countries120 
The traditional prescriptions of the classical theories of regulatory interventionism 
however encountered a formidable challenge from a new vista in the theories on money 
and finance pioneered separately by Edward Shaw and Ronald Mckinnon. The Mckinnon- 
118. See Robert C. Vogel. . and 
Stephen A. Buser. 
. 
"Inflation, Financial Repression, and Capital 
Formation in Latin America " in Ronald 1. Mckinnon, (ed. ). Money And Finance In Economic Growth 
And Development : Essays in Honor of Edward S. Shaw. , 
Marcel Dekker, INC. New York and Basel 
1970) p. 3-5. See Mckinnon. Ronald. 1. ," 
Introduction " in Ronald. l. Mckinnon, (ed. ) (1976) op. cit., pp. I- 
2. 
119. See Keynes. Maynard. J. ,A 
Tract on Monetary Reform. Ist ed.. 1921. (Volume IV of The 
Collected Writings of J. M. Keynes, Macmillan, New York, 1971). In the words of Kevnes. "A 
government can live for a long time even the German government or the Russian goverriment, by 
printing mone. N ......... It is the form of taxation which the public finds hardest to evade and even the 
weakest government can enforce. when it can enforce nothing else ". 
120. See Fry (199 1). op. cit., pp. 6 & 14. 
Shaw model usually called the'financial repression"' hypothesis' is labelled in this work as 
the developmental theory of regulatory repressionism because it underscores the negative 
effects of regulatory interventionism in financial sector particularly banking, on the 
economic development of a nation. It has a broader and generalised conception of the 
impact of financial regulation, and is rooted in a developmental philosophy with a special 
relevance to the developing countries. 
2.8 From Financial Regulation to Financial Repression : An Analysis of the 
Developmental Theory of Regulatory Repressionism. 
The sporadic regulatory intervention in financial markets spurred by the classical 
theories of regulatory interventionism propelled many developing countries to slip into 
financial repression122. Financial repression 1231s described as the indiscriminate distortions 
of financial prices including interest rates and foreign - exchange rates that reduce the real 
rate of growth and the real size of the financial system relative to non financial 
magnitudes. Since financial regulation is the mechanism for transmitting financial C 
repression into reality, then financial repression is usually regulatory repression124 per se . 
Hence the term regulatory repression features prominently in this thesis to underscore the 
regulatory dimension of this discourse and highlight the role of financial regulation as the 
main conduit pipe of financial repression. 
Professor MckinnonI25 charactenses financial repression as a phenomenon 
whereby bank credits are allocated to entrenched and , 'ested interests and activities like 
121. The term financial repression refers to the constraints on in -estment caused v the ratio ng of Nk ni 
credit, ustially to a few large borrowers, in financial markets where interest rates and hence the supply of 
savings are below nia rket-clca ring levels. 
122 See Frý (1991). op. cit.. p. 14. 
123. Ibid., P. I 
124. The term regulatory repression features prominently in this work to underscore the regulatorý 
dimension of this thesis and highlight the role of legislation and regulations as the main conduit pipes of 
financial repression. 
I -)i See Mckinnon (1973). op-cit., pp. 68-69. 
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licensed import activities, large scale mýineral exports, protected industries, multinational 
corporations, and public companies, while the financing of the other sectors must depend 
on the meagre resources of the informal markets. Professor Shaw's prognosis for an 
economy marked by financial repression is grave retardation of its development process'26. 
The deterioration from financial regulation or restriction into financial repression' 27 
is attributed to the egregious assumptions128 which formed the basis of the theoretical 
influences of financial regulation superimposed or imported by most developing countries. 
Edward Shaw129 in his celebrated text ' Financial Deepening in Economic Development ' 
demonstrates that the conditions in developing countries are antithetical to those assumed 
in the classical theories called wealth view and wealth Keynesian view130. Money is 
posited as risky and costly, and governmental intervention is pervasivel3l. Shaw describes 
1132 the economies with these symptoms of market segmentation as 'lagging economies 
1133 while for Mckinnon they are labelled 'fragmented economies 
Mckinnon and Shaw proffer a new hypothesis to explain the nexus of money and 
capital to economic prosperity in developing countries. The Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis 
rejected the conventional axiom that money and capital are substitutes in the portfolios of 
126. See Shaw op. cit, pp. 3-4. 
127 See Fry ( 199 1). op. cit, p. 7. 
128. The classical and keynesian thoughts are anchored on a number of basic assumptions such as 
perfect foresight. perfect mobility. perfect information.. availability of best technology, homogeneous 
output. and existence of competition. These schools of thought further assume that money is riskless and 
costless. See Shaw, op. cit, chapters 2&3 and in particular p. 61. 
121). See Shaw. op-cit. p. 49. 
The shavian thesis portrays the economic environment in developing countries as marked by 
expensive and imperfect information. imperfect foresight. differentiated and non competitive pnces, 
fra mented capital market. slow and expensive technology. and grave instabilltv. 
1 
-1) 
r. 
Ibid., chapter 3. 
132 Ibid.. p. 48. 
133. See Mckinnon (1973). op. cit.. P. 5. 
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private wealth holders. They enunciate the thesis that money and capital are complements 
in less developed fragmented economies134- 
In his classic entitled Money and Capital in Econornic development, Mckinnon135 
considers the additional assets to money and capital such as unfinished inventories called 
inflation hedges. He hypothesises that self finance dominates the method of capital 
formation in fragmented economies, and maintains that under such regime of self finance 
the prior accumulation of stocks of money and / or inflation hedges is an essential 
condition ex ante for new investment whenever the scale of an investment project exceeds 
the resources accruing from the present income. Mckinnon136 concludes that there is a 
strong complementarity 137 between money and capital, with strong substitutability 
between money and inflation hedges. 
The renowned economist further argues that other goods can substitute for money 
as a store of value or as an inflation hedge, and if the real return on holding money is low 
or negative a significant portion of the physical capital of the economy will consist of such 
inventories of finished and semi finished goods which are not directly productive or 
consumablel38 
134 vor. M.. Financial Liberalization in Developing Countries. Edward Elgar, . 
See Sikorski. Tre', 
Clieltenham. UK. Brookfield, US, (1996). pp. 66-69. 
135 See Mckinnon (1973). op. cit., chapter 6. 
136. See Robert C. Vogel and Stephen A. Buser, op. cit., p. 36. 
Professor Mckinnon further opines " (T)his complcmentaritv works both wavs . the condition of 
money supply have a first - order impact on decision to save and invest unlike the neoclassical model. In 
particular, if the real return on holding money increases. so will self-financed investment over a significant 
range of investment opportunities. The increased desirability of holding cash balances reduces the 
opportunity cost of saving internally for the eventual purchase of capital goods from outside the firm- 
household. The financial "conduit " for capital accumulation is thereby enlarged "see NIckinnon ( 1973), 
op xit.. p. 60. 
Ibid.. p. 63. 
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Mckinnon's intellectual collaborator and progenitor, Edward Shaw states139 the 
virtues of money as numerarel40 , means of payment and store of value. In his words, 
"(A)ccumulation of money is one form of saving . It 
is a substitute for saving through self- 
finance of physical investment, purchase of primary securities or acquisition of non- 
monetary indirect financial assets 11141 . At the heart of the Mckinnon-Shaw model lies the 
indispensability of money. For Mckinnon, " it is clear .... that money 
is important 11142 and 
Shaw says " Finance matters "143. Contrary to the wealth view, where the financial system 
serves no purpose, a crucial role is identified for financial institutions in the Mckinnon- 
Shaw model to break the confines of self-finance and pool savings more efficientlyI44 
Thus, Mckinnon-Shaw model advocates greater roles for the financial institutions for the 
purposes of savings mobilisation, financial intermediation and allocation. 
The all purpose implication of the Mckinnon-Shaw model for financial regulation is 
the revelation of traditional philosophy of low returns on money embodied in interest rate 
ceilings or regulation as baseless, counterfactual, and perilous at least in the environment 
of the developing countries. The model finds no reason for the discouragement of money 
holding in the portfolio of wealth holders, and advocates a uniformly high real interest rate 
on financial assets and high real yields on physical assets as sine qua non of a successful 
development poliCy145. Under the model, the capital market can operate at optimum 
139. See Sham. op. cit., chapter 3. 
140. This depict the fact that money can be counted. 
14l See Shaw. ibid.. p. 6 1. 
142 1 Sec Mckinnon (1973). op. cit. p. 67. 
143. Sec Shaw. op. cit. p. 79. 
144 
. 
Sec Mckinnon (1973). op. cit. p. 65. 
145 1 See Mckinnon (1976). op. cit. p. 
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efficiency only if the monetary system was fully deploved as a financial intermediary 
between savers and investors'46. 
The Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis also provides a schema articulating most vividly I 
the negative impacts of specific measures of regulatory intervention masquerading as 
financial regulation. The regulatory measures are characterised as instruments of financial 
147 repression . Mckinnon places the lacklustre performance of the organised bank lending 
in most developing countries at the doorstep of " regulated interest ceilings and collateral 
requirements 11148 
Interest rate regulation which ensures low return on real cash balances through a 
floor on deposit rate and cap on loan rate is demonstrated as injurious to capital 
accumulation. A low deposit interest rate discourages savings by depositors through 
negative rewards, and encourages consumption or direct investment in lower yielding 
ventures rather than bank savingsI49. Negative deposit interest rates are also described as 
penalty on depositors for substituting indirect financial assets against other forms of asset 
150 or consumption . 
Low and negative loan rates provide cheap credit to large borrowers, politicians 
and big corporations at a great cost to the larger society151 . 
The low lending rates 
invariably precipitate credit rationing since there will be large army of borrowers that the 
banks cannot satisfy. The allocation of credit becomes dependent not on the quality and 
146 Ibid., p. 2 
147. See Mckinnon, Ronald. I., The Order Of Economic Liberalization. The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore and London. (l 99 1). p. 43. 
148 See Mckinnon (1973 ). op. cit.. p. 69. 
149 
. 
See Cole, David. C., and Hugh T. Patrick.. " Financial Development in the Pacific Basin Market 
Economics " in Augustine H. H. Tan and Basant Kapur. (eds. ). Pacific GroNAIh and Financial 
Interdependence. SNdncy: Allen and Unwin. (1986). p. 38. 
150. See Shaw. op-cit. P. 83. 
151. Ibid.. p-86- 
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productivity of investment, but on mundane issues like political connection, name, loan 
size, reputation, and personal ffiendship'll. Credit rationing is also "vulnerable to 
corruption and conspiracy in dividing between borrowers and officers of the intermediarY 
the monopoly rent that arises from the difference between low, regulated loan rate and the 
market-clearing rate" 153. Low lending rates also create risk aversion by bankS154 and 
intensify unemployment155. 
The imposition of reserve requirements on financial intermediaries is also 
characterised as extortionist. A high and uniform reserve requirement against all deposits 
appropriates a share of the funds flowing from depositors for lending by the monetary 
authonty and siphons potential loanable funds out of the commercial loan market156. It 
contracts the volume of credits available for bank lending157 and in the absence of official 
interest ceilings, induce banks to lower deposit rates and raise loan rates. The imposition 
of high reserve requirements also propels most financial intermediaries to buy low- interest 
government bonds and thereby become captive lenders to the government and public 
corporations'". 
152 See Fry ( 199 1 ). op cit. p. 18. 
'5-'. See Shaw, op. cit, p. 86. 
154. Low lending rates also create risk aversion tendencies because the banks only lend to established 
borrowers and new investments are stifled %Nithout necessary financing. See also Cho, Yoon. Je.. 
"Inefficicricies from Financial Liberalization in the absence of Well-Functioning Equity Markets" (1986 
) 18 (2) Journal of Money, Credit. and Banking. pp. 191- 199. (May). 
1-55. Excessive investment in capital intensive projects at the expense of abundant labour is also 
attributed to the ability of some borrowers to obtain funds at low loan rates which induce wastes. Thus. the 
low rates intensify unemployment. See Shaw, op. cit. p. 86. 
156 See Mckinnon (199 1), op. cit., p. 49. 
157. See Mckinnon (199 1), Ibid., pp, 49-50. 
158. Sec Fry. Maxwell. J.. "The Fiscal Abuse of Central Banks 1993C ) Mimeo : University of 
Birmingham. See further Cole and Patrick. op. cit.. p. 38. 
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Selective or directed credit which is a standard regulatory stipulation directing or 
compelling banks and financial institutions to make priority loans at very low lending rates 
to specific sectors or individuals in the economy is demonstrated as financially repressilý'e. 
Under such regulation or direction, credits are allocated to unworthy projects and 
objective assessment of economic Viability is subjugated to political considerations' 19. 
Selective credits are usually complemented by low loan rates set to provide real subsidies 
to favoured borrowers, thereby penalising depositors with low returns on their savings, 
Hence, the subsidised loan rate is represented as "repression at its worst" 160. The 
proliferation of import dependent industries and projects that are wasteful of foreign 
exchange has been attributed to selective or directed crediti6l. 
The Mckinnon- Shaw hypothesis underscores the role of an overvalued domestic 
currency in contam=inating the domestic financial process. An overvalued domestic 
currency makes the foreign financial assets attractive by undervaluing them, and the his, -Yh 
deposit rates normally paid on such foreign financial assets are enough temptation for 
savers to evade domestic regulation and transfer their deposits abroad. This tendency 
causes capital flight whereby domestic savings are exported abroad. Shaw observes that 
"(C)apital flight away from domestic asset markets, where yields are depressed by ceilings, 
and around an overvalued exchange rate to foreign markets is an expensive result of the 
statute and custom and moral law that tell excess demand for savings to behave itself and 
,,,, anish. Needless to say, the borrowers hurt most by capital flight are the poor and 
weak" 
162 
159. See Fn' (1991), op. cit., pp. 398 & 417. see also Fry (1993B). op. cit . 
160. See Shaw. op cit.. p. 87. 
16 1. ibid. 
162. Sec Shaw. op. cit.. p. 94. 
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The hypothesis analyses the inflationary effect of government deficit financing from 
the central bank when high reserve requirements are already imposed on the banks, and 
the attendant difficulty of monetary control. According to Mckinnon, the resulting price 
inflation "reduces real rates of interest perceived by potential depositors (savers). Reallsed 
private financial saving falls contracting the flow of loanable funds and reducing 
productive investment and possibly employment '1163. The role of charter policy and 
regulation on entry and exit in discouraging competition among banks and other financial 
institutions also receives attention in the modeI164. The hypothesis surmises that under the 
aegis of the central bank, the banks exploited their oligopolistic position by returning 
attractive profits through wide rate spreads while maintaining high unit cost'65. 
One can safely assert that the Mckinnon- Shaw framework is a path breaking 
approach from the prevailing orthodoxy, providing a refreshing insight into the role of 
perverse financial regulatory measures in the economic adversity of the less developing 
countries. Its basic assumptions have close affinity with the realities symptomatic of the 
developing economies like Nigeria, and the breathtaking demonstration of the nexus 
between financial repression and underdevelopment is vivid. The developmental theory of 
regulatory repression helps to unravel the phenomena of low interest rate, credit ceilings, 
capital flight, government borrowings, and ownership restrictions in Nigerian banking 
system. The analysis of the impact of financial regulation on banking sector has been 
considered in different intellectual context aside from the financial repression hypothesis. 
163 See Mckinnon (1991). op. cit.. p. 48. 
164 See ShmN. op. cit., p. 88. 
pothcsis remarkably demonstrates the consequences of the repression 165 Finally. the Mckinnon-Shaw hy 
of the formal market on the equally repressed informal market. The burgeoning, tenacity, and ubiquity of 
informal market is a reflection of the unsatisfactory state of the formal market. The informal market 
provides a meeting venue for the disgruntled savers who abhor negative re. -il deposit rates and the rqjected 
borrowers rationed out of the cheap credits in the organised market. see Shaw. op. cit., p. 89, see further 
Shahin. W.. " Unorgafflscd Markets and Monetary Pollcy Instruments 1990 ) 18 (2) World 
Development. pp. 325-332. 
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Although both perspectives have a conterminous object of study, the intellectual 
approaches differ166. 
2.9 The Concept of Financial Liberalisation and Deregulation 
The strategy of financial liberalisation emphasises the withdrawal of unwise public 
intervention from financial market167 - The concept postulates the loosening of the Gordian 
knot of regulatory interventionism, and the substitution of the supremacy of bureaucrats 
with the hegemony of the market in the financial sector168. It is predicated on the axiom 
that "government failure" as indicated by its regulatory mishap was best combated by 
removing the government. 
Financial liberalisation is often posited as the removal in their totality of 
government controls and regulations of the financial system. This is a misconception. 
Indeed, as Mckinnon states " successful liberal'sation is not simply a question of removing 
all regulations " 169and financial liberalisation requires stronger rather than weaker 
prudential regulation170. Financial deregulation did not prescribe a complete removal of 
all types of regulations, Rather, it enunciates a core of prudential regulations that are 
prerequisites to a liberalised or deregulated banking system and, in a sense, deregulation 
may actually signify reregulation which indicates the introduction of essential rules. 
166. Perhaps, a segmentation of the two approaches can be neatly undertaken by characterising the 
present approach as 'pure theory of regulatory repressionism'. The pure theory in much the same vein as 
its developmental counterpart has a tremendous relevance and utill I ity for this discourse. It is a significant 
academic input to the understanding of the impact of financial regulation. see Rae Wesson, Domestic and 
Multinational Banking : The Effects of Monetary Policy. (London. Croom Helm Ltd, 1980), p. 65. see 
Black, Fischer. , 
"Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market ", (1975) 2 Journal of Financial 
Economics, pp. 338-339. See Black, Fischer., " Banking and Interest Rates in a World Without Money 
", (1970) Journal of Bank Research. (Summer). 
167 See Mckinnon (1973). op. cit.. p. 8. 
168 See Shaw. op. cit.. p. 12. 
169. See Mckinnon. R. L. " Issues and Perspectives : An Ovemew of Banking Regulation and 
Monetary Control ", in Tan and Kapur (eds. ) op. cit.. p. 326. 
170 See Long ( 1983 ), op. cit., p. 4 1. 
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The key components of financial liberalisation consist of interest rate deregulation, 
refinement of reserve requirements, abolition of selective or directed credit, privatisation 
of commercial banks and correct pricing of the currency exchange rates 171. It equally 
signifies the regulatory shift from direct forms of financial regulation to the indirect or 
traditional forms of financial regulation. The other elements of financial liberalisation 
include the promotion of competitive banking with entry and exit rules, liberalising the 
curb or informal financial market, redirection or abolition of development finance 
institutions especially the special banks, and desegmentation of banking operations 172 . 
The list is not exhaustive since the degree of regulatory repression vanes from country to 
country. However, the identified elements are treated as the salient features of financial 
liberalisation. 
Interest rate deregulation is the conventional way of financial liberalisation173. It 
prescribes the removal of ceilings on interest rate so that both the deposit and loan rates 
can gravitate towards their free-market equilibrium levels. The interest rate structure 
should apply mutatis mutandis to the government and the private sector. Fry posits that 
"if the government is unwilling to compete in this way, financial development is 
doomed" 174 
The liberalisation theme also includes the eradication of selective credit and 
subsidised interest rates. It has been contended that where a government is too weak to 
eliminate selective credit., it would be incapable of implementing sound macroeconomic 
171. See in particular Mckinnon (199 1). op. cit., p. 12.. see generally Shaw, op. cit., 
cliapter5., Mckinnon (1973), op. cit.. chapters 8.10 &11'. and Fry (1991), op. cit., 
chapters II& 17. 
172. fbid., 
173. See Kanhaya L. Gupta and Robert Lensink, Financial Liberalization & Investment . 
London &New York : Routledge, (l 996). p. 6. 
174. See Fn, (1991). op. cit. p. 436. 
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poliCy175- A fundamental component of the strategy of financial liberalisation is getting 
the exchange rate right. Mckinnon176 recommends a downward crawling exchange rate 
after the initial devaluation of overvalued currency. A large dose of devaluation is 
undesirable. 
Financial deregulation also signifies the promotion of competition in the banking 
industry through a liberal charter policy of entry and exit. The restriction of entry is 
castigated as the cause of technological backwardness and oligopolistic tendencies of 
banking system, and a recipe for non price competition such as construction of marble 
buildings177as symbols of market power and profitability. A competitive banking ensures 
the existence of a relatively small spread between loan rates and deposit rates on short 
term obligations and creates an atmosphere in which superior technology wins. 
It is usual that the desegmentation of banking activities forms a core aspect of a 
financial liberalisation programme. The purpose of desegmentation is the improvement of 
the operational and dynamic efficiency by liberating banks from the regulatory yoke of 
prohibited activities that make the banks operationally rigid, uncompetitive and 
unresponsive to environmental changes178. The desegmentation agenda has a tendency 
towards German concept of universal banking, and has been advocated by the World 
Bankl79,, Khatkhate and Rieche1180, Fry'81 and Virmanil82 
175 Ibid., p. 437. 
176 See Mckinnon (1991). op. cit, p. 78. 
177 See Mckinnon (1973), op. cit, p. 84. 
178 11 would be capable of . 
Under the mechanism of financial deregulation through desegmentation, banks 
undertaking financial activities like investment banking. trust management, securities dealing, mortgages, 
insurance, finance consultancy, and equity ownership in non-bank subsidiaries. The diversification of 
banking operations w-ill enable banks to compete with the other financial intermediaries that have 
encroached on banking activitics. 
179 
' 
See World Bank. The Philippines - Aspects of the Financial Sector. Washington. D. C.: World 
Bank, May, (1980). p. 74. 
180. See Khatkhate. Deena. R. and Klaus-Walter Riechel ." 
Multipurpose Banking : Its Nature, 
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It is of interest to note that the desegmentation of banking did not feature in the 
Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis, and Mckinnon'83 is in fact supportive of the restriction of 
banking actiVities in the US Glass - Steagall fashion. The major criticisms of 
desegmentation in developing countries have been identified as the accentuation of 
conu-nercial and financial monopoly through the interlocking ownership of corporate and 
bank interests, and the aggravation of financial fragility of the banks through imprudent 
debt exposures184 
A pivotal role is accorded privatisation of commercial banks in the menu of 
liberalisation options. It is believed that private ownership of the banking sector will free 
most public owned banks of political interference and control of management, 
bureaucratic inertia, corruption, patrimonialism, undercapitalisation and gross inefficiency. 
Financial liberalisation attains its ascendancy in policy reforms due to the 
multifarious positive effects ascribed to its implementation. Interest rate deregulation 
which increases the return on deposits has its effect in the rising propensity to save since 
11185 "saving behaviour is not insensitive to the reward for saving This facilitates the 
effective mobilisation of domestic resources. An attractive rate of return prevents 
186 
substitution into consumption or other inflation hedges C 
Scopcand Relevance for Less Developed Countries ". (1980) 27 (3) MF Staff Papers, 
pp. 478-5 16 (September). 
181. See Fry (1991). op. cit, pp. 440 &441. 
182. - -ernment Policy and the Development of Financial Markets: The See Virmani, Anind, "Gov, 
Case 
of Korca ". (Washington, D. C. : World Bank Staff Working Papcr No. 747, August, 1985). 
183 See Mckinnon (1986), in Tan and Kapur (eds. ). op. cit., p. 335. 
184. See Diaz - Alejandro, Carlos. ." 
Good - Bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash " (1985) 
19 (1 - 2) Joumal of Developmcnt Economics, pp. 
1 -24. see also Velasco, Andres. " 
Liberalization. Crisis , 
Intervention : The Chilean Financial System, 1975 -1985 
Washington D. C. : IMF, Central Banking Department. (December 1986). p. 11. 
18 See Shaw, op. cit., p. 78. 
Financial Factors in Econonii '3. see also Okuda. H. ic 186 See Fn, (199 1). op. cit.. pp. 154 &4 It 
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The elimination of selective and subsidised credits reduces the flow of cheap 
credits to the affluent persons, and where this is coupled with abolition of import licences, 
the rents accruing to this class of persons are effectively curtailed187. The effect of these 
liberalising techniques is a reduction in the income inequality gap between the rich and 
poor members of the society. The abolition or refinement of reserve requirements 
188 increases the volume of deposits that the banks can lend to borrowers , while the 
privatisation or denationalisation of the banks and a competitive charter policy ensure the 
operational efficiency of the banking system'89 
Ultimately, financial liberalisation yields a saving, income, investment, employment 
and distributive effects. Shaw has however warned that "It is not our theme that only 
financial liberalisation matters. On the contrary, financial liberalisation is appropriately 
linked with complementary measures that reach beyond the financial sector" 190. Hence, 
certain prerequisites of financial liberalisation must be considered . 
Macroeconon-ýc stability has been identified as a vital ingredient for successful 
liberalisation'91. Fiscal reforms through the elimination of budget deficits, unproductive 
public borrowing , 
deficit financing, and the improvement of tax collection system are 
postulated as crucial factors192. The proponents of financial liberalisation advocate the 
Development :A Study of Financial Liberalization Policy in the Philippines ". (1990) 
28 (3) The Developing Economies, pp240-270. 
187 See further Fry (1991). op. cit., p. 436. 
188. See Mckinnon (1991). op. cit., pp. 48 -65. 
189 See Fn, (1991), op. cit., p. 312. 
190. Sce Shaw. op. cit.. p. 4. 
191. There must be low inflation with an appreciable price stability for financial Liberalization to attain 
its ends. 'on dcstroys existing 
financial markets and prevents potential financial " High and variable inflati I 
markets from developing ". see Fry (1991). op. cit.. p. 425. 
192. See Hanson. J. A. and Craig R. Neal . 
"Interest Rate Policies in Selected Developing 
Countries. 1970 -1982 " (Washington. D. C. : World 
Bank Staff Working Paper No. 751. 
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liberalisation of current account to stimulate trade and export, but recommend retention or 
imposition of restriction on capital accounts193 . 
The potency of financial liberalisation as a policy panacea for the developmental 
ailments of developing countries has however been jolted by the financial crises which 
were the aftermath of the implementation of financial liberalisation in some countries 
especially the Latin American countries of Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay'94and South 
East Asia. These developments foist a refinement and rethinking of the paradigms of 
financial liberalisation on its progenitors and proponents. One of the first reactions was to 
define the limits on the speed of financial liberalisation. The appropnate sequencing of the 
monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange policies is posited as a major determinant of the 
success of the liberalisation adventure. " Governments cannot, and perhaps should not, 
undertake all liberalising measures simultaneously "19. David Cole'96 sketches the 
differences in the individual postulations of Mckinnon and Shaw, and advocates the 
1985), p. 35. See also Mckinnon (1991). op. cit, p. 112. 
193. Capital account is the portion of a countn's balance of payments that shows the volume of private 
foreign investment and public grants and loans that flow into and out of a country over a given period, 
usually one year. Mckinnon prescribes the imposition of restriction on capital inflow either loans or credit, 
and to some extent the purchase of domestic assets by foreigners. The necessity of a consistent monetary 
and exchange rate policies is underscored. and the adoption of a cra,, N, Iing peg or a freely floating 
exchange rate is advocated. sec Mckinnon (1973). op. cit.. p. 160. and Mckinnon (199 1). op. cit., pp. 104 
& 117. 
194. 
- Ate '5). op. cit.. -. Velasco, op. cit., -. and Mckinnon (1982 ). op. cit.. See Diaz jandro (198- 
195 
. 
See Mckinnon (1991), op. cit. p. 4. Mckinnon enunciates the optimum order of econonu'c 
liberalisation as first, the institution of fiscal control which must precede financial liberalisation. Second, 
is the prescription of the opening of the domestic capital market Nvith real interest rates on deposits and 
loans. The third order is the pace of liberalisation of the foreign exchanges. Current account is 
recommended to be liberalised prior to capital account . 
The liberalization of the capital account is the last 
stage in the optimum order of economic liberalization. A premature deregulation of exchange controls on 
foreign capital movement may result in unwarranted capital flight and massive foreign debts. 
196 
. 
See David Cole. " Concepts, Causes. and Cures of Instability in Less Dcvelopcd Countnes " in 
Mckinnon (1976), op. cit.. pp. 143-171. 
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payment of interest on demand deposits. Lewis SpellnianI97 concurs with the hy othesis lp 
that a lower deposit rate result in a state of under capitalisation of the economy. 
Most recently, additional testing and elucidation of the hypothesis have been 
undertaken by an array of scholars including Vicente Galbis'98 , 
Donald Mathieson'99, Paul 
Krugrnan200, Basant Kapur201, and Maxwell Fr-V202. Sebastian EdwardS203 suggests the 
197 See Spellman, LeNvis. J., " Economic Gro,, Ath and Financial Intermediation " in Mckinnon (1976) 
op. cit., pp. 11- 22. 
198. See Galbis, Vicente., " Financial Inter-mediation and Economic GroNNIh in Less- Developed 
Countries :A Theoretical Approach ", (1977) 13 (2) Journal of Development Studies, pp. 58-72, 
(January). see also the following articles by the same author viz. : "Analytical Aspects of Interest 
Rate Policies in Less-Developed Countfies " (1982) 6 (2) Savings and Development. pp. 111-16-5. 
and "Financial Sector Liberalization under Oligopolistic Conditions and a Banking Holding 
Company Structure " (1986) 10 (2) Savings and Development, pp. 117-14 1. 
199. Mathicson, Donald. J., " Financial Reform and Stabilization Policy in a Developing Economy 
(1980) 7 (3) Journal of Development Economics, pp. 359-395, (September) . see also the 
following articles by the same author viz. : "Financial Reform and Capital Flows in a Developing 
Economy ", (1979) 26 (3) IMF Staff Papers, pp. 450-489-, and " Exchange Rate Arrangements and 
Monetary Policy " (1989) Finance and Development pp. 21-24. 
200 U See Krugman, Paul., "Interest Rate Ceilings, Efficiency, and Gro 1h: A Theoretical Approach 
(New, Haven : Yale University, Department of Economics, 1978 
201. See Kapur, Basant. K., " Alternative Stabilization Policies for Less-Developed Economies " 
(1976) 84 (4 ) Joumal of Political Economy, pp. 777-795, (August). see further the following 
articles and treatise by the same author viz. :" T%,, -o Approaches to Ending Inflation ", in 
Mckinnon (1976), op. cit; " Inflation and Financial Deepening" ( 1989 ) 38 Journal of 
Development Economics, pp. 379-396. 
202. See Fry. Maxwell. J., ( 1988 &1991.1993A. 1993B, and 1993C ). op. cit... see also the following 
articles by the same author Niz. :"A Note on Some Aspects of Money and Capital Markets in 
Lowest Income Countries ", ( 1976 )4(3) Bangladesh Development Studies, pp. 399-404. (July)l 
" Pitfalls in Partial Adoption of the Mckinnon-Shaw Development Strategy - The Nepalese 
Experience ". ( 1978 )6(3) Bangladesh Development Studies, pp. 257-270. " Money and Capital 
or Financial Deepening in Economic Development? "( 1978 ) 10 (4) Journal of Money. Credit 
and Banking. pp. 464-475-, " The Cost of Financial Repression in Turkey ", ( 1979 )3(2) 
Savings 
and Development, pp. 127-135, " Saving, Investment. Growth and the Cost of Financial 
Repression "( 1980 )8(4) World Development. pp. 317-327; " Financial Structure. Financial 
Regulation. and Financial Reform in the Philippines and Thailand, 1960-1984 ", in Cheng ( ed. 
Financial Policy and Reform in Pacific-Basin Countries, ( New York. Lexington Books, 1986 ). 
pp. 160-1831. " Neo-Classical and Neo-Structuralist Models of Financial 
Development : Theories 
and Evidence ". ( 1987 )9(I) The Greek Economic Review. pp. 1-37-, and 
" Financial 
Devc1opinent: Theories and Recent Experience " (1989 )5(4) Oxford Rc%-ie%%- of Economic 
Policv. pp. 13-27. 
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order of liberalisation and emphasises the all important role of policy credibility in the 
success of financial liberalisation adventure. The expectation of policy reversal may 
influence the attitudinal derailment of the programme. Hence, for Edwards, " even more 
important than determining the correct order of liberalization may be defining a consistent 
and credible policy package that will support which ever order is chosen "204 
The tendency for interest rates to skyrocket during certain periods of the financial 
liberalisation programme has been identified by VeneroS0205, Harberger206, Corbo and 
Jamie de Me10207, and James TyboUt208. The excessive high interest rates are attributed 
to distress borrowing, rolling over of bad loans with new borrowings and the exploitative 
practices of relending cheap foreign funds at high domestic rates. 
The financial liberalisation experience highlights the importance of gradualism in 
the deregulation process, and counsels a cautious regulatory reform with stronger 
prudential norms. Political will and stability coupled with policy credibility are emphasised 
as vital underpinn-ings to the success of financial deregulation in developing countfieS209 
Notwithstanding its theoretical refinements, the financial repression cum liberalisation 
203 
. 
See Edwards, Sebastian. The Order Of Liberalization Of The External Sector In Developing 
Countries, ( Essays In Intemational Finance, No. 156, Decemberl984. Princeton. Princeton University ) p. 
19. 
204 Loc. cit 
205. ty hi gt See Veneroso, Frank., " New Pattems of Financial Instabill (Was n on, DC.. 
World Bank, February, 1986 ). p. 17. 
206 - Country Managers and Policymakers See Harberger. Arnold. C.. " Lessons for Debtor 
in Smith and Cuddington (eds. ), International Debt and the Developing Countries 
( Washington. D. C. : World Bank, March, 1985). pp. 236 -257. 
207. See Corbo, Vittorio and Jaime de Melo. " Oveniew and Summary ". (1985) 13 (8. ) World 
Development. p. 364. 
208. Ibid.. pp. 86, -866. 
209. See Edwards, op. cit, pp. 17 & 20 ; Diaz - Alqjandro, op. cit. pp. 1 -24. and Fn- (1991). 
op. cit. p. 429. 
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hypothesis has provoked reactions ranging from passive comments"O) and critical insights 
to outright repudiation2ll. 
2.10 Conclusions 
There is no universally accepted definition of financial regulation because of its 
multidisciplinary nature and the differences in its conceptualisation from country to 
country. It is what the regulators do in fact. The objectives of financial regulations have 
21O. See Cho, Yoon Je., " Inefficiencies from Financial Liberalization in the Absence of Well 
Functioning Equities Markets ", ( 1986 18 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, pp. 191- 199. see 
Stiglitz, J. E. and A. Weiss, " Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information ". ( 1981 ) 71 (3 
American Economic Review, pp. 393 - 410. see also Stiglitz and Weiss, " Incentix, e Effects of 
Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets ". (1983) 73 (5) American Economic 
ReN, iew, pp. 912 - 927. 
211. The neo - structuralist school of thought is made up of scholars like Van Wijnbergen, Lance 
Taylor, Edward Buffie and Akira Kohsaka to mention a few. The nomenclature of' neo - 
structuralist ' signifies the theoretical affinities and differences of this school to the 
traditional structuralists of the Latin American fame. see Lim . J. 
" The New Structuralist 
Critique of the Monetarist Theory of Inflation "( 1987 ) 25 Journal of Development Economics, 
pp. 45 - 61. See for a comprehensive discussion of the school - Fn, (1991). op. cit. pp. 88-107, 
Gupta and lensink (1996), op. cit, pp. 50-68; and Sikorski (1996), op. cit. pp. 91 -102. see 
Taylor, Lance. , 
Structuralist Macroeconomics: Applicable Models for the Third World 
( New York : Basic Books, 1983 ), pp. 98-103-, see also Van Wýjnbergen. S. . "Interest Rate 
Management in LDCs "( 1983 ) 12 (3) Journal of Monetary Economics. pp. 433-452 
Van Wýjnbcrgen, S. ," 
Credit Policy, Inflation and Growth in a Financially Repressed 
Economy ", ( 1983 13 ( 1-2 ) Journal of Development Economics. pp. 4-5 - 65. see 
Buffie, Edward. F. " Financial Repression . the 
New Structuralists. and Stabilization 
Policy in Semi - Industrialized Economies ", ( 1984 ) 14 3) Journal of Development 
Economics, p. 320. see Chang. Doug. and Woo S. Jung - 
Unorganized Money Markets in LDCs The 
Mckinnon - Shaw Hypothesis versus the Van Wýjnbergen Hypothesis " 
( Nashville, Tennessee, USA -. Vanderbilt University, Department of Economics, Working Paper 
84 - W2 1, June, 1984). see Owen. P. and Solis - Fallas, " Unorganised Money 
Markets and Unproductive 
Assets' in the New Structuralists' Critique of Financial Liberalization "( 1989 ) 31 Journal of 
Development Economics, pp. 341- 355: Germidis. D. ," 
Interlinking the Formal and Informal Financial 
Sectors in Developing Countries "0 990) 14 (I) Savings and Development, pp. 5-2 1; 
Fischer, B. L., " Savings Mobilization in Developing Countries: Bottlenecks and Reform 
Proposals 1989) 13 (2) Savings and Development. pp. 117 -1 -3 )2: and 
Hoff, K. and 
J. E. Stiglitz ," 
Introduction : Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets - Puzzles and 
Policy Perspectives ". ( 1990) 4 The World Bank Economic Review. A Syniposium Issue on 
Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets. pp. 235 -250. see Jose Maria Fanelli. Roberto Frcnkel 
and Lance Taylor. " The World Dcvelopment Report 1991: A Critical Assessment 
" in International 
MonctarNý And Financial issues For The 1990s. (1992) 1UNCTAD. pp. I- 29. 
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been identified as varying from the protection of private, public and systemic interests to 
the promotion of the dictatorial or personal interests of the regulators. 
The ascendancy of direct forms of financial regulation has been traced to the 
theoretical influence of classical theories which enunciated their beneficial effects. 
However, the developmental theory of regulatory repression has challenged the classical 
orthodoxy of financial regulation. An incomparable contribution of the theory to learning 
is the insight into the deleterious impacts of regulatory intervention in the financial sector 
and its social costs.. In the words of Fry, "govemment regulation of financial systems in 
developing countries has more frequently retarded than promoted economic 
development". 212 
The Mckinnon-Shaw financial liberalisation theory has influenced significantly the 
intellectual and political thoughts on the modes of financial regulations, and has been 
embraced by IMF and World Bank213. It is the academic precursor to the current wave of 
financial liberalisation and deregulation that now pervade the regulatory structures of most 
developed and developing countries including Nigeria. It appears however that Nigeria 
adopted the Mckinnon-Shaw hy . pothesis 
half-heartedly and in wrong order. The gravamen 
of financial liberalisation is the removal of all repressive financial regulatory norms of the 
banking system. It is however a misconception to portray liberallsation as total elimination 
of all forms of financial regulation. The Mckinnon-Shaw developmental theory of 
regulatory repressionism affords a theoretical paradigm for evaluating the impact of 
banking regulation in Nigeria, and the Mckinnon-Shaw concept of financial liberalisation 
provides a schematic framework for assessing banking deregulation in the country. 
212 Sec Frv (1991). op. cit.. p. 302. 
13 t ik II it. See Fn- ( 199 1). op. cit.. p. 245-. see also Si orski. op. cit., p. 9 1. and Mckinnon (199 1). op. c' 
pp. 12 & P, - 
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CHAPTERM 
POLITICAL, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
3.1 Introduction 
I have admired Nigeria as having all the resources 
to make her a leader in Africa; but have been ashamed 
that Nigeria has also all the qualities to corrupt and 
pervert Affican society214. 
This chapter provides an insight into the historical, political, economic, legal and 
social structure of the Nigerian state that underpin the regulatory system including 
financial reforms. The chapter is divided into seven parts. The first part is the introduction. 
The second part analyses the colonial era and the third part discusses the post-colon-lial 
eras in the country. The fourth part highlights the Nigerian economy. The fifth part 
explains the legislative and governance structure of the country. The sixth part 
underscores the interface between the state, economy and the elite, while the conclusions 
are contained in the seventh part. 
3.2 The Colonial Era 
The Bfitish connection2l5with Nigefia began with the establishment of a consulate 
at Fernando Po under John Beecroft in 1849. In 1861, King Dosunmu ceded Lagos to 
Great Britain. The British consul also entered into several treatieS216 of protection and 
214 
- 
See Okigbo, Pius.. Essays in the Public Philosopkv of Development. Lectures on the Structural 
AdJustment Programme, Vol. 4, Fourth Dimension Publishers, Enugu, (1993). p. 126. 
215. See Nicholson. 1. F. The Administration of Nigeria 1900-1960 : Men, Methods and MN-ths, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford. (1969). pp. 15-26. 
216. See NNvabueze. B. O.. A Constitutional Histon, of Nigena, C. Hurst & Compan-y. London. (1982). pp. 
5-9.111 1885. Great Britain fornially declared a protectorate over the Oil Rivers District including the areas 
covered by treaties concluded by Royal Niger Company In 1887, the protectorate was extended to the 
.; 5 
amity with some Affican kings and peoples in the area2l'. The Royal Niger Company 
which had been granted a charter in 1886 established direct political control over the areas 
covered by the charter which included the North of the Benue and stretched from Sokoto 
to Lake Chad218 
The Royal Niger Company concluded about 360 treaties which covered the areas 
included in its charter. The chiefs and the poeple of the concerned areas ceded " the whole 
of our territory to the Company, their heirs and assigns for ever "219. The company had 
powers to settle all native disputes and " to raise revenue, levy duties, defray the cost of 
administration, provide compensation for expenses incurred in obtaining Treaty rights, 
preserve public order; control trade within the limits permitted by the Act of The Berlin 
West Affica Conference of 1884-85.... 11220. 
It was in the exercise of these legal powers that the company took political control 
of Northern parts of Nigeria in addition to its commercial operations. The greatest 
impetus for British expansion in Nigeria was however the " desire to establish and expand 
trade "221 in cotton, palm oil, cocoa, timber and other tradeable goods. 
The full colonial government over Nigeria was established222 as from I 
January1900 with the appointment of separate governors 223 for each of the three 
Northern Nigeria. Aftenvards, many independent kingdoms such as Benin and Abeokuta signed treaties 
of protection with Great Britain. 
217. See Udoma, Udo., Histon, and the Law of the Constitution of Nigeria, Malthouse PressLtd, 
Lagos, (1994)p. 66. 
218. See Udoma, op. cit.. p-24. 
219. see Mvvabueze. op. cit.. 8. 
220. see Udonia, op. cit.. p. 24. 
22 1. See Udonia, op. cit., p. I- 
222. In 1895 .a new 
Secretary of State. Joseph Chamberlain assumed office in England and inspired a 
policy of effectivc occupation of Nigena by the British Government. The administration of the colony and 
protectorates was transferred from Foreign Office to Colonial Office, and the charter of Royal Niger 
Company was revoked and the Crown assumed jurisdiction over colony of Lagos. and the Protectorates of 
Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1900. 
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colonial structureS224within the Nigerian state. The nature, personality and background of 
the governors differed225. The Legacies of the wide disparities in the backgrounds of the 
governors and their actions remained the features of the modem Nigeria, with unequal 
developments, ethnic fivalfies and strife over sectional domination. 
The British Government amalgamated the Northern and Southern Nigefia226 in 
1914, and constitutional developments were undertaken in 1922,1946,1951 and 1954 
respectively227. The demand for independence reached a higher crescendo and at a 
constitutional conference in 1958 in London, the imperial Government agreed to 
independence for Nigeria on I Octoberl960 and the Independence Constitution of 1960 
was promulgated228. 
3.3 The Post Colonial Era 
A fruitful intellectual paradigm for analysing the Nigerian political, legal and 
institutional structures in the post -independence era has been provided bY Joseph229, as 
223. Sir William Macgregor was appointed for Colony and Protectorate of Yorubaland, and Sir Ralph 
Moor was appointed for the Southern Protectorate, while Lord Frederick Luggard became the governor of 
Northern Nigeria. 
224. i. e. the colony and Yorubaland protectorate, protectorate of Southern Nigeria and the Protectorate of 
Northern Nigeria. The Colonial government structure consisted of the Govemor-General of Nigeria, the 
Governors of Southern and Nothern Nigeria and the administrative officers who reported directly to the 
Colonial Secretary in London. 
225. See Nicholson, op. cit p. 42. The governors of the Colon), and Southern protectorate were persons of 
considerable administrative background and experience with political acquity and religious dispositions. 
Thus, both were characterised as philistines. On the other hand, Lord Luggard was a public school 
educated military officer without adm-inistrative experience. hence belonged to the barbarian school of 
thought. The term barbarian was coined and used by Nicholson. See Nicholson, op. cit., p. 42. 
226. See Elias, T. O., Nigcria: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, Stevens and Sons, (1967) p. 
22. 
227. See Nwabueze. op. cit., p. 46. The 1922 Constitution introduced a concept of elective principle, and a 
ncw Icgislative council for the country except Northern Nigeria. The 1946 Constitution empowered the 
legislativc council to legislate for the whole of Nigeria and established regional councils in each of the 
regions. The Constitution of 1951 introduced elected mqjorities into the central legislature and granted 
legislative powers to regional houses of assembly in respect of certain matters. The 1954 Constitution 
introduced federal structure into the country and regionalised both the. judiciar)- and civil senice 
228. See Elias, op. cit., p. 117. 
229. See Joseph. Richard. A.. Democracy And Prebendal Politics In Nigeria : The nse and fall of the 
Second Republic. Cambridge University Press. New York. ( 1987). 
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prebendalism and clientelism. Prebendalism typifies a political behaviour under which 
political offices are captured and utilised for the personal benefit of the office holders and 
their support groups. Clientelism underscores the patron-client ties which underlie the 
relationship between the office holders and their supporters on the basis of ethnic, regional 
and religious identities. 
The form of politics which operated in Nigeria since independence irrespective of 
regime in power has been characterised as " prebendal politics "230. This is defined as an 
unremitting and unconstrained struggle for possession and access to state offices, with the 
chief aim of procuring direct material benefits to oneself and one's acknowledged 
communal or other sectional group. This peculiar political culture of Nigeria has 
bequeathed on the country devastating consequence of political instability and economic 
mismanagement. 
3.3: 1 Corruption and Instability Between 1960 and 1966 
Although at first the independent Nigerian state had looked to the future with 
considerable prospect for rapid growth and development, prebendal politics dominated the 
Nigerian political scene. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa became its prime minister under a 
parliamentary system of government. The Southern Cameroon which formed part of 
Nigeria was excised from the country in 1961 following a plebiscite. In 1963, the last 
vestige of colonial regime was exterminated when the country attained a republican status. 
The government was however confronted by two critical problems of secular deterioration 
through corruption, profligacy and waste, and the episodic deterioration through the 
sequence of exhausting and unresolved cfiseS231. 
A serious dimension to these problems was the determination of the northern elites 
to enforce a regime of political domination over the other tribes which was manifested in 
230. Ibid., P. 55- 
23 I. See Diamond. Larry. Class. Etlinicity and Democracy in Nigeria. Syracuse Universitv Press, New 
York, (1988). p. 289. 
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S1433 suppression of opposition through unconstitutional meanS232, and precipitated crise 
This charged atmosphere provided the opportunity for military intervention In Nigerian 
politics. The Nigerian military was not free from prebendalism. Indeed, it had been 
prebendalised by deliberate political and legal acts in 1962 when the dominant Northern 
politicians forced through a law which introduced a quota system into army recruitment 
based on ethnic origin and a pre-allocated quota for a specified area, rather than merit and 
ability. The law politicised the Nigerian military since advancement in the military became 
dependent on one's' patrons . 
1234 
On 15 Januaryl966, soldiers led by Major Nzeogwu staged a coup which 
resulted in the massacre of the prime minister, the premiers of the North and West regions, 
the finance minister and some high-ranking soldiers predominantly of northern origin. The 
coup partially succeeded, and the most senior officer who had escaped assassination took 
over the reigns of the government. Thus, Major-General Agulyi-Ironsi, an easterrier, 
became the Nigerian first military Head of State and reverted Nigeria to a unitary system 
of government235. He abolished the then existing four regions of Nigeria and reintroduced 
provincial system of government236. Prebendal politics were continued by the appointment 
of General Ironsi's tribe men as political acolyteS237. 
The apparent ethnic bias of General Ironsi infuriated the northern elements in the 
Nigerian Army, and on 28 July 1966 a coup organised by soldiers of northern origin ended 
232. See Nigerian Opinion. February 1966. p. 16.. See also ibid.. p. 302. 
233. The Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). the pamý at the federal government tried to shift the balance 
of power to its favour by manipulating the results of 1962-3 census and 
1964 federal election to its favour, 
and imposing minority faction of Action Group (AG ) as regime 
in Western Region. 
234. See Joseph. op. cit.. p. 7 1. 
235. See Decree No. 14 of 1966 which abrogated federal structures of 
Nigeria. 
236. See Kirk-Grecne. A. and Rimmer. Douglas.. Nigeria 
Since 1970- A political and economic outline. 
Hodder And Stoughton. London. (l 98 1), p. 
26. 
237. See Udoma. op. cit.. p. 237. 
59 
General Ironsi's regime and life. Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a northemer, 
emerged as the new Head of State. The rise of Gowon in the military hierarchy and the 
subsequent killing of some easterners in the northern part of Nigeria angered Lieutenant - 
Colonel 0jukwu, an easterner, and Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria. All attempts to 
reconcile Gowon and 0 ukwu broke down irretrievably. j 
3.3: 2 War and Oil Boom (1967 - 1975) 
On 30 May1967 the Eastern Region seceded. Earlier, General Gowon had created 
twelve stateS238 for the country and abolished the existing four regions in a pre-emptive 
move to neutralise the tribal and ethnic motivations of the secessionists. Nevertheless a 
civil war resulted and lasted till 12 January1970 after a huge loss of human and material 
resourceS239. It may be underscored that oil played an influential factor in the Nigerian 
civil war240with the Federal Government and the Eastern Regional government squabbling 
over the rightful recipient of oil proceeds from the multinational companies that had been 
exploring oil since 1957. 
In the aftermath of the civil war, the OPEC price moves of 1973 bequeathed the 
country with massive oil revenue. The Gowon regime embarked on euphoric planning and 
spending241, and attained new height in public corruption leavue242. General Gowon 
further prebendalised the Nigerian state with the centralisation of all economic and 
commercial activities in the government. The increased interventionism was accompanied 
238. See States (Creation and Transitional Pro%isions) Decree No. 14 of 1967. 
239. The estiniated cost of the -war to the Federal Government Nvas N000m. and over a million 
Nigefians 
lost their lives. See Kirk-Greene, A. H. M.. Crisis And Conflict In Nigeria A Documentary 
Sourcebook 
1966-1970, Vol. 11. Oxford University Press. London, (1971), p. 470. 
240. See Ikein. Augustine. A., The Impact of Oil on a Developing Countrv The Case of Nigeria. Praeger. 
New York. (1990 ), p. 65. 
241. See also Olorunsola. Victor. A., Soldiers and Power : The Development 
Performance of the Njgerjan 
Militan, Regime, Hoover Institution Press. (1977). 
242. See Nwabueze. B. 0., Military Rule And Constitutionalism in Nigeria. Spectrum 
Law Publishing. 
(1992), p. 296. 
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by personalisation of government and absence of accountability243. The line between 
public and private activities evaporated. General Gowon also reneged244on his promise of 
a return to civil rule in 1976. In the final event, the Gowon regime was removed in a 
bloodless coup on 30 July1975. 
3.3: 3 Quest for Sanity and Civility (1975 - 1979) 
General Murtala Mohammed regime replaced Gowon regime. General 
Mohammed, a northemer, attempted a radical transformation of the Nigeria society 
plagued by the vices of corruption, waste, and social decadence. He also promised a return 
to civil rule in 1979. The regime purged the civil service of perceived corrupt and bloated 
officers, and prosecuted military officers for corrupt practices. However, General 
Mohammed was killed in a bloody abortive coup on 14 February1976. The second in 
command, General Obasanjo ,a southerner, took over the reigns of the government. 
The Obasanjo regime increased the number of states from 12 to 19, and introduced 
democratic reforms to the local governments as a prelude to the restoration of civilian 
rule. The institutions for drafting and approving a new Constitution were established. 
During the Obasanjo regime, the oil shock and recession set in and the revenue of the 
nation dwindled. The government maintained the external account by borrowing on the 
Eurodollar market245. The regime also introduced palliative austerity measures that were 
essentially cosmetic. 
The regime also fuelled more prebendal politics by enhancing state's "omnipresence 
and omnicompetence 
11246 in economic and commercial spheres. Corruption was 
prevalent247 under the regime as well. Perhaps, the high point of the regime was in 
243. See Joseph, op. cit.. p. 73. 
244. See Forrest. Tom.. Politics And Economic Development In Nigeria. Westview Press. Oxford, (1993). 
p. 5 6. 
245. See Okigbo. (1993) op. cit.. p. 
246. See Joseph, op. cit.. p. 75. 
247. See Nwabue/e (1993). op. cit.. P. 297. 
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fulfilling the promise of a return to civil rule, and on I Octoberl. 979, the Obasanjo regime 
handed over to a civilian government. 
3-3: 4 Bungled Democracy and Military Paternalism (1979 - 1985) 
The 1979 Constitution was enacted to provide the constitutional framework for 
the civilian government. It introduced presidentialism, state equality, and federal character 
to redress ethnicity, domination and weak governance, and imposed state control on the 
economy. Unfortunately, the constitution serves to legalise the prebendal practices in the 
Nigerian polity, as demonstrated by the principle of federal character enshrined in the 
248 constitution 
Under this principle, the composition of the government must reflect the multi- 
ethnic structure of Nigeria. The composition of the armed forceS249 and all governmental 
appointments must reflect this principle, and specifically at least one Minister must be 
appointed from each state250. The effect has been the accentuation of clientelism and 
prebendalism. It has been asserted that this principle which sacrifices merit in 
governmental appointments may be "twisted into a factor for regressive penny- 
picketing"251, and this was the exact scenario under the civilian regime. 
The President, Alhaji Shehu Shagafi, a northerner, was notorious for his political 
complacency and managefial incompetence252. These negative values were compounded 
by state patronage syndrome of the politicians. The state was regarded as the centre of 
capital accumulation, and firm link was established between commercial and political 
248. See S. 14 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. as amended. 
249. See S. 197(2). Ibid. 
250. SCC S. 135 (3). ibid. 
251. Sce Kirk-Greenc and Douglas. op. cit.. p. 30. 
25". See Forest. op. cit.. p. 73. 
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interests. The government was concerned with distributive issues and development 
programmes were neglected'53. 
The absence of well-defined economic policy was accompanied by financial in 
discipline, massive corruption, state violence, northern domination and electoral rigging. 
Although the oil revenue was dwindling, approximately US $14 billion took flight from 
Nigeria between 1979 and 1983. The economic and political crises which engulfed the 
nation in the aftermath of the 1983 election culminated in yet another military intervention 
on 31 December 1983. 
The military regime of General Buhari was puritanical in its approach254, and 
attempted social and moral re-orientation of Nigerians by declaring a war against 
indiscipline. Considerable attention was given to econorrk problems, and the regime 
curtailed government expenditure, controlled budget deficit and restricted imports. The 
servicing of Nigerian debts was made a priority. 
However, the government was unable to reach an accord with EMT and World 
Bank on the economic policies to be pursued255. The international curtailment of credit 
aggravated economic woes. The regime also faced criticisms of selective treatment and 
ethnicity in its punishment of corrupt politicians, especially those from the defunct ruling 
political party256. This setting provided the scenario for yet another military coup in 
August 1985, when General Babaginda became the Nfilitary President of Nigeria. 
253. Ibid., pp. 75-78. 
254. The politicians were detained under Decree NO. 3 of 1984 ( Recovery of 
Public Property ) Decree. see 
also Decree No. 2 of 1984 ( State Security : Detention of 
Persons ) Decree under which a person may be 
detained for an indefinite period. 
255. See Forest, op. cit., pp. 100- 10 1. 
256. See Nwabueze (1993). op. cit,, p. 220. 
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3.3: 5 The regimes of predatory dictatorship (1985 - 1998) 
Within twenty-five years of independence, Nigeria had declined from a nation of 
prebendal politics to one of predatory dictatorship, according to one commentator257. 
Lewis emphasises predation in this sense as the abandonment of diffused clientellsm and 
weak institutional frameworks by Nigerian governments for " more arbitrary and 
debilitating control by a single ruler "258. The predatory dictatorship begun under the 
Babaginda regime. General Babaginda was at first a benevolent dictator reform-ing259 the 
repressive machinery of his authoritarian predecessor. The Babaginda government also 
adopted the structural adjustment prograMMe260 that culminated in the financial 
liberalisation of the Nigerian banking system. 
The maverick dictator was however dishonest and disingenuous with his political 
transition prograrnme261to a civil rule because its conditions were leading towards 
increased authoritarianism and self succession by the GeneraJ262. There was systematic 
destabilisation of all civil and political forceS263. The regime was incredibly corrupt and 
lacking in financial discipline to sustain economic reforms. Between 1988 and 1994, it was 
257. See Lewis, Peter., From Prebendalism to Predation : the Political Economv of Decline in Nigeria. C3 
(1996) 1 The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 34, p. 79 at p. 80. 
258. Loc. cit. 
259. The politicians in pfisons had their cases reviewed and liberal regime was in place. The regime 
permitted public debate on the INIF loan and instituted a framework for transition to civil rule. 
260. See Olukoshi. Adebayo. 0., (ed. ). The Politics of Structural Adjustment In Nigeria. James Currey 
Ltd, London, (1993). p. 8. 
261. Preparatory to the civilian regime. the 1989 Constitution was promulgated and a population census 
was undertaken. The results of these ventures %vere aborted. The Babaginda regime also increased the 
number of states to 30. See Maniman, Tahir.. The Law and Politics of 
Constitution-Making in Nigeria, 
1862-1989 : issues. Interests and Compromises. Ed-Linforin Sen1ces. Maiduguri. Nigeria, (1998). p. 
324. 
262. See Ibrahim. Jibrin.. " The Transition to Civil Rule : Sapping Democracy "in Olukoshi. Adebavo. 0., 
(ed. ), ibid, p. 129. 
263. Ibid., P. 136. 
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found that the regime could not account for $12.4 billion264 . 
The death knell of the regime 
was however sounded when after instituting civil rule at the local, state and federal levels 
of government, it annulled the presidential election of 12 June1993 for no justifiable 
reasons. General Babaginda was forced to abdicate in the ensuing political crisis, and the 
interim government265 which replaced him was removed in yet another military 
intervention after political and legal setbacks. 
General Abacha, a coup veteran and Babaginda's henchman emerged as the 
military Head of State and transformed himself to an octopus dictator. The spate of 
indefinite detention, state killing, enforced exile, forceful coercion and fabricated 
treasonable cases under the regime was legendary266 
The economic policy had no direction with the abolition of liberalisation, and 
reinstatement of control regime and the enunciation of the phantom policy of guided 
deregulation. Corruption became a legitimate economic pursuit reinforced by the 
beleaguered General's bid for self successIon267 under a concocted political transition 
programme268. The regime of the maximum ruler however came to an abrupt end on the 8 
June 1998 when the dictator suddenly died of an heart attack269. His denuse paved way for 
264. See Soremekun, kayode., " Oil and the Democratic Imperative in Nigeria "in Olowu, D., Soremekun. 
K., and Williams, A., (eds. ), Governance and Democratisation in Nigeria, Spectrum Books Ltd, lbadan, 
(1995). p. 103. 
265. The interim govemment ivas headed b,, - Chief E. Shonekan, but the Lagos High Court later declared 
the government illegal. 
266. Man%- pron-dnent Nigerians including former Head of State. Gen. Obasan o and the incumbent deputy 
Head of State. Gen. Diya have been sentenced to death for treason. 
267. See Tell, (Nigenan magazine) January 12.1998. p. 20, 
268. General Abacha increased the number of states in Nigeria to 3-5. and organised elections into local 
government councils and parliaments. 
269. See The Express. WedncsdaN-. June 10.1998. p. 16. 
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his succession by General Abdulsalam Abubakar who became the new Nigerian militarv 
270 ruler 
3.4 Nigerian Economy 
In the immediate post colonial pefiod, Nigena was an agrafian society with 
agriculture as the most important sector of its econoMy271. :7 Its share of GDP in 1960 was 
63 per cent. The sector was the principal foreign exchange eamer for the country 
accounting for 82 per cent of the total export value of the nation in 1962. It also had the 
largest share of the employment of about 70 per cent. The country was regarded as one of 
the world's poorest countries. 
The oil boom in the early 1970s however impacted positively on the growth and 
development of Nigerian economy. It became transformed from an agranan society to a 
monetised economy. The country emerged as the sixth largest oil exporter in the world. 
Oil became the dominant sector of the economy accounting for 90 per cent of the 
exportS272,30 per cent of the GDP, and 70 per cent of the Federal Government total 
revenue. The per capital GNP of a meagre $90 in 1968, rose to $1,020 by 1980273 
The new found oil wealth resulted in massive growth and transformation of the 
Nigerian economy. It motivated a tremendous expansion in public enterprises and public 
investments in large scale industrial projects. Manufacturing grew from about 5 per cent in 
1960 to 10 per cent in 1973, and an annual compound rate of 15.6 per cent between 1975 
and 1978. The growth was however not sustainable because the industries relied heavily 
on imported raw material274. Furthermore, the dominance of oil sector resulted in a 
270. Loc. cit. 
271. See Forest, op. cil. P. -1-1- 
272. See GATT. Nigeria. Trade Policy Review. Vols. I&". GATT. Geneva, 
273. See Todaro. Michael. P.. Economic Development, Longman, New York & London. (1995). C11 
Third irrip. p. 56. 
274. See GATT. Vol. L op. Cit. P. 19. 
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corresponding decline in the agricultural sector which accounted for only 2.4 per cent of 
the country's foreign exchange earning in 1980. 
The heavy dependence of the economy on petroleum and imported inputs made 
the economy highly vulnerable to changes in the world demand and prices for petroleum, 
The prebendal politics underlying the Nigerian state which instigated state intervention in 
most economic activities encouraged euphoric planning and spending by the government, 
massive public corruption and distortion of all the sectors of the economy including the 
banking system. 
The oil wealth enabled the Nigerian government to intervene directly in the 
banking sector by compulsory acquisition of all foreign interests in Nigerian banks. This 
brought the banking system into the public sector where it became a victim of Nigerian 
prebendal politics. Although the practice of looting banks by influential politicians and 
persons through irrecoverable loans was a common phenomenon towards the end of the 
colonial era 275, it attained new heights with the ownership of banks by the Federal 
Government of Nigeria. A large number of ministerS276 and government officiaIS277 
procured loans from these acquired banks with irregular loan documentation. This cavalier 
attitude of Nigerian government officials and politicians rendered most banks unsound. 
275. Two leading Nigerian statesmen, Dr Azikiwe and Chief Awolowo had been implicated in banking 
irregularities which occurred when both men were premiers of Eastern and Western regions of Nigeria. 
see The Report of the Tribunal to inquiry into allegations reflecting on the Official Conduct of the Premier 
of, and certain persons holding Ministerial and other Public Offices in The Eastern Region of Nigeria. 
(London, HMSO, Cmnd. 51,1957 ). see also Report of Coker Commission of Inquiry into the affairs of 
Certain Statutory Corporations in Western Nigeria, 1962. ( Lagos, Federal Ministry of 
Information, 1962ftespWively. 
276. An example is the case of Alhaji Fen-Li Okunnu. a Federal Commissioner of Ministry of Works. N%ho 
obtained loans from U. B. A and Standard Bank respectively in 1973 and 1974 during his mi niste rial ship. 
See 
"Government Views on Second Report of the Federal Assets Investigation Panel ", Ministry of 
Information. Lagos, 1978. pp. 12-15. 
277. Sonic Permanent Secretaries to the Federal Government like Mr Philip Asiodu and Alhaji 1. M. 
Damcida, procured loans from banks during their tenure of office. see " Government VicNN's on 
Second 
Report of the Federal Assets Investigation Panel ". Ministry of Inforniation. Lagos, 1978. pp. 
5-7. 
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The Nigerian economic problemS278 surfaced in 1978 when the oil prices slumped 
and reached its alarn-iing stage with the precipitous decline in oil prices in 198 1. The 
austerity measures of the Obasanjo regime and the economic stabilisation programme of 
the Shagari regime failed to redress the economic problems, and the regimes began 
excessive external borrowing. The Shagari regime refused to swallow the EMY-World 
Bank bitter pills of reforms, and its successor Buhan regime maintained the belligerent 
posture to the EMT despite curtailing the fiscal profligacy of the government279. The 
persistence of the economic crisis and another massive decline in oil prices in 1985, 
compelled the Babaginda regime to succumb to the dictates of UMT and World Bank's 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986. Thereafter, financial deregulation 
would become the cornerstone of Nigerian economic policy. 
3.5 The Legislative and Governance Structure of Nigeria 
The legislative and governance structure of Nigeria is dependent on the type of 
political regime in power. Civilian regimes had practised both the parliamentary280 and 
presidential281 systems of government whereby the legislative powers for the federation 
were vested in the National Assembly which comprised the Senate and the House of 
RepresentativeS282. The modes of exercising the powers were specified in the 
Constitution283. The executive powers were vested in the President284, whilst the cabinet 
278. See Okigbo. (1993) op. cit. P. 126. 
279. See Olukoshi. Adebayo. 0., (ed. ). op. cit. pp. 6-7. 
280. This was the system of government between 1960 and 1966 
( First Republic 
28 1. This system was in operation between 1979 and 1983 ( 
Second Republic 
282. See S. 4 of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (as amended 
283. See S. 54. ibid. 
"84 2, See S. 5. ibid. 
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possessed powers under the parliamentary government. The judicial powers of the country 
were exclusively allocated to the Judiciary'". 
This constitutional distribution of powers have been irrelevant under military 
regimes that have predominantly ruled Nigeria . 
The legislative powers of the military 
government are absolute and unlimited, and there is no legally prescribed procedure for 
law-making286. The Decree merely provides that the " power of the Federal Military 
Government to make law shall be exercised by means of Decree signed by the Head of the 
Federal Military Government"287, and that a decree is made when it is signed by the Head 
of the Federal Military Government288 . This 
is the circumstances in which a n-fflitary ruler 
becomes the supreme authority in Nigeria, and the manner of exercising legislative powers 
depends on his personal predilections. 
The powers for the determination of national policy on major issues are vested in 
Supreme Military CounciJ289, and those for policy guidelines on financial, economic and 
social matters are vested in the Federal Executive CounCiJ290. Both councils are presided 
over by the Head of State. The Judicial powers are granted to the Judiciary subject to the 
powers of the military government to exclude, or delimit such powerS291' or vests it in a 
Tribunal. With respect to banking regulation, the judiciary has been passive because of the 
285. See S. 6. ibid. 
286. See Nwabueze. B. 0., Military Rule And Constitutionalism, Spectrum Law Publishing. Lagos. (1992). 
p. 8. 
287. See for example SS. 3(l) of Constitution (Suspension and Modification) 
Decree No. I of 1984. 
288 ication) Decree No. I of 1984. The 
. 
See for example SS. l&2 of Constitution (Suspension and Modif 
body is now called Provisional Ruling Council. 
289. SCC S. 10, ibid. 
290. SCe S. I Libid. 
291. See S. 1(2)(b) of the Federal Military Government ( Supremacv and Enforcement of 
Powers) Decree 
1984. See Abiola. Qjo-. Constitutional Law and Military Rule in Nigeria. 
Evans Brothers (Nigeria 
Publishers) Limited. lbadan, Nigeria. (1987). p. 133. 
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provision in the banking laws which tend to restrict judicial challenges of actions of 
banking regulators. Section 49 (1) of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Decree of 
1991 provides: 
Neither the Federal Government nor the Bank nor any Officer of that 
Government or Bank, shall be subject to any action, claim or demand 
by or liability to any person in respect of anything done or omitted to be 
done in good faith in pursuance or in execution of, or in connection with 
the execution or intended execution of any power conferred upon that 
Government, the Bank or such officer, this Decree'92. 
This provision which is identical to section 36 (1) of the repealed Banking 
Decree293 of 1969 has been interpreted to restrict the scope of challenges of Nigerian 
banking regulator in Merchant Bank Ltd V. Federal Ministry of Finance294. 
This is the nature of legislative and governance structure that influenced financial 
regulation and deregulation in Nigeria since military regimes occupy the government for 
most periods under consideration. It also explains the reason for paucity of banking law 
during the short-lived second Republic in Nigeria. The civilian regime utilised the banking 
laws enacted by the military rather than embarked on cumbersome legislative procedure 
under the constitution. 
3.6 State, Elite, and Economy 
The political disarray and inept econoMic policies which characterise the Nigerian 
state are deeply rooted in colonial administration. The utilisation of politics for purely 
economic purposes appears to be the greatest bequest of the colonial administration to its 
political successors, the Nigefian elite. PiCCjotto295 has provided a schematic framework 
292. See Decree No. 25 of 1991 as amended. 
293. See Decree No. I of 1969 as rcpealed. 
294 
. 
119611 ALL NLR 598. See also the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Bank of Credit & 
Commerce International V. Bank of England reported in The Tinics of 5/12/98, p. 30. 
295. See Picciotto, Sol., " Fimi and State in the World Economy ". in Faundez and Picciotto (eds. ). op. cit 
pp. 217 - 225. 
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that demonstrates the nature of corporation as political and economic body in mediaeval 
Europe. This framework is useful in analysing the interelationship of politics and 
economics in Nigeria. 
The Royal Niger Company enjoyed partial state sovereignty and state support in 
its acquisition of parts of Nigeria, and expansion of trading power over the acquired 
territory. Indeed, the Chairman of Royal Niger Company, Sir Goldie Taubman, was 
regarded as the father of Nigeria. A company like Royal Niger Company was not a mere W 
private venture rather "in many cases monarchs personally initiated the formation of such 
companies, and they and layers of the nobility both lent their status to the enterprises as 
well as participating in them financially"296. This was the lesson that the Nigerian elite 
learnt from the colonialists about the relationship between economics and politics. 
The Nigerian elite in the post-independent era gravitated towards the state in order 
to use it to achieve economic and social power. The inheritors of colonial power tried "to 
build a material base by using its political power to generate economic power"297. The 
machinery for transmitting political power into wealth is state intervention in economic 
activities. The benefits of state interventionism in terms of wealth, power, patronage and 
status for the Nigerian elite propelled not only increased interventionIsm but also a 
"struggle for power of unprecedented intensity"298 resulting in aggravated political 
instability. 
The economic interests which underlie political governance in the country render 
political and economic competition normless, with a tendency "to violate the legitimate 
methods of contestation to whatever degree necessary to capture and retain power"299 
296. Ibid. p. 218. 
297. See Akc. Claude.. " The Nigenan state : antmomics of a pcriphery formation " in Ake. Claude.. (ed. ). 
Political Econoniv Of Nigena, Longman. Essex, (1985). p. 19. 
298. Loc. cit. 
299. Scc Diamond. op. cit.. p. 297. 
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The Nigerian elite appeal to ethnicity and tribalism to mask class struggle for access to 
economic power. The desperate struggle is to win the control of state power as such 
"control means for all practical purposes being all powerful and owin everything. Politics 9 
11300 becomes warfare, a matter of life and death 
Economic factors therefore dominate the political power struggle in Nigeria. The 
military interventions in politics in the country are also motivated by the foregoing 
considerations. The soldiers have "tasted politics and they know the money is there"301 
Indeed, the dominant factor in Nigerian politics is the ambition of indiVidual officer in the 
Nigerian Army for political power, hence the country is described as a nation where 
"every soldier see himself as a potential president "302 
The foregoing provides an insight into the circumstances in which politics 
predominate economic policy, regulation and reforms in Nigeria. It also articulates the 
interrelationship between economics and political instability. Any proposition for 
economic and financial reforms must be formulated within the context of the schematic 
interaction between politics and economics. A neglect of this reality will doom any reform 
proposal to failure with disastrous consequences. The state in Nigeria is not impartial or 
regarded as impartiaJ303 
In fact, economic regulation of whatever shade is partial and politicised, and a toot 
for the economic advancement of the ruling class hence, the fundamental necessity for 
"adequate institutional"304 arrangement to ensure its neutrality. Specific rules "regulating, 
checking, controlling and canalising dysfunctional elite behaviour"301 in Nigeria have been 
300. see Ake. Claude., (1982)- pp. 1162-3. 
301. See Ne%NsN%-cck, Atigust 10.1992. 
302. See NNNabuezc (1993). op. cit p. 334. 
303. See Ake (1985). op. Cit. P. 10. 
304. Loc. cit. 
305. See Graf. William. D.. The Nigerian State. James Currey. London. (1988) p. 244. 
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advocated, while the arrest of state expansion, and promotion of economic pluralism and 
pfivate initiatives in some views appear crucial to stem economic irrationality and political 
instability. 
3.7 Conclusions 
The sole motivation of British colonial incursion into Nigeria was purely 
commercial to enable British industrialists and traders to secure tradeable goods and raw 
material like cotton, cocoa and rubber. Many of the geo-political problems of the modem 
Nigeria such as unequal development, northern domination, educational differences are 
rooted in colonial administration. These political and economic diversities remain the 
serious problems of the Nigerian state now plagued by political instability. 
The high incidence of political instability may be attributed to prebendal 
politicking, clientelism, and the economic quest for wealth by Nigerian elite through the 
machinery of the state. In stfiking resemblance to the British colonial'sts, the Nigerian 
elite regards politics as the instrument of economic advancement. Politics therefore 
becomes war of attfition, and capital accumulation of the elite dominates all state 
economic and political policies through interventionism. This is the political structure 
that overris and shapes financial regulation and deregulation in Nigeria. 9 I=) 
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CHAPTERIV 
THE EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING 
SECTOR IN THE PRE-LIBERALISATION ERA (1892-1985) 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examýines the evolution and structure of the Nigerian banking system 
in the pre-liberalisation era. Its main theme is that banking regulation in Nigeria during the 
period under review was determined by the historical evolution of the banks, the socio- 
political and economic circumstances of the country, and the classical theory of financial 
regulation. 
The chapter has six sections. The first section contains the introduction. The 
second section traces the evolution of the banking sector. The third, fourth and fifth 
sections identify and discuss the three different eras of financial regulation of the Nigerian 
banking system. The sixth section analyses the fourth era of financial regulation in Nigeria 
and underscores the factors that influenced the regulatory shift in the post-independent 
Nigeria. It is concluded in the seventh section that banking regulation in Nigeria was 
largely laissez-faire prior to 1968 when financial regulation became increasingly 
interventionist. Many factors underpinned the regulatory shift including the Nigerian 
political system, the growth of economic nationalism and socialism, the Nigerian civil war 
and the influence of the classical theorists. 
4.2 Evolution of the Banking Sector 
The seeds of the modern financial system in Ni eria'06 were sown ýý-Ith the 9 
eradication of the commodity currencies prevalent in the pre-banking era. Prior to the 
306. The Nigcriaii financial sector embraces all its financial entities and can be classified into the 
monetary and non-nionetarýý financial institutions. The institutions consist of the central bank, the 
banking sector , the non- 
bank financial intermediaries. the money and capital markets. The ob, . lect 
of this 
study is the banking sector. and the term bank used to be a generic term for commcrcial bank. merchant 
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incursion of the colonialists, Nigeria had developed a functional political and economic 
system with a regime of multiple currencies and a barter economy. With the ascendancy 
of the colonial rulers, the British currency was superimposed on the commodity currencies 
in order to encourage uniformity and monetarisation of the traditional society. 
It is the abolition of the commodity currencies that foreshadowed the emergence 
of the modem financial institutions because ' financial institutions could not develop until 
barter economy gave way to the money economy' 307. Thus, the evolutionary starting 
point of the Nigerian modem banking sector in 1892 may be traced to the period of the 
standardisation of currency. 
4.2.1 Standardisation of Currency 
Cotton, gin, cowrie shell, and rum were the commodity currencies prevalent in 
Nigeria during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries .A number of 
imported currencies 
also migrated and circulated in the Colony and hinterland308. Imported currencies such as 
Spanish doubloon, American gold double-eagle, the half eagle and eagle, Mexican dollar, 
and Austrian Maria Theresa dollar had fixed exchange rates to the cowrie shells that were 
the primary local medium of exchange. Ekpo309 reported that in 1820 one Maria Theresa 
dollar was worth two thousand shells, and in 1851 two thousand five hundred shells were 
equal to one Spanish doubloon. 
The British gold sovereign, the British silver and bronze coins were introduced in 
1825310. Subsequently, the British colonial authority embarked on an era of sporadic 
bank, an acceptance house, discount house and financial institution. See S. 41 of the Banking Decree No. 
I of 1969 as amended by the Banking ( Amendment ) Decree No. 88 of 1979. 
307. W. Okefic Uzoaga. "A Survey of Nigeria's Modem Financial System " in Onoh, J. K. (cd). The 
Foundations of Nigeria's financial Infrastructure, Croom Helm Ltd, London. (1980). p. 3 1. 
308. See Walter Ofonagoro. Trade and Imperialism in Southern Nigeria 1881- 1929, New York. NOK 
(1979) p. 91. 
309. Ekpo. Evo. Nigeria And The Evolution Of Money. Central Bank- of Nigeria. Lagos. Nip-cria. (1979) 
P. 91. 
310. lbid 
76 
legislation to end the multiplicity of currencies. Governor Ussher fired the legal salvo 
through the Ordinance No. 2 of II May 1880 that demonetised all the cadre of currencies 
then in existence within ten days, and imposed British silver coins as the only legal tender 
effective from 21 May 1880 311 . 
In 1904, the importation of cowrie shells was prohibited and criminalised in order 
to eliminate them as monetary units. The other species of commodity currencies like 
manilla and metal currencies were demonetised by the Native Currencly Repeal Ordinance 
of 1911 so that the monetary hegemony of the British coins became firmly established in 
1912312. 
Following their introduction in 1880, the use of British coins gradually spread 
beyond the Colony to other parts of the country upon the territorial expansion of the 
British rule into the hinterlands. Consequently, the utility of the silver coins both for 
administrative and commercial purposes increased tremendously. The problems of 
transportation and safety of the silver coins from the British Royal Mint spurred Mr 
George William Neville, the Lagos agent of the shipping firm, Messrs Elder Dempster and 
company, to moot the idea of the establishment of a bank in LagoS311. The chairman of 
Elder Dempster and Co., Alfred Lewis Jones, accepted the idea and requested the Affican 
Banking Corporation to open a branch in Lagos. 
In 1892, the Aftican Banking Corporation (ABC) opened its branch in Lagos with 
the approval of the colonial office, and became the first bank established in Nigeria. Its 
birth signified the arrival of the Western banking system to the Nigerian financial sector. ýI 
111 
- 
See P. N. C. Okigbo, op cit.. p. 76. 
312. Ibid., P. 77- 
313 
. 
Sce E kpo, Eyo. op cit.. p. 9 2. 
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4.3 Era of Laissez-Faire: The Growth of the Banking System(1892 -1952) 
The seventy year period examined here could be called the era of laissez-faire or 
free banking 314 due to the absence of banking regulation. Any person could establish a 
bank provided the company was registered under section 2(l) of the 1922 Companies 
Ordinance and complied with section 105 of the said Ordinance under which a banking 
company must render a half-yearly statement of its liabilities and assets, and exhibit the 
same in a conspicuous place in its office. It was in this free banking era that the first bank 
in Nigeria began operation. 
The Aftican Banking Corporation (ABC) commenced business in Lagos and was 
also appointed the banker to the Colonial Government with partial monopoly to import 
silver coins from the Royal Mint and regulate their circulation. The bank's operation was 
however short-lived315 and came to an end in 1893 when the bank transferred its Lagos 
interest to Messrs Elder Dempster andC0316. 
Although, the ABC operation abruptly ceased, the commercial and administrative 
needs of a bank persisted. Hence, in March 1894, a joint stock bank namely Bank of 
British West Affica (BBWA) was incorporated in London with an authorised capital of 
1100,000. The BBWA opened its office in Lagos and succeeded to the function and 
pnvileges of the ABC. It extended its tentacles to other parts of Nigena'17 and West 
Africa. In 1899, the Anglo- African Bank was established and in 1905 changed its name 
to Bank of Nigeria. The Bank of Nigeria merged with BBWA on 20 June 1912. Several 
314 
. 
SCC (;. 0. Nwankwo, op. cit., p. 45. 
315. Due to economic depression as a result of the Egba-Ijebu intercine hostilities and alleged 
malpractices of Elder Dempster management in Lagos, 
316 
. 
Loc. cit. 
317. The bank is now known as the First Bank of Nigeria. 
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other banks such as Colonial Bank318,, British and French Bank for Commerce and 
Industry319, International Bank for West AfiiCa320, and Bank of America321 emerged on 
the Nigerian banking system. 
A common characteristic of these early banks is that all belonged to the category 
called expatriate banks because their capital was entirely foreign -owned. This made them 
susceptible to accusations that they engaged in discriminatory acts against Nigerians in 
their credit operationS322, denied them loan facilities and often humiliated theM323. 
SchartZ324, however, defended the expatriate banks against the allegation, and Professor 
Nwankwo contends that "in most cases the accusation is either not founded or 
misplaced"325. 
The expatriate banks were also assailed for servicing the export and import trade 
rather than financing indigenous industry in Nigeria. They pointedly refused to contribute 
to the economic development of the country but 'geared their efforts and resources 
318. The bank is now known as the Union Bank of Nigeria and has 60% of its equities vested in 
Nigerians. 
319. In 1956, the bank removed the words "for Commerce and Industry" from its name, and in October 
196 1, its Nigerian branches were taken over by a new bank, the United Bank for Africa which was 
incorporated in Lagos. The bank is still a leading financial institution with mAjority ownership by 
Nigerians. 
320. This was established in 1959 in Kano. Its ownership had since been mutualised. 
32 1. Some other foreign banks also established branches in Nigeria in the early 1960s. These were Bank 
of America, Chase Manhattan, Bank of India, and Arab Bank which established in 1960,1961, and 1962 
respectively. 
322. See P. N. C. Okigbo, op. cit., p. 85. 
323 
. 
See Zik. Selected speeches of Dr Nnamdi Azildwe, Cambridge, (196 1), p. 212. 
324. Schatz, Sayre P; Nigerian Capitalism, University of California Press Ltd. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, California, U. S. A. (1977). 
325. See GO Nwankwo, The Nigerian Financial System, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, Hong Kong. 
(1980) p. 7 1. 
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towards achievement of Britain's national economic objectr-,, eS' 326. Perhaps the greatest 
objection to the expatriate banks was that they invested their deposits and other resources 
in the London capital market to the detriment of the Nigerian financial systeM327. 
4.3.1 Indigenous Banks 
The laissez-faire era also witnessed the birth of numerous indigenous banks and 
ushered in the period of n-ýnimalist regulation. Resentment at the discriminatory and 
contemptuous treatment by expatriate banks imbued the Nigerians with the desire to 
establish indigenous bankS328 that would neutralise the financial edge of the European 
banks. In 1929, the first indigenous bank -Industrial and Commercial Bank Limited came 
into being, but went into liquidation in the following year. Another bank called the 
Nigerian Mercantile Bank was floated in 1931 and existed until 1936 when it shut its 
doorS 329. 
On II February 1933, the National Bank of Nigeria was established by some 
indigenous business men330 amidst the econorMc depression. The bank weathered the 
storm and remained the oldest indigenous bank as at 1985 (the end of the pre-liberalisation 
In 1945, the Agbomagbe Bank332 era) having existed for fifty-two yearS331. was 
326. Sce Olukonyinsola Ajayi. Financial and Legal Implications of the Nigerian Capital Market, Evans 
Brothers (Nigeria Publishers) Ltd, lbadan, Nigeria, (1984) pp. 29 -3 1. 
327. Ibid., pp. 29 -30. 
328. The tcrrn indigenous banks refer to banks whose capital Nvas entirely o%, vned by Nigerian capitalists. 
This is incontradistinction to the foreign or expatriate banks with foreign owned capital. 
129. Ekpo. Evo, op cit.. p. 47. 
330. Over the years, the ownership of the bank had been transferred from the private holders to the 
Governnicnt of Wcstern Nigcna now succeeded by Oýo, Ondo, and Ogun States respectively. 
331 
. 
Sce P. N. C. Okigbo, op cit., p. 86. 
The bank's narne had been changed to WEMA BANK with the ownership now %, csted in the earlier- 
mentioned successors to the GoN errinmit of Western Nigena. 
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incorporated with an authonsed capital of N10,000. Inspite of liquidity problems, it 
survived through several lifeboat operations of the Western Nigerian Government which 
eventually acquired it. 
The good fortunes of Agbomagbe Bank did not extend to another bank formed in 
the same year under the name of Nigeria Penny Bank which failed in 1946. The perennial 
failure of the indigenous banks with the attendant losses to the depositors forced the 
Colonial Government to ponder on the advisability of enacting legislation providing for the 
control of the establishment and operation of banking corporations. The demise of Penny 
Bank in particular created the necessary consensus between the Government and banks on 
the desirability of a controlling legislation for enterprises engaged in banking business in 
333 the interest of the general public and the banking commurfity 
4.4 Era of Minimalist Regulation (1952 - 1958) 
The Government established a commission of inquiry on 7 September, 1948 under 
Mr G. D. Paton of the Bank of England with the duty of recommending the form and 
extent of banking control which should be introduced334. The commission submitted its 
report on 25 October 1948, and about three and a half years thereafter on 22 May 1952 
, the 
Nigerian legislature enacted 'An Ordinance for the Regulation of the Business of 
Banking'. Thus., the 1952 Banking Ordinance emerged as the first banking regulation in 
Nigeria. 
It is therefore apposite to assert that the first attempt at regulation of the Nigerian 
banking industry was motivated by endemic environmental factors, to wit the failure of 
indigenous banks and the consequent injury to the public. The enactment of the 1952 
Banking Ordinance signalled the end of the laissez-faire era, and the beginning of the 
period of minimalist regulation marked by meagre regulatory requirements. 
333. Sce G. O. Nwankwo (1980). op cit.. p. 47. 
334. See Charles V. Brown. The Nigerian Banking System, George Allen & UnNNin Ltd. London, (1966). 
P.. 3 1. 
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The main regulatory features of the 1952 Banking Ordinance consisted of liberal 
rules of entry and exit335, capital and reserveS336, reserve fund337 and rules on lending 
restrictionS338, cash reserveA 39 and dividend restrictionS340. Section 3(2) of the 1952 
Banking Ordinance stipulated that the "incorporation of a company which has as its object 
or one of its objects the carrying on of banking shall not be registered unless its nominal 
capital is not less than twenty-five thousand pounds". The power of granting banking 
licence was vested in the Financial Secretary by Section 6 (1) which provided that " no 
company shall carry on banking in Nigeria unless it holds a licence granted by the Financial 
Secretary in such behalf'. 
A far-reaching provision designed to curtail insider abuse of the indigenous banks 
was contained in Section 7 (1) of 1952 Banki I ia ing Ordinance interal' 
No banking company shall make any loans or advances on the security 
of its own shares or grant unsecured loans or advances in excess of BOO 
to any one or more of its directors or to a firm or private company in which 
it or any one or more of its directors is interested as director, partner, 
manager or agent, or to any individual, firm or private company of whom 
or of which any one or more of its directors is a guarantor. 
The period of minimalist regulation was however short-lived and ended six years 
later for causes which had their origins in the closing years of the laissez- faire era, and 
some shortcomings of the Ordinance. Particularly between 1947 and 1952 the Nigerian 
financial system witnessed an unprecedented banking boom with a record time 
phenomenal increase in the banking companies registered in Nigeria. The exact figure of 
135. See S. 6 of the Banking Ordinance No. 15 of 1952. 
336. See S. 3 ibid. 
337. See S9 ibid. 
31N. See S. 7 ibid. 
339. Sce S. 8 ibid. 
340. See S. 10 ibid. 
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the emerging banks has been a subject of debate, but there is a general agreement that the 
number of banks ballooned341 during the period. 
Some of the reasoned opinions on the factors underpinning the banking boom were 
divided. There are suggestions it was occasioned by the diversion of the profits from the 
trade boom of the second World War into investment in banking342. Other views 
attributed the banking boom to the anticipattion and foreknowledge of Government's 
intention regarding the Paton Report 343 
The crux of the matter lies however in the banking crisis in which the emerging 
banks were involved soon after the passage of the 1952 Ordinance. The rate of failure of 
indigenous banks was such that by the time the 1952 Ordinance became fully operational 
in 1955 only two of the twenty-two emerging banks registered between 1947 and 1952 
had not collapsed. One of these, the Affican Continental Bank344(ACB) survived until 
recently. The other, the Merchant Bank, eventually collapsed in 1960 under the burden of 
fraud and bad management 
The catastrophic failure of most of the indigenous banks was often attributed to 
the monopolistic conducts of the expatriate banks which enjoyed the exclusive patronage 
of the British firmS345. Indeed, the real causal factors may be in corporate misconduct, 
341. The Financial Secretary in a statement to the Federal House of Assembly in 1952 put the number of 
the banking companies that registered bet-vveen 1947 and 1952 in Nigeria as 185 . The 
Central Bank of 
Nigeria in its study recorded that only twent-y-two banking companies registered in Nigefia between 1945 
and 1952. Dr C V. Brown indicates that no less than eighteen indigenous banks registered in the fifteen 
months bet, %N, cen Fcbniary 195 1 and Maý, 1952. Dr Pius Okigbo, on his own suggests that 25 banks were 
registered between 1928 and 1952. 
. 
142. G. O. N%vankwo (1980), op cit., p. 47. 
3-13. See W. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan, Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa. p. 108; See also. 
0. Teriba. "Nigeria's Indigenous Banks", Bankers' Magazine, (August. 1969) p. 79. 
344. The ACB had succeeded an earlier registered bank namely Tinubu Bank Limited on 29 October, 1947 
under its present name. All the shares of ACB's predecessor were subscribed by Dr Nnamdi Aziki%ve, but 
the Government of the Eastem Region of Nigeria later acquired interest in the bank. 
345 
. 
See Adeoloyin Soyibo, and Femi Adekanyc, The Nigerian Banking Systern in the context of policies 
of financial regulation and deregulation. AERC Research paper 17. Nairobi. (Dec. 1992) p. 3. 
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counterfeiting, gross under- capitalisation, reckless branch expansion346, or as graphically 
stated by one failed bank in its winding up notice "---persistent stealing, bad management, 
inexperienced accounting ---- 11347. 
However, the litany of bank failures had an impact on the existing regulatory 
structure. It exposed the defects of 1952 Ordinance, and by implication made regulatory 
failure culpable for the bank failure. The inadequacies and lacunae of the said Ordinance 
such as inadequate rules on reserve fund, liquidity requirements, and absence of rules on 
business restrictions, banking examination, and approved auditors came under close 
scrutiny, and was reinforced by the World Bank's recommendation of 'further guidance 
and support for Affican Banking' 348 in Nigeria. In the midst of barrage of attacks against 
the 1952 Ordinance, it was not surprising that the Loynes Report349 recommended a fresh 
regulation, and the new Banking Act of 1958, together with the Central Bank of Nigeria 
Actl also of 1958, came into operation . 
4.5 Era of Liberal Regulation (1958 - 1968) 
With these pieces of legislative innovations, the period of n-tinimalist regulation 
ended and a new regime of liberal financial regulation characterised by the permissive 
nature of its dictates, flourished. The regulatory stipulations of the 1958 Banking Act 
mainly consisted of liberal entry and exit ruleS150, capital and reserve fund ruleS351 , rules on 
346 See G. O. NNNinkwo (1980). op cit.. p. 49. 
3-47 
. The defunct Standard Bank of Nigeria Limited. Daily Times- 
September 24.1952. This bank had 
no relationship with the Standard Bank that later became First Bank of Nigefia. 
348 
. 
See International Bank Of Reconstruction and Development. The Econorruc Development of 
Nigeria, Johns Hopkins University Press. (1954). P. 98. 
349. The Federal Govcmnient commissioned a study by Mr JB de Loynes in 1958 to report on the 
establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria and the ancillary matters. See Report by J. B . Loynes on 
"The establishment of a Nigenan Central Bank. the Introduction of a Nigerian Currency and other 
Associated matters " Nigerian Secretariat Library No. 214 B. Unix-crsity of Lagos Library edition, 1957. 
See S. 3 of the Banking Act 1958. Cap 19. 
351. See SS. 4 and 5 ibid. 
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business operations and functions'52, dividend restrictionS353 banking exan-ýnation3 _5 4 
special exarnination355, approved auditorS356and liquidity requirementS357 
The Central Bank of Nigeria Act of 1958 also conferred certain financial 
regulatory powers on the Bank which included powers to prescribe liquidity requirements, 
rediscount rates, and to engage in open market operationS358. Section 31 of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria ACt359 stated that the "Bank shall make public at all times its minimum 
rediscount rate". Section 40(l) of the same IaW360 empowered the CBN to "prescribe from 
time to time by publication in the Gazette the minimum amount of specified liquid assets 
which each bank operating in Nigeria under the Banking Act is required to hold". 
The general powers of the CBN was preserved under Section 29 (1)(f) of the said 
IaW361 which stated that subject to any express proVision of the law the CBN may 
"generally conduct business as a bank, and do all such things as are incidental to or 
consequential upon the exercise of its powers or the discharge of its duties under this 
352. Scc S. 7 ibid. 
353. See S. 6 ibid. 
354. See SS. II and 13 ibid. 
355. See S. 12 ibid. 
356. SeC S. 1-5 ibid. 
357 
. 
See S. 8 ibid. 
-158. The establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria had regulatory. political and economic motivations. 
Firstly, the West African Currency Board (WACB) did not provide a distincti,, 'c national currencý- 
prerequisite for an independent country. since the WACB currency circulated in four British Colonies of 
West Africa. Secondly, there was no specialised financial monetary management training for Nigerians 
Thirdly. the developments of indigenous financial institutions as well as money and capital markets were 
neglected. 
'59. See Central Bank of Nigeria Ordinance, Cap. 30 of 1958. 
See Central Bank of Nigeria Ordinance. Cap. 30 of 1958 as amended by Central Bank of Nigeria 
(Amendment) Act No. 17 of 1962. 
i Ordinance. Cap. 30 of 1958. . 
Sce Ccntral Bank- of Niger a 
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Ordinance" This regime prevailed until 1968 when an avalanche of new regulation was 
unleashed on the banking industry. 
The justfication. for the regime of liberal regulation can be located in the historical 
circumstances surrounding its inauguration. The Government was determined that the 
embarrassing failure of the indigenous banks would not be repeated. Thus, the additional 
step in the establishment of a regulatory authority- Central Bank of Nigeria " to monitor, 
regulate and check the practice of commercial banking was all calculated to restore 
confidence of the public in this vital sector of the financial system" 362 
Indeed, as early as 1952 Late Dr K. O. Mbadiwe had moved a private member's 
motion in the House of Representatives for the establishment of a Central Bank in Nigeria 
to facilitate internal monetary management and international monetary co-operation. The 
House upon deliberation decided on a feasibility study in the first instance. Consequently, 
Mr J. L. Fisher of Bank of England was appointed to conduct the study. In his report, Mr 
Fisher opined that 'it would be inadvisable to contemplate the establishment of a central 
bank at the moment'363. The report provoked resentment from the nationalists and was 
effectively jettisoned when the World Bank mission364 which visited Nigeria inl953 
examined the issue and recommended a'State Bank of Nigeria'with limited functions 365. 
Thus, in 1957, the services of Mr J. B. de Loynes, an adviser of the Bank of 
England was engaged to make recommendations on 'the establishment of a Nigerian 
Central Bank, the introduction of a Nigeria currency and other associated matters '. De 
3o2 
. 
P. N. C. Okigbo. op cit p. 92. 
. 163. Report by J. L. Fisher on' The desirability and practicability of establishing a Central Bank in 
Nigeria as an instniment for promoting the economic development of the Countn-' (Lagos - Government 
Printer. 1956) p. 18. 
364. See Uche. Chibuike. U.. " Bank of England vs the IBRD. Did the Nigefian Colony Desen-c a Central 
Bank? ". (1997) 34 Explorations In Economic History. . 
220 at p. 213. 
365 IBRD Rcport. op cit.. p. 56. 
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Loynes recommended the establishment of the Central Bank of Nigenia (CBN)366, and a 
draft legislation based almost entirely on his report was promulgated in 1958. 
The success of the regulatory change is illustrated by the fact that no bank failure 
occurred throughout the life span of regime of liberal regulation which made impossible 
the extravagant banking expansion of the preceding era. Between 1959 and 1962 only 
eleven banks were incorporated or registered in Nigeria, making the total number 
seventeen367 
4.6 From Laissez-Faire to Banking Interventionism in Nigeria: The Post 
Independence Experience 
The immediate post- independent Nigerian banking system relied almost 
exclusively on traditional colonial-era regulatory measures and the period was described as 
largely liberal368. However, the honeymoon with the colonial regulatory legacies was 
short-lived. The years 1968 and 1969 signalled the " break "369 with English law by 
Nigerian banking regulations. Before these developments, the English bureaucrats had 
retumed home and their positions had been taken over by NigefianS370. Hence the break 
was total. 
The landmark years of 1968 and 1969 witnessed a transformation of the Nigerian 
banking regulatory environment. In these years, the Central Bank of Nigeria Ordinance of 
1958 was subjected to sporadic and intermittent changes, and the Banking Ordinance of 
366 
. 
Loynes Rcport. op cit.. p. 4. 
367 
. Teriba , 
0. (1970) " The development of banking habit in Nigeria "a paper presented at the Annual 
Seminar of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers , 12 -17 
October. 
368. See Akanle. 0.. " Regulation Of Trade And Investment In Nigeria " in Ajomo. M. A., Akanle 
Oluwole. & Adewale Oniobolaii , (eds. ) 
Regulation Of Trade And Investment In An Era Of Structural 
Adjustment : The Affican Expenence, Nigerian Institute Of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos, (199-5) p. 43. 
3"). See Sofola. Olatokunbo. The Nigerian Law Of Consumer Credit And Security. ( Ph. D. thesis. King's 
College. Universit) of London, April 1988 ) p. 219, 
370. See Brown. C. V.. Op-cit.. PP. 142 &144. 
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1958 was abrogated and replaced. The 1968 amendment to the CBN Ordinance alone 
endowed the CBN with seven additional regulatoqy powerS371 
The 1968 and 1969 amendments bequeathed the CBN with far -reaching powers 
of direct financial regulation of the banks. These consisted of powers to prescribe and 
vary cash reserves, specified liquid assets, special deposits and stabilisation 
securitieS372. The additional powers included powers to regulate the maximum and 
minimum interest rates, direct loans to specified persons, and fix ceilings on the volume or 
aggregate amount of loans, advances and discounts outstanding or granted by any bank373 
Section 2(l) of Central Bank of Nigena Act (Amendment) (No. 3) of 1968 stipulated that 
the "Central Bank may, after consultation with the Commissioner prescribe a minimum 
ratio of total loans, advances and discounts, granted to indigenous persons, to be 
maintained by each bank licensed under the Banking Act". 
The 1969 Banking Decree imposed new regulatory requirements on the banks 
including restrictive rules on entry and exit, new rules on capital and reserves, restrictive 
business operations rules, cash reserves, specified liquid assets, special deposits, 
stabilisation securities, interest rate regulation, advertisement and branching restriction 
ruleS374 
This era of regulatory interventionism further impacted on the existing banking 
structure in remarkable ways. It instigated the predominance of public ownership of the 
banking sector, and the converse relative absence of privately owned indigenous banks. 
371. See Onoli, J. K.. " Commercial Banks'Deposit Liabilities And Credit Generation " in Onoh, J. K.. 
(ed. ), op. cIt., p. 89. 
372. See S. 40 of the Central Bank of Nigena Act Cap 30 Laws of Federation of N, gefia and Lagos 1958. 
as aniended by Decree No. 4 of 1969. 
373. See S. 40 of the Central Bank of Nigena Act Cap '10 Laws of Federation of Nigeria and Lagos 1958, 
as amended by Decree No. 4 of 1969. See also S. 2 of the Central Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Decree 
(No. 3) Decree No. 5o of 1968. 
374. See SS. 2,4.6,12.13. and 14 of the Banking Decree No. I of 1969. 
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The ownership of the so called expatnate banks was compulsorily nationalised such that 
their authentic classification became 'mixed bank. The consequence of this regulatory shift 
was the abandonment of the British regulatory mechanisms and its attendant reliance on 
traditional control measures for the Nigerian regulatory methods with emphasis on direct 
regulatory measures. 
The sudden and firm rejection of the British and World Bank mission's inspired 
traditional modes of financial regulation in Nigefia can be traced to many factors. Some of 
these factors relate to the specificity of the Nigerian political system, while the others are 
economic, intellectual and general in nature. These factors will now be discussed. 
4.6.1 Nigerian Political System and Financial Regulation 
The shift into financial regulatory interventionism was influenced and facilitated by 
the socio -politicality of the Nigerian society. The efficacy of banking regulations and the 
realisation of the hegemonic functions of the central bank are indeed "closely connected 
with the political attitudes of the countries concerned and cannot, therefore be dealt With 
exclusively as technical questions 11375 
With regard to the peculiafities of the Nigerian nation, the first critical particularity is 
the fusion and homogeneity of the political, economic, and the military classes into one all- 
embracing crony capitalist clan. The Nigerian businessmen propelled regulatory 
. This interventionism through a phenomenon called " Our Government " 
mentality376 
phenomenon therefore made the demand for selective allocation of credit to the business 
class and preferential financial access inevitable. It also culTMnated in the increasing 
375. SCC Ricker- Fleetwood, E.. op. cit.. p. 55. 
-176. This Nvas founded on the belief that the Nigenan government ( "our govemment must not only 
create a conducive economic atmosphere and business support. but " that the government should aid 
Nigenan businessmen in direct, personal, day-to-day. and iminediatcly tangible ways " see Schatz, SaN re. 
P.. op. cit pp. 84 - 85. 
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agitation for governmental intervention in the banking industry since the " government has 
to a significant extent been popularly conceived of as a bestower of benefits "377. 
The British complicity in the emergence of an economic cum political class in a setting 
that was conducive to the abuse of political power in Nigeria has been underscored. A 
policy of bolstering those considered as the responsible elements of the Nigerian 
population was employed by the colonialists. According to Lee " (T)he British were not 
unaware that those coming to power in the colonies tended to constitute an economic as 
11378 well as a political class, but did not want to discuss it publicly 
In the circumstances, the predominantly self seeking political class used the attainment 
of political power for personal enrichment and political entrenchment379 and found the 
banking sector in Nigeria as the most accessible source of funds. It is pertinent to recall 
here Professor Galbraith's assertion that "(P)ower serves the acquisition of income, 
income accords power over the pecuniary reward of others"380 
The regulatory and governmental intervention in the banking sector was 
considered by the political class as a means of rewarding ffiends and punishing enemieS381 
A sefious damaging charactenstic of the political class that regulated and owned the C, ý- 
banking sector in Nigeria is according to Professor Ladipo the " pathological desire of 
Nigerians, especially the politicians, to amass individual wealth within the shortest time 
possible"382which led to a "general failure in Nigena to distinguish between public, party 
377 
. see Post, 
K. W. J.. The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959: Politics and Administration in a 
Developing Political System, Oxford University Press, London. (1963). p. 390. 
378. See Lee, John. M., Colonial Development and Good Government. Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1967). p. 
98. 
379. See Schatz. op. cit.. p. 161. 
380. See Galbraith, I K.. The Good Society: The Humane Agenda. Sinclair-Stevenson. Great 
Bntain, (1996) p. 65. 
""'. Sec Schatz. op. cit.. p. 164. 
- 
SL grian Economic Development And International Externalities, ( Inau-g-ural -l' I -e Ladipo. 0.0., Ni 
Ucture Series 79. Obafenii A%volowo Uni%crsity. January 14,1986 ) p. 8. 
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and private financial interestS"383. The structure of the political and econon-k power 
enabled a few Nigerians to gain control of the government apparatus largely for the 
promotion of personal interest under the guise of public control and state interest. As 
David Calle0384 admirably contends the State tries to take over the commercial market 
place and the interest groups try to take over the State. 
The tendency of the Nigerian political class to cause destructive distress to the 
banking sector had been observed and recognised by the World Bank mission in 1953 
hence the mission cautioned against close affinity between the government under the 
political class and the banking sector385. The political trend also influenced the mission's 
recommendation of the transference of banking supervision from the Ministry of Finance 
to a State Bank (CBN). 
Indeed, within a short time span of the mission's report eminent politicians like Dr 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, the former premier of the Eastern Region of Nigeria and first President 
of Federal Republic of Nigeria and Chief Obafemi AwoloW0386, former premier of the 
Western Region of Nigeria were implicated in banking irregularities involving the ACB 
and NBN before the Foster-Sutton387and Coker388 Judicial inquiry Tribunals, respectively. 
383. See Schatz. op. cit., p. 166. 
38-1. Cited in Okigbo. Pius., Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development, Vol. 3: GrovNih and 
Structure of the Nigeria Economy, Fourth Dimension Publishers. Enugu, (1993), p. 184. 
385. Sce The Economic Devclopment of Nigcria - IBRD. op. cit., p. 159 
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Ironically. it was the same Chief ANvolowo who later as the Federal Comnussioner for Finance and 
Vice -Chairman of the Federal Executive Council of Nigena directly supenlsed the evolution and 
intensification of regulatory intenentionism and Nigenan unorthod oxy in banking regulation in Nigeria. 
387. See Report of the Tribunal to inquire into allegations reflecting on the Official Conduct of the Premier 
of. and certain persons holding Ministerial and other Public Offices In The Eastern Region of Nigeria. 
(London, HMSO. Cmnd. 51.1957 ). 
388. See Report of Coker Comniission of Inquiry into the affairs of Certain Statutory Corporations in 
Western Nigeria 1962. ( Lagos. Federal Ministry of Information. 1962 
91 
Suffice it to recognise like Dr Okigbo that "(W)ith independence and intrusion of 
partisan politics into the financial system, direct and wanton interference in the 
administration of banks ...... polluted the system"389 and " intrusion of partisan politics in 
financial system destroyed it 11390 
This standardised political culture also typified the second civilian government of 
Nigeria . Professor Osunbor observes in respect of this regime that "under the guise of 
ensuring national control over this sector the grant of banking license became extremely 
restricted and a subject of political patronage with the result that the country became 
chronically underbanked and with very few branches . "391 The civilian rulers of the 1979 - 
83 also demonstrated " how government revenue could also be used to build personal and 
political empires at the expense of developmental philosophy "392 
This insight into the socio-political environment of financial regulation in Nigeria 
necessitates a digression into the military dimension of Nigerian politics and its consequent 
effect on financial regulation. Since 1966, the military regime393 has occupied a prominent 
position in Nigefian legal, political and financial system and history. 
The military rule in Nigeria has remarkable features of frequent legislative activity 
and legislative absolutism or supremacy and it was to these peculiarities that the massive 
regulatory and governmental interventionism in the banking sector owed their origin. 
Indeed, while the deposed civilian government was cautious and reluctant to embark on 
381). See Okigbo, Pius.. Essays in the Public Philosopky of Development. op. cit., p. 2 10. 
390. Loc. cit. 
391 
* See Osunbor. 0. A., " Trends In The 
Regulatory Framework In Banking Legislation From 1970 To 
1992 " in The Nigerian Banking And Finance In Transition: Shaping The Future. op. cit., p. 23. 
392. See Syngc. Richard., Nigeria to 1993- Will Liberalisation Work'? ( ElU Economic Prospects Senes. 
Business I riternational. Special Report No. 1134 ) p. 16. 
ý19-'. Militarv rule spans 29 out of the 38 Nears of Nigena's Independent existence till date. This pefiod has 
been charactefised by persistent instabilities of gover-nments. bureaucracy and policies including financial 
regulation. 
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further intervention, the military regimes constituted themselves into masters of financial 
repression and intervention. 
The difference of financial regulatory mechanisms under the military and civilian 
governments may be located in the absence of legally prescribed procedure for law making 
under the former and explains the reason why all the re latory repression of the banking gU 
sector in Nigeria occurred under the military rule. This nature of military lawmaking also 
ensured that in the financial regulatory creativity the "Government ........... became 
deprived of the benefit of ideas and opinions other than those tendered by public 
functionaries and perhaps by proximate decision -makers and others of the elite group 
within the corridors of power. "394 Perhaps it may be mentioned that despite the patent 
financial illiteracy of the core of military political leadership, the head of the final authority 
on monetary and banking policies in Nigeria under military regime has usually been a 
member of this novice class. 
The Nigerian military class shares the culture of personal enrichment, political 
entrenchment and massive corruption with its civilian political counterpart. Matter of 
factly, the political system in Nigeria "whether military or civilian, has usually been based 
on patronage"395 and rents remain important in the regulation of the banking sector and 
the Nigerian economy in general'96. This culture and the legislative nature of the military 
"397 re ime have given rise to "a highly personalised topology of the rules and re lationS gu 
in the banking sector. A common legacy of the endemic political culture of Nigeria has 
been the impairment of the bureaucracy including the financial bureaucrats at the CBN and 
394. See Ogunbanjo, C. 0.. Nigeria's economic and industrial development - which Nvay? ( Nash 
Publications, London, 1983 ) p. 46. 
5 -N- and . See Bevan. Da%id. Paul Collier. and Jan. William 
Gunning.. Nigerian Economic PoliL. 
Performance : 1981-92. ( Centre for the Study of African Economics, University ofoxford. May 1992 ) p. 
65. 
396. Ibid. p. 59. 
397. See Okigbo. Pius.. Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development. op. cit.. pp. 258-259. 
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Finance Ministry through politicisation, prebendalism, political paternalism, mediocrity and 
grave corruption. 
4.6.2 Banking Interventionism in Nigeria: General Underlying Factors 
The first raison d'etre of direct control of banking system is the growth of 
economic nationalism after the attainment of independence and republicanism that found 
expression in important legislation. Although the first republican government acted with 
guided caution and restraint in rebuffing the calls for nationalisation and state 
capitaliSM398, the succeeding military governments fanned the embers of economic 
nationalism and signified the change of attitude with the promulgation of laws with far 
reaching intervention in the banking sector such as the Banking Decrees which amended 
the CBN Act; the Banking Decree of 1969; the Companies Decree of 1968; and the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972. 
Another factor which facilitated the emergence of direct regulatory measures was 
the financing needs of the government. This is well encapsulated in the CBN assertion that 
"The government of the newly independent Nigerian nation, anxious to promote 
accelerated economic development , viewed the 
CBN as an instrument for mobilising 
development-oriented finance . In particular, the 
domestic financial system was expected 
to generate a substantial part of the funds projected in the development plan"399 
The other factor that propelled regulatory intervention in the banking sector was the 
ideological romance with socialism by succeeding governments. According to Professor 
Aboyade "everyone was fashionably one kind of socialist or another"400, and all sorts of 
socialism converged in Nigeria even though "(T)here was nothing on record to indicate 
398. See Ogunbanjo, C. 0., Nigeria - The Search for Economic Stability ( Onestop Design and Print. 
Great 
Britain. 1986 ) pp. 98 -101. 
399. See Twenty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria. op. cit.. p. 106. 
400. See Ojctun i Abovade. " The Economy Of Nigeria " in Peter Robson &D. A. Lurv ( eds. ). The 
Econoniv Of Africa Evanston : Northwestern University Press. 1969 ) pp. 191 -192. 
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that Nigerians were ' socialists' or 'communists' "401. Indeed, Ekundare401 contends that 
the philosophy behind the economic history of Nigeria is based on 'Competitive 
Capitalism', and SchatZ403 identifies varying typologies of capitalism in Nigerian Economic 
development. The role of socialism in regulatory intervention in Nigerian financial system 
can not be overstated. 
An additional significant reason was the intellectual and theoretical influences of 
some Western thinkerS404who challenged the efficacy of the traditional tools of control in 
developing countries. It is apposite to recall at this point that when Loynes was preparing 
the CBN Ordinance he was confronted with the issue of empowering the central bank with 
unorthodox weapons specially designed to meet Nigerian circumstances. He vehemently 
rejected the idea405. This regulatory dispensation was to avoid the monumental disaster 
which unorthodox regulatory tools had wrought in some European States. 
Another prominent intellectual thinker with considerable influence on Nigerian 
banking regulation is Dr. CharlesX. Brown who in his 'The Nigerian Banking System' 
labels the objectives of the CBN as one of the most conservative in the Commonwealth 
and explicitly expresses his major bias as the willingness to try unorthodox measures - 
what Loynes called 'rash experimentS'406. He doubted the efficacy of moral suasion in 
Nigeria in the absence of more powerful weapons and indicated the ineffectiveness of 
401. See Ekundare. Olufemi. R., An Economic Histoný of Nigeria 1860 - 1960. ( Methuen & Co. Ltd, 
London, 1973 ) p. 384. 
402. Ibid., p. 383. 
403 See Schatz. Sayre. P.. Nigerian Capitalism, ( Universitv Of California Press. Berkeley. Los Angeles, 
London. 1977 ) Chapter one. 
404. Professor R. S. Savers Nvas a leading flopre in this circle. See Savers, R. S., Central Banking After 
Bagchot, Oxford University Press. London. (l 958). p. It 3. 
405, Loynes concluded that " (T)o givc the Central Bank a NNide framework does not mean that it need or 
should possess an arsenal of arbitrary meapons to interfere in the delicate and efficient mechanism of 
payments ............ 
Nor would there be a case for rash experiments .......... 
See Loynes. I B., op. cit p. 4. 
406. See Brown, C. V.. op. cit.. p. 17 1. 
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traditional tools in CBN legislation. The traditional methods of financial regulation were - 
also perceived as unsuitable to the peculiarities of the developing countrieS407 . 
This discussion of the intellectual influences on the Nigerian banking regulation can 
not be concluded without pointing to the inspirational motivation of Lord Keynes' writings 
on Nigerian regulators. The Keynes' faith in legal coercion of banks found favours with the 
enthusiastic regulatorS408. It is therefore not out of place to see commentators rightly 
contending that "Nigerian Economy was highly regulated in line with the Keynesian 
Economics "409 
It may be added as a last line that the civil war unleashed on Nigerians by an 
uncouth military class must have accentuated the emergence and hegemony of financial 
repressive measures since all the regulatory infrastructures were erected during these 
unfortunate period. 4 10 However, it appears that the war was merely incidental to the reign 
of repressionism as the preparation had been commenced much earlier , and the 
government made no pretence to use repressionism as an emergency measure only. It was 
conceived as the normal mode of financial regulation in Nigeria adopted under the 
L)uidance of US advisorS411 
407. See TNvcntN Years Of Central Banking in Nigeria. op. cit., pp. 100 - 10 1- 
408. For Lord Keynes preference for legislative coercion of banks or coercion through public opinion, see 
Harrod, R. F., The Life of John Maynard Keynes, Pelican biographies, Pelican Books, (1972) p. 45 1. 
409 
* See Yahaya. 
M. L. " The Changing Roles And Functions Of The Banking Industry In A Developing 
Economy " in The Nigerian Banking And Finance IndusM In Transition: Shaping The Future. op. cit.. 
P. 88. 
4 10. The Nigerian civil N% ar Nvas between 1967 and 1970. 
411. One may underscore the influence of the Federal Reserve System ( FED ) which supplied the bulk of 
the research adNisors of the CBN in its formative Nears. The consequent adoption of a FED style of 
regulation should therefore not come as a surphse since it merely sen, ed as a pointer to the efficiencý of 
the US advisors already tutored in such regulatory extraversion. See Brown, C. V., op. cit p. 142. 
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4.7 Conclusions 
The financial regulation of the Nigerian banks was originally laissez-faire at the 
point of banking evolution in 1892, before the sporadic failure of indigenous banks 
instigated the era of minimalist regulation in 1952. The unabated failure of the banks) and 
the political agitation for independence culminated in the era of liberal regulation of the 
banks in 1958. The era of liberal regulation achieved its purpose because bank failure was 
exterminated in the country. However, the era of liberal regulation later capsized to 
another era of banking interventionism in 1968. 
The era of bank interventionism marked the entire period of post independent 
Nigeria between 1968 and 199 1. The era which inundated the banking system with far- 
reaching repressive regulations was influenced by diverse factors. These included the 
intellectual instigation of the classical theorists and their cohorts, the growth of economic 
nationalism and socialism in the country, the influence of the US advisors, the emergence 
of the Nigerian civil war and the socio-political milieux of the Nigerian society. 
The combination of these factors invested the Nigerian banking system with the 
repressive regulations that produced results which are the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
NIGERIAN BANKING REGULATORY NORMS AND THEIR EFFECTS (1960- 
1985): A REFLECTION ON THE PRE-LIBERALISATION ERA 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter has outlined the historical circumstances and factors which 
influenced changes in financial regulatory mechanism in Nigeria from laissez-faire to w 
interventionism. The aim of this chapter is the analysis of the specific financial regulatory 
norms and their effects on the Nigerian banking system which respected bankerS412 
described as "the most regulated of all the economic sector"413in the country. This chapter 
attributes inefficiencies and inadequacies of the banking system to factors which were 
induced by governmental regulations. These factors consisted of deficit financing, low 
interest ratesf structure, reckless and totally irresponsible governmental fiscal operations 
and gross inefficiencies of credit guidelines - the principal instrument of regulation. The 
regulatory measures often had conflicting objectives and unpalatable results. The 
regulatory setting of the banks affects not only their contributions to the national 
developmental objectives, but substantially determines the level of their competitiveness 
and performance. 
The chapter contains nine sections. Section one is the introduction. Section two 
discusses the regulatory str-ucture of the Nigerian banking system. Sections three to seven 
412. See Nwankwo, G. 0.. Prudential Regulation Of Nigerian Banking. University of Lagos Press. Lagos. 
(1990). see also Adekanye. Femi. A.. " Major Developments and Innovations in the Nigerian Financial 
Environment Since 1960 " in Innovations, Technology & the Nigerian Finance Sector, Papers and 
Proceedings of the Bank Directors' Seminar. 1990. ( Financial Institutions Training 
Ccntre. Lagos, 
Nigeria, 1990 ) p. 14. 
413. See Olashore, op. cit P. 126. 
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highlight the effects of banking regulations, in particular interest rate regulation, credit 
control rules, ownership rules, foreign exchange rules, and governmental borrowing from 
the banking system. A critical assessment of the era of banking interventionism was 
undertaken in section eight. The conclusions are contained in section rune 
5.2 The Regulatory Structure of the Nigerian Banking System 
The importance of the Central Bank of Nigeria in the pre -adjustment era lies in its 
position as the premier institution and acme of the financial sector. The Board of the 
Bank was endowed with the power of formulation and implementation of monetary and 
banking polICy4I4 which was subject to the direction of the Federal Executive Council in 
case of conflict between the board and Nfinister of Finance on a proposed policy4l' 
Section 3 of the Central Bank of Nigeria ACt416 ollows. provided as f 
(1) The board shall keep the Commissioner informed of the 
monetary and banking policy pursued or intended to be 
pursued by the Central Bank. 
(2) The Commissioner shall, from time to time if he disagrees 
with the board on the monetary and banking policy pursued 
or intended to be pursued by the Central Bank, so inform 
the board of his disagreement thereto, and the Commissioner 
may submit his representation and that of the Central Bank 
on the disagreement to the Federal Executive Council 
(3) The Federal Executive Council may in writing after considering 
the representations direct the Central Bank as to the monetary 
and banking policy pursued or intended to be pursued and the 
direction shall be binding on the board which shall forthwith take 
all steps necessary or expedient to give effect thereto. 
This regulatory structure weakened the authority of the CBN since the final 
authority for monetary and banking policy was with the Federal Executive Council 417 
414 
. 
See S .3 (1) of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria Act (amendment) (No. 3) Decree No. -50 of 1968. 
415 1 . 
See S. 3 (2 & (' ). ibid. 
-416. See Central Bank of Nigeria Act (Amendment) (No. 3) Decrce No. 50 of 1968. 
417 11 . 
See Section of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act ( Amendment No. 3) Decree No. iO of 
1968. 
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The subservient position of the CBN is illustrated by the fact that the CBN usually 
submitted its monetary proposals and other related matters fiscal proposals for the 
consideration of the Ministry of Finance during the latter's annual budgetary exercise 418 
The predominant control of the CBN by the Federal Government and the Ministry of 
Finance which often treated the Bank as one of its departmentS419 had led to the CBN 
being "involuntarily compelled to take on such functions that are neither of monetary or 
developmental nature in recent years all of which have tended to overshadow its primary 
function of monetary management 11420 
The CBN regulatory and supervisory powers were further undermined by a number 
of institutional and functional weaknesses embedded in the system. The regulatory 
authority of the CBN over the banking system was not pervasive. Some banking 
institutions were excluded421 from the operations of the Banking Decree and the 
supervision of the CBN on the grounds of their speciallsation even though they performed 
essentially banking activities. Only commercial and merchant banks were under the 
supervisory jurisdiction of the CBN. The specialised banks had various Nfinistries as their 
supervisory authorities. The following table demonstrates the relationships . 
Table I 
REPORTING RELATIONSHIP OF NIGERIAN BANKS 
Banking Institution Supervisory Institution 
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank Ministry of Commerce 
418. SeeTwenty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria, op. cit., p. 146. 
'119. See Nwankwo, G. 0.. The Nigerian Financial System, op. cit., p. 15. 
420. See Falegan. S. B., " Restnicturing Nigena's Financial System For Economic Recovery " in National 
Economic Recoverý. p. 85. 
42 1. See Section 38 of the Banking Decree No. I of 1969. 
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Nigefian Bank for Commerce and Industry 
Nigefian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank 
Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria 
Federal Savings Bank 
Commercial and Merchant Banks 
Ministry of Commerce 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Ministry of Work 
Nfinistry of Finance 
Central Bank 
(Source - Nwankwo, G. 0. ) 
" The Structure Of The Nigerian Economy And The Nigerian 
Banking Environment " in National EcononUc Recovery., op. cit. p 16) 
This table shows the relative influence of the CBN and that the Bank cannot effectively 
oversee the whole banking sphere due to the institutional structure with the attendant 
conflict of directions to the different banks from their different supervisory authorities 
often in direct violation of the CBN monetary guidelines. 
Besides this conflicting supervisory authorities, the CBN even in its sphere of 
operation lacked the necessary powers and facilities essential for the performance of its 
regulatory and supervisory roles. The CBN had no power to conduct special banking 
examination422, or grant423 and withdraW424banking licences on its own fights Without the 
express authority of the Minister of Finance. It cannot discipline any bank staff or bank 
board for banking malpractice. Although, the CBN usually submitted its examination 
reports to the Ministry of Finance and the management of the concerned bank, it had no 
control over the form in which such examination reports may be presented to the bank 
board425 
-422. See Section 21 of Banking Decree No. I of 1969. 
42.1. See Section 2 ibid. 
424. Sce SS. 3 and 8 ibid. 
425. Ibid.. pp. 24 & 25. 
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With respect to periodic banking examination by CBN, a former executive director of 
the CBN comments that " (A)lthough the Bank aims at examining a bank at least once in 
twelve months, it scarcely does so once in twenty-four months "426 
This portrait of the apex of the banking system in Nigeria and its political and 
administrative subjugation provides an indispensable pillar to any objective analysis of the 
impact of financial regulation on the banking system, and serves as an appropriate point 
to assess the effects of specific regulatory norms on the banking system. 
5.3 Interest Rate Regulation 
The interest rate charged by the Nigerian banks was not made a subject of specific 
regulation427 until 1962 when an inserted section 7(4) of the 1958 Banking Ordinance428 
provided that rates of interest charged on credit facilities and advances by the banks shall 
be linked to the minimum rediscount rate of the Central Bank subject to a stated minimum 
rate of interest. The law further made the approval of the Central Bank a precondition for 
the interest rate structure of each bank and stipulated that "the minimum rate of interest 
when so approved shall be same for all licensed banks"429 
Section 14 of the 1969 Banking Decree which replaced the above provision 
provided - 
(1) The rate of interest charged on advances, loans or credit facilities 
or paid on deposits by any licensed bank shall be linked to the 
minimum rediscount rate of the Central Bank subject to stated 
minimum and maximum rates of interest, and the minimum and 
maximum rates of interest when so approved shall be the same 
for all licensed banks. 
(2) The interest rate structure of each licensed bank shall be subject 
426. Ibid., p. 25. 
-427. Prior to 1962. the interest rate structure in Nigeria was adjusted to the rediscount rate of the Bank of 
England Nkithout regards to the local circurnstances. 
428. See Banking Amendment Act No. 19 of 1962 which amended the 1958 Banking Ordinance. For a 
short discussion of the impact of financial regulation on Nigerian banking system, see Seidman. A., 
Money, Banking & Public Finance in Africa. Zed Books Ltd. London. (1986), pp. 77 - 83. 
429 
. 
Ibid. 
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to the approval of the Central Bank. 
In 1970, a proviS0430was added to section 14 which allowed differential rates of 
interest to be approved for the various categories of banks. 
This regulatory structure made interest rate liable to direct management by the 
government under the expertise of the monetary authority431. The CBN administered the 
interest rates by stipulating the ranges within which both the deposit and the lending rates 
are to be maintained . The regulation of interest rates was predicated on the needs to 
reduce debt servicing burden of the government, ensure socially optimum allocation of 
resources in the context of low inflation and smooth financial markets development. 
In March, 1970 the CBN stipulated for the first time the minimum and maximum rates 
on advances and loanS432. Since then the mechanism had been firnfly established and 
entrenched in Nigerian financial regulatory culture. The interest rates fixed by the CBN 
however had been at a persistently " unrealistically low level 11433 
According to the CBN 434 for fifteen years (1960 - 1974) the rediscount rate 
changed only five times and within a very narrow range of between 4 and 5 1/2 % The 
deposit rates fixed at 2 1/2 -5% for all types of financial institutions was described as "the 
most unrealistic low levels which could not be expected to stimulate saving 
mobilisation"435 . Apart 
from 1964 when the interest rate was raised all the changes until 
430 
. 
Sce the Banking ( Amcndment ) Dccree No. 3 of 1970. 
43 1. See TN%enty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria, op. cit., p. 102. 
432. The rates were fixed at 2 1/2% and 7 1/2% minimum and maximum respect i velv. above the 
rediscount rate of the Central Bank and 1 1/2 % below and 1 1/2 % above the minimum rediscount rate 
as the nuiumuni and maximum respectively on interest bearing deposits see Okigbo, P. N. C.. Nigeria's 
Financial SN-stem : Structure And Grow-th, Longman Group, London, (1981) p. 69. 
433. See Twcntv Years Of Ccntr, -d Banking In Nigeria. op. cit.. p. 124. 
434. Ibid., pp. 124 - 12's. 
435. Ibid.. p. 12-5. 
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1976 were downwards. The relatively low interest rates in Nigeria with occasional small 
changes since 1970 till 1980 is illustrated in Appendix I. 
The absurdly low interest rateS436 in the 1970s and 1980s may be contrasted with 
the early 1960s when the interest rates in Nigeria were comparable to the level of interest 
rates in Great Britain and Germany and higher than what obtained in Switzerland437. It 
was not surprising as the CBN observes that the low rates failed to stimulate saving 
mobilisation438, since given the existence of high traditional rates of interest at the informal 
market "(O)nly a rapid increase in savings invested through money or capital markets, 
where the return is seen and calculated , can break the iron grip of usurious 
rateS"439 
A leading banker put it more bluntly that "a major disincentive to saving in this 
country is the low rate of interest allowed to be paid on deposits. With such low rates, it is 
better for a person to buy imported product , which 
he knows will cost him 20% in a 
year's time , than 
keep the money in a savings account and earn 9 1/2 % per annum. 11440 
The interest rate structure favoured present consumption rather than postponement or 
future consumption. 
The low interest rate was an underpricing of a relatively scarce capital and made the 
cost of borrowing rather cheap in Nigeria with attendant profligacy and corporate 
preference for debt as opposed to equity finance441. It also prevented the rapid growth of 
436. In the fiscal years of 1976- 1978, the prescribed range of banking lending rates was 6 to 10 per cent 
but with a ceiling of 8 per cent on credit to the preferred sectors of the economy. An aqjustment was made 
in 1978/1979 when the range was increased to 7- 11 per cent . 
Some sectors and acti, %rities enjoyed 
preferential rates hence in 1978 and 1979 fiscal years banking lending for residential building 
construction and agricultural production had a fixed interest rate of 6 per cent , -vvhiIst 4-6 per cent 
interest rate was prescribed for government guaranteed credit to the agricultural sector. 
437. Sec Jucker-Fleetwood, op cit., p. 234. 
438. See Twenty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria, op. cit.. p. 125. 
439. See hicker-Fleetwood. op-cit.. p. 107. 
440. Sec Olashore. op. cit.. p. 12-5. 
441 
- 15. . 
Ibid.. p 
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money and capital markets since low interest rates on government debts failed to attract 
private sector saverS442 and the prohibition of interest payment on demand deposits forced 
banks to engage in non-price competition in form of locations, buildings, and facade441. 
A principal motivating factor underlining the policy of low interest rate in Nigeria in 
the words of the CBN was "to minimise the cost of borrowing to the govemment"4-1-1 
which clearly meant provision of cheap money for government financing . 
This policy had 
been condemned by the CBN as "largely conducive to inflationary monetary expansion" 445 
because low prized government instruments failed to attract private sector savers, and the 
CBN had a legal obligation to absorb the unsubscribed proportion of the unmarketable 
instruments hence "substantial high -powered money was usually injected into the 
economy. 11 446 
The deletefious effects of interest rate regulation were so patent that Agu concludes "it 
is ..... clear that there 
has been a great measure of financial repression in the Nigerian 
economy. Such repression, working through negative real rates , poses 
important 
macroeconomic questions concerning the ability of the economy to accumulate financial 
assets, the volume of national savings and investment, the efficiency of investment and the 
allocation of resources"447. The effects of interest rate regulation confirms the thesis of 
442. See Ojo. M. 0., The Evolution And Performance Of Monetan- Polic-N, In Nigeria In The 
1980s, (Ceiitral Bank of Nigeria, Research Department Occasional Paper No. 2, Lagos, Februan 10, 
1992). p. 9. 
443 
. 
See Okigbo. P. N. C.. Nigeria's Financial System. op. cit., p. 110. 
-144. See T%Nenty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria, op. cit., p. 86. 
445. Ibid.. p. 12-5. 
446. See Ojo. M. 0.. Op. Cit.. p. 
447 
. 
See Agu. C. C.. Nigerian Banking Structure And Performance. ( Research Monographs in Banking 
Institute Of European Finance. Univers tN College Of North Wales, and Finance No. 3 Bangor. 1987 ) p. 
26. 
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Mckinnon-Shaw development theory of regulatory repressionism that interest rate ceilings 
discourage savings and encourage capital flight. 
The most objectionable aspect of this pervasive price regulation is its presentation as a 
regulatory measure, which according to the CBN " remains an ineffective instrument of 
monetary regulation in Nigeria"448 .A much greater cost of low interest rate structure in 
Nigeria according to Professor Nwankwo was that it "has certainly encouraged capital 
flight from the country in quest of higher interest earnings overseas"449 
5.4 Credit Regulation 
Credit regulation through credit guidelines dictating the rate of credit expansion by 
the banking sector and prescribing the minimal and maximal credit for sectoral allocation 
was the most popular of the monetary control techniques uttlised by the CBN450. The 
credit and lending operations of the banks were made subjects of explicit regulation by the 
Central Bank. Section 2(l) of Central Bank of Nigeria Act (Amendment) (No. 3) of 1968 
stipulated that the " Central Bank may, after consultation with the Commissioner prescribe 
a minimum ratio of total loans., advances and discounts, granted to indigenous persons, to 
be maintained by each bank licensed under the Banking Act" 
The Central Bank also possessed the powers by virtue of section 40 of its enabling 
IaW451 of requiring banks to submit for pfior approval loans applications exceeding stated 
amounts, and to fix ceilings on the volume or aggregate amount of loans, advances and 
discounts outstanding or granted by any bank452 
448. See Twenty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria, op. cit.. p. 122. 
449. Sec Nx%-aiikwo. G. 0., The Nigefian Financial System. op. cit.. p. 36. 
450. See Twcnty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria op. cit.. p. 105. 
451 
. 
See The Central Batik of Nigeria Act Cap 30 Laws of Federation of Nigena and Lagos as aniended 
by the Decree No. 50 of 1968 and Decree No. 4 of 1969 respectively. 
452 
. 
See The Central Bank of Nigeria Act Cap 10 Laws of Federation of Nigena and Lagos as amended 
bN the Decree No. 50 of 1968 and Decree No. 4 of 1969 respectively 
106 
The credit guidelines were designed with a specific goal of providing for the 
financing needs of the Nigerian Government453, and also with the aim of ensuring an 
acceptable rate of credit expansion with emphasis on directed credit to production, and 
reduced credit to the distributive trade sectors. Assertions that Nigerian banks especially 
the foreign ones had neglected the productive sectors in preference to import trade454 
were invoked to justify adoption of this regulatory instrument. 
Two variants of credit regulation had been adopted by the CBN namely credit 
ceilings and sectoral credit allocation455. Within this context the credit ceilings on the 
commercial banks had witnessed serious fluidity and rampant variations between 1969 and 
1985 financial yearS456. Additionally, these ceilings were not pervasive since exceptions 
were granted in certain respectS457 
The sectoral allocation and selective controls aspects of the credit guidelines were 
in theory designed, interalia, to direct credit to the directly productive sectors, indigenous 
453. See Ojo, M. 0., op., cit p. 2 1. 
454. See Otiti, A. 0. G., " Position of the Central Bank in the economy " Bullion, 5,2 ( April/June 1980 
23 at p. 26. 
455. The first variant involved overall and sectoral ceilings stipulating the rates of change for the 
aggregate and components of banks' loans and advances whilst the second vanant specified sectoral 
distribution of credit YAth positive discrimination in favour of productive activities as against non- 
productive sectors. 
456. In the fiscal year of 1969/70, the permissible rate of increase in commercial bank credit was stipulated 
as 10 per cent 
ihis 
ceiling rate was raised to 20.0 per cent in 1970/71 but reduced to 8.4 per cent in 
1971/72 fiscal years respectively. Between March 1972 and April 1976 the credit guidelines were 
confined to scctoral rationing of bank credit without imposition of aggregate ceilings. The credit ceiling 
rate for 1976/77 and 1977/78 fiscal years was fixed at 40 per cent in both periods save that in the latter 
year the application of the credit ceiling and guidelines Nvas extended to the merchant banks. A 
downwards revision of the ceiling rate to 30 per cent occurred in 1978/79 fiscal year. The 30 per cent 
credit expansion ceiling Nvas maintained inI980 to 1982 , 
but by 1985 the ceiling was pegged at 7 per 
cent. 
457. See Ojo, M. 0., op. cit., p. 11. The exemptions were in respect of bank loans for purchase of certain 
motor cars, and purchase of shares under the indigenisation programme by Nigerians, and in respect of 
agriculture. and residential building construction loans. Additionally, nc%N and small banks were allowed 
to exceed the general ceiling either in the form of a slightly higher credit ceiling or as a proportion of their 
total deposit liabilities. 
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businesses, small scale enterprises and the rural areas . Within this purview, sixteen sectors 
and subsectors were identified and classified into preferred and less preferred sectors with 
an omnibus miscellaneous class. The details of the classifications and specific allocation 
between 1969 and 1985 can be found in Appendix X herein. The Appendix reveals that in 
the fiscal years 1972 -1974, the production and services sectors were allocated a minimal 
45per cent and II per cent of banks' aggregate loans and advances respectively. The 
rateS458were reviewed to 48 per cent and 10 per cent respectively in 1975/76. 
In 1979/80 and 1980/81, the stipulated total minimum allocation for the 
preferred sectors was increased to 70 and 75 per cent respectively and the less preferred 
sectors experienced corresponding reduction in maximum allocation from 30 per cent to 
25 per cent. The percentage of the preferred sector had increased by 1985 to 79 per cent. 
The prescribed proportion of total loans and advances assigned to indigenous borrowers 
was increased from 35 per cent in 1971/72 to 80 and 90 per cent respectively in1982 and 
1984. 
The assessment of these broad and penetrating directional credit control measures 
shows that they have been largely unsuccessful in line with the predictions of Mckinnon- 
Shaw hypothesis. The guidelines have been attacked as broad, confusing and easily 
manipulated. 459 Indeed, the CBN admitted the existence of loopholeS460. The classification 
of the sectors under the practice is imprecise and easily evaded by banks since "this 
becomes a semantic problem and the banks get around this by classifying as best the ......... 
458. Conversely. the less preferred sectors of general commerce and 'others' were alloted regulatory 
maxima of 30 per cent and 12 per cent in 1972 -74 respectively while in 1975/76 witnessed the reduction 
of' others' category to 10 per cent. The subsequent years of 1976/77 to 1978/79 had no material departure 
from the preceding allocation structure. 
459. See Agu, op. cit., P. 102. 
460. See Twenty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria, op. cit., p. 120 
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loans they have given without , 
indeed anyone being able to successfully challenge their 
classification . 
"461 
The sectoral classification under the guidelines also discrin-unated in favour of large 
scale enterprises because " (I)t is common knowledge that in all the sectors referred to in 
the guidelines, the larger scale enterprises have a built-in advantages in securing credit 
fTom the commercial banks ...... "462. Despite the guidelines, small scale enterprises have 
received inadequate financing , yet loan 
finance was the best finance source for theM463 
The guidelines have also fostered antagonism between the banks and the CBN since 
the banks were divested by the directed credit measure ftom their normal and profitable 
operations that they understood well into areas where other and different institutions 
normally speciallse464. The banks were rendered unable to accommodate profitable lending 
requests where such request ran a foul of the monetary policy guidelines. 
The enforced compulsory lending to sectors often adjudged unprofitable by banks 
had led to continued resistance to abide by the credit guidelines by bankers, who often 
preferred the payment of fines to compliance465. The former Governor of CBN attested to 
this persistent negative deviations from the credit guidelines and sectoral allocation stating 
that the performance of the banks with regards to guideline stipulation on sectoral 
allocation has not been very impressive. Loans to such vital sectors as agnculture, exports 
46 1. See Okigbo, P. N. C.. Nigeria's Financial System, op. cit.. p. 62. 
462. Ibid., p. 64. 
463. See Olashore. op. cit.. p. 65. 
464. See Okigbo, Pius- Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development, op. cit.. p. 169. 
465. See Nwankwo. G. 0.. " The Structure Of The Nigerian Economy And The Nigerian Banking 
Environment" in National Economic Recover),, op. cit., p. 24. 
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and small-scale enterprises have persistently fallen below their stipulated minima while 
loans to the less productive sectors have always been above prescribed maxima. 11466 
A number of other serious defects of the directed credit measures have been 
acknowledged. Bankers pointed to the fact that previous directed lending "agamst prudent 
credit judgement of the banks have not in the past proved successful or beneficial to the 
economy"467. The massive diversion of fungible funds by favoured borrowers, and 
inefficient public corporations, into non productive consumption purposes had been 
recognised even by the CBN4611. Apart from credit regulation, the banks were also under 
massive restrictions regarding the permissible banking activities469. The totalily of the 
serious problems which bedevilled this predominant financial regulatory instrument470 
forced the CBN to conclude - 
Apart from the fact that the banking system failed on a number of occasions to 
attain full compliance with the various CBN credit guidelines, the problem of 
" window dressing " in the figures of their credit operations cannot be ignored 
More importantly, there is the problem of inability to control the ultimate use into 
which a borrowed fund may be put. The mere prescription of a sectoral distribution 
of credit may not ensure that funds borrowed for production cannot be applied for 
471 consumption expenditure 
466. See Closing Address By Alhaji Abdulkadir Ahmed, Governor, Central Bank Of Nigeria, at the 
Seminar for Bank Directors And Chief Executives in the Public And Private Sectors, in National 
Economic Recovery. op. cit., p. 123. 
467. See Olashore. op. cit.. p. 69. 
468 
. 
See Twenty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria, op. cit.. p. 105. 
469 
. 
See generally s. 13 of Banking Decree No. I of 1969 as amended by the Banking (Amendment) 
Decree No. 3 of 1970 and Banking ( Amendment ) Decree No. 88 of 1979. 
470. Besides credit regulation, the compulsory holding of government secufities had also restricted banks' 
lending ability. Prior to 1969, banks Nvere required to maintain certain minimum holdings of liquid assets. 
but were free to hold these assets in any of a number of approved forms , one of which was 
Treasury Bills. 
After 1969. comptilson, holding of Treasun, Bills as part of liquid assets became the rule tinder the 
ensuing repressive regime. In 19731. the banks were required to hold at least 40 per cent of their liquid 
assets in Treasury Bills and Treasum Certificate and call monev. 
471. [bid., p. 127 
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5.5 Indigenisation Decree and Government ownership 
Indigenisation described as the policy of extending Nigerian ownership and control 
by government fiat or pressure, through the employment of government leverage either to 
exclude or evict foreign concerns from certain fields of economic activity or to require 
direct sale of partial or complete ownership of existing foreign firmS472, has a long 
hiStory473 in Nigeria. 
Prior to 1977, a liberal and non discrin-ýinatory rule was operative in respect of 
banking business such that any person irrespective of the nationality may own and operate 
a banking institution in Nigeria. The rule however changed in 1977 when section 5 of the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree474 stipulated that subject to the Decree " as from 
the appointed date no alien shall be the owner or part-owner of any of the enterprises 
specified in Schedule 2 to this Decree unless the equity participation of Nigerian citizens 
or associations in the enterprises is not less than sixty per cent". Banking475was included 
in the specified enterprises. As a result of this ownership requirement, the foreign banking 
corporations in Nigeria had their ownership nationalised, and in fact one withdrew 
its operations fTom the country476. 
This change in ownership rule had its effect in the public ownership of most 
banking corporations in Nigeria since the Federal Government under the guise of the 
Decree acquired majority share holdings in the expatriate banks. The Federal 
Government 
compulsorily acquired 40 per cent equity in 3 major foreign banks and 
later increased the 
472. Sec Schatz, op. cit., p. 58. 
473 It can be traced to 1949, when the policý of the colonial govemnient was to ensure 
" maximum 
participation by Nigerians themselves " in the trade and industry of the country. 
474 
. 
See Decree No. 3 of 1977. 
475 See specif ically Item No. I in Schedule 2 of Decree No. 3 of 
1977 - 
476. The First National City Bank of New York. 
level to 60 per cent in the said 3 major batiks and the remaining 7 foreIgn bankS477. The 
ownership structure of banks with the Federal Government participation is illustrated in 
Appendix VI. 
The dominance of public ownership becomes vivid when it is considered in the 
context of the fact that State Government also had majority interests in most of the 
indigenous banks, and established new banks after 1977. Of the 19 commercial banks in 
the country in 1978,, State Governments had majority share holding in 13. The ownership 
structure had an important implication for the banks in that their management, control and 
policies were brought under the direct influence of the Government. 
Government acquisition of ownership interests in the banks was predicated on the 
need " for the government to get intimately involved in commercial banking activities so as 
to guide them to operate to the maximum benefit of the economy . This 
is as much in their . 0-- 1 
own interest . as 
it is in the interest of the country 11478 . 
An objective inquiry into the 
effects of government ownership will reveal that such ownership had neither been in the 
interest of the banks nor of the country as a whole. 
The immediate effect of the indigenisation of the banking sector was the complete 
governmental ownership of the Nigerian banking industry since only one bank , 
Societe 
Generale Bank Limited was not wholly or principally owned by either the Federal or State 
Govemment479. In the periods after indigenisation, the banking industry in Nigeria 
became a public sector industry and the Federal Government not only exercised a 
regulatory role but also a participatory role with "occasional conflicts of interest 
manifesting themselves in the management of the economy 11480 W 
477. See Nwank-vvo. G. 0., " The Structure Of The Nigerian Economy And The Nigerian Banking 
Environinenr op. cit.. p. 17. 
478. See 1973/4 Budget Speech of the Federal Govemment Of Nigeria. 
479. See NNN-ank-wo. G. 0., " The Structure Of The Nigerian Economy And The Nigerian Banking 
Environment" op. cit.. p. 17. 
480. See Ogunban o. C. 0.. Nigena - The Search For EcononUc Stability. op. cit., p. 
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The ascendancy of mediocrity on banking Boards was the first problem that the 
indigenisation and ownership programme gave the Nigerian banking industry. The 
appointments to the Board of banks under the purview of the government were often 
devoid of any meritorious standard. Okigbo asserts that such appointments were based on 
horse trading "with persons appointed to the Board who may not be fit as candidates for a 
minor clerk's office in the bank on whose Board they are appointed to Sit"481. 
The appointments were thoroughly politicised and based on mundane issues as 
federal characte, 482 or geographical representation. The government appointees regarded 
such appointments as conduits to achieve" purely personal objectives "483 
These political and self motivated Boards often put bank- management under 
intolerable interference in their pursuits of personal enrichment, power and influence 484 
The intimidation and coercion of bank management and top executive by Board members 
and the associates of the government like public functionaries, members of the armed 
forces, or political parties who relied on the majonty holdings of governments in banks 
had been blamed for a large percentage of the bad debts of many Nigerian 
bankS485. It has 
been averred that " the bulk of the bad and doubtful debts which our banking industry is 
saddled with today were incurred "486 dunng the second Republic due to the politicisation 
of the banks' Boards. 
481. See Okigbo. Pius., Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development, Vol. 3, op. cit.. p. 222. 
482. See S. 14 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. 
483. See Olashore. op. cit.. p. 113. 
484. See GiNNa, R. F.. " The Role of Bank Directors in the 1990s " in Innovations, Technology & the 
Nigerian Finance Sector. op. cit.. p. 65. 
495. Ibid.. p. 45. 
496. Sec Giwa. R. F., op. cit.. p. 65 
11") 
Another effect of government ownership of the banks has been the instability and 
fluidity of the membership of banks' Boards and the management487. There had been 
manifest job insecurity with serious negative impacts on the banks as appointments and 
their retention were based on politicking, lobbying and pressure groups rendering 
managers susceptible to undue influence and pressure. Thus, favours were shown by . vaý, 
of loans granted to influential individuals,, often without adequate security, resulting in 
irrecoverable debts. 
The ownership structure in great measure facilitated the granting of loans to 
ambitious government projects of doubtful viabillty488 and increased ftinding of prestigious 
projects of statutory corporations and banks "placed large amounts of " soft-credit " at 
their disposal - with few questions asked, and few strings attached 
11489 
In this respect, it is apposite to recall that the indigenisation scheme affected banks 
in two important ways. They were the financiers of indigenisation and were simultaneously 
indigenised themselveS490. With regard to their former role, the banks were directed to 
extend credit to individuals for the purchase of shares in industries which were the subject 
of incligerusation even though the long-term viability and profitability may not be easily 
identifiable under the condition of urgency in which the scheme was implemented. The 
CBN authofised the banks to exclude loans granted for the purchase of shares in 
computing their permissible credit growth limit under the monetary policy guidelineS491 
487. See Sanusi. J. 0.. " Developments In The Banking And Finance IndusM : Institutional Framework 
1970 To Date - Changes In Ownership Structure " in The Nigerian Banking 
And Finance Industry In 
Transition : Shaping The Future, op. cit., p. 18. 
488. Ogunbanjo, C. 0.. Nigefia - The Search for Economic Stabilitý'. op. cit.. p. 32. 
489. Sec Olashorc, op. Cit. - P. 
191. 
490. Sce Olashore. op. cit.. P. 12. 
491. Loc. cit. 
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Perhaps it may be underscored that the indigenisation loans went mainly to the 
po itica ly influential, strategically located or wealthy Nigerians. Hence, the indigenisation 
was 'Ia windfall for a sprinkling of fortunate NigerianS"492 who were aided in the 
acquisition of private properties by public funds. The ancillary effects of indigenisation 
and government ownership of banks include the bureaucrat i sation of the banking 
industry493, lax supervision and withdrawal of foreign investment in Nigerian banking 
industry494. 
It has been argued that there is no "rational justification for the Federal 
Government's participation in the bank's equity"495. Indeed, private pecuniary interests of 
cheap loans, office perquisites, board membership or management appointment, and 
nothing else underlie the continued governmental participation in banking ownership in 
Nigeria. The political factors underlying the problems of banks are captured by the 
conclusion that "(F)inancial system in Nigeria lacked autonomy and suffered from 
illiquidity and insolvency due to political interference resulting in poor management and 
bad loans. 11496 
5.6 Exchange Control Measures 
Exchange control regime is a British legacy introduced in 1939 . In 1962, the 
Exchange Control Act enacted this regulatory instrument into Nigerian law. The pre- 
liberalisation legal regime was characterised by a stringent exchange control laW497whIch 
prohibited the buying, selling, borrowing, lending or dealing in foreign currency by any 
492. See Schatz. op. cit., p. 60. 
493. See Ogunbanjo. C. 0.. Nigeria - The Search for Economic Stability. op. cit., p. 34. 
494. Ibid.. p. 16. 
495. Loc. Cit. 
496. See Bevan. David.. et al. op. cit.. p. 49. 
497. See Exchange Control Act No. 16 of 1962. 
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person other than an authorised dealer except with the permission of the Minister of 
Finance498. The law prescribed the compulsory surrender of foreign currency by residents 
to authorised dealers through mandatory sale of any acquired foreign currencv499. it 
further banned ownership of offshore financial assets by residents5OO, and proscribed 
dealing in Nigerian securities by foreignerS501. Specifically, Nigerian residents were 
prohibited from lending money or securities to any resident foreign controlled 
corporation502. There was effective restriction on capital movement in respect of current 
and capital accounts transactions. 
Nearly all types of foreign currency payment required the permission of the 
Minister for its validity503. Draconian criminal punishments were attached to the breach of 
the law by the Exchange Control (Anti-Sabotage) Decree504 of 1977. The international 
operations of the domestic banks were effectively circumscribed. The leeway for the 
banks under the Exchange Control was their appointment as authorised dealers505which 
allowed them to deal in foreign exchange transactions subject to the directions of the 
Minister. Another exemption506 also permitted banks to make cash payment in Nigeria to 
a foreign resident in the course of banking busineSS507 and the foreign controlled banks in 
498 
. 
See S. 3, Ibid. 
499. See S. 4. Ibid. 
500 
. 
See for instance S. 10 ( 1) (d). Ibid. 
501 
. 
See S. 10 (1) (a) (b) &(c). Ibid. 
502 
. 
See S. 25 (2). Ibid. 
503. See S. 8, lbid. 
504 
. 
See Decree No. 57 of 1977 . 
505 
. 
See Exchange Control ( Appointment of Authorised Dealers ) Notice. L. N. 83 of 1962 - 
506. See Exchange Control (Pa-ments ) Order. L. N. 91 of 1962. 
507. See Order 4 (d ) (i )& Oi ), Ibid. 
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Nigefia were excluded from the blanket ban on domestic lending to resident foreign 
corporationS508. Most of the powers under the Act had been delegated by the Nfinister of 
Finance to the CBN509. 
Although, banks were appointed authorised dealers for foreign exchange 
dealings, the implementation of the instruments for the management of foreign exchange 
resources by the CBN and the Nfinistry of Finance often impacted seriously on efficiency 
and competitiveness. Principally, the fact that the exchange rate mechanism was managed 
and admlnýistered510 rather than determined by market forces usually fostered a situation 
where an army of bank customer desirous of foreign exchange were turned down by the 
banks due to CBN policy directives. Furthermore, the major administrative mechanism of 
foreign exchange allocation in the country was the discredited import licence scheme 
which has been descfibed as " the shortest cut ever devised for haemorrhaging a nation's 
foreign exchange reserves"511 
The scheme relegated the role of banks in the allocation of foreign exchange and 
"promoted a generation of gentlemen touts and financial pimps who became instant 
millionaires by virtue simply of their connections in the apparatus for issuing import 
licences. A brisk under-the-counter trade had grown in licences as they were often issued 
not to genuine users but to hawkers and touts"-' 
12. The myriad of abuses associated with 
the scheme such as corruption, over-invoicing, and favouritism facilitated the siphoning of 
508 
- 
See Exchange Control ( Lending to Banks Exemption ) Order. L. N. 92 of 1962. 
509. See Odozi. Victor. A., "Foreign Exchange Management: The Role Of The Central Bank Of Nigena" 
in National Economic Recovery, op. cit., p. 54. 
510. Ibid.. p. 58. 
511. See Soyinka, Wolc- The Open Sore of A Continent :A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis. 
Oxford University Press, New York. (1996). p. 80. 
512. See Okigbo. Pius., Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development. Vol. 3. op. cit. p. 214. 
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foreign exchange into private accounts in Europe and the o-vervaluation of naira513. These 
effects of exchange control law lends credence to the Mckinnon-Shaw developmental 
theory of regulatory repression. 
5.7 Financial Repression through Government Borrowing 
One of the most invidious mechanisms of financial repression was governmental 
borrowing from the banking system especially the commercial and merchant banks 
through compulsory holdings of the government securities and other forms of directed 
credit mandated by law'14. An example of such law is section 40 (7) of the repealed 
Central Bank Bank of Nigeria ACt5l5which prescribed - 
The Bank may for the purposes of maintaining monetary stability 
of the economy of Nigeria, issue, place, sell, repurchase, amortize 
or redeem securities to be known as "stabilization securities" (which 
shall constitute its obligations) and the securities shall be issued at 
such rate of interest and under such conditions of matufity, amortization, 
negotiability and redemption as the Bank maý, deem appropriate. 
Specific provisions of the law also mandated the CBN to finance the budget deficit 
of the Federal Government. Section 34(l) of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act5l6provided 
that nothwithstanding "the provisions of paragraph (d) of section 30, the Bank may grant 
temporary advances to the Federal Government in respect of temporary deficiencies of 
budget revenue at such rate or rates of interest as the Bank may determine". Section 35 of 
the same law stipulated that the " Bank shall be entrusted with the issue and management 
of Federal Government loans publicly issued in Nigeria, upon such terms and conditions as 
may be agreed between the Federal Goverrument and the Bank". This section had the 
513. See Yerokun. Olusegun.. Legal Aspect Of Structural Adjustment Programme In Nigeria. op. cit., p. 
78. 
514. See S. 12(5)(d) of Banking Decree No. I of 1969 on the holding of goverment securities as specified 
assets. 
515. See Central Bank of Nigeria Act (Amendnient) (No. 3) Decree No. 50 of 1968 as further amended by 
sectim I of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1969. 
516. See Cap 30 of 1958 as amended. 
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unsavoury effect of forcing the CBN to underwrite and subscribe the low ,. ielding 
securities of the Federal Goverment. 
Much of the total internal debt in Nigeria had been financed through the banking 
system and the commercial banks had provided "the most important and reliable"517 
sources of financing of the intemal public debt. This method of financinia was the most 
feasible for the government since private individuals are averse to holding government 
papers with ridiculously low yields and thus preferred investment in real property. 
The trend of forcing the bulk of internal debt on the Nigerian banking system 
appeared to have emerged in 1968 with introduction of banking unorthodoxy into the 
Nigerian financial landscape. Appendices 11 and III respectively indicate that in 1963, the 
commercial banks only held 2.7 per cent of total domestic public debt in Nigeria and 
although this proportion rose gradually in the succeeding years, the total holding of the 
commercial banks was a meagre 9.1 per cent in 1967. 
This relatively low level of governmental indebtedness to the commercial banks 
however changed dramatically in 1968,1969, and 1970 when the commercial banks held 
the proportions of 44.4%, 40.6%, and 42.9% respectively of the total Nigerian domestic 
public debt. In 1974, commercial banks became the main source of internal borrowing by 
the government holding over 60 per cent of the total domestic borrowing. However, ftom 
1978, the CBN overtook the commercial banks as the dominant source of the government 
finances and the commercial banks' holdings of the domestic public debt were 33.2% and 
32.5% respectively in 1979 and 1980. 
Inspite of this change of leadership, commercial banks were still significant holders 
of government debt XVIth proportions above the total holdings of the Non-Bank Public 
and just behind the CBN which held 35% and 38% respectively in 1979 and 1980. The 
517. Sec Agu. op. Cit.. P. 136. 
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commercial banks' proportions rose in 1984 and 1985 fiscal years to 35.0% and 38.2% of 
the total public debt respectively. 
The commercial banks' share of the public debt had thus witnessed phenomenal 
increase and fluctuations with the immediate consequence of " the need for unusually high 
proVision for bad and doubtful debts; which puts the equity of the banking system under 
pressure"518. Of importance, however, was the crowding out of private investment by 
credit to the government. It has been observed that the excessive government indebtedness 
propelled illiquidity and reduced " credit available to the productive sectors of the 
economy. "119 
This is compounded by the additional financing of government budgetary deficit 
by excessive borrowing from the central bank "a practice which has serious inflationary 
implications"520. According to the Director of CBN Research Department, "(T)he major 
source of bank credit to government has been the CBN. All other things being equal, this 
type of liquidity injection into the economy is highly inflationary ....... 
11521 
.A cursory 
look 
at Appendices 11 and III confirmed the dominance of CBN credit522 as a proportion of 
domestic public debt since 1978. 
The strange but true reality which underscored this deficit financing phenomena had 
been the persistent warning by the CBN and its officials to the successive governmentS523 
since 1960s on the dangers of this practice524. One cannot disagree with the assertion that 
518. Sec Olashore, op. cit.. p. 191. 
519. Ibid., p. 193. 
520. See Twenty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria, op. cit., p. 127. 
521. See Ojo. M. 0.. op. cit.. p. 2 1. 
52- ý. The CBN became the principal lender to the government since 1978 when it held 53.4 % of the total 
public debt. Although, this proportion fell in the two successive fiscal ycars. 
it rose in 1981,1982. and 
1981 fiscal years to 52.8%, -54.0% and 
5 1.1% respectively. 
52 3. See Twenty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria, op. cit.. p. 118. 
524. See Central Bank Of Nigena Annual Report (1966), pp. 13 - 14. 
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the banking system in Nigeria ........ has been subject to considerable non-commercial 
interference and to the destabilising effects of a volatile government deficit"525. The 
destabilising consequences of Nigerian government's financial repression reflect the 
diagnoses of the Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis. 
5.8 Efficacy of Regulatory Interventionism and Repressionism in Nigeria : 
Critique 
The CBN526 had attributed the monetary and financial policy gyrations and 
inadequacies that plagued the Nigefian economy to factors which were essentially 
governmental in origin and nature. These factors consisted of deficit financing, low 
interest rates' structure, reckless and totally irresponsible governmental fiscal operations 
and gross inefficiency of credit guidelines - the principal instrument of regulation. The 
regulatory measures often had conflicting objectives and unpalatable results. 
It may be added that the repressive system created a structure in which access to 
credit in Nigeria was based "on distribution of power and influence"527and the regulatory 
regime made it possible for large incomes to be earned, without "any visible sign of 
hardwork, by a few people who had influence over, or had access to those in power"528 
The circumstances were such that the Nigerian banker had greater latitude to be bad and 
devious but no "opportunýity to be good"529 
The regulatory setting of the banks affects not only their contributions to the national 
developmental objectives, but substantially determines the level of their competitiveness 
and performance. Perhaps the first alarn-ung observation regarding the Nigerian banking 
525. See Bevan, David., et A op. cit., p. 49. 
526. See TNN, cnt-,, Years of Central Banking in Nigeria, op. cit.. pp. 124 - 128. 
527. See Okigbo. Pius.. Essays in the Public Philosophy of De%, clopmcnt. Vol. 3, op. cit., p. 218. 
528. Ibid.. p. 249. 
5"9. Ibid.. p. 212. 
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system was the incredible paucity of banking institutionS530 due to the rigid regulatory 
control of entry and exit of banks. 
According to Dr Sofola , in 1987 " cashing a personal cheque at the branch where 
the account is kept is capable of taking the entire morning, depending on the length of 
queues on the day"531. The situation was described as " frustrating and agonising "532 and 
underscores the reluctance of the majority of Nigerians to use banking services and the 
tendency to reduce any interaction with the banking industry to the barest unavoidable 
minimum. 
The effects of regulatory repression of the banking system are very conspicuous in 
the Nigerian economic structure and affirm the Mckinnon-Shaw thesis. Before the era of 
directed credit to the so-called priority sectors of the economy, agriculture was the 
mainstay of the economy and employed 70 per cent 533 of Nigeria's labour force . 
The 
agricultural sector during the regime of directed credit regulation witnessed a low 
investment and precipitous decline in its productivity and international competitiveness. 
The sector accounted for only 20 per cent of the GDP in the 1970s and the country 
530. In 1962, Nv-ith an estimated population of 50 million. and about 200 banking officcs. each banking 
office in Nigeria served an average population of over 250., 000. In 1976, as at June of that year the 
banking offices had risen to 450, but so also was the population estimated at 80 million resulting in a ratio 
of one bank to 124.713 persons. One respected view put the proportion at one branch office to over 137. 
000 persons. These estimates when compared with international statistics brought to the fore the reality 
that Nigeria NN as grossly tinder-banked. The position remained unchanged in 1987 when the ratio was one 
bank to 2.4 million persons and a branch to about 54,000 persons. see Brown, C. V., op. cit., p. 81., See 
Odoh, N. 0.. "Fundamental Problems Of Banking In Nigeria " in Onoh. J. K., ( ed. ). The Foundations of 
Nigeria's Financial Infrastructure, op. cit.. p. 73., See Okigbo, P. N. C., Nigeria's Financial System, op. 
cit., P. 100. 
53 1. See Sofola, op. cit.. p. 192. 
532. See Mvank-wo. G. 0.. " The Structure Of The Nigerian Economy And The Nigerian Banking 
Environment" in National Economic Recovery. op. cit., p. 23. 
533, See Ekundare. Oluferni. R.. An Economic History of Nigena 1860 - 1960, Methuen & Co. Ltd. 
London, (1973). pp 15 - 16. 
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became dependent on food importation to feed its growing population534. The agricultural 
sector stagnated . 
The manufacturing and industrial sectors were accorded greater importance in the 
credit directions and their contributions to the GDP grew but the growth was 
unsustainable because the industries were largely import substitution based and dependent 
almost exclusively on imported raw materiaIS535 . The high import contents were a drain 
on foreign exchange reserveS536 
The external dimension to this directed and cheap credit phenomenon xvas the priority 
accorded this venture in foreign exchange allocation . 
The allocation was facilitated by the 
issuance of import licences. Import licensing however led to over-invoicing and under- 
invoicing of the required imported materials by the industries and persons concerned 137 
The operation of import licensing scheme was described as a "huge racket whereby the 
foreign exchange was siphoned into private account in European countries. The scheme 
thus contributed to a greater fast depletion of foreign exchange earnings through 
racketeenng"538 
Indeed, Bevan and his colleague asserted with considerable veracity on capital 
flight in Nigeria that " (V)irtually every business man, officials of government, politicians 
and military officers in the country had a foreign bank account 
(S)"539. The primary and 
534. SCc Ojo, M. 0., op. cit., p. 10. 
535 See Akanle, 0.. " Regulation Of Trade And Investment In Nigeria " in Ajomo, M. A- Akanle. 0. & 
AdeNý, ale, 0. ( eds. ). Regulation Of Trade And Investment In An Era Of Structural Adjustment : The 
African Experience, Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos, Nigeria, (1989). p. 46. 
536. See Nigeria, Trade Policy Review, Vol. 1. GATT Publication services, Geneva. (199 1), p. 1. 
537. See Ogunbanjo. C. 0., Nigeria's economic and industrial development - Which way?. op. cit.. pp. 89 
-90. 
538. See Yerokun. olusegun. Legal Aspects Of Structural Adjustment Programme In N12ena. op. ct.. p. 
78. 
539. sce Bevan. DaNid.. et al. op. cit.. p. 67. 
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fundamental cause of this phenomenon has been the exchange and interest rates which 
reduced the price of money locally compared with abroad. 
Hence, the regulatory repressionism of both the interest and exchange rates had 
only a negative effect of massive capital flight from Nigena. An estimated US $7 billion 
net capital flight occurred in Nigeria between 1976 and 1982, while a further US S3 
billion capital flight took place from 1983 to 1985540 
The large scale predominance of importation and dwindling oil revenue propelled 
not only domestic debts but equally massive external borrowing. The borrowing 
philosophy of the Nigenan govemment was founded on the euphemism that the economy 
was under-borTowed541. 
The foreign debts of Nigeria rose from about N376 million in 1976 to N10,577 
million in 1983 and peaked at N 17,290 million in 1985. While the foreign debts increased, 
the total reserves also fell precipitously from a respectable US $ 10,235 million in 1980 to 
a despicable US $990 million in 1983 and a dismal US $ 1,667 million in 1985. Under the 
circumstances, it is no surprise that the Nigerian balance of payment reflected542 this 
unwholesome state of financial upheaval. The succeeding govemmentS543 in Nigeria had 
540. See John Charles Pool and Steve Stamos, The ABCs of International Finance. Lexington. Mass, 
Lexington Books, D. C. Heath & Co., (1987). 
541. See Akanle, 0.. " Regulation Of Trade And Investment In Nigeria " in Ajomo, M. A., et al ( eds. ) op. 
cit., p. 48. 
542. Since 1977 when a deficit of US$823 million was recorded which increased to US $ 2.109 million in 
1978. Although, surpluses were entered for 1979 and 1980 respectively, the deficit returned in 1981 and 
increased in 1982 to unprecedented level of US $ 5,613 million. The deficit level in 1985 was US$1.233 
million 
543. The Obasaqjo regime promulgated the Exchange Control (Anti-Sabotage) Decree of 1977 ýNith 
draconian penalties to minimise the illegal foreign exchange transfers from the country. The measures 
were thrown over board by the succeeding civilian regime which relaxed the import and exchange control 
restrictions and placed most goods on open general licence. However. the increasing perennial level of 
balance of payment deficit and plummeting foreign reserves forced the civilian government to promulgate 
the Economic Stabilization ( Temporary Provisions) Act in April 1982 which was designed to arrest 
further deterioration of the economy through more stnngent exchange control measures and import 
restrictions . 
The succeeding Buliari regime imposed further stringent exchange control and imports 
restrictive measures while its successor. the Babaginda regime in October 1985, declared a 15-month 
Economic Emergency period with further control measures. 
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made attempts since 1977 to stem the economic downtum without success. The futility 
of all the measures imposed and adopted by the various regimes and the fundamental 
distortions prevalent in the rapidly declining economy of the Nigeria made an approach to 
the international financial institutions inevitable544 
5.9 Conclusions 
The reflection on the effects of specific banking regulatory norms on the Nigerian 
banking sector and economy reveals their close approximation to the realities diagnosed 
by Mckinnon-Shaw developmental pure theory of regulatory repression. Indeed, the 
Nigerian position confirms the theoretical prognoses of Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis. The 
interest rate regulation foisted low rates and savings on the economy. Credit direction 
diverted loans to unworthy and corruptive projects. Reserve requirements reduced credit 
availability. The governmental borrowings from the banking system crowded out the 
private sector, and prompted inflation. The indigenisation facilitated the politicisation and 
mismanagement of banks, and the foreign exchange allocation rules encouraged 
corruption, foreign exchange misapplication, and capital flight. 
The realisation that the regulatory interventionism in Nigeria has had serious 
deleterious effects prompted the Deputy -Governor of the CBN and a past master of 
regulatory repression to assert that an "objective observer cannot fail to see that the 
controls have been, on the balance, a very costly affair 11545. It was in this circumstance of 
the effects of the financial regulatory measures that the teams from the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank arrived in Nigeria as predicted by Professor Shaw546. 
544. See IMF Press Release No. 87/2 - "Nigeria: Stand - bv Arrangement" INIF 
Sun-ey, Vol. 16, No. 3 of 
Febniary 9 1987, pp. 46 - 47. 
545. See Odozi. Victor. A., " Foreign Exchange Management: The Role Of The Central Bank Of Nigeria 
in National Economic Recovery. op. cit.. p. 66 
546. In the Nvords of Edward Shaw after a penod of massive financial repression in 
developing countnes. 
economic crises ensued and then "a team from the IMF amves 
". sec Shaw. op. cit.. p. 247. 
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PART IV: DEREGULATION: THE CHANGING NATURE OF BANKING 
REGULATION IN NIGERIA 
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CHAPTER VI 
IMF AND WORLD BANK IN NIGERIA: AN ECONOMY n-'FULL RETREAT 
6.1 Introduction 
The IMF and World Bank are international financial institutions that specialise in 
providing assistance to their country members with economic and financial problems. The 
preceding chapter has highlighted the effects of regulatory and financial repression on the 
Nigerian banking system and economy, and their roles in instigating and compounding the 
country's economic problems. This chapter examines the International Monetary 
Fund(IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) 
assistance to Nigeria in resolution of the economic crisis, and emphasises the two 
institutions' roles in the adoption, design, and implementation of Structural Adjustment 
Programme for the country. 
The chapter chronicles the circumstances in which the IMF and the World bank 
compelled the Nigerian government to adopt financial liberalisation policy of the banking 
system as a core measure of its structural adjustment programme. It traces the relationship 
between the two international financial institutions and Nigeria fi-om the colonial era to 
1987, when the Bretton Wood institutions ensured that Nigeria embarked on financial 
liberalisation of the banking system. The chapter contains three sections. The first section 
is the introduction. The second section examines the role of IMF and World Bank in 
Nigerian banking deregulation and economic reforms, and the conclusion is contained in 
the last section. 
6.2 IMF, World Bank and Nigeria: The Movement Towards Banking Deregulation 
Nigeria became a member of the IMF and World Bank in 1961 pursuant to the 
International Financial Organisations Act No. 47 of 1960 which authorised the accession 
of Nigeria to these international institutions. 
The country's relationship with the Bretton 
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Wood institutions, however dates back to the colonial era. We have already underscored 
the role of the World Bank mission of 1953547 in the economic development plan of 
Nigeria which encompassed all the sectors of the economy including banking. The mission 
had anUVff 541 representative on it thus both institutions had participated in the design of 
the Development Plan of Nigeria at least with respect to expert technical 
recommendations of highest influence. 
The World Bank's financial operation can equally be traced to the colonial period 
when in 1958, the Bank provided the first loan for the construction of a new railway 
through Bauchi to BOM0549. The first loan to an independent Nigeria was however made 
in 1962 for the improvement of the Lagos Port510. Since then, other series of development 
loans have been made in respect of electricity, education , industries, agricultural, and 
transport. The loans were granted by the World Bank and often its affiliateS551. 
In direct contrast to the intense relational activities between the World Bank and 
Nigeria, the country's contact with INIF had been minimal . 
Indeed, Nigeria had made 
relatively small use of IMF resourceS552 and all " the drawings have, however been 
repurchased (repaid)"553. The country had in the past granted credit in respect of some of 
the IMF resourceS554. Thus upon the creation of the IMF Oil Facility in 1974, Nigeria lent 
547. See The Economic Development Of Nigeria, IBRD, op. cit - 
548. Ibid., pp. V& Vii. 
549. See Olinger, John. P., " The World Bank And Nigeria " (1979) Review of African Political Economy, 
no. 13,9. p. 102. 
550. Loc. Cit. 
551. Le. International Development Association and international Finance Corporation. 
552. See Tmvent-N, Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria. op. cit.. p. 182. 
553. Loc. cit. 
554. Loc. cit. 
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it SDR 300 million and pledged a sum of SDR 220 million to the Supplementary Financing 
Facility of the IMF for the assistance of members in balance of payment difficulties. 
The relative amity and balanced relationship between the Bretton Wood 
institutions and Nigeria suffered a jolt at the onset of 1980s due to the collapse of world 
oil price towards the end of 1981 and early 1982. The drastic depletion of the foreign 
reserves of Nigeria, and the country's inability to discharge some trade debts' obligation 
estimated at US $5 billion, precipitated a credibility crisis with refusal of creditors such as 
export credit guarantee agencies of further insurance to exports to the country., while 
commercial banks withheld fresh loans. The ensuing balance of payment and debt crises 
compelled the Shagari government to introduced domestic measures for the resuscitation 
of the economy and seek international means to curtail the economic disequillbrium. 
The Nigerian Government had recourse in June 1982 to its holdings at the fMF as 
the first line of defence mechanism. The country's drawings from the Fund consisted of 
SDR 239m ($268m) from its SDR holdings and SDR 424m ($475m) from its reserve 
tranche, including the Oil and Supplementary Financing FacilitieS555. The Government also 
initiated the negotiation of six months interest fTee loan of Million from the Saudi 
Arabia556. The drawings from the Fund and the Saudi Arabian loan were required to boost 
the country's foreign reserves. 
Ironically, the debt tentacles that engulfed the country became rather pronounced 
despite the drawings from the IMF. The current account deficit remained persistent with 
mounting a rise in arrears on trade payments. In July and September 1982, the Nigerian 
Government concluded agreements with more than 60 international banks on refinancing 
some $2 billion arrears outstanding on letters of credit alone557. The international banks 
555. See Financial Times. '5 June 1982. p. 3(d). 
556. Loc. cit. 
557. See Financial Times. 22 November 1983. p. 18 (c). 
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however declared their intention of not making more credit available to Nigeria without 
the underpinning of the Fund'18- This declaration together with the growth in trade 
payment arrears and further deterioration in the current account deficit made the Nigerian 
Government approach to the IW imperative. 
The Shagari Govemment which was sceptical of the INIFiWorld Bank market 
approach, made a cautious invitation to both institutions. The negotiations with the IMF 
which commenced in April 1983 were for a loan of US$2.5billion under the Extended 
Fund Facility (EFF) and an additional US $500 million from the compensatory financing 
facility because of the decline in Nigeria's oil exportS559. Simultaneously, parallel 
negotiations were initiated with the World Bank for a structural adjustment loan of about 
US $300 million560. The INIF and the World Bank agreed with some of the policy 
measures already initiated by the Shagari administration, but critical differences remained 
regarding certain key measures, especially devaluation of the Naira and privatisation. The 
Nigerian Government objected to these measures. 
The Nigerian officials opposed the Fund and the World Bank's recommendation on 
devaluation clarning " It would amount to nothing less than a policy ...... suicide" 
561 
. 
This 
was the feuding relationship between the IMF, World Bank and the Nigerian Government 
until the 31 December, 1983 when the Shagan administration was removed in a coup 
d'6tat under the leadership of General Muharnmadu Buhari . 
The Buhan Government immediately postponed the IMF -Nigerian Government 
talkS562which were due in January 1984, and took drastic measures to stem the outflokv 
558. Loc. cit. 
559. Loc. cit. 
560. Loc. cit. 
561. Scc Financial Times. 22 No, %-cnibcr 1983. p. 18 
562. See Financial Times. II Januaiý- 1984. p. 46. 
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of foreign exchange from Nigeria. The administration also announced a package of tough 
economic measureS563 as the core of the regime's first budget in pre-emptive moves on the 
eve of the IMF - Nigerian Government talks in May 1984. However, the May 1984 talks 
between the seven -man IMF team and the Nigerian Government failed to agree on the 
economic stabilisation programme necessary for the grant of the Nigerian Government's 
request of between US $2.6 billion and US $3.2 billion under the Extended Fund Facility 
of the Fund to bridge its persistent balance of payment defiCit564. 
It may be mentioned that the areas of disagreement concern some of the conditions 
of the IMF in particular the devaluation of Naira, reduction in petroleum subsidies, 
liberalisation of trade and privatisation of public corporations and enterprises. The Buhari 
administration refused to accept these conditions regarding them as detrimental to the 
Nigerian econoMy561 The international financial muscle was further compressed on Nigeria 
when the World Bank informed Nigeria that its application for an adjustment loan could 
not be considered until an appropriate economic stabilisation programme had been 
concluded with the IMF566. The Bank added that the disbursement of all outstanding loan 
requests from Nigeria would be suspended unless an accord with the INfF was reached. 
This financial fait accompli forced the Buhan regime to engage in counter-trade 
deals whereby Nigerian oil was bartered for inten-nediate and consumer goodS567. Suffice 
it to assert that the deterioration of the external and internal sectors of the Nigerian 
economy persisted, creating an opportunity for another group of self-seekers to intervene 
563, The measures included large cuts in government spending. embargo on new projects, ban on foreign 
borroxvings by state governments, wage freeze, increased interest rates, ceilings on bank lending, reform 
and simplification of import duties and control , reductions in expatriates' remittances and other 
forms of 
foreign exchange restrictions. 
564. See Financial Times, 21 May 1984, p. 3 (a). 
565. See Financial Times, 4 October 1984. p. 3 (d). 
566. See The Guardian ( Nigerian Newspaper ). 8 August 1984. pp. I&2. 
567 
. 
See Dail), Sketch ( Nigerian Newspapu ). 19 March 1984. p. 10. 
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in the political structure through a palace coup d'6tat by key military members of the 
Buhari regime. Thus, on the 27 August, 1985 the Babaginda regime replaced the Buhari 
government citing vaned economic, political and social reasons for its intervention. 
The Babaginda administration was desirous of finding a panacea to the economic 
problem of Nigeria and the country's controversy with the international financial 
community on the IW demands. In this respect, the regime permitted a national debate on 
the acceptance of the EMY loan by the Nigerian Government568. 
Indeed, the motive of the Babaginda regime in launching the debate appears 
questionable since in the words of Professor Nwabueze the " populace should not have 
been involved in D4F debate , 
it is the province of the government "569. The debate was 
both inappropriate and unfair since "government was far better informed on the issues than 
the public could ever be"570. The realisation that the misinformed public generally opposed 
the IMF loan led the Government to declare a 15-month state of national economic 
emergency beginning from I October 1985. The emergency brought with it general pay 
cut for civil servants and military personnel. The Babaginda regime announced on 12 
December 1985 its rejection of IMF loan and suspension of further IMF-Nigerian 
negotiation. 
Perhaps, one respect that appears settled to the Government was the willingness of 
the Nigerian public to undertake measures similar to the INIF conditional-ities without 
taking the loan571 . 
Hence, in its 1986 budget572 the Babaginda regime implemented 
568. For a detailed discussion of the IMF debate in Nigeria see Oyejide, T. A., Sovode. A.. & Kayode. M. 
0., Nigeria And the IMF. ( lbadan, 1985 ). 
569. See Nwabueze. B. 0., Military Rule And Constitutionalism, Spectrum Law Publishing. lbadan. 
Nigeria, (1992). p. xi. 
570 
. 
Olashore. op. cit.. p. 234. 
571. Sce Olukoshi. Adebayo.. op. cit.. p. 95. 
572. Loc. Cit. 
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substantially most of the IMF recommendations. The goverment commýitted itself to a 
reduction of petroleum subsidy by 80 per cent, a policy of privatisation and 
commercialisation of public enterprises, export promotion incentives and trade 
liberalisation through a new customs tariff structure and abolition of the import licensing 
system and other trade restrictions. However, in spite of the measures, Nigeria was unable 
to reschedule her debts. The Paris Club of Western government creditors insisted that 
Nigeria must meet the usual precondition of an agreement with the RVIF before its debt 
rescheduling can be contemplated573. 
The prescription of an IMF agreement as a condition ex ante by both the public 
and private creditors has been rationalised on the basis that the IMF stand-by arrangement 
is a "certificate of good standing"574which gives confidence to creditors that the debtor is 
creditworthy for lending purposes and pursues sound economic policies. 
The realisation that an IMF seal of approval was a condition precedent to the 
rescheduling of a large stock of Nigerian external debt forced a tactical reappraisal on the 
Nigerian Government. The government based on the advice of the World Bank designed 
an economic stabilisation programme which was sufficient to obtain an "imprimatur" or 
stamp of approval from the IMF without taking the Fund's loan575. It was believed that the 
Paris Club would be satisfied with such IMF approval. This strategy was novel and the 
Financial Times commented that "(S)hould the strategy succeed, it will set a precedent for 
Third World countries, and give the World Bank a role in helping resolve Third World 
debt problems it has not up to now played "576. 
573. Loc. cit. 
574. See Burns, Arthur.. Reflections Of An Economic Policy Maker: Speeches And Congressional 
Statements 1969 - 1978. ( 1978 ) p. 462. 
575. See Financial Times. 24 April 1986, p. 4 (a). see also Financial Times. 2 October 1986. p. 4. 
576. Loc. cit. 
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The agreement of the Nigerian Government to an economic stabilisation 
programme designed by itself with outside support paved the way for the arrival of INIF 
officials in May 1986 to finalise the terms of the stabilisation programme especially the 
issue of devaluation577. Both the Fund and the Bank offered technical assistance on the 
modalities for the operation of a foreign exchange auction system which the Nigerian 
Government had decided to implement578. 
The stage was set for the announcement in July 1986 of the commencement of 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Nigeria by the Babaginda administration. This 
announcement signified the acceptance by the Nigerian Government of all the 
conditionalities of the EMT including devaluation of Naira through a Second Tier Foreign 
Exchange Market579 (SFEM). The government established a time-table for the merger of 
the first and second windows of the foreign exchange market which was duly complied 
with in 1987 when SFEM became FEM- Foreign Exchange Market. 
The conditionality of IMF had been the greatest source of controversy and 
animosity between the IMF and the succeeding Nigerian Government. IMF 
conditionality580 seeks to ensure that the member's policies are adequate to achieve a 
viable balance of payment's position and sustainable economic growth over a reasonable 
period. It has been described as a mechanism of ensuring that members who make use of 
RMF credit will be able to meet the repayment schedule, and thereby maintain the 
revolving nature of IMF resources"'. Although conditionality is not regarded as a legal 
577. See Guardian ( Nigerian Newspaper ), 24 May 1986, pp. I&2. 
578. Loc. cit. 
579. SFEM was the foreign exchange market where foreign currencies can be purchased for private 
purposes. 
580 
* 
See Gultan. Manuel- Fund Conditional ity. Evolution of Principles and Practices. ( IN/T. Washington 
D. C.. 1981 ), 
5,41. See " Financing and Adjustment Should Work in Tandem ", in IMF Survey - Supplement on the 
Fund. (September 1988 )I at 13 - 14. 
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concept but rather a subject in the realms of economic and political science582. Yet the 
foundation of IMF conditionality lies in its constitutive law . 
Article I (V) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund583 
requires the IMF to make its general resources temporarily available to members with 
balance of payments difficulties under adequate safeguards. Additionally, Article V section 
3 (a) of the said Agreement empowers the IMF to adopt policies or special policies on the 
use of its general resources by the members with a view towards establishing "adequate 
safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the fund". These provisions 
endow the IMF with the power to impose such conditions as are necessary for the use of 
its general resources. 
The power of the BAF to impose such conditions regarding a member's drawing 
has been confirmed in decisions of the INW's Executive Board584. However, the IMF is 
required to pay due regard to the domestic, social and political objectives, the economic 
priorities, and the circumstances of members, including the causes of their balance of 
payments problems in "helping members to devise adjustment programS"585. It seems while 
the powers of the IMF to impose conditionality is settled, the precise ambit or scope of 
such conditionality has been the subject of most trenchant debate in international financial 
186 discourse 
582 
* 
See Denters, E.. " IW Conditionality : Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. and the Evolving 
Principle of Solidarity " in P. De Waart. P. Peters & E. Denters., ( eds. ). International Law and 
Development. ( 1988 )p. 235. 
583 
. 
See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Dec 27.1945. (1947) 2 U. N. T. S. 20. 
584. See International Monetary Fund Executive Board, " Use of Fund's General Resources and Stand - BN 
Arrangements, " Decision No. 6056- ( 79/38 March 2,1979 ), Annual Report of the Executive Board 
for the Financial Year Ended April 30.1979, pp. 136 - 138. 
585. See Intemational Monetan, Fund Executive Board, " Use of Fund's General Resources and Stand - By 
Arrangenictits, " Decision No. 6056- ( 79/38 )( March 2,1979 ). Annual Report of the Executive Board 
for the Financial Year Ended April 30.1979, pp. 136 - 138. 
586 
* 
See the follovving examples : DOI. Sidncy.. On being Grandmotherly - The Evolution 
Of IMF 
Conditionality. ( EssaN s In International Finance No. 144. Princeton University. Princeton, New Jerscy, 
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It is therefore not surprising that the dispute over certain conditional iti es provoked 
serious antagonism between Nigerian Government and the IMF. An underlying issue In the 
controversy may be identified as the utilisation of the INff conditionality as cross 
conditionality by the World Bank which refused lending and even proposed the suspension 
of existing funding unless an MV seal of approval was obtained by the Nigerian 
Govemment. 
In September 1986, the Nigefian Government most discreetly signed a letter of 
intent to the IMF for SDR 650 million drawing to fund its economic stabilisation. 
prograMMe187. The IMF in turn issued a formal endorsement'18 of the Nigerian economic 
programme - 
The World Bank agreed a US $450 million trade policy loans for Nigeria in 
aid of the economic stabilisation programme519. In October 1986, another agreement with 
the World Bank on a three year project loan of US $4.3 billion was announced. The 
breakdown of the project loan was US $1.4 billion in 1987, US $1.2 billion in 1988, and 
US $1.7 billion in 1989590 
In February 1987, the IMF formally announced the approval of a stand-by loan 
arrangement of SDR650 million for Nigeria591 . 
The arrangement commenced on 30 C 
January 1987 and expired on 31 January 1988. The stand-by arrangement signalled 
October 198 1), Pirzio-Biroli, Making Sense of the IMF Conditionality Debate "( 1983 ) 17 Journal of 
World Trade Law 115, Taylor. Lance.. " INE Conditional ity: Incomplete Theory, Policy Malpractice. " in 
R. Myers ( ed. ). The Political Morality of the International Monetary Fund ( 1987 ), p. 33, Mosley. Paul., 
Conditionalit-%, As Bargaining Process : Structural -Aqj ustment Lending, 1980-86, ( Essays In International 
Finance No. 168, Princeton Universlt%-. New Jersev. October 1987 ), Adams, Patricia., " The World Bank 
and the IMF in Sub-Saharan Africa : Undermining Development and Environmental 
Sustainabilit)' 
1992 ) 46 Journal Of International Affairs. 97. 
587. See Financial Times, 29 September 1986, p. 4 (e). 
588. Loc. cit. 
589. See Financial Times. 2 October 1986. p. 4. 
590. See Financial Tinies. 16 October 1986. p. 6. 
591. Sce IMF Press Release No. 87/2 -" Nigeria - Stand-by Arrangement " IMF Sun, cy. Vol. 16, No. 
3 of 
Februarv 9 1987. see also Financial Times. 4 February 1987. p. 3. 
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according to the Financial Times that "Affica's last significant bastion of resistance to the 
conventional economic wisdom of the West has been won over"592. The Nigerian 
Goverrunent however kept to its firm standing that the loan would not be drawn down and 
the loan was never drawn. 
A stand-by arrangement is a form of documentation by which the UVIF assures a 
member state that it will be able to draw on the resources of the IMF up to a stated 
amount within a stated period, without further examination of its economic situation or 
policies593. The stand-by arrangements are however mere "gentlemen's agreements" since 
they are not treated as legally binding agreementS594. According to Joseph Gold "Stand-by 
arrangements are not international agreements and therefore language having a contractual 
connotation will be avoided in stand-by arrangements and letters of intent"595. 
In essence, the member state has no liability under international law for any 
inffingement of the terms of a stand-by arrangement which requires no registration with 
the United NationS596. In contradistinction to stand-by arrangements with the IMF, the 
World Bank loan agreements are international agreements and must be registered by the 
member states with the United Nations597 and upon registration become public documents. 
The stand-by arrangements on the other hand are usually secret documents. 
592. See Financial Times, 18 November 1986, p. 24. 
593. See Article XXX (b) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, see also Gold, 
Joseph., The Stand-By Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund: A Commentary on Their 
Formallegal, and Financial Aspects. ( IMF, Washington, D. C., 1970 ) p. 3., see Further Gold, Joseph., 
"The Growing Role of the IMF's Stand-By Arrangements "( 1984 ) Journal of Business Law 308. 
594. See Lauterpacht, " Gentlemen's Agreements " in W. Flume et al ( eds. ), International Law and 
Economic Order 381. 
ý9 i. See International Monetary Fund Executive Board, " Use of Fund's General Resources and Stand-BN, 
Arrangements ", Decision No. 6056- ( 79/38 )( March 2,19979 ), Annual Report of the Executive Board 
for the Financial Year Ended April 30,1979, p. 136. see also Gold, Joseph., The Legal Character of the 
Fund's Stand - By Arrangements and Why It Matters. (5- 11 IMF Pamphlet Series No. 35.1980 
596. See Gold, Joseph.. " The Growing Role of the IMF's Stand -By Arrangements ", op. cit p. 312 
597. See UNITAR, International Financial Institutions, op. cit p. 34. 
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The strategy of the Nigerian Government of securing a stand-by arrangement with 
the IMF without drawing down the loan has been commended by Paul Mosley, Jane 
Harrigan and John Toye, who argued that "(T)his showed great ingenuity on the part of 
General Babangida 
....... 
19". Despite occasional hiccups between the Bretton Wood 
institutions and Nigeria especially on the seemingly foot dragging by the Nigerian 
Government in respect of measures relating to removal of petroleum subsidy, 
privatisation, and mounting budget deficit in 1988, a new stand-by arrangement for US 
$550 million with a life expectancy of fifteen months was approved by ME for Nigeria in 
December 1988599. 
The above recapitulation demonstrates the means by which the IMF and World 
Bank "have come to occupy an important, even commanding position in Nigeria's effort to 
manage its external debt and other economic crisis 11600. However, the Nigerian 
Government asserted that its own Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was 
autonomous and independent of IMF, and rather than " accept the loan with its 
controversial conditionalities, the government resolved to modify and apply some aspects 
of IMF conditionalities in a unique manner with a view to restore the confidence of the 
international creditors in the Nigerian economy 11601 . 
Yet, the programme had all the 
trappings and trimmings of the basic core IMF/World Bank programme., except that IMF 
financial relief was not utilised602. 
598 
' 
See Mosley, Paul., Harrigan, Jane.. & Toye. John.. Aid And Povver, The World Bank & Policy - 
based Lending, Vol. 1, Analysis and policy proposals. Routledge, London and New York, (1991), p. 61. 
n. 6. 
599. See Olukoshi, Adebayo.. op. cit., p. 100. 
600. Ibid., p. 101. 
601. See Yerokun, Olusegun.. op. cit., p. 87. 
602. See Okigbo. Pius.. Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development. Vol. 3. op. cit., p. 240. 
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Indeed, the fundamental measures under the strict IMF conditionalities such as 
devaluation of currency, privatisation, removal of government subsidies, liberalisation of 
trade and finance, interest rate deregulation, reduction of budget deficit and inflation, 
market forces hegemony, and bureaucracy reduction were the pivotal measures under the 
Nigerian SAP. Additionally, the approval of IMF stand-by arrangement for Nigeria 
brought in its tail the typical performance criteria like ceilings on the banking system 
lending, ceilings on public sector debt, ceilings on the government's budget deficit, 
minimum levels of foreign reserves and removal of specific import restrictions. The failure 
of the Nigerian government from time to time to abide by the performance criteria and 
conditionalities had provoked criticism and threats from the Fund and the Bank603. 
The paramount featureS604 of the Nigerian SAP have been stated as adoption of a 
realistic exchange rate policy; rationalisation and restructuring of tariffs; strengthening of 
demand management policies; adoption of measures to stimulate domestic production, and 
broaden the supply base of the economy; adoption of appropriate pricing policies; 
encouragement of rationalisation and pfivatisation of public sector enterprises, reduction 
of complex administrative controls simultaneously with a greater reliance on market forces 
and lastly move towards improved trade and payments liberalisation. The programme had 
the basic objectiveS605 of restructuring and diversifying the productive base of Nigerian 
economy from its oil sector and import dependence, achieving fiscal and balance of 
payment's Viability, sustaining non-inflationary or minimal inflationary growth while 
reducing public sector inefficiency and intensifyin the growth potential of the private W9 
sector. 
603. See IMF Press Release. op. cit. 
604. See The 1987 Budget Speech. 
605. Ibid. 
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Although the resemblance of the Nigerian SAP measures and objectives With the 
typical IMF/World Bank SAP is beyond debate, yet in some ways marked a departure 
from the usual IMF prescription in other countries. The constant feuding between the 
Bretton Wood institutions and the Nigerian Government regarding key aspects of the 
programme indicated that the Nigerian programme was not the ideal MU's SAP606. 
Indeed, according to Essien the "timing of policy actions, the choice of instruments and 
the targets, are obviously what the Nigerian government would not pern-ýt external 
interferences"607 
Nigeria in this respect used its leverage to the greatest advantage of its leaders and 
civil servants who were "demoralised , inefficient and less than enthusiastic about a system 
which curtails many of its (their) powers of patronage 11608. Nigeria with its oil revenue and 
size " was in a much stronger bargaining position than a country which can reasonably 
hope for a substantial net aid inflow 11609. Indeed, Nigeria is not qualified 610 as a heaVily 
indebted poor country(HIPQ under the IMF/World Bank initiative for debt relief 
Although the INIF Standy-By Agreements enabled Nigeria to rescheduled her debts with 
the Paris and London clubs of creditors. Thus, the IMF and World Bank were less 
effectively in the design, operation and supervision of economic stabilisation programme in 
Nigeria. This ineffectiveness reflects conspicuously in the implementation of the key 
aspects of the SAP in Nigeria including the liberalisation and deregulation of the banking 
and financial system. 
606 
* 
See Essien, Eflong., Nigeria Under Structural Adjustment, Fountain Publications, fbadan, (1990) p. 
295. 
607. Loc. cit. 
608. See Financial Times. 18 November 1986, p. 24. 
609. See Collier. Paul., "LiNing Down The Past - Redesigning Nigerian Institutions For Economic Gro%Nlh" 
(1996) 9-5 African Affairs 325 at '130. 
6 1(). The following countries Burkina Faso. Cote d'IN, oire. Mozambique and Uganda are regarded as 
qualified in Africa. See IMF Survev, Vol. 26, No. 13, Julý 1 7.1997, p. 202. 
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The financial liberalisation of the domestic and external sectors of the Nigerian 
economy was embarked upon as an essential policy measure in the adoption of a realistic 
exchange rate, the establishment of appropriate pricing regime through interest rate 
deregulation, the greater reliance on market forces, privatisation of government ownership 
of financial institutions including banks and the liberallsation of payment system. Indeed, 
financial liberalisation underscores almost all the SAP measures and has the IMF and 
World Bank as its most enthusiastic advocates in developing countries including Nigeria 
that made financial liberalisation a pivotal policy measure of her SAP. 
6.3 Conclusions 
The relationship between Nigeria and the Bretton Wood institutions dates back to 
the colonial era, and became full fledged when the country acceded to ther membership, 
as an independent country. The relative amity in the relationship changed in the 1980s 
when the tumultuous economic situation of Nigeria forced her to seek financial assistance 
from the IMF and World bank. However, the reluctance of the succeeding Nigerian 
governments to accept in totality the conditionalities of the Bretton Wood institutions, 
created animosity in the relationship. The Babaginda regime finally succumbed to the 
pressure of the INIF and World bank, and accepted the conditionafities which signalled the 
inception of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Nigeria. This was the 
circumstances in which financial liberalisation of the banking system formed the core of 
the Nigerian SAP under the aegis of the IMF and World Bank. 
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CHAPTER VII 
BANKING DEREGULATION IN NIGERIA: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrates the circumstances in which the IMF and 
World Bank forced the Nigerian government to embark on financial deregulation of its 
banking system. This chapter analyses the laws and policies that form the basis of banking 
deregulation in Nigeria. It also contains a critical exposition of these laws and policies that 
underpin the financial deregulation programme. Its theme is the revelation that contrary to 
the widely expressed views in the Nigerian legal literature611, the new banking and related 
laws and policies of the deregulated Nigerian financial system are in many crucial aspects 
grossly defective and gravely inadequate. 
The chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section is the introduction. 
The second section examines the legislative and policy changes to banking regulations in 
the two classified pefiodS612of 1985 to 1993, and 1994 to 1997. This section contains two 
subsections. The third section consists of eleven sub-sections which locate some of the 
major defects in the current Nigerian banking laws and their effects. The fourth section 
identifies the inconsistencies of some bank related legislation that impinge on the success 
of the financial reforms. The last section contains the conclusions. 
611. See Aderemi, Adedamola, 0., " Legal Framework For Establishing A Bank In Nigeria: A Critical 
Appraisal ", op. cit.. p. 6 L, Osunbor. 0. A., " Legislative And Institutional Developments In The Banking 
Industry ", in A decade of innovative Bankers Training, ( Financial Institutions Training Centre, Lagos, 
1992)p. 86, see also Sofola, op. cit., p. 219. 
612. The discussion of the relevant banking lavN-s and policies has been classified into two distinct periods 
namely 1985-1993 and 1994-1997. This classification underscores the differences in the nature and 
regulator), orientations of banking laws and policies during the two periods, as result of changes in 
political regimes. The first period marked the General Babaginda regime when the banking laws and 
policies, vN-cre essentially liberal. The second period relates to the political ascendancy of General Abacha. 
under %, v, hom the regulatory stance of banking laws and policies has been mixed, reflecting both 
deregulatory and inter%-ctitionist tendencies. 
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7.2 Letting Capital Loose: The Regulatory and Institutional Fabric of Banking 
Deregulation in Nigeria 
7.2.1 Banking Laws and Policy Directives (1985 - 1993) 
The Nigerian banking laws and policies which had been strictly interventionist and 
control oriented before 1985, underwent significant transformation during this period as a 
result of the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programme by the General Babaginda's 
military government. The regime was largely disposed to financial deregulation of the 
Nigerian banking system, and its legislative measures and policies reflected this political 
dispensation, despite the occasional outburst of control measures. 
The initial legislative measures of the government were aimed at the liberalisation 
of the Nigerian external sector. The foreign exchange operational rules of banks received a 
most radical legal change in 1985 with the enactment of the Foreign Currency 
(Domiciliary Accounts) No. 18 of 1985. The Decree granted the listed banks and any 
other designated institution the authority to open, maintain, and operate interest yielding 
domiciliary accounts designated in foreign currency for Nigerians, resident foreigners, and 
any specified person613. 
A further reform of the foreign exchange transactional paradigm was instituted 
with the promulgation of the Second - Tier Foreign Exchange Market Decree No. 23 of 
1986. The Decree established the market framework614 for transaction in convertible 
613. See S. I of Foreign Currency (Don-dcllian, Accounts) Decree No. 18 of 1985. The specified persons 
include corporate and incorporate bodies registered in Nigeria, foreign diplomats, missions, international 
organisations and such persons as may be designated by the Armed Forces Ruling Council. 
614. The market was structure on the inter-bank system and two forms of transactions in the market 
naniely spot and foRvard transactions were recognised. The inter bank system consisted of dealings 
between the public and authorised dealers. interse dealings between authonsed dealers themselves. and 
transactions between the authorised dealers and the CBN. 
143 
foreign currency615, replacing both the fixed rate exchange mechanism of Naira, and the 
corrupt-ri den foreign exchange allocation mechanism through import and export licences. 
In August 1987, a policy of complete deregulation of interest rate was announced 
by the CBN as a major policy shift from prior fixed interest rate regime of the Nigerian 
banking system. Individual bank was allowed freely to determine its deposit and prime 
lending rates based on the market forces, provided such rates were displayed at its place of 
businesS616. Payment of interest on current account deposits was also permitted617. 
This policy of complete interest rate deregulation continued till 1991 when a 
ceiling on the maximum lending rate was re-introduced and fixed at 21 per cent618, due to 
the wide disparity between deposit and lending rates, and excessive high level of lending 
rates. The re-introduction of interest rate regulation was however short-lived, and in 
January 1992, the ceiling on bank lending rates was removed. This policy of interest rate 
fiberalisation subject to the perfonnance criterion was retained in 1993. 
The CBN in further pursuant of the financial deregulation programme, 
rationalised619 the 18 sectors / sub sectors which had enjoyed mandated credit allocation 
from the Nigerian banks under the CBN sectoral allocation guidelines. 
The procedure for licensing new banks was simplified and rationalised620 by the 
CBN and thus encouraged mass entry into the banking industry with attendant vigorous 
615. See S. 1 (1) of the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market Decree No. 23 of 1986. 
616. See Monetm Policy Circular No. 22, p. 10. 
617. See NDIC, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1990, p. 1. See also CBN, 1990 Monetary 
And Credit Polic-v Guidelines, Monetary Policy Circular No. 24. 
618. See CBN, 1991 Monetary And Credit Policy Guidelines, Monetary Policy Circular No. 25, p. 8. 
619. The sectoral allocation was rationalised from 18 sectors to 8 sectors in 1984 and 1985 respectively. 
In 1986, the sectoral classification was ftirther streamlined to 4 sectors and effective from January 1987. a 
two -sector categorisation policy was enunciated and adopted. 
The two sectors consisted of high prionty 
sectors comprising Agricultural production and Manufacturing. and other sectors. 
See CBN, Credit Policy Guidelines For 1986 Fiscal Year. Monetary Policy Circular No. 20, p. 5.. See 
CBN, Credit Policy Guidelines For 1987 Fiscal Year. Monetary Policy Circular No. 2 1, p. 5. 
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competition. The minimum paid -up capital of banks was increased621 to ensure the 
proper capitalisation of new bank entrants. 
mandatory deposit insurance scheme by licensed banks in Nigeria became a legal 
requirement in 1988 when section 15(l)(a) of Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Decree No. 22 of 1988 requires all licensed banks and such other financial institutions in 
the country that engaged in the deposits receiving business to insure their deposit liabilities 
with the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) established under the Decree. 
The CBN622 also permitted the commercial and merchant banks in 1988 for the first time, 
to take up equity ownership in companies. 
In 1989, some contentious and largely destabilising policy measures crept into the 
liberalisation programmes of the Nigerian government. The Federal Nfinistry of Finance 
and Economic Development during the year, issued a circulal-623 that directed the transfer 
of Federal and State Governments, and Parastatals accounts imth the Merchant and 
Commercial banks to CBN. The CBN also issued stabilisation securities from time to time 
to banks in order to mop up the excess liquidity in the systeM624. These measures interalia 
allegedly invested many Nigerian banks with acute illiquidity, and precipitated their 
subsequent insolvency and collapse. 
620. See Oresotu, F. 0., " Implementation of Indirect Monetan- Control in Nigeria : Problems and 
Prospects", CBN Economic And Financial Review, Vol. 3 1, No. 3. Sept. 1993. p. 174. 
62 1. The minimurn paid-up capital for conunercial banks was raised from NIO million to N20 million 
and that for the merchant banks from N6 m-illion to N12 million. Furthermore, In February 1990, the 
minimum paid-up capital was increased to N40 million and N50 million for merchant and commercial 
banks respectively. see Qjo, M. 0., " Deregulation In the Nigerian Banking Industry: A ReView and 
Appraisal ", CBN Economic And Financial Review, Vol. 29, No. 1. March 199 1, p. 9. See also CBN 
Briefs, Research Department, Series No. 95/03, p. 5. 
622. See CBN, Credit Policy Guidelines For 1988 Fiscal Year, Monetary Policy Circular No. 22. p. 13. 
623. See Federal Ministry of Finance and Development Circular Letter Ref. Noc / 2700/ v/ 226 of 26 
MaN, 1989. 
624. See CBN, Monetary Policy Circular No. 24 ( Amendment No. I) of August 2.1990 which re- 
introduced the use of stabilisation securities for purposes of reducing the bulging size of excess liquidity in 
batiks. 
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The pre-deregulation ownership rules also received a major legal transformation 
during the deregulation era. A stringent and restrictive law which restricted foreign equity 
participation in most Nigerian enterprises including banking to a maximum of forty percent 
was repealed625 .A replacement law, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree No. 54 
of 1989 was enacted, and permitted foreign ownership of any enterprise which had not 
been exclusively reserved for Nigerians by that Decree626. The schedule of the Decree 
which contained the list of reserved enterprises does not including banking. Thus a 
foreigner may own a banking enterprise in Nigeria. 
Prior to 1990, Nigerian banks had prudential requirements which included the 
compliance with minimum paid-up capital rules, and the maintenance of the liquiditY 
ratios and minimum holding of cash reserves, specified liquid assets, special deposits and 
stabilisation securitieS627. In March 1990, the CBN implemented the recommendations of 
Baste Committee of the Bank for International Settlement with respect to a common 
standard of measurement of capital adequacy. Consequently, a circular628was issued by 
the Apex Bank which required all licensed banks to maintain forthwith a specify per cent 
of risk weighted assets to capitaJ629 
625. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree No. 3 of 1977 was repealed by S. 18 of the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree No. 54 of 1989. 
626. See S. I of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree No. 54 of 1989. 
627. See Adekanve. Femi.. " Problems Of Bank Credit And Securities For Bankers Advances " in 
Advanced Law ýnd Practice Of Banking In Nigeria ( Financial Institutions Training Centre, Lagos, 
Nigeria, 1991 )pp. 81 &111. 
628. See NDIC, Annual Report And Statement of Accounts. 1990., p. 11. See also CBN Circular of March 
1990. 
629. The licensed banks were required to maintain forthwith a minimum of 7.25 per cent of nsk . veighted 
assets as capital. and ensure that at least 50 per cent of their total capital are made up of core capital 
consisting of share capital and resen, es. The minimum ratio has been raised to 8.0 per cent of risk 
weighted assets to capital si nce I st January. 1992. The CBN further prescribed new prudential guidel i nes 
for the licensed banks vide Circular Letter No. BSD/DO/23Nol. 1/11 of November 7,1990. AddItIonally. a 
mandatory "Statement Of Accounting Standard: Accounting By Banks And NoN-Bank Financial 
Institutions ( Part I was issued for use by preparers and users of published financial statement of 
banks. 
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It seems after a quinquennium, that the Nigerian goverru-nent discovered the 
unsustainability of the financial deregulation without a major overhauling of the pre- 
eminent banking laws contained in the 1958 CBN Act and the 1969 Banking Decree. In 
the circumstances of this realisation, the Nigerian banking laws witnessed fundamental 
legal reforms in 1991. A new law, the Central Bank of Nigeria Decree630 No. 24 of 1991, 
was enacted and it repealed the 1958 CBN Act631 .A new 
banking legislation, the Banks 
and Other Financial Institutions Decree (BORD) No. 25 of 1991, was also 
promulgated632. This new banking law repealed and replaced the 1969 Banking Decree. 
Section 8 of CBN Decree of 1991 specifies the President as the final authority on 
monetary and banking policy. Section 8(2) of the said Decree provides that 
The President after due consideration may, in writing, direct 
the Bank as to the monetary and banking policy pursued or 
intended to be pursued and the directive shall be binding on 
the Board shall forthwith take all steps necessary or expedient 
to give effect thereto. 
Although, the 1991 CBN Decree retained the principal objectS633 of the CBN , its 
regulatory role in respect of monetary and banking policy became enhanced634. The 
Governor of CBN was made the sole licensing authority for banks, unlike the repealed 
banking law, under which the Minister of finance was the grantor of banking licenceS635 
The power of revocation of banking licence under specified circumstances was vested 
630. See Central Bank of Nigeria Decree No. 24 of 1991 hereafter called 1991 CBN Decree. 
631. See S. 54 (1) & (3). Ibid. 
632. This Decree is hereafter called BOFID. 
633. See S. 2, Ibid. 
634. Section 8 (1) of the CBN Decree merely required the Govemor of CBN to keep the President 
infornied of the monetarv and banking policy pursued or intended to be pursued by the 
CBN. The 
President may however direct the CBN as to the monetary policy pursued or intended to be pursued and 
such directive shall be implemented forthN%rith bý the CBN. See also SS. 6.8, & 1'$ of 
CBN Decree No. 24 of 
1991. 
63 See S. 2 of the Banking Decree 1969. 
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under BOFID in the Governor of CBN subject only to the approval of the President636. 
Section 12 of BOFID provides in this respect that " The Governor may, with the approval 
of the President by notice published in the Gazette, revoke any licence granted under this 
Decree 
....... 
The 1991 CBN Decree contains many new provisions enhancing the regulatory 
and supervisory powers of the CBN as the financial regulator of the banking system. The 
BOFID, on the other hand establishes new regulatory framework for the operations and 
activities of banks and other financial institutions. The BORD changes the banking norms 
in Nigeria in some significant respectS637. 
The privatisation programme of the Nigerian government which excluded the 
public banks in 1988, was later extended to the privatisation of the government banks by a 
new law, the Bureau of Public Enterprises Decree No. 78 of 1993. This law repealed the 
Decree No. 25 of 1988, and authorised the full privatisation of thirteen Federal 
Government-owned bankS638. The Nigerian banking regulatory mechanism also shifted 
636. See SS 12 & 14 of BOFID. 
637. It introduces two new categories of banks, prescribes the maintenance of minimum capital funds and 
rescrve fund bv banks. The law fonnally liberalises interest rate by removing the statutory obligation for 
the observance of fixed interest rate structure bNr the Nigerian banks. Specifically, the BOFID was made 
applicable to the finance houses which prior to 1991. had been operating virtually NNithout formal 
regulation or regulatory authority. Furthermore, the BOFID also liberalises the banking business 
operations and functional rules. All banks are allowed to undertake equipment leasing business or debt 
factoring and own approved shares in specified financial companies subject to the aggregate value 
prescribed by the law. Section 21 of BOFID unlike the repealed law, also permits banks to own equity 
shares in small and medium scale commercial, industnal and agricultural enterprises, or in any other 
business approved by the CBN. Additionally. BOFID sanctions the establishment of representativc offices 
in Nigeria by foreign banks. 
It is important to emphasise the fact that BOFID however retained albeit in modified forms the general 
restrictions of banking activities in respect of maximum credit exposure, insider dealings, non- banking 
tradings, share acquisition in financial and industrial conglomerates, ow-nership of non-banking 
subsidiary, and real estates %vhich were cloquently stated in the repealed banking law subject however to 
an important modification . The restricted activities can 
be undertaken by any bank w'Ith the prior 
approval of the CBN. This is an important improvement on the pre-1991 law under which the restrictions 
were absolute. 
638. See Part 11. Second Schedule of Decree No. 78 of 1993. 
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from direct regulation to indirect regulation with the introduction of open market 
operation on June 30,1993 by the CBN639 
7.2.2 Changes in Banking Laws and Policy Directives (1994 - 1997) 
This part concentrates on the update of banking policies and directives. It must however 
be emphasised that unlike the preceding period which was characterised by a deregulatory 
stance, this period has been marked by serious policy changes and instability which went 
from outright repression to complete deregulation depending on the policy mood of the 
government. The attempt here is to capture the essential policy changes since 1994. 
7.2.2: 1 Banking Regulation and Policies (1994-1997) 
The year 1994 witnessed the re-introduction of administratively controlled interest 
rateS640,, retained in 1995641 . The contraction of the sectoral allocation categonsation was 
altered mildly with the addition of an export sub sectol-642 in 1994 and another solid 
minerals sub sectol-643 in 1995. 
The high incidence of banking failure in Nigeria due to naked abuses by insiders 
and recalcitrant debtors prompted the government to enact the Failed Banks (Recovery of 
Debts) and Financial Malpractice in Banks Decree No. 18 of 1994 as amended by Decree 
No. 18 of 1995644. This law is one of the legal norms with far - reaching effect on the 
banking activities in Nigena, since it is the first time that a conscious attempt has been 
639 
. 
See CBN, Annual Report And Statement of Accounts, 1993, p. 12. 
040 
' 
See CBN, Monetary. Credit And Foreign Exchange / Trade Guidelines, 1994 Monetan, Policy 
Circular No. 28 . The maximum 
lending ratewas pegged at 21 per cent. 
See CBN, Monetary. Credit And Foreign Exchange / Trade Guidelines, 1995 Monetan, PolicN, 
Circular No. 29 of 17/1/95. 
642. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1995. p. 10. 
643. Loc. cit. 
644. See Failed Batik (Recovery Of Debts) And Financial Malpractices In Banks (Amendment) Decree No. 
18 of 1995. 
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made to punish bank criminals and recover debts. Section 3 (1) of the said Decree No. 18 
of 1994 states the powers of the Tribunal established under the law interalia : 
(a) recover, in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, 
the debts owed to a failed bank, arising in the ordinary 
course of business and which remain outstanding as at the 
date the bank is closed or declared a failed bank by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria; 
(b) 
.................. (c) try the offences specified in the Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions Decree 1991 and the Nigeria Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Decree 1988; and 
(d) try other offences relating to the business or operation of a 
bank under any enactment. 
The rule on foreign ownership of Nigerian enterprises including banking which 
had been liberalised significantly in 1989 became completely deregulated with the 
abrogation of the 1989 Decree645 by the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Repeal) Decree 
No. 7 of 1995. The implication of this law is that there is absolutely no restriction on 
foreign ownership of any enterprises in Nigeria irrespective of the nature or capitalisation 
of such enterpriseS646. The Exchange control regime was liberalised further with the 
abolition of the Nigerian Exchange Control Act647 by the Exchange Control (Repeal) 
Decree No. 8 of 1995. A new foreign exchange market has been introduced by the 
Foreign Exchange (Monitonng And Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 17 of 1995. 
In a dramatic change of policy, on I October 1996 the cap on interest rates 
imposed in 1994 was 
lifted648 and remained in force in 1997649. A remarkable policy was 
645. See Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree No. 54 of 1989. 
646. For the N, IcN%- that foreigners cannot invest in specified sectors such as petroleum production and 
defence which are " classified prime sectors of the economy ". see Okorodudu-Fubara. M. T., " State 
Control And Intervention In Strategic Business And The Promotion Of Private Investment " in Ayua. 1. 
A. and Owasanoye, Bolqji.. Privatisation Of Government CM-ned Banks And The Issues Of Ownership 
And Control ( Legal And Economic Perspectives ), Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 
Lagos, (1996), p. 3 1. 
647. No. 16 of 1962 now Cap. 112 of 1990 LFN. 
648. See CBN, Monctan'. Credit. Foreign Trade And Exchange Policy Guidelines For 1997 Fiscal Ycar. 
Monetary Policy Circular No. 3 1. P. 9. 
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unveiled when all forms of mandatory credit allocations by banks through sectoral 
allocation guidelines was abolished650 effective from I October 1996. The cash reserves 
requirement of commercial banks was hiked to 8.0 per cent With changes concerning the 
base for measuringit651 . The base for measuring liquidity ratio was equally changed652 as 
well as minimum paid- up capital requirement653. The operations of merchant banking 
attracted significant liberalisation in 1996 with specific measureS654. 
The most controversial legislative measures since the commencement of banking 
deregulation in Nigeria are contained in Central Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Decree 
No. 3 of 1997 which amended the Principal Decree No. 24 of 1991655. A domineering 
theme of this legislative change is the denial of all forms of independence656which the 
1991 Decree had accorded the CBN and its Governor. Decree No. 3 of 1997 removed the 
Governor of CBN from the chairmanship of the CBN Board657. 
649. Loc. cit. 
650 
' 
See CBN, Monetary, Credit, Foreign Trade And Exchange Policy Guidelines For 1997 Fiscal Year, 
Monetary Policy Circular No. 3 1, p. 15, 
651. Ibid., p. 7. 
652. Loc. cit. 
653. Perhaps. the most controversial policy enunciated in 1997 is the increment in the minimum paid-tip 
capital requirement of both commercial and merchant banks to a uniform level of N500 million and the 
existing banks are required to comply with this directive over a transitional penod of two years, expiring 
on 31 st December, 1998. see CBN, Monetary, Credit, Foreign Trade And Exchange Policy Guidelines For 
1997 Fiscal Year, Monetary Policy Circular No. 31ýp. 18. 
654. Ibid., p. 14. 
655.1991 CBN Decree. 
656. The Governor of the CBN was relieved of his direct responsibility for monetary and credit policy and 
exchange rate policy. He was also subordinated to the Minister of finance in these respects. see SS. 6&8 
of the CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as amended by Decree No. 3 of 1997. 
657. See S. 6 (2) (3) (a) of 1991 CBN as amended by Decree No. 3 of 1997. Similarly, t,, N, o Deputý-- 
Governors Nvere rcheved of the Board membership whilst new members consisting of a part-time 
chairman, four part -time other members, the Director-General of the Federal ministry of Finance. and 
Managing Director of NDIC are introduced. 
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In the same vein, the 1991 BOFID was amended by the Banks And Other Financial 
Institutions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1997. The amendment now requires the 
Governor of CBN to obtain the approval of the Minister in respect of the grant or 
suspension of any banking licence658. Perhaps, the most repressive new provision in 
BOFID is the amended sectionl (I) which now makes the CBN in its banking regulatory 
and supervisory functions subject to the overall supervision of the Nfinister of Finance. 
The said section I (I) of BOFID as amended659provides that "The Central Bank of Nigeria 
(hereinafter in tl-iis Decree referred to as "the Bank") shall have all the functions and 
powers conferred and the duties imposed on it under this Decree subject to the overall 
supervision of the Minister". 
It may be stated that the analysis of the law and policy of financial deregulation in 
Nigeria reveals several attempts to institute some of the main thrusts of Mckinnon-Shaw 
concept of financial liberalisation such as interest rate liberalisation, privatisation, abolition 
of repressive instruments, and liberalisation of bank entry rules. 
7.3 Nigerian Banking Laws Under Financial Deregulation: An Appraisal 
A careful appraisal of the Nigerian banking laws during financial deregulation 
reveals the following critical deficiencies in the laws. 
7.3.1 Lack of co-ordination of regulatory and supervisory activities 
The first noticeable defect in the Nigerian banking laws is the absence of a legal 
pro,,, ision mandating the co-ordination of regulatory and supervisory activities between 
the numerous regulatory agencies. The defect has precipitated regulatory arbitrage in 
which financial operators exploit the gaps in the laws', since the laws and procedures do 
not clearly spell out who should initiate actions or how each agency can support the other. 
658. Sce SS 3 (5) & 60 (2), Ibid. 
659. See BOFID 1991 as amended by Banks and Other Financial Institutions (Amendment) Decree No. 4 
of 1997. 
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Specifically, the NDIC and the BOFID DecreeS660 equipped both the NDIC and CBN with 
substantially the same powers of take-ovel-661, assumption662' closure663, receivership664 I 
examination665, special exarrunation666and removal of officerS667 , in respect of 
failed and 
failing banks. Yet, there is no provision on seniority of regulatory actions or mechanism, 
and methodology of co-ordination of implementation. 
Additionally, while the CBN under BORD Decree , is empowered to appoint the 
NDIC as receiver of a failed bank668, the NDIC Decree on the other hand, vests in the 
Finance Minister the power to appoint NDIC as receiver of a failed bank669. Similarly, the 
CBN receives approvals for its regulatory actions in respect of failed banks from the 
President or Head of State670, but the NDIC receives authorisation for identical regulatory 
actions from the Finance Ministel-671 . 
Furthermore, the provision of section 54 of 1991 
BOFID that allowed the provisions of that Decree to prevail over any inconsistent 
provisions of the NDIC Decree, thus granting the CBN a regulatory hedge over NDIC, 
660. See NDIC Decree No. 22 of 1988 as amended. See also BORD No. 25 of 1991 as amended. 
661. See S. 4 (i) of NDIC Decree, Ibid.. see also S. 34 of BOFID, Ibid. 
662. See S. 4 (i) of NDIC Decree. Ibid.. see also S. 34 of BOFID, Ibid. 
663. See S. 4 (g) of NDIC Decree. Ibid., see also S. 36 of BOFID. Ibid. 
664. See SS. 4 0) & 24 of NDIC Decree. Ibid.. see also S. 38 of BOFID, under which the CBN mav 
appoint the NDIC or any person as either official receiver or liquidator. 
665. See SS. 4 (c) & 16 of NDIC Decree, Ibid.. see also S. 30 of BOFID, Ibid. 
666. See SS. 4(e)& 18 of NDIC Decree, Ibid.. see also S-32 of BOFID. Ibid. 
667. See S. 4(I) of NDIC Decree, Ibid., see also S. 33 of BOFID. Ibid. 
668. See S. 38 of BOFID, Ibid. 
669. See S. 28 of NDIC Decree No. 22 of 1988 as amended. 
670. See SS. 12,33.34, & 37 of BOFID No. 25 of 1991 as amended. 
01. Sec SS. 4.24, & 28 of NDIC Decrec No. 22 of 1988 as amended. 
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has been amended in 1997 to remove this particular regulatory supefiofity672. The CBN 
and NDIC are now mutually exclusive in their respective regulatory jurisdictions. 
There is no provision for co-ordination of activities between the two regulatory 
bodies, although they often undertake joint examination whenever they wish673 and section 
36 (5) of the NDIC Decree provides for co-operation between NDIC and CBN. Yet, the 
absence of mandatory co-ordination of regulatory activities and the 1997 legislative 
amendments have exacerbated the regulatory conflicts between the two institutions 
precipitating regulatory arbitrage, policy slippage, unreasonable delays, conflicting 
directives and regulatory intransigence. Thus, the Deputy Governor of CBN, Victor 
Odozi, avers that "the situation requires ... a re-exarnination of the statutes and decrees 
governing the regulation of banks and getting the regulatory agencies to co-ordinate their 
11674 activities more effectively 
It is submitted that a provision mandating the co-ordination of regulatory actions 
between CBN and NDIC , is crucial to the performance of both their regulatory duties, 
and must be enacted promptly as a critical component of regulatory measures restoring the 
stability and viability of the Nigerian financial sector. Indeed, such provision requiring co- 
ordination of regulatory activities exists between the Federal Reserve System and Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation in U. S. 
A. 675 
, and the Governor of the Bank of England is 
tile Chairman of the Deposit Protection Board 
676and 
appoints other ordinary members of 
672. See S. 54 of BOFID No. 25 of 1991 as substituted by BOFID ( Amendment ) Decree No. 4 of 1997. 
673. See CBN Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts. 
674 
. 
See Odozi, V. A., " Discussion ", in Growth And Stabili[N Of Nigena's Finamcial Services Industr). 
Papcrs and Procccdings of the Bank Dircctors' Scniinar, 1993 (Financial Institutions Training Ccntre. 
Lagos, Nigcria, 1993) p. 20. 
675- See Scott, Hal. S and Wellons. Philip. A.. InternaLional Finance. Transactions. Polic,. And 
1'. )8. Rcgulation. The Foundation Prcss. Inc., Wcstbury. Ncw York, (1996), p. Y-. 1- 
676. e Paragraph I (I) (a) of Schedule 4 to the Banking Act, 1987, Cap 22. see ho%%e%er the statutorN Se 
cliangcs undcr the Bank of England Act 1998. 
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the Board677, while the Deputy Governor and Chief Cashier of the Bank of England are 
ex-officio members of the said Board678. This functional arrangement and the fact that the 
British Deposit Protection Board operates through the Bank of England, and has no 
similar regulatory and supervisory powers as the Bank ensures amicable and effective 
regulatory actions. 
The section 23C of the NDIC Decree as amended679in 1997 which now 
specifically requires the NDIC to recommend the revocation of the banking licence of a 
failed or failing insured bank to the CBN, and to act suo moto if the CBN offers no 
response within 30 days, does not satisfy the need for a legal provision for co-ordination 
of regulatory activities between NDIC and CBN in respect of examination, special 
examination, take-over, assumption, closure, and removal of officers of failed banks. In 
same respect, the establishment680of the Financial Services Coordinating Committee 
(FSCC) in 1997 has not removed the urgent need for a legal provision mandating the 
coordination of financial regulatory activities among the financial regulators. 
7.3.2 Absence of clear procedure for the treatment of Failed Banks 
Another fundamental flaw in the Nigerian banking laws is the failure to establish 
clear procedure for liquidation of problem banks. The regulatory agencies are endowed 
with wide discretionary powers and varied policy toolS681, and they select the proper tool 
in each case. The ambiguity of procedure and wide discretionary powers have had the 
effects of investing the rules of the game with regulatory discretion often translating to 
u npred ict ability. In fact, the CBN has been accused of regulatory favouritism for 
677. Sce Paragraph I(D (c). Ibid. 
678. See Paragraph I (I) (b) & (c). Ibid. 
679. See NDIC ( Amendment ) Decree No. 5 of 1997. 
680. See CBN. Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1997. p. 22. 
681. For example powers of take-over. assumption. closure. revocation of banking licence. removal of 
officers, and winding up of banking business. 
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sanctioning two or three banks out of 29 distressed banks then polluting the Nigerian 
financial systeM682. 
Furthermore, the wide discretionary financial regulatory powers usually degenerate 
into forbearance with financial regulators and insurers avoiding the responsibility of 
closing down the problem banks. This is because " rehabilitation is a costly venture, the 
path of least resistance may be to turn a blind eye to insolvent institutions and provide 
implicit subsidies through exemptions from regulations "683. The attitude of the Nigerian 
financial regulators is succinctly captured by this assertion. The CBN had granted 
numerous forbearance and exemptionS684to the failing banks without any positive effects, 
and the reluctance of the regulators to apply the market discipline has come under intense 
CfitiCiSMS685. 
It is in this respect that banking laws which clearly delineate the circumstances 
that deserve liquidation, assumption, rehabilitation, or conservation, and specify the range 
of the receiver's or conservator's actions, powers, and fights as well as the time limit for 
the exercise of the regulatory powers, would have been most helpful in rrtinimising the 
regulatory inertia that captured the Nigerian financial system. However, the Nigerian 
banking laws are neither clear in these respects nor endowed regulatory authorities' with 
adequate powers and time limits. Hence, the demand for the enhancement of the 
regulatory and supervisory capacity of the Nigerian financial regulators. It must be 
682. See Ekpenyong. David, B., " Financial Distress In Banks: Nature And Implications " (1994) The 
Nigerian Banker, Journal of The Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria, April - June 1994, p. 2 1. 
683 
' 
See Glaessner. T. and Mas, Ignacio.. " Incentives And The Resolution Of Bank Distress " (1995) The 
World Bank Research Obsen-er, Vol. 10, No. 1,53 at p. 70. 
684. The regulatory forbearance measures included the re-admission of some distressed banks into the 
foreign exchange market. and waiver of penalties for non-compliance with minimum capital 
requirements, see CBN. Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1993, p. 164. 
685. See Afolabi. 'Layi.. " Bank Failure And The Rest Of Us ". (1994) The Nigerian Banker. Journal of the 
Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria, (April - June). p. 13. see also 
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emphasised that even with clearer laws, the regulators must have the Nvill for regulatory 
enforcement. 
The Nigerian banking laws especially both the CBN and NDIC Decrees, failed to 
require t ese regulatory agencies to liquidate or reprivatise assumed banking institutions 
within a specific period of time. Hence, the regulatory agencies have assumed the control 
of some Nigerian banks for three or more years, and no decisive regulatory actions had 
been taken against such assumed institutionS686. On the contrary, if the Nigerian banking 
laws had mandated these regulatory institutions to liquidate or sell an assumed institution 
within a time limit, the saga of numerous assumed banks with many interim management 
committees would have subsided. In the U. S. A., the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation is required by law to divest itself of any acquired bank within two yearS687. 
The NDIC Decree lacks such time limit provision although it was influenced by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provisionS688. 
The absence of time limit for acquisition of failed banks by regulatory agencies had 
given rise to an adverse incentive by financial regulators who now prefer such indefinite 
assumption and take over to outright liquidation since it provides pecuniary compensation 
for the regulators in terms of Board membership of acquired banks, remuneration for such 
membership or other duties undertaken for the assumed bankS689, and opportunities to 
reward ftiendS690with appointment into interim boards of assumed banks. The Nigerian 
686 
* See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. 1995, p. 166. 
See further The Punch. Business 
News. Friday. May 16,1997. p. 11. 
687 
. See Glaessner and Mas, op. cit p. 62. 
688 
. See Ebhodaghe, J. U. (Managing Director of NDIC), 
" Some Operational Issues Of NDIC And The 
Banks", (199 1) NDIC Quarterly. p. 13. 
689. See S. 33 (2) (d) (11) of BOFID No. 25 of 1991 as amended. permits remuneration to persons 
appointed to the Board of a failed or failing bank. 
690 
* The law allows the CBN to appoint anv person as a 
director of an assumed failed or failing bank. see 
S. 33 (2) (d) (ii) of BOFID No. 25 of 1991 as amended. Indeed, a number of the failed banks are now 
presided over by three man Boards of directors appointed by the CBN. Such appointed directors are in 
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situation is full of these instances with some officers of the NDIC or CBN sitting on five 
or more Interim Management Boards of assumed banks as directorS691with remunerative 
incomes for such positions. Indeed, the Director of CBN Banking Supervision, Mr G. A. 
Ogunleye, and the Board Secretary to the NDIC, Alhaji N. Baba-Ahmed, served as 
chairman and director respectively of at least seven assumed bankS692 simultaneously as at 
end of 1995. One wonder, whether the membership of such Interim committees had not 
taken over their primary duties as key officers of the NDIC or CBN. 
It is submitted that the Nigerian banking laws should be amended to specify the 
clear circumstances for regulatory actions of liquidation, conservation and rehabilitation by 
the regulatory agencies, as well as the particular powers and duties of the regulatory 
agencies in respect of each regulatory action. A time limit for the liquidation or sale of 
assumed and acquired banks must also be incorporated into the Nigerian banking laws. It 
is contended that if the regulatory framework had contained the suggested provisions, the 
presidency and the regulatory agencies may have been forced to liquidate the numerous 
ailing banks now contaminating the Nigerian financial system. It would also have 
provided a clear signal to the bank owners that the government would take decisive 
actions against ailing banks. The present intransigence, forbearance, and rehabilitation by 
the Nigerian financial regulators under the direction of the government, which are 
charge of Amicable Bank of Nigeria Ltd. Commercial Trust Bank 
i 
Nigeria Ltd, Credite Bank Nigeria Ltd, 
First African Trusr Bank Ltd, Nigerian Universal Bank Ltd. Premier Commercial Bank Pic, Progress 
Bank of Nigeria Pic, Abacus Merchant Bank Ltd, Centurý' Merchant Bank Ltd, Continental Merchant 
Bank Nigeria Pic, Great Merchant Bank Ltd, Group Merchant Bank Ltd. ICON Limited ( Merchant 
Bankers ), Ivory, Merchant Bank Ltd, Merchant Bank of Africa ( Nigeria ) Ltd, Nationwide Merchant 
Bank Ltd, Nigeria Merchant Bank Pic. Prime Merchant Bank Limited, and Victory, Merchant Bank Ltd. 
691. See NDIC, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1995. pp. 80 - 89. 
""2. The banks were African Continential Bank PLC. Co-operative & Commerce Bank ( Nigeria ) PLC. 
Mercantile Bank of Nigeria PLC, National Bank of Nigeria Limited. New Nigeria Bank PLC, Pan African 
Bank Limited. and Savannah Bank of Nigcfia PLC. see NDIC. Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 
199-5, pp. 80,81,83,84, & 85. 
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designed to prevent failure of sick banks implies "full deposit protection and compromises 
market discipline"693. 
7.3.3 Lack of adequate safeguards for dealings between Banks and their 
Subsidiaries and Conglomerates 
A very grave deficiency in the Nigerian banking law is a provision which allows 
banks to own financial subsidiary dealing in money or capital market694, but contains no 
firewall provision restricting the investment of a parent bank in such financial subsidiary. 
Hence, the dangers of contagion risk695which may occur where a subsidiary runs into 
financial difficulty, and transmits such problem to its parent bank, with substantial 
investment in it, have not been prevented. Indeed, the financial instability of some banking 
corporations in the country was actually triggered off by contagious financial problems in 
their subsidiaries in which they had large financial investments and exposures. 
An example of such numerous cases, is the Abacus Merchant Bank Limited Vs. 
Abacus Securities Limited696, in which the parent bank that became insolvent had placed 
large investments with the Defendant , its subsidiary, to the tune of 
N5,900,351.71 and 
made payments to the other investors in the Defendant, when the Defendant had payment 
difficulties. These payments totalled N3,514,756.88 . 
The Plaintiff, parent bank later failed 
the capital adequacy test and was assumed by the regulatory agency which sued the 
subsidiary defendant for the sums of the investment, exposures and interests. The 
Tribunal awarded judgement to the Plaintiff for the various sums claimed. The fact of the 
financial difficulties of the defendant may however render the judgement nugatory. It 
seems the Plaintiffs receiver may now proceed on the defendant's assets (if any) and its 
693. See Glacssner and Mass. op. cit.. p. 7 1. 
694. See S. 20 (2) (d ) (i) of BORD No. 25 of 1991 as amended. 
695. See Scott and Wellon, op. cit.. p. 337. 
696. See Suit No. FBFNITIL / Z. 11/46/96. 
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debtors. A clear lesson however is that the subsidiary crisis was transmitted to the parent 
bank, and no law prevented this occurrence or future incidents. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian banking law also did not curb imprudent exposure of 
parent banks to their subsidiaries. There is no provision prohibiting lending to such 
subsidiaries, or lending on the security of the shares of such subsidiaries. The only 
provision is a requirement that a bank shall not be permitted to have outstanding an 
unsecured credit697 in excess of N50,000.00 to its subsidiary or any company in which it 
has a share holding of at least five per cent.. Thus, a parent bank can grant secured credit 
of any amount to its subsidiary subject to the rule on a bank's maximum loan exposure to 
a single individual or corporation698. This deficient law enabled many failed banks to grant 
substantial credits to their fragile or phantom subsidiaries on the security of the unworthy 
shares of such subsidiaries or undervalued securities. 
The law also facilitated large insider abuses with funds transferred from banks to 
subsidiaries which allocated them to their ultimate beneficiarieS699. Some directors of the 
parent banks who were also common directors of the subsidiaries simply evaded the law 
which prohibited unsecured credit in excess of N50,000.00 to such directorS700, by placing 
the share certificates of the subsidiaries as securities for credit from the parent banks. 
It is recommended that a firewall provision be enacted in Nigerian banking law 
prohibiting the banks from granting loans to, or investing in securities underwriting by 
their subsidiaries, or granting loans on the security of such subsidiaries' shares. 
697. See S. 20 (2) (a) (ili) of BOFID No. 25 of 1991 as amended 
698. See S. 20 (1) (a) of BOFID No. 25 of 1991 as amended, which limits a bank's maximum loan 
exposure to any person to mvily per cent of the shareholders fund unimpaired by losses, and in case of a 
merchant bank to fifty percent of its shareholders fund urumpaired by losses. 
199. See Sagbaniah, J. E. L.. " Gerald P. O'Driscoll. JR.: Bank Failures : The Deposit Insurance Connection 
Conteniporary Policy Issues Vol. VI, No. 2. April 1988 ", (199 1) CBN Economic & Financial Review. 
\, 'ol. 29. No. 2. p. 220. 
700 
. 
See S. 20 (2) (a) (i) of BORD No. 25 of 1991 as amended 
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Alternatively, a parent bank's loans or investment in its subsidianes, may be deducted from 
the parent bank's capital. The identical provisions to those suggested exist in Chile701 and 
USA702. It is our view that a firewall provision will rninimise the large scale abuses of the 
interlocking corporate structure, which are prevalent in the Nigerian financial system. 
7.3.4 Absence of provisions on managerial and financial competence 
Another very serious ornission of the Nigerian banking law is the absence of a' fit 
and propertest. The 1991 BOFID glaringly omitted this important provision despite the 
condemnation of its legislative predecessor for the same error of omission. A legal 
commentator comments on the absence of a provision relating to the personality of bank 
owners and director in Nigeria thus "as the law stands (notwithstanding practice) it is 
indeed possible for dishonest persons to be engaged in the formation and operation of 
banks and that this does not augur well for the country's financial system ..... 
11703 
The 1991 BORD did not cure this defect and it has still not been rectified. This 
failure enabled banking licences to be given " to those who could not by stretch of 
imagination pass the test of personal integrity. Management with little or no credible W 
background or experience were approved and entrusted with the responsibility of 
managing financial institutions 11704 
Section 19 of the said BORD which prescribes the CBN approval for interlocking 
directorship in banks, and requires all bank directors and officers to sign a code of 
conducts, and section 44 of BOFID that mandates CBN approval of a bank chief 
executive or director's appointment before such appointment is made, have failed totally as 
legal facade. They have not prevented the likes of Lord Chief ifegwu holding directorship 
70 1. Sce Eyzaguirre, in Shakil Faruqi (ed. ). op. cit., p. 13 7. 
702. See Scott and Wellons. op. cit.. p. 132. 
703. See Adererni, Adedamola. 0., " Legal Frame-svork For Establishing A Bank In Nigeria :A Critical 
Appraisal" op. cit.. P. 58- 
704. See Osa-Afiana. op. cit.. p. 38. 
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in two banks, 705 fraudulently wrecking one bank706, absconded707, and installing his wife 
as the chairman of the second bank708. These laws have also failed to protect the banking 
system from the kleptomaniac activities of many bank chief executives that now put the 
financial system in a state of collapse. 
In the circumstances, we reconunend the introduction of a mandatory 'fit and 
proper'test into the Nigerian banking law. This recommended provision must require the 
regulatory agency to determine before the grant of banking licence, whether the proposed 
persons are fit and proper persons to hold the positions of directors, controllers or 
managers of a banking corporation having regards to their probity, competence, diligence, 
soundness of judgement, and general honesty or other public record. A provision similar 
to this exist in UK709 , and the 
law in USA requires the regulatory agency to determine the 
adequacy of the managerial resources of an applicant banking corporation before the grant 
of banking authorisation710 
It is further recommended as an urgent legal remedy to the high incidence of 
insider abuses of Nigerian banks by their respective Chief executives, a fundamental rule 
that " at least two individuals effectively direct the business of a banking corporation 
11711 
The failure to observe this rule should be made a ground of revocation of a banking 
705. Chief lfeg%vu Nvas the majority shareholder and director of Alpha Merchant Bank, and Chairman of 
the Citizen Bank Limited. 
706. Alpha Merchant Bank. 
707. Chief Ifegxvii absconded from Nigeria and Nvas tried in absentia for his crinunal activities against the 
Alpha Merchant Bank. 
708. See NDIC, Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1995. p. 8 1. 
709. See S. 9 (2) and Paragraph I of Schedule 3 of Banking Act. 1987, Cap. 22. Non- compliance NNith 
this provision is a ground for revocation of banking licence. See S. II of Banking 
Act, 1987, Cap. 22. 
710 
. 
See Scott and Wellon. op. cit.. p. 225. 
711 
. see 
Paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 of Banking Act. 1987. Cap 22. 
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licence. This so-calledfour eyes'test which is a core banking rule in UK112., will put an 
end to the present era of abusive Chief executives or executive chairmen who arrogate all 
decision-making powers in banks to themselves, and subsequently abuse such powers 
without any internal checks. It is hoped that aTour eyes'test in Nigeria may prevent the 
episodes such as that of Jimi Lawal713whose draconian executive powers single-handedly 
wrecked the Alpha Merchant Bank, of which he was the managing director at the material 
time. The recommended rule will require the collusion of the two principal controllers of 
a bank for high level insider abuses to undermine the financial stability of a bank. 
7.3.5 Inefficient restrictions of banking activities 
The Nigerian banking laws seem to have also neglected the important needs of 
responding to the challenges of financial disintermediation now facing the Nigerian banks. 
The Process of banking disintermediation according to Zahler714, means the substitution 
by big firms of part of their bank financing with debt financing through the issuance of 
debt instruments such as bonds, commercial paper, stocks, and the substitution by 
consumers of bank financing, as result of the prevalence of commercial credit being 
offered by the non bank financial institutions. 
Despite the acknowledged tendency towards banking disintermediation observable 
in Nigeria715 due among several reasons to increasing securitisation and the emergence of 
large number of finance and other non bank firms competing With banks in the latter's 
traditional areas, the Nigerian banking legislation and policies have failed to respond to 
712. Loc. cit. The failure to comply xvith this rule is a ground of revocation of banking licence. See S. II 
of Banking Act, 1987, Cap 22. 
713. The managing director of the Alpha Merchant Bank who mandated and perpetrated most of the 
criminal activitics that culminated in the bank's failure. 
714. See Zahler. " Welcome Address " in Shakil Faruqi (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 50 -51. 
715. See N%vankwo. G. 0.. Monev and Capital Markets in Nigena Today. University of Lagos Press. 
Lagos, Nigeriaj 199 1), pp. 31-' )') 
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these challenges and still maintain excessively restrictive legislation that impede the ability 
of banks to undertake new activities. 
The commercial banks in Nigeria are still prohibited from underwriting activitieS716 
and other forms of investment banking, whilst the merchant banks are restricted from 
operating in a so-called retail end of banking, and their ability to manage or hold equity 
issues is unduly encumbered717. The line of demarcation between commercial bank and 
merchant bank has become increasingly blurred, and it may be necessary to harmonise the 
regulations governing the two types of banking to ensure a level playing field. 
It is submitted that many countries such as Chile have reacted positively to the 
problem of banking disintermediation by permitting banks to enter non-traditional 
businesses like mutual funds, brokerage, leasing, insurance agency, and investment 
banking718 . The 
legal position in Europe as indicated by the Second Banking Directive of 
the European Union719 , is a general 
liberalisation of banking activities with trading in 
money market instruments, exchange and interest rates instruments, foreign exchange, 
derivatives, and transferable securities, as well as participation in share issues and 
provision of related services, money brokerage, portfolio management and advice, and 
credit reference services among others, regarded as core aspects of traditional banking in 
European Union720. Even, in USA, the traditional strict separation of investment and 
commercial banking is changing with the introduction of the Financial Services 
Competitiveness Act of 1995, which would amend Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 
716. See CBN circular Ref. BSD/DO/CBNol. 1/29 of 5 January 1995. 
717. See S. 22 of BOFID No. 25 of 1991 as amended. 
718 
. 
See Zahler. "Welcome Address " op. cit.. p. 5 1. 
719. See Directive 89/646/EEC . 
OJ 1989 L 386/1 ( approved by the Council in Dec. 1989 ). 
720. See the Annex to the Second Directive. Ibid. 
164 
and permit adequately capitalised Bank Holding Company to own a securities affiliate 
engaged in the dealing and underwriting of secufitieS721. 
We recommend the reform of the Nigerian banking law to reflect the current law in 
Europe that tremendously enhances the competitive ability of the banks by obliterating the 
distinction between investment and commercial banking, and granting banks greater 
latitude regarding activities they can undertake . It 
has been argued that Nigerian 
regulations limiting banks to certain category of assets should be abolished722 and banks 
allowed to diversify into risky but profitable assets which may reduce their overall risk 
standing. It is further contended that evidence abound " that less risky assets, in the 
perception of regulators, such as commercial loans and government bonds are either less 
lucrative, contributing less to the overall margin, or ironically, increasing their risk 
standing. 
For example, of the nine distressed banks in the NDIC 1990 report, for every one 
Naira (N I) loan, 75k is in collectible - this, therefore, is the irony of less risky assets 
annihilating the very existence of these bankS"7.3. The damaging effect of the severe 
restrictions on banking activities in Nigeria with numerous banks pursuing same line of 
activities is the present diversification into mundane retailing business by some banks of 
selling G. C. E. Examination forms, University Entrance Examination forms (JAMB), and 
phone cards. This desecration of the banking charters according to a CBN official " is a 
01724 
reflection of the decadence in the system. We condemn it strongly 
Our proposal for the granting of legislative leeway to Nigerian banking operations 
will also support the current drive towards globalisation of the banking system, since only 
721 
. 
See Scott and Wcllons. op. cit., p. 132. 
722. See Sagbamah. op. cit.. p. 220. 
723. Loc. cit. 
724. Pfivate intemew Nvith Cluef Z in Lagos on 22/5/97. 
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banks that are competent in diversified financial activities can compete in the present 
globalised financial system in which banks operate more or less as financial conglomerates 
or supermarkets. Perhaps, it may be mentioned that even the USA directly permits its 
banks to engage in certain prohibited domestic banking operations in their overseas 
brancheS725. The liberalisation of Nigerian banking activities will put the banks in good 
stead and afford them the necessary experience in financial diversification crucial to their 
global ambitions. 
It must be underscored that in implementing this proposal many safety rules, 
firewall provisions, and capital adequacy requirements specifically designed to cater for 
the dynamics and inherent risks of banking desegmentation or universal banking must be 
enacted into the liberalising regulatory measures. With respect to globalisation and asset 
diversification, we further suggest that the Nigerian banks be permitted to hold foreign 
assetS726 in their asset portfolio, especially those of foreign eovemments and reputed 
institutions. This would minimise the risk concentration of their assets, and may be more 
profitable than the repressive instruments of the Nigerian government. 
7.3.6 Defective provision on Foreign Banks' operations in Nigeria 
it may be mentioned that section 8 of BOFID which authorises the opening of 
foreign representative offices in Nigeria by foreign banks subject to the approval of CBN 
is defective in at least two respects. One, the law neither defines the term foreign 
representative office , nor stipulates 
the permitted activities of such foreign representative 
office. Yet, both the term and the scope of the permitted activities are capable of different 
interpretations. Second, no right of examination or supervision of such 
foreign 
representative office is conferred by law on the CBN or any other regulatory agency. This 
right would now have to be inferred from the law. We recommend that these 
defects be 
725 
. See Regulation 
K of the Federal Resene Board (1994) 12 C. F. R. S. 211.5. See also Scott and 
Wellons, op. cit p. 206. 
726. See Collier. Paul.. op. cit., p. 344. 
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cured by incorporating into the current banking law the definition of the term foreign 
representative office, its permitted activities and the fight of exarn=ination by the CBN at 
the expenses of such foreign representative office. This is in line with the position of the 
banking law in both UK727 and USA728, where the banking laws are very clear with respect 
to foreign representative office, and prevent a situation of conflicting interpretation which 
the present Nigerian banking law may generate in respect of foreign representative office 
operations in the country. 
7.3.7 Absence of Judicial Review 
Finally, the most odious defect of the Nigerian banking law even in the context of 
financial reform is the absence of judicial review of the regulatory actions of the regulatory 
agencieS729. This is an overt politicisation of financial regulation ensuring that corruptive, 
politicised and abusive decisions of the regulators under the direction of the Presidency or 
Finance Minister could not be challenged. It also denies the financial deregulation 
programme of the essential checks and balances that are crucial to its success. This defect 
has no counterpart in civillsed world. 
The Banking Act in UK, specifically provides for a judicial tribunal730 to hear 
persons aggfieved by the regulatory and supervisory actions of the Bank of England, and a 
further right of appeal to High Court and Court of Appeal on points of law is granted by 
the said Act731. In USA, the law also confers the fight to judicial review on banks 
727. See SS. 74 - 81 of Banking Act. 1987. Cap 22. 
728. See I riterriational Banking Act of 1978, as amended 12 U. S. C. S3101; see also Subpart B. S. 211.24 of 
Regulation K of the Federal Reserve Board (1994) 12 C. F. R. - 
729 
. 
See Uinezuruike, H. A. C., " An Appraisal of the supervisory role of the Central Bank of Nigena over 
commercial banks under the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Banks and other Financial Institutions' 
Decrees 199 1" in Okonk-Nvo. C. 0.. (ed. ). Legal issues in Banking, Insurance and Corporate Law. The 
Faculty of Law. University of Nigena. Enugu, Nigeria, (1992) pp. 6-8. 
730. See SS. 27 & 28 of Banking Act. 1987. Cap. 22. 
73 1. See S. 31 of banking Act, 1987. Cap. 22. 
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aggrieved by the decision of any of the regulatory agencieS732. We suggest the amendment 
of the Nigerian Banking law to incorporate the fight to judicial review in a court of law by 
any bank or person aggrieved by the decision of any of the financial regulators such as 
CBN or NDIC. This would enhance the credibility of the regulatory actions of the 
financial regulators, and curb the undue politicisation of their regulatory and supervisory 
activities especially reprisals on competent but politically disfavoured bankers and their 
institutions. 
7.3.8 Relegation of competence in financial regulation 
It seems the defects with the Nigerian banking laws are never ending, and indeed, a 
number of such defects may be outlined733. Yet, some repulsive provisions must be 
accorded a form of prominence. These are the nauseating provisions contained in CBN 
(Amendment) Decree 1997 which now made the chairmanship and directorship of the 
CBN Board, part time appointment S734 , and also removed the 
legal requirement that 
appointees to the CBN Board shall be persons " of recognised standing and experience in 
financial or banking affairs "735. The substituted qualification is that such appointees shall 
be " persons of proven integrity and professional competence 11736. In the same vein, the 
requisite qualification for the posts of the Governor and Deputy Governors is lowered 
from high standard requirement of "recognised financial expefience 
11737 to a lower and 
732. See Scott and Wellons, op. cit., pp. 198-199. 
733. Some of these defects relate to control over advertisement, inadequate penalties for banking frauds, 
absence of rules on payment risks, lack of enforcement powers by CBN, and the issue of risk based 
insurance premium. 
734. See S. 6 (3) (a) of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as substituted by CBN ( Amendment ) Decree No. 3 of 
1997. 
7.1 S. See S. 11 (2) of CBN Decree No. 24 of 199 1. 
736. See S. 11 (2) of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as substituted by CBN ( Amendment ) Decree No. 3 of 
1997. 
737 
. 
See S. 9 (1) of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991. 
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uncertain requirement of " proven integrity and professional competence "738. The type of 
profession in which such competence is required is nowhere indicated. Thus, the 
amendment paved the way for the appointment of persons of dubious, doubtful or 
inconsequential professional backgrounds to the Board, Governorship and Deputy 
Governorship of a highly complex financial institution - the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
These amendments have the combined effects of lowering the standard of the 
highest organ of the apex financial regulator in Nigeria, at a time when full time devotion 
to duties and highest recognition and expertise in financial and banking matters are crucial 
conditions to the restoration of the Nigerian fragile financial system to financial stability, 
viability, and credibility. The motivation for these crude and irrational amendments is 
political rent- seeking and provision of plump financial jobs for the unmeritorious and 
uncommitted political boys, at the expense of a banking system that is in danger of total 
collapse. We recommend that these irrational amendments be abrogated, and the pre- 1997 
provision be re-enacted. 
It is further submitted that the 1997 Amendment of the NDIC Decree which also 
introduced739 part -time chairman and directors, of nebulous credentials to the NDIC 
Board, is equally irrational, and political motivated. This amendment should also be 
abolished, and the pre-1997 provision be re-enacted. In the present precarious 
circumstances of the Nigerian financial system, neither of the two main financial regulatory 
agencies nor the Nigerian economy, can afford the extravagance of uncommýitted and 
inchoate financial novice, as chairman or director. 
738. See S. 9 (1) of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as substituted by CBN ( Amendment ) Decree No. 3 of 
1997. 
739. See S. 2 (3) of NDIC Decree No. 22 of 1988 as substituted by NDIC ( Amendment ) Decree No. 5 of 
1997. 
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7.3.9 Absence of rules promoting systemic efficiency 
W740 The proponents of financial liberalisation, professors Sha and Mckinnon"", 
and an array of intellectuals such as Diaz- Alejandro742, Fry743 , Annibale744, Cho and 
Khatkate745, and Zahler746, among others have all underscored the crucial importance of a 
competition or antitrust law to a programme of financial deregulation or reform. The 
competition policy has been prescribed as a veritable measure to promote free competition 
in a deregulated financial market, and prevent anti -competitive practices such as 
monopolistic pricing, cartelisation, price fixing, and abusive dominant powers from 
distorting the free flow of competition in the financial market. 
Inspite of this importance of competition policy, the Nigerian financial deregulation 
contains no element of competition regulation at all, and very high prices are being paid 
for this regulatory omission since some dominant banks have continuously distorted 
competition in the money market. The structure of the Nigerian banking system has been 
marked by oligopolistic character with few old but well established commercial banks 
always in surplus funds, and therefore exercise considerable market power over the other 
banks which are in perpetual need of reserve747. This market structure has been exploited 
by the few liquid commercial banks. 
740. Sce Shaw, op. cit., p. 137. 
741. See Mckinnon. op. cit 
742. See Diaz-Alejandro. op. cit., p. 381. 
743. Frý. Moncy. Intercst. And Banking In Economic Development. op. cit. 
744. Amilbale. op. cit. 
745. Cho and khatkate. op. cit. 
746. Zahler. op. cit. 
747. See Oresotu. F. O.. Interest Rates Beha-%iour Under A Programme Of Financial Reform: The 
Nigenan Case ". ( 1992 CBN Economic & Financial Rcview, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 124. 
Most annual reports of the CBN and NDIC since deregulation, have attributed 
the high bouts of interest rates, interalia. to the oligopolistic and abusive practices of some 
Nigerian bankS748. In the words of the CBN Governor, the " high lending rates could have 
been lower than the current level but for the oligopolistic structure which permits a few 
banks to act as the prime supplier of funds to the market "749. The few banks possess such 
dominant market power that " each action by the Central Bank to drain reserves from the 
system merely strengthens the bargaining position of these institutions, resulting in higher 
11750 interest rates, even when there is excess liquidity in the system as a whole 
These few dominant banks in Nigeria have clearly been abusing their dominant 
market powers since a" less skewed distribution of reserves would have led to lower and 
less volatile rates 11751. It is submitted that the absence of a competition policy in the 
country has fuelled and sustained these abusive practices of the dominant banks. A 
competition policy would have prohibited the banks with dominant positions in the money 
market from activities incompatible with effective competition in the market such as 
directly or indirectly imposing unfair pnces or other unfair trading conditions . 
A competition policy is proposed as a legal curb on the abusive market activities 
of the few dominant banks in Nigeria, which have been a continuous source of concern to 
the financial regulator, whose officers have persistently called for the encouragement of a 
"healthy, competitive and responsive money market "752. It is submitted that a competition 
748 
* 
See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. 1992. p. 14.. See also CBN. Annual Report and 
Statement of Accounts. 1993, p. 15. 
749. See Ogwunia ( 1993 ), op. cit.. p. 156. 
750. SeC Qio, M. 0., " Monetary Policy Instruments In Nigeria: Their Chan ing Nature And Implications 91 
(1993) The Nigcrian Banker, Journal of the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria, April - June 
1993, p. 11. 
751. Loc. cit. 
752. See Q10, M. O.. " Monetary Policy Instruments In Nigena: Their Changing Nature And 
Implications", (1993)The Nigenan Býanker. Journal of the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria, 
April-June. 1993, p. II- 
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policy is an essentially indispensable regulatory instrument for instituting and encouraging 
a competitive market. 
The proposed competition policy would however afford more benefits than simply 
ridding the market of abusive dominant banks, it would also foster more vigorous 
competition among the Nigerian banks by prohibiting and banning the present price fixing 
racket among the Nigerian banks in the form of Bankers Tariffs that prescribe uniform 
bank charges for all banks in respect of banking services. This price fixing fosters 
monopolistic practices, ensures unfair pricing753, and distorts free and fair price 
competition in the banking system. The Nigerian banking consumers are denied the 
advantage of benefiting from lower prices from efficient banks which would occur due to 
price competition754. 
Indeed, all progressive economies in the World have competition or antitrust laws, 
with USA enacting one since 1890, and UK enacted a competition policy in 1980. Japan, 
Germany, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and the European Union countneS755, all have 
competition laws. 
7.3.10 Absence of information disclosure rules 
The urgent needs for improved preventive and protective measures in the Nigerian 
banking laws informed our additional suggestions for the reform of these laws. No 
information is available to guide depositors in these banks, and even to wam some of their 
owners and shareholders of impeding doom. We therefore propose the incorporation into 
both the 1991 CBN Decree and 1991 BOFID Decree, two new provisions. The first 
provision should mandate a public information disclosure by the CBN on the financial 
conditions of each bank in the country. The proposed provision should require the CBN to 
753. See Edozien, John.. Midweek Concord, 25 June 1997. p. 3. 
754. See Accad, Micheal.. ibid. 
755. See Articles 85 & 86 of the EC Treaty. 1957. 
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publish in a national newspaper, at least three times a year, its opinion on the state of 
affairs of each banking institution. 
The second provision should permit authorised private specialised agencies to 
classify the quality and risk of bank assets, and each bank must have at least two private 
appraisers. These two proposed provisions may, and in our view, must be extended to the 
other non-bank financial institutions. It may be underscored that Chile756, a country that 
expenenced financial crisis of the present Nigerian dimension in the 1980s, has these 
provisions in its banking laws, and other countries have similar provisionS757. 
It is submitted that such public information disclosure rules will ensure the 
adequate capitalisation of banks, and curb massive insider abuses in many banks. 
Additionally., the proposed rules will force the corrupt supervisors at the CBN and NDIC 
to undertake banking supervision diligently, while the private bank auditors will stop false 
reporting. These results will be propelled by the presence of pnvate credit ratings and 
public information on which the banks can be assessed, and the supervisors and auditors' 
examinations and reports scrutinised. The opposing argument that new banks may be 
adversely affected is also not valid. It seems the proposed rules will ensure that new banks 
are adequately capitalised, and offer efficient value-added services to compete with the W 
well established banks. 
7.3.11 Lack of Judicial Protection against Extortionate Credit Charges 
Another provision that we suggest should very urgently find its way into the 
Nigerian banking laws is the one which empowers a court to re-open credit agreements 
where their terms are extortionate, and do justice between the parties. This provision is 
crucial to curb the exploitative acts of many Nigerian banks in charging new floating 
interest rates on old debtS758. The banks often justifiably relied on the interest rate 
756. Sce Eyzaguirre. op. cit p. 137. 
757 
. E. g. 
Canada and Hong Kong. 
758. See Okigbo. Essaýs in Public Philosophy of Development. Vol. 3. op. cit p. 220. 
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variation clause in the credit agreement, and the Nigerian highest court has upheld this 
arrangement759 . However, the underlying issue that some banks may misuse or abuse this 
interest rate variation clause to extort arbitrary, exploitative, and unreasonable interest 
rates from their customer remains unresolved. 
There is no law at present which allows a court to re-open extortionate credit 
bargain with banks in Nigeria, unlike the position in UK, where the court under the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 may re-open extortionate credit bargains between banks or 
other financial and credit institutions, and their customers, and make an order doing 
justice between theM760. 
It is submýitted the enactment of the power by a court to re-open extortionate 
credit agreements between banks, other financial institutions and their customers, will 
provide a crucial succour to many Nigerian bank customers who are suffocating under the 
yokes of interest rates aggravated debt burdens in respect of loans concluded many years 
before the regime of vafiable and floating interest rates. Indeed, the recent case of Union 
Bank of Nigerian Limited VS OZiggi761' comes to mind here. In this case, both the High 
Court and Court of Appeal refused to allow a bank to charge new interest rates on an old 
mortgage loan, in the face of an ambiguous variable interest rates clause. However, the 
Supreme Court upheld the agreement and validated the new interest rates that made the 
outstanding debt, a triple amount of the original loan762. A law similar to the proposed one 
759. See Union Bank of Nigeria V. Professor Albert Ozigi ý 1994 )3N. W. L. R. 385. 
760. See S. 137 (1) of Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
76 1. Supra. 
762. See for an analysis of the case Adekunle. Adedeji.. "Variation of Interest Rates in Loan Agreement". 
(1995) 2 Journal of Nigenan & Comparative Law. No. 1, p. 25. See also Aiai. Olawale.. "Recovei), of 
Interest by Banks: A Critical Examination of Nigerian Case Law", (1997) 41 Journal of Affican Law, p. 
109. 
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perhaps, could have forestalled the occurrence of this monumental commercial 
exploitation and injustice. 
7.4 Perversion of Purposeful Bank Related Legislation 
A tendency of the Nigerian government to undermine the purpose of genuine bank 
related legislation may also be discerned. The Money Laundering Decree No. 3 of 1995 is 
a good example in this respect. The Money Laundering Decree is enacted to stem the 
laundering of drug money through the Nigerian banking system. However, the Decree has 
been twisted from its lofty goal by some of its perverse provisions which outlaw certain 
cash transactions in Nigeria. These provisions are rather irrational and inconsistent with 
some existing laws. 
Section I of the Money Laundering Decree763. prohibits cash transaction in Nigeria 
of any amount exceeding N500,000 or N2 million in case of individual or corporation 
respectively. Any transaction over the specified linUt must be transmitted through a 
financial institution. A simple demonstration of the irrationality of Section I of the Money 
Laundering Decree above may be undertaken. This law requires transactions exceeding 
N500,000 (equivalent of L5,000) by an individual to be channelled through the banks, yet, 
the maximum amount available to a depositor in the event of bank failure under the NDIC 
Decree 764 is N50,000 (equivalent of 1500). Thus, if a bank fails before the completion of a 
transaction, a depositor who obeys the Money Laundering Decree would suffer serious 
financial hardship mandated by the NDIC Decree. This shows the irrationality of Money 
Laundering Decree and its conflict with another bank related law. 
A much damaging provision is a legal obligation imposed by the said Decree on a 
bank to disclose and report in writing to the NDLEA765 within seven days, any single 
763. See S. I (a) & (b) of Money Laundering Decree No. 3 of 1995. 
764. See S. 26 of Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Decree No. 22 of 1988 as amended. For the 
criticism of the inadequate Deposit Insurance in Nigeria see Uche, Chibuike. U., and Osho. Babatunde., 
"Rethinking Deposit Insurance in Nigeria", 1199716 Journal of International Bank Law, p. 240. 
765. NDLEA is the acronyrn for the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency. in Nigeria. 
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transaction, lodgement or fund transfer in excess of N500,000 or N2 million in case of 
individual or corporate body respectively766. The NDLEA may issue a stop notice in 
respect of the transaction, or procure an order blocking the account involved767. The law 
grants the NDLEA the general powers to investigate an account in any manner deemed 
appropfiate768, and abolishes the defence of bank secrecy by any bank refusing to 
collaborate with the NDLEA769. 
It is equally important to underscore the fact that the NDLEA is not required by 
the law to have reasonable suspicion before stopping or blocking bank accounts, or 
conducting surveillance on such accounts, including phone tapping, computer bugging and 
illicit procurement of financial and commercial documentS770. 
The problem is further complicated by the corruption, notoriety, and executive 
lawlessnesS771 of the NDLEA, the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency. Since, the 
law has granted the NDLEA these powers Without any judicial oversight772, the possibility 
of abusive exercise of the powers for corrupt purposes make the Nigerian banking system 
a danger zone to many wealthy customers. That all banks have obligations to report 
particular transactions to the NDLEA, suggests that the Dru Agency without any effort 9 
766. See S. 10 of Money Laundering Decree No. 3 of 1995. 
767. SCC S 10 (4) & (6). Ibid. 
768. The la%N- expressly permits the NDLEA to undertake surveillance operations in respect of any bank 
account including Nvire tappings, telephone tappings, and computer buggings. see S. 12 (1). Ibid. 
769. See S. 12 (2). Ibid. 
770. See SS. 10 & 12. [bid. 
771. See Newswatch, February 2.1998, p. 15, -where the chainnan and chief executive of the NDLEA, 
Major-General Bamaiyi, reportedly refused to advocate the legal ordination of the agency as a federal 
government agency because of its high level of corruption. 
77 ý. The NDLEA does not require a court order to undertake any investigative or punitive activities under 
the Money Laundering Decree. except the blockage of an account, which requires the order of a Tribunal. 
See S. 10 (6) of Money Lzuridering Decree No. I of 199-5. 
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will have details of the financial transaction of most Nigerians, and may procure corrupt 
reward from any bank customer, upon the threat of a stop notice or account blockage. 
The capacity of the NDLEA to detain a person on suspicion of drug money laundering 
means most Nigerian bank customers are in serious dilemma. 
It is submitted that the unqualified disclosure rules now enshrined in this law, 
negates the purpose of financial deregulation to attract capital return flight as most flight 
capital would not return under such looming investigation, prosecution and possible 
persecution. Most Nigerian capital hoarded abroad would certainly remain outside except 
for clandestine informal movement in and out of the country. Additionally, and very 
significant, is that the Nigerian banking system has been made much more unattractive to 
customers since the banking secrecy no longer exists, and banks are now spies and 
informants on their clients. In the words of Umunnaehila, the Money Laundering Decree is 
11773 already " taking its toll on the banking system 
We therefore recommend a major overhauling of the Money Laundering Decree to 
accord with economic sense and common rationality. In this respect, it is submitted that 
the prohibition of any cash transaction over N500,000 or N2,000,000 in case of 
individuals or companies should be abolished. The existence of banking secrecy under the 
Nigerian banking law should be fully restored subject to the generally accepted 
exceptionS774. The NDLEA should be able to exercise power of stopping or blocking an 
account or obtaining banking information only upon reasonable suspicion and pursuance 
to a prior court order. A rational, coherent, realistic, and enforceable money laundering 
law should be enacted, with broader and wider categories of activitieS775 constituting 
money laundering. 
773 
. 
Loc. cit. 
774. Stich as when disclosure is compelled by law. or the disclosure is in public interest or the bank's 
interest. and when the customer consents to a disclosure. 
775. such as tax evasion. conversion of public funds. proceeds frorn oil bunkering. kick-backs. and 
smuggling. 
177 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has underlined the major regulatory and institutional elements of financial 
deregulation in Nigeria between 1985 and 1997. In the pefiods 1985 to 1993, the main 
dere latory policies concerned the liberalisation of the external sector- deregulation of gU 
interest rates, reduction of sectoral allocation prescriptions, privatisation of banks, 
adoption of new prudential regulations, and enactment of new central bank and banking 
laws. The new laws enhanced the regulatory powers of the regulators in some respects. 
The periods 1994 to 1997 combined both the elements of interventionism and 
deregulation. The Exchange control law and the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 
were repealed, while sectoral allocation was scrapped. The Failed Bank Tribunals were 
constituted to deal with the problem of bank failure. However, the financial regulatory 
agency, the CBN, lost all its independent regulatory powers. 
The chapter has equally identified some major defects in the current Nigerian 
banking laws contrary to the established views that the banking laws are adequate. 
Specially, the chapter identifies the defects in relation to the provisions dealing with co- 
ordination of regulatory actions by regulatory agencies, treatment of failed banks, financial 
dealings between banks and their subsidiaries, competence of bank managers and 
directors, restriction of banking operations, and foreign banks' operations. 
The absence of core rules promoting systernic efficiency and preventing 
extortionate bank charges or abusive financial regulatory actions has also been 
underscored, while the tendency of the Nigerian government to subvert purposeftil bank 
related legislation is highlighted. The chapter recommends credible reforms to the 
identified defects in the current Nigerian banking laws. Suffice to assert that this chapter 
has highlighted the regulatory and institutional dynamics that influenced the consequences 
of financial deregulation of the Nigerian banking system. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEREGULATION AND LIBERALISATION OF 
THE NIGERIAN BANKING SECTOR 
8.1 Introduction 
The legal and policy underpinnings of banking deregulation in Nigeria have been examined 
in the preceding chapter. This chapter analyses the consequences of the financial 
liberalisation. The indices embraced as gauges for measuring the effects of deregulation 
include the growth of the banks, changes in financial savings, level and structure of 
interest rate, competitiveness and efficiency of the system, profit, and the system's 
integration with the international banking systeM776. It is appreciated that these indices are 
by no means exhaustive for measuring changes in a banking systeM777. The chapter 
consists of six sections. The first section is the introduction. The second, third, fourth and 
fifth sections deal with specific consequences of liberalisation of the banking sector in 
Nigeria 
. 
The last section contains the conclusions. 
8.2 Growth of Financial Sector : Banks and other Financial Institutions 
A core aspect of financial deregulation was the deliberate relaxation of the rules of entry 
into banking operation and privatisation of banking corporations that permitted banking 
ownership by private entrepreneurs. The liberalisation of ownership rules also encouraged 
foreign interests in Nigerian banking industry. The CBN simplified and rationallsed the 
procedure for licensin new banks, and simultaneously increased the minimum paid-up 9 
capital requirements for the new banks to ensure their adequate capitalisation. Thus, in 
776. See Ojo, M. 0., " Deregulation In The Nigerian Banking Industry :A Rcvieiý And Appraisal in 
Deregulation in the Nigerian Banking Industry : Directions. Challenges, Problems and Prospects, 1991 
Bank Directors Seminar Papers And Proceedings, FITC. Lagos, Nigeria. )p. 115. 
777. See Fry. M,, LxNN'cll. J., Money. Interest. And Banking In Economic Development. The John Hopkins 
Universitv Press, Baltimore and London, (1991) 
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1988, the minimum paid -up capitals for commercial and merchant banks were increased 
to NI Omm and N6mm respectively from their levels in 1979. 
This fiberalisation of the entry obstacle immediately propelled a rush for banking 
licences. At the dawn of financial liberalisation in 1986, there were 42 bankS778 in the 
country. Deregulation however catapulted the number of banking corporations to an 
unprecedented level. In 1987, the number of banks rose marginally to 50, and by 1990 
there were 107 bankS779. This banking growth occurred inspite of a further increase in the 
minimum paid-up capital for commercial and merchant bankS780. The upsurge in banking 
corporations continued unabated, and in 1992 the CBN reported781 the existence of 120 
banks comprising 66 commercial banks and 54 merchant banks. The branch networks 
also rose exponentially from 1,494 bank branches in 1986 to 2,391 bank branches in 
1992 and pegged at 2,478 bank brancheS782 in 1993 . 
It may be underscored that the phenomenal increaSe783 in the number of banking 
corporations in the country would have continued but for a temporary embargo on 
licensing of new banks prescribed by the government784 in 199 1. The embargo was a 
778. See Ebhodaghe. J. U., A century of banking : Lessons for Deposit Banking : Lessons for Banks 
Deposit Protection. (1992 NDIC Quarterly, Vol. 2, December. 
779. See NDIC. Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. 1990, - See also Ebhodaghe, ibid. ý p. 
2- 
780. The CBN further hiked the minimum paid-up capital requirements of commercial and merchant 
banks from N20mm and NI 2mm in 1989 to N50mm and N40mm respectively. However, the Nigerian 
banking promoters Nvere patently undaunted by the incessant increase in minimum paid-up capital 
requirements of banks which in a spate of four years, had occur-red thrice. ( See Appendix IV). For an 
analysis of Bank Share Capital see Uche. C. U., "Bank Share Capital Regulation in Nigeria", 119981 
Journal of International Banking Law. p. 30. 
78 1. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1992. p. 15-1. 
782. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. 1993. p. 161. 
783. The number of banking corporations in the country as at December. 1995 was 115 consisting of 64 
commercial banks and _5 I merchant 
banks. The decline in aggregate bank number Nvas due to the 
liquidation of 5 failed banks. The total bank branches fell from 2.541 to 2.500 in 199ý due to the 
liquidation of the _5 
failed banks. see CBN. Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1995, pp. 5& 17. 
784. SCc ( 199 1) N'DIC Quarterly. p. 1. 
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response to the alarming increase in unethical banking acts, geographical concentration of 
banks in a section of the country781, and protestations of bankers to the emergence of 
unhealthy banking institutionS786. Thus, since 1991 no new banking licence had been 
787 granted 
The liberalisation of bank entry and the concomitant growth in the number of 
banks, have tremendously improved the availability of banking facilities to the Nigerian 
depositors, in direct contrast to the pre-deregulation pefiod788. The growth in the banking 
system can equally be assessed from the changes in its total assets and deposit liabilities. 
The total assets of the commercial and merchant banks in Nigeria that was N62,108.4 
million in 1987, increased to N555,472.7 million in1995 respectively789. The illustration 
of the changes in the total assets and deposit of the banking system is contained in 
Appendix V. 
The remarkable growth in financial industry during the period of deregulation 
was not imite to the banking sector, there was a radical transformation of the Nigerian 
financial landscape with the emergence of different types of banks like peoples' bank, 
profit and loss sharing banks, community bankS790 and diverse non -banking institutions 
785. Loc. cit. 
786. See Umunnaehila, Allwell., Bank Failure In Nigeria : History, Causes and Remedies, Foundation 
Publishers, Lagos, Nigeria, (l 996), p. 17. 
787. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1993, p. 1. 
788. The changes in the number of operating banks in the country significantly enhanced the accessibility 
of members of public to banking services since the average number of persons to a banking office was 
25.220 In 1995. This may be compared to population per bank branch in 1980 and 1986 which was 
115,027 and 75,466 persons respectively. see (1991) NDIC Quarterly. p. 40. 
789. The total assets of the commercial and merchant banks in Nigeria which was N62,108.4 million in 
1987. increased to NI 11.551.3 million and N232,278-5 million in 1990 and 1992 respectively. In 1995. 
the total assets rose to N55-5.472.7 million. The deposit liabilities witnessed an equally spiral growth from 
. 
869.0 million in 1990 to N87,738.2 million and N208,850.3 million N26,469.7 million in 1987 and N43) 3 
in 1992 and 1995 respectively. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. 1995, p. 43. see also 
CBN. Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1992, p. 48. 
790. Sec S. 9 (2)(b) & (d) of BOFID. 
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such as finance houses, bureaux - de - change791, security affiliates, and mortgage 
institutions. The emergence of these financial institutionS792 was a direct result of 
deregulation. The peoples' bank for example was created by the government to promote 
financial services among local indigenes and sectors that were neglected by the modem 
banking sector. 
The origin of finance houses appears to be sui-generis. They emerged with 
virtually no regulatory frameworks or regulatory institutions. Most companies operated as 
finance houses without any form of licence at all, while the cautious companies merely 
obtained the moneylenders licenses before operating as finance hoUSeS793 
The absence of any regulatory framework for the finance houses made their 
establishment attractive to many banks which in the early days of financial deregulation 
created them as instruments of regulatory circumvention794 . 
The banks circumvented the 
monetary and banking policy of the CBN on credit control and credit exposure with 
impunity. 
It seems the credit policy of the CBN was rendered practically ineffective by the 
unregulated finance houses. Similarly, the bureaux - de - change were established as 
mechanisms for diverting allocated foreign currencies to black market . 
The untoward 
operative mechanisms of the bureaux-de-change complicated and frustrated the foreign 
79 1. See S. 41 of Decree No. 17 of 199's. 
792. The numerical strength of the specialised banks and other financial institutions which are key plavers 
in the banking and related industr), may be graphically illustrated by the statistical fact that in 1992 there 
were 401 community banks, 145 mortgage institutions. 132 bureaux-de-change, 48 licensed and 618 
approwd finance houses, 140 stock brokerage firms, and 3 approved discount houses in the country. In 
1995, the upiward s%ving in the number of most of the mentioned institutions continued with 1,355) 
community banks, 280 mortgage institutions, 223 bureaux-de-change, 279 licensed finance companies, 
162 stock brokerage firms and 5 licensed and approved discount houses. See CBN, Annual Report and 
Statement of Account, 1992 and 1995, p. 17. 
793. See Sofola, op. cit.. p. 105- 
794. See Sagbarnah, I. E. L., " Gerald P. O'Driscol. Jr.: Bank Failures : The Deposit Insurance Connection 
Contemporary Policy Issues Vol. VI, No. 2. ApnI 1988 ", CBN Economic and Financial Review. Vol. 29, 
No. 2, June 1991, p. 220. 
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exchange policy measures of the government. Regulatory catch-up game was played in 
1991 to capture the regulatory free-fiding by the finance houses which had operated 
largely as informal market795. 
Since it is acceptable that growth can be measured by the reference to the 
increase in the number and size of service providers, the complexi I ity of the organisational 
settings of the service providers, the range of services provided and the location in which 
services are rendered796, it may be safely concluded that banking deregulation has 
precipitated phenomenal growth of the financial industry in Nigeria. Indeed, the growth in 
the banks influenced a corresponding growth in financial savingS797. 
The twin liberalisation policies of interest rate decontrol and liberal bank entry 
rules, directly influenced the level of financial savings in Nigeria in the period after 
deregulation. The financial savings of the financial system in 1985 were NI 1,786.8 
million. This aggregate sum later increased in 1991 to N3 7173 8.2 million, and N1 21,026. 'ý 
million in 1995798 (see Appendix VII). In nominal term, this is about a tenfold increase 
within ten years. The data on the aggregate credit to the economy also indicates the 
utilisation of financial savings by the financial systeM799. 
795. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1992, p. 17. 
796. See Oyejide, Ademola. T., " Policy Framework and Grovvth of the Nigerian Financial System " in 
Growth And Stability Of Nigeria's Financial Services Industry. ( 1993 Papers and Proceedings of the 
Bank Directors' Seminar. FITC, Lagos, Nigeria ). p. 2. 
797. See Nwankwo, G. 0.. Money and Capital Markets in Nigeria Today, University of Lagos Press. 199 1. 
p. 26. Indeed, professor NwankA, o observes the positive development in the Nigerian money market as 
increased institutional savings since the deregulation of interest rates in 1987 
798. See CBN. Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 199-5, p. 38. 
799. Ibid.. p. 25. The monthly average total credit to the economy which in 1985 was N31.335.5 million 
increased to N83,823.7 million in 1991 with a further rise to an unprecedented level of N18;, 821.4 
million in 1995. This is a thirtýfold increase which indicates that the average amount of bank credit to the 
economy is thrice the arnount of mobilised savings. 
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Another offshoot of the banking growth and interest liberalisation was financial 
innovation and enhancement of banking competition. The banks utilised payment 
incentives such as interest payment on current account, high yielding bank products, and 
up-front interest payment on deposits to attract depositors8011. Money market instruments 
and other high yielding bank products made their debut on the Nigerian money market801. 
Indeed, Nwadike8O2 in 1990 reported the existence of 151 different banking productS801 in 
Nigeria. The Nigerian banks also intemationalised their services804. 
The growth of the banking system was however precarious and unsustainable. The 
policies underlining the banking deregulation were politici II ised and mismanaged. Firstly, the 
decision to increase the number of the banks and other financial institutions was premature 
and politically motivated. The final approval for new banking licences resided in the 
presidency until 1991 when the CBN Governor was made the sole licensing authority. Yet, 
this position of the CBN Governor was a mere legal cosmetic because the Government 
had placed an embargo on the licensing of new banks when the licensing powers became 
800. See Umunnachila. Allwell., op. cit.. p. 17. 
801. See NDIC, Annual Report And Statement of accounts, 1990. p. 98. 
802. See Nwadike, C. L, " New products in banking industry ", Department of Economics, University of 
lbadan, M. Sc. ( Bank-Ing and Finance ), Project Report. cited in Soyibo and Adekanye. op. cit., p. 27. 
803. Many banks invested in computerisation of their operations and related technology to facilitate 
efFicient financial intermediation on behalf of their customers. The Societe Generale Bank and the First 
Bank of Nigeria introduced Automated Teller Machines (ATM), while Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) 
was pioneered by Universal Trust Bank in June. 1991. Many plastic cards also emerged like the 
UBACARD and UNICARD. and -weekend banking became the vogue. The CBN joined the Society for 
World%Nide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and paved way for the Nigerian banks to 
. 
join the SWIFT which now has eleven member banks in Nigeria. 
804. See NDIC. Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1990. p. 4. The above deregulatory measures 
and the adoption of the capital adequacy standard of the international banking community by Nigeria 
facilitated the exportation of banking services from the country to neighbouring countries. Thus 1990, 
four Nigerian banks namely First bank Pic, Union Bank Pic. Continental Merchant Bank, and First 
Interstate Merchant Bank together with some Nigerian and Beninoisc private investors opened a bank in 
the Republic of Benin called Banque International Du Benin ( BIBE ). 
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vested in the CBN Governor. Furthermore, the presidency still retained the routine 
approval of new banking licences. 
Secondly, the decision to increase the number of banks was made without regards 
to the supervisory capability of the CBN, which was tenuous and grossly inadequate. 
Additionally, the CBN was only concerned with increasing the minimum paid-up capital 
for banks without implementing stringent prudential regulations. Hence, capital adequacy 
rules and improved prudential requirements were not introduced until 1990 when the 
banks had started failing. Thirdly, the mass licensing of the new banks was embarked on 
without prior recapitalisation of the existing undercapitalised government-owned banks 
which were then dominating the banking system. This position puts some government- 
owned banks in competitive disadvantage and encouraged moral hazard in unwise lending 
and solicitation of deposits at unrealistic windrow dressing rates. 
Lastly, a new banking regulatory framework was not enacted before the premature 
liberalisation of banking entry rules, and crucial procedure for early exit of problematic 
banks was non-existent. It was only in 1991 after the first bouts of bank failure that a new 
banking law came into operation in the country. 
8.3 Privatisation of Federal Government Owned Banks 
Bank privatisation was an integral part of the deregulation policies pursued by the 
Nigerian government. However, banking privatisation was initially bedevilled with policy 
intransigence and prevarication801, demonstrated by the non-inclusion of banks in the 
privatisation exercise sanctioned by the Privatisation and Commerciallsation Decree No. 
25 of 1988. The privatisation of the federal government owned banks commenced in 1992 
in pursuance of a Presidential Order8O6 of August that year which directed the full 
pnvatisation of equity holdings of the federal government in all bankS807 . 
805. See Faniqee. Rashid.. " Nigeria : ownership abandoned in Ishrat Husain and Rashid Fartiqee ( eds. 
Adjustment In Africa : Lessons from CountrY Case Studies, The World Bank, Washington. 1994 ) pp. 
260,261.282 & 283. 
806. See Ne-svs%vatch . Nigerian magazine. 
17 July 1995, p. 24. 
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This policy stance of the government was given legislative approval in the Bureau 
of Public Enterprises Decree No. 78 of 1993 which listed 13 banks with government 
ownership interest for ftill privatisation'01. The Decree ostensibly placed all banks with 
federal government equity interests on privatisation programme. Prior to 1992, the federal 
government had equity interest in 14 banks comprising eight (8) commercial banks and six 
(6) merchant banks". (see Appendix VI). The federal government held equity interest of 
at least 45 per cent in eight commercial banks, and five of the merchant banks, and less 
than 5 per cent equity interest in the sixth merchant bank810. The aggregate assets of the 
fourteen banks with Federal Government ownership interest represented about 51 per cent 
of the total banking industry assets, and their total deposits constituted 60 per cent of the 
total banking depoSitS81 1. 
Twelve of the four-teen banks with federal government equity interest were put up 
for privatisation and nine have been fully privatised. The privatisation programme was 
undertaken through public floatation of the shares of the privatised banks on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange. However, preferential allotments were made to the staff of each of the 
privatised banks with two percent of the shares sold to the existing staff, and three percent 
to the Staff Pension Fund for the benefit of the future staff In the case of Merchant Bank 
807. See Bernard B. A. Verr. " Post - Privatisation Appraisal Of Control And Management In Privatised 
Banks: The Need For A Golden Share " in Ayua 1. A. and Owasanove B. (eds. ). Privatisation Of 
Government Owned Banks And The Issue Of Ownership And Control, (Legal And Economic 
Perspectives) (Papers and Proceedings of a One-Day Roundtable Conference. NIALS, Lagos, Nigeria, 
1996 ) p. 66. 
808. See Second Schedule. Part 11 to the Bureau of Public Enterprises Decree No. 78 of 1993 
809. See NDIC, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1992. p. 46. 
810. Loc. cit. 
811. Ibid. p. 47. 
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of Africa Plc, the Federal Goverment share ownership of 4.45 per cent was sold by 
private placement to staff of the bank812 
The total number of shares offered to the Nigerian public from the nine banks 
was 879 n-ffllion worth N1.050 billion, representing about 30 per cent of the total 
privatisation proceeds813. The remaining three banks namely Continental Merchant Bank 
Limited, Nigerian Merchant Bank Limited, and ICON Limited - Merchant bankers, which 
had been plagued with insolvency and capital adequacy problems are in danger of ultimate 
liquidation unless the capital reconstruction and reorganisation plans of the government 
with respect to them materialiSeS814 
With the privatisation of rune banks through public subscription, and one by 
private placement, a total of ten banks with Federal Government interest had been 
privatised. Of the remaining banks with Federal Government interest, three are facing 
liquidation, while one, the FSB International Bank Pic is yet to be privatised. 
Banking deregulation may be hailed for the singular achievement of propelling the 
return of banking ownership to the private sector from an enforced federal government 
ownership with its ill-effects of bad management, political interference., poor asset quality, 
and general inefficiency815. The privatisation of banks has however generated its own vices 
which have made the whole programme suspect. Instances of multiple share holding by 
individuals who acquired substantial shares in privatised banks through surrogates have 
been cited816. It was alleged that one indi-vidual acquired 23 million shares representing 
812. Ibid. p. 48. 
813. See Bernard B. A. Verr. op. cit p. 72. See further World Debt Tables 1996, External Finance for 
Developing Countries Vol. I- Analysis And Summary Tables, (The World Bank, Washington, 1996) p. 
14-5. 
814 
. 
See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1995. p. 168. 
815. See NDIC. Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1992. p. 47. 
816. See Brigadier E. E. IkNN-uc. " Discussion aflcr paper one " in AyUa and ONvasanoye (cds. ). op. cit.. p. 
88. 
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I I% of the shares in Affibank PLC and another shareholder boasted of 40 million shares 
in Union Bank PLC817. This shareholding structure had engendered domination of the 
banks' ownership by few rich persons. 
Another side effect of the privatisation programme is the routine board room 
wars and shareholder cfises which had engulfed many privatised banks such as Savannah 
Bank Nigeria Plc which had its board of directors removed by the CBN in September 
1995. ) 
due to the persistent board room conflict and intractable shareholder cnsis8l8. The 
further tendencies are the frequent buy out of foreign share holdings in the privatised 
banks by rich Nigerian shareholders who had the desire to gain substantial share holding in 
the banks'19, and excessive interference in the management of the privatised banks by the 
part-time non-executive directors which may jeopardise the operations and viability of the 
banks 
The Federal Government was however responsible for some of the ownership 
problems that affected the privatised banks. Principally, the Federal 
Government820Continued the appointment of the directors to the boards of the privatised 
banks despite their pfivatisation. These created an untoward corporate structure in which 
the shareholders had no input in the composition of the Boards of directors of their banks. 
The desire for corporate control stimulated the shareholders into organising "the 
displacement of government appointed boardS"821 , and precipitated 
the power struggle in 
some privatised banks. 
817. Loc. cit. 
818. See Bernard B. A. Vcrr. op. cit.. p. 75. 
819, Ibid., p. 76. 
820. See Bolaji Chvasanoyc and Yagba. T. A. T.. "Legal Framework For Pnvatisation Of Banks In Nigeria". 
in Avua and ON% asanoye (eds. ). op. cit., pp. 13 - 14. 
821. Ibid.. p. 14. 
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Perhaps, the loss of patronage by the government and negative aspects of banking 
privatisation provided the impetus for the recent moves by the Nigerian government"' for 
re-acquisition of interests in the four biggest banks under a concept of golden shares 
which are minority shares with superior voting fights that will enable the government to 
influence corporate decisions of the banks for strategic reasonS823. This attempt at re- 
nationalisation or de-privatisation had been sefiously challenged and contested by national 
and international intereStS824. The position at present is that the privatised banks remains 
privatised - thanks to banking deregulation. 
8.4 Foreign Exchange Speculation 
Prior to 1986 the exchange rate of Naira was fixed by the govemment, and the procedure 
for foreign exchange allocation in Nigeria required possession of an import or export 
licence by an applicant, which together with other relevant documents would be passed on 
to an authofised dealer, usually a bank. The authorised dealer handed over such 
825 
application to the CBN for approval and foreign exchange allocation while the 
applicant was required to deposit the equivalent amount in Naira with the CBN. 
In 1986, pursuant to the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market Decree No. 23 of 
that year, the exchange rate of Naira was made to reflect market forces. A dual exchange 
rate was adopted at the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange market. The first-tier exchange 
rate was managed, and applicable only to public sector transactions. The second-tier rate 
was subject to demand and supply forces. However, the market was 
described as unusual 
822. See Okorodudu - Fubara. M. T., " State Control And 
Intervention In Strategic Business And The 
Promotion Of Private Investment " in Avua and Owasanoye (eds. ). op. cit., p. 34. 
Ibid.. p. 39 n. 18. 
824. See Thomas Hutcheson expressing the World Bank stance against " golden share " in Avua and 
Owasanoyc (eds. ). op. cit.. P. 106. 
825. See generally Exchange Control Act No. 16 of 1962 now repealed 
by Decree No. 8 of 1995. 
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with many banks as demand agents, but the CBN as the sole supplier. In July1987, the 
first and second tier markets were merged, with a single exchange rate. 
Under the system, the CBN appointed banks and non-banks alike as authonsed 
dealers on the market826 and the rate of exchange in each transaction was left to the 
mutual agreement between an applicant purchaser and an authorised dealei-827. All private 
and public sectors' transactions that were adequately supported by appropriate documents 
were eligible for the purchase of foreign exchange on the market and such purchased 
foreign currency may be repatriated from the country828. The CBN however allocated 
foreign exchange to individual bank based on a Pre-detertnined quota, until March 5, 
1992, when the predetermined quota was abolished, and a floating exchange rate system 
was introduced by the government which induced the substantial depreciation of the over 
- valued Naira829. The problem of exchange rate was compounded by the fact that the 
government regularly instructed the CBN to change the foreign exchange rate"O 
Before 1992, the existence of a dual exchange rate and pre-determined quota 
allocation for individual banks had fuelled speculative activities in foreign exchange market 
P exchange marketS831. g with a booming business both in the formal and the parallel foreig 
Initially, two important factors facilitated this development. One, the foreign exchange 
allocated on the first-tier market at below market fixed rate to influential persons found 
their ways to the parallel market where they are sold at high market rate with substantial 
arbitrage profit. Additionally, the allocated foreign exchange to banks on pre-determined 
826. See S. 5 of Second -Tier Foreign Exchange Market Decree No. 23 of 1986. 
827. See S. 9(3). Ibid. 
828. See SS. 10 (I)& 12. Ibid. 
829. See Ojo. M. 0. - 
The Economics Of Controls And Deregulation -. The Nigerian Case Study CBN. 
Research Department Occasional Paper No. 10, October 31.1994 ) p. 17. 
1-1(). See Okigbo. P. N. C.. Essays In The Ptiblic Philosophy of Development. Vol. 4. p. 100. 
831. See O*o. (1994 ). op. cit.. p. 17. 
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quota basis was also made at an exchange rate that was below the market rate, hence most 
banks recycled their allocated foreign exchange to the parallel or black market for 
arbitrage purposes. 
Indeed, one of the crucial allurements which instigated the massive investment in 
banking business was the foreign exchange seignorage which the possession of a banking 
licence confers on the bank ownerS832. An authorised dealership in foreign exchange was 
usually granted as a matter of course to new banks with the effect that such banks 
concentrated their operation in foreign exchange dealings"'. The foreign exchange deal 
created incentives that allowed for new entries into the banking econoMy834 
It was therefore not surprising that most banks during deregulation depended on 
foreign exchange speculations for survival and profit. The simplified modus operandi is 
captured by this illustration: 
Last year a young banker went in to the weekly forex exercise 
and got $ 100,000 at under N22 for $1 through the Central Bank 
which has been pre-sold for N40 making a profit of N1.8 mm. for 
doing nothing, just utilising the resources of all of us (oil) to feather 
his own neSt835. 
The comment demonstrated the ease with which banks extracted profits from their foreign 
exchange operations. 
Additionally, the absence of effective controls by the CBN enabled some banks to 
sell allocated foreign exchange in the parallel market, and extracted sizeable profitS836 
832. See Unitinnachila, Allwell.. op. cit., P. 18. 
833. See Olashore. Oladele.. op. cit. - p. 121. 
See Avodelc. Sesan. A.. " Monetary Policy Instruments In Nigeria (1970 - 92) Nature And Impacts 
On The Economy " The Nigerian Banker, Journal of the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria . April 
- June 1993, p. 19. 
835. See Bamisaive. Adepitan.. " Bankers Against Industry ". Guardian. April 19.1994. 
See S-mge, Richard.. Nigena to 1993 : Will Liberalisation Work ? (EITJ Economic Prospects Senes. 
Business Intmational. Special Report No. 1134) p. 29. 
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Many banks enjoyed the windfall from the huge arbitrage profits made from foreign 
exchange activitieS837. Some banks hoarded their officially purchased foreign exchange 
and falsely altered their books to reflect acceptable exchange dealingS838, While the 
hoarded foreign exchange was later sold at exorbitant rates., with huge profits for the 
bankS839. The round tripping of funds either throuQh the exporters selling export proceeds 
to banks at rates above the one per cent margin allowed for foreign exchange market 
transactions840 or through some dubious foreign banks' guarantees of Naira denominated 
loans was prevalent841. 
The banks engaged in speculative activities on the foreign exchange market by 
putting pressure on the demand for foreign exchange often with overdraft facilities 
obtained from the CBN842. It has been rightly observed that the "banks were adept at the 
manipulation of the exchange rate of the dollar all with a view to profit maximisation. The 
bidding system was replete with so many deficiencies that the Central bank tried one 
11843 method after the other ..... The CBN applied various pricing mechanisms including 
marginal, weighted, average and Dutch auction systems. Indeed, the profit declared at the 
inception of deregulation by banks has been attributed to speculative gains from foreign 
837. See Okafor, Francis. 0.. " Fiscal And Monetary Policies in De-regulated Banking Envirorument " in 
The Nigerian Banking And Finance Industry In Transition: Shaping The Future, (1992 Bank Directors 
Seminar Papers and Proceedings, FITC, Lagos, Nigeria, ) p. 132. 
938. See Adeyerni, Adedokun., "Malpractices in the Banking Industry " in Ajibola and Kalu (eds. ). op. 
cit., p. 23. 
839. Loc. cit. 
840. See Nwankwo, G. 0., Money and Capital Markets in Nigeria Today, op. cit., p. 28. 
841. See Adcvenu. Adedokun.. in Ajibola and Kalu ( eds. ), op. cit., pp. 24 - 25. 
842. See Giwa. R. F. op. cit., p. 67. 
843. Loc. cic The CBN at various periods of the financial deregulation in Nigeria embraced diverse 
exchange rate system such as dual exchange rate system, unified exchange rate system, completely 
deregulated exchange rate system. fixed exchange rate system, and return to dual exchange rate system. 
see CBN Briefs, Research Department. Series No. 9-5/07, June 1995. pp. 2-3. see further NDIC Annual 
Report and Statement of accounts. 1990. pp. 8- 11. 
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exchange market "than returns from productive investment"844. The profits were invested 
in expensive cars and palatial houses in expensive locations. 
It must be emphasised that the foreign exchange transactions by the banks were 
riddled with illegal activities, graft and alarming corruption845which were designed to aid 
the illicit profit making by the banks in the foreign exchange operations. There was 
exponential growth in incidence of undervaluation and overvaluation of letters of credit, 
opening and processing of false and fraudulent letters of credit, negotiation of false and 
fraudulent bills of exchange, and processing of fraudulent foreign exchange transferS846 
Banks were often suspended from bidding sessions or required to pkv fines on the 
accounts of their malpractice at the foreign exchange market. Thus in 1992, dealership 
licenses of two banks were suspended for aiding capital flight and penalties were imposed 
on 65 defaulting banks with a total sum of N14.7 million realised as 
fineS847. Nine banks 
were suspended from participation in FEM auctions for varied foreign exchange 
malpractice848 in 1993 and further suspension orders imposed on erring 
bankS849 in 1995. 
The speculative flurry continued until the CBN in the usual manner embarked on a 
regulatory catch-up game of merging the banks' current accounts with their foreign 
exchange market accounts, abolishing foreign guarantees of Naira denonunated loan, 
844. See Umunnachila. Allwell.. op. cit.. p. 26. 
945. See Okigbo. Pius.. Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development, Vol. 3, op. cit., p. 250. 
840. See Adeycmi, Adedokun.. in Ajibola and Kalu (cds. ). op. cit., pp. 22 - 25. see also NDIC. Annual 
Report and Statement of accounts. 1992. p. 6. 
847 
. 
See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1992. p. 15' 
848. Sce CBN, Annual Rcport and Statemcnt of accounts. 1993. p. 164. 
849. See CBN, Annwil Report and Statement of accounts. 1995. p. 166. 
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requiring Naira deposit for forex allocation"O, and in March 1992, alloWing the exchange 
851 rate to be market determined, and in step with the target parallel market rate . 
These measures checkmated the speculative bidding for foreign exchange by 
banks for a short period852. The unabating pressure on the foreign exchange market 
instigated the re-introduction of regime of re lation in 1994 during which the Naira was gu 
formally pegged and a pro-rata system of foreign exchange allocation became the non-n853. 
Under this system, 90 % of the available foreign exchange was allocated to the classified 
productive sectors, and the remaining 10% was allocated for invisible through the banks 
which had been categorised into six classes with fixed allocated shares for this purpose. 
The policy of guided deregulation adopted since 1995 has now reversed the 
control system of 1994, while, the Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market was created 
which further liberalised the foreign exchan e dealingS854 . The Autonomous Foreign 
9 
Exchange Market is the market where transactions in foreign exchange is conducted851 
However, a dual exchange rate has been reimposed as the norm with a market rate 
applicable to pfivate transactions, while a fixed rate applies to public sector transaction. 
This dual exchange rate system has been assailed as distortive of the market and 
corruptive by providing cheap foreign exchange to public functionaries and their cronies. 
The jumbo profits of banks had evaporated with the closure of most foreign 
exchange arbitrage and speculative opportunities. It is believed that the drying up of the 
foreign exchange goldmine precipitated "the genesis of the insolvency / distress and 
150. See GiNva. op. cit.. pp. 66 - 67., see CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1995. p. 162. 
851. See NDIC, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1992. pp. 6- 10. 
852. See NDIC Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1992. p. 10. 
853. Sec CBN Brids. Rcscarch Dcpartment. Scnes No. 95/06, Junc 1995. p. 4. 
854. See S. I of Foreign Exchange (Monitoring And Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 17 of 1995. 
855. See SS. I& 40 ibid. 
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consequent failures in the banking industry"856. The recent measure857 in 1997 to liberallse 
the foreign exchange market further by permitting the unrestricted purchase of foreign 
exchange for personal travel allowances by Nigerians and business travel al-lowances for 
registered companies in the AFEM, has been engulfed by fresh controversy of abusive 
practices by bankS158. 
8.5 Interest Rate Escalation 
The Nigerian government enunciated a policy of complete deregulation of interest rate in 
August 1987. The CBN permitted the individual bank to determine its deposit and pnme 
lending rates based on the market forceS859. The CBN also fixed the Minimum Rediscount 
Rate (NIRR) which was intended to indicate the size and direction of desired changes by 
government at 15 per cent per annuM860 
The high bouts of interest rate in the country in the aftermath of interest rate 
deregulation were instigated by the CBN and the government when the NIRR was fixed 
very high861. Olashore contends that ........... by predetermining the level of interest to be 
paid for treasury bills fixed at 14 % by the Central Bank of Nigeria, an indication has 
already been given of the interest rate regime that will now prevail. Are we suggesting that 
small scale industries can be sustained on interest rate of 18-20 per cent9 "862. The CBN 
856. See Umunnaehila, Alhvell.. op. cit.. p. 27. 
857 
. See CBN, Monetary. 
Credit, Foreign Trade And Exchange Policy Guidelines For 1997 Fiscal Year. 
Monetary Policy Circular No. 3 1, pp. 30 - 32. 
151. Scc Midwcck Concord. Wcdncsday. 25 Junc 1997. No. 34. pp. I& 11. 
859. See CBN, Credit PolicN Guidelines For 1988, Monetan- Policy Circular No. 22. p. 10. 
860. See CBN, Credit Policy Guidelines For 1987 Fiscal Year, Monetary Policy Circular No. 
21 (Amendment No. I). 
861. See Olashore. Oladelc.. op. cit. (1988). p. 71. 
862. Loc. cit. 
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swiftly reacted to accusation of orchestrating high interest rate by reducing the MERR to 
12.7 per cent per annum in December, 1987863. 
In 1988, the deposit rates varied between 12.40 % and 16.10 % depending on the 
type and duration of deposit, and type of bank864. The high interest rates offered by banks 
on short term deposits stimulated a preference for such short term deposits of 60 days or 
90 days' tenor865 by the Nigerian depositors. It became a rarity to find willing depositors 
of money for one year or 365 dayS866. 
The interest rate structure changed dramatically in 1989, and ballooned to 
incredible proportions. It appears the interest rate liberalisation signalled to the Nigerian 
banks the freedom to charge any rate that the market can bear and the only restraint was 
the fear of a bank losing its client to another bank867. The reported deposit rates pegged at 
between 16.50 % in case of savings, and 27.20 % in case of one year time deposit. The 
prime lending rates also climaxed at 25.50 % and 29.80 % respectively. The inflation rate 
was 50.5 per cent, hence the interest rates appeared justifiable in view of the inflationary 
trend. 
The CBN lamented868 the existence of the wide spread between banks' deposit 
rates and their lending rates as well as the spread between the prime rate and other 
commercial rates. This banking practice was described by the CBN as "unfair to the 
863. See CBN, Credit Polic), Guidelines For 1987 Fiscal Year. Monetary Polic-v Circular (Amendment 
No. 2) of December 28,1987. 
864. Tlic prime lending rates hovered around 16.30 % and 16.50 % depending on the týpe of bank. The 
merchant banks offered higher deposit rates and lower maximum lending rates than the commercial 
banks. 
865. See Umunnachila, Allwell.. op. cit., p. 2 1. 
866. Loc. cit. 
867. See Okigbo. Pius.. Essaýs in the Public Philosophy of Development, Vol. 3. op. cit.. p. 213. 
868. See CBN. Credit Policy Guidelines For 1988 Fiscal Year. Monetan-ý Policy Circular No. 22. p. 10. 
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banks' customers and also not in the best interest of the economy "869. The borrowers and 
debtors alike suffered the fate of financial strangulation with the skyrocketing of the 
lending rates. The then Governor of CBN criticised the alarming interest rate thus 
lending rates have been pushed to a height that threatens the life 
of non-bank corporate sector and ultimately the financial system 
as well ............. And this has happened even though banks have 
paid relatively low rates on savings deposits. The situation 
suggests that the liquid banks are employing some collective 
market power to their immediate advantacyp870 
The CBN therefore in 1989 attempted a removal of the distortion in the interest 
rate structure especially the wide gulf between the banking deposit and lending rates by 
reaching an accord with the banks. The accord fixed the spread between the saving 
deposit rates and lending rates at 7 percentage points and the margin between the prime 
and the maximum lending rates for each bank at 4 percentage points, while the inter-bank 
rates were to be at least I percentage point below the prime lending rateS871. 
This accord was however cosmetic and palliative. The underlying reasons for the 
skyrocketing of interest rates were not addressed. The principal problems were inflation of 
50.5 per cent in 1989, and the demand management measures designed to fight inflation 
and stabilise the Naira exchange rate. The mopping up of liquidity by the CBN evaporated 
all liquidity from the banking system, with many banks becoming cash strapped and 
registering "interbank market rates as high as between 30 and 40 per cent, Just to attract 
11872 the much-needed deposits 
869. Loc. cit. 
870. See CBN Governor's Address at the 1989 Annual Dinner of the Nigerian Institute of Bankers quoted 
iii Nwankwo, G. 0., Money and Capital Markets in Nigeria Today. op. cit., p. 28- 
871 
- 
See CBN Brief, Research Department. Series No. 95/04. June 1995. p. 
872. See Nwankwo. G. O.. Money and Capital Markets in Nigeria Today. Universitv of Lagos Press. 
Lagos, (1991), p. 24. 
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The observed high lending rates of the banks during this period may be explained 
by the above factors of illiquidity, high interbank rates and inflation. Indeed, the banks 
were in fact reluctant to lend or grant credit, and charged high interest rates for any 
lending facilities. The interest rates of the banks although high, were lower than the 
inflation rate. 
The interest rates in 1990 remained in very high region as in 1989. The deposit 
rates ranged from 17.80 % to 25.40 %, and the lending rates remained stubbornly at 
26.00% and 29.00 % respectively. It is surprising that the interest rates witnessed a 
percentage rise from the 1989 position in 1990, despite the reported lower inflation rate of 
7.4% in 1990. It is doubtful that the reported inflation rate actually reflected the real 
inflation rate in Nigeria for 1990, and in fact, one author873 claimed that the interest rates 
ballooned to 45 % per annum and the inter-bank rates reached an all time high point of 50 
% and often more. The lending rates catapulted into higher regions causing acute 
difficulty to borrowerS874. 
The banks exerted their financial leverage over existing debtors to a most 
unreasonable extent charging the new interest rate on old debts in a "ruthless pursuit of 
profit"875 with the sad consequences that most debtors were saddled with exorbitant 
interest charges which threatened their business and their lives. This extortionist practice 
876 has received the judicial approval of the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
873. See Umunnachila. Allwell., op. cit p. 20. 
874. See Giwa. R. F. " The Role of Bank Directors in the 1990s" in Innovations, Technology & the 
Nigerian Finance Sector, ( Papers and Proceedings of the Bank Directors' Seminar, FITC, Lagos, 1990 
p. 68. 
875. See Okigbo, Plus.. Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development. Vol. 3. op. cit., p. 220. 
876 
- 
See Union Bank of Nigeria Vs Professor Albert Ozigi 1199413 N. W. L. R. 385. In this case. the 
appellant bank %%-as allowed to vary and charge different interest rates on a mortgage loan despite the 
absence of a clear and unambiguous variation clause in the mortgage deed. The appellant bank's 
contention that the interest rates on the respondent's loans varied between 1981 and 1989. as result of 
CBN directives was upheld by the court, in preference to the respondent's argument that the imposition of 
various rates by the appellant was unilateral variation of their agreement. The Supreme Court in 
upholding the appellant's submission overruled the concurrent decisions of the High Court and Court of 
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Perhaps, it must be emphasised however that the unsustainable high interest rates 
had been propelled by some of the regulatory and monetary contractionary policies of the 
government and the CBN. Firstly, the complete liberalisation of interest rate at once was 
precarious, questionable and contrary to the Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis. Such immediate 
and unplanned interest rate deregulation destabilises financial market. Hence, in U. S. A877, 
the liberalisation of interest rate was undertaken in stages according to a time-table over a 
four-year period. Yet in Nigena, interest rate deregulation occurred in a single day. It may 
be underscored that the CBN was well aware878 of the ill-effects of premature 
deregulation of interest rates, hence its decision to undertake the exercise contrary to its 
sound judgement may have political undertone. Indeed,, the CBN Governor was publicly 
humiliated "by higher authonties to reverse himself and to publicly change the stand of the 
Central bank "879. Additionally, the interest rate when liberallsed attained its high level 
because the CBN set its MRR at very high level indicating to the banks, its preference for 
very high interest rate regime. 
Further actions of the CBN such as tinkering with the liquidity of the banking 
system by raising their reserve ratio and swiping the outcropping from the customers' 
Appeal in the case that the appellant ought to consult with and notify the respondent borrower of the 
variation in interest rates. This decision of the Nigerian highest court which bequeaths many debtors 'Aith 
old debts quadrupled by new interest rates, may be assailed on one valid ground. With respect, it seems 
the court overlooked the changes in the law which in our view frustrates any agreement between the 
parties on interest rate. The law which governed interest rate at the time the parties entered into the 
mortgage agreement mandates fixed but variable interest rates., and this interest rate structure was the one 
contemplated by the parties. Hence, the variation clause was ambiguous and uncertain. However, since 
1987, the policýý on interest rate adopted by the CBN directly changed the law, and permitted floating and 
independent interest rates by banks. Thus, the nature of interest rates since 1987 was beyond the 
contemplation of the partiesThe changes in interest rate policy in 1987 affected the substratum of the 
partics'agreement, and changed the legal position on the issue. The appreciation of this legal situation in 
our vicw would have led the court to different conclusion from its decision in the case. 
877. See Garn St. Gennain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. 
878. See the CBN caution against complete liberalisation of interest rate in Nigeria, CBN. Monetary and 
Banking Policy , 1986. 
871). See Okigbo, P. N. C., Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development. Vol. 4. op. cit.. p. 99. 
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deposits for Letters of credit which had hitherto provided the banks with interest free 
money"O. Indeed, these actions in combination with other liquidity mopping up measures 
including withdrawal of government deposits from banks, abolition of foreign assets 
guarantees for Naira denon-finated loans, and raising of liquidity ratio culminated in serious 
Pr881 liquidity squeeze and unprecedented hike in interest rates 
The actions of the CBN and the government had another effect of exposing some 
old and new banks to serious liquidity crunch while aggravating the precanous positions 
of some marginally liquid bankS882. The affected banks embarked on aggressive deposit 
seeking programme luring depositors with irresistible "window dressing" interest rates . 
This development gave rise to Ponzi schemeS883 undertaken by most banks whereby 
depositors were lured with high interest rates , temporarily 
financed out of inflow of 
depoSit884. The ponzi scheme collapsed when banks started defaulting on the ostensibly 
money doubling agreements. 
The attempt by the government to curb the interest rate upward swing led to the 
re-introduction of interest rate control regime in 1991 when the maximum lending rate 
was pegged at 21 percent885. The banks responded by reporting the prescribed rates to the 
regulatory authority as the prevailing rate but charged higher lending rates in the forms of 
880. Loc. cit. 
881. See Giwa, op. cit., p. 66. 
882. See CBN, Economic and Financial Review. Vol. 27, No. 2. June 1989. p. I. 
883. Named after Charles or Carlo Ponzi who duped savers in Boston in 1920 promising 50 per cent 
interest on 45 day deposits. but -was later arrested -when he defaulted on his manipulative financial 
promise. see Jose Maria Fanelli. Roberto Frenkel and Lance Taylor. " The World Development Report 
1991 :A Critical Assessment ". op. cit., p . 24. 
884. See Collier. Paul.. "Living DoN,, -n The Past -. Redesigning Nigcrian Institutions For Economic 
Growth" (1996) 95 Afficaii Affairs NO. 380. p. 344. 
885. See CBN. Monetan And Credit Policy Guidelines 1991. Monetary Polio, Circular No. 25. p. 8. 
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service charges and processing fees that raised the effective cost of funds beyond the 
recommendedMaXiMUM886 
The interest rate control regime was, however, short-lived as the government 
reverted to the deregulation of interest rates in 1992 due to persistent criticisms of the 
interest rate control by both the banks and the organised private sector. The performance 
of the economy in 1991with lower GDP growth rate887 and higher inflation rate888 than 
1990 also compelled the change of policy by the Nigerian government. 
With the removal of the ceiling on banks' lending rates in January 1992, the interest 
rates resumed their upward swing889. The average prime rate rose from 21 per cent in 
1991 to 44.4 per cent in 1992890. The rise in the level of interest rates must be considered 
against the background of the inflation rate in 1992 which was 44.6 per cent. Thus, the 
interest rates were at par with the inflation rate. 
In 1993, all interest rates were higher at the end of the year than their levels at 
1992, and the deposit and lending rates of commercial banks were negative in real term 
even though merchant banks' lending rates maintained upward trend'91. The inflationary 
spiral at 61.4 per cent made most bank deposit and commercial banks lending rates 
886. See NDIC. 1991 Quarterly. p. 3. 
887. The GDP growth rate for 1991 Nvas 4.7 per cent as against 8.27 per cent in 1990. 
888. The inflation rate in 1991 was 13.0 per cent as against 7.4 per cent in 1990. 
889. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1992, p. 14. Savings deposit rates ranged from 
13.5 to 25 per cent and the pnme rate ranged between 21 and 45 percent. Merchant banks had higher 
interest rate margins. The average rates on ninety day deposit increased ftom 18.2 per cent at the end of 
1991 to 38.0 per cent at the end of 1992 
890. Ibid., pp. 31 - 32. 
89 1. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1993. pp. 2.30-3 1. The saving interest rates 
ranged between 19.2 per cent and 16.7 per cent . The commercial 
banks average prime rates and 
maximum Icnding rates were 36.1 per cent and 39.1 per cent respectively Merchant banks'average 
prime rates was 59.1 per cent and the average maximum lending rate was 60.5 per cent. 
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negative in real terms. The inter-bank rates also rose and defaults in the market attained a 
higherievel892 
The underlying factors for the high level of interest rates in 1992 and 1993 
according to the CBN were inter alia use of stabilisation securities for reducing excess 
liquidity, oligopolistic structure of the banking system , arbitrage activities, persistent 
depreciation of Naira exchange rate, high inflationary expectations, rapid spread of 
insolvent and distressed financial institutions leading to high risk premium, competitive 
mobilisation of funds for foreign exchange transactions, and monetary policy 
extemalitieS893. It seems in a way that the causes for the rise in interest rates went beyond 
the mere fact of deregulation. 
The Nigerian government however thought otherwise and re-imposed interest rate 
control by pegging the maximum lending rate at 21 per cent894 in 1994. The regulated 
rates were substantially negative in real terms since they were below the inflation rate 891at 
57.0 per cent. 
The regulated interest rate which did not reflect the market condition with 
inflation rate at 72.8 per cent continued in 1995, and compelled marginal banks to solicit 
funds at higher CoSt896. A combination of these effects and the general lull in the 
892. lbid., p. 27. 
893. See CBN, Annual Report And Statement of Accounts, 1992, p. 14. See also CBN, -, knnual 
Report 
And Statement of Accounts, 1993, p. 2. 
894. See CBN, Monetary. Credit And Foreign Exchange / Trade Guidelines 1994, Monetary Policy 
Circular No. 28. 
89i 
. 
See CBN, Annual Report And Statement of Accounts, 1995, p. 14. The Nigerian banks as usual 
reported full compliance Nvith the interest rate control even though effective 
deposits and lending rates 
were higher than reported as cost of funds Nvere generally high in the unofficial market . 
896. Loc. Cit. 
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economy amidst national and international pressure forced the government to revert again 
to a regime of deregulation of interest rateS897with effect from October 1996. 
8.6 Conclusions 
The effects of banking deregulation in Nigeria have rightly been described as 
mixed898. The banking system undeniably has witnessed a phenomenal growth in terms of 
the institutions, market participants, volume and complexity of operations, types and 
nature of products and technological innovations. The horizontal and vertical growths 
witnessed by the banking system together with its efficiency in the ten years of bankin 9 
deregulation are historic . 
However, the macroeconomic instabilities and the other policy inconsistencies 
have invested the banking system with escalating and often negative interest rates, and 
caused a foreign exchange speculative flurry. The privatisation of banks which is a most 
worthy objective has been fiddled with controversies and corruption. Nevertheless, 
observers rated the merits of financial deregulation of the Nigerian banking system over its 
visible evils. The Director of CBN Research, Dr Ojo contends that on " balance 
however, there is no gainsaying the fact that the advantages of deregulation have so far 
out-weighed the negatives effects, given the background of the economic problems which 
led to the adoption of SAP "899. It has also been asserted that the benefits of banking 
deregulation in Nigeria are much higher than the costs since the gains have impacted 
positively on the industry and the nation's economy900. 
897. See Newswatch. 26 June 1995. p. 11. See also CBN. Monetary. Credit. Foreign Trade And Exchange 
Policy Guidelines For 1997 Fiscal Year. Monetary Pollcy Circular No. 3 1. p. 9. 
898. See Oycjide. ( 1993). op. cit., p. 6. 
899. See Ojo. M. 0.. " Deregulation In the Nigerian Banking Industry: A Review and Appraisal " 
CBN 
Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 29, No. . 
March 199 1. p. 12. 
900. Sce Okafor, L. E.. (1993). op. cit.. p. 10. 
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It cannot be demed, however, that the high hopes of financial deregulation had not 
been realised901. Indeed, the perennial deterioration of the Nigerian economy is often 
attributed to the adoption of the financial deregulation programme, and the banking 
system is now in deep distress. 
See The Nigenan Vanguard. 18 June 1997, p. 
-104 
CHAPTER IX 
BANK FAILURE IN NIGERIA : FROM DEREGULATION TO REGULATED 
RECEIVERSHIP. 
9.1 Introduction 
The varied consequences of financial deregulation in Nigeria have been exan-ýned in the 
preceding chapter. However, the most devastating consequence is the failure of some 
banking corporations within the short span of the liberalisation phenomenon. The fact that 
no banking failure occurred at all in the country902 throughout the era of interventionist 
regulation (1968-1985) makes the massive failure of banking corporations the greatest 
weapon of attack against the virtues of the banking liberalisation by its critics. This is the 
context in which bank failures constitute a significant consequence of banking 
deregulation in Nigeria. 
This chapter which consist of five sections is devoted to the issue of bank failure in 
Nigeria. The first section describes the magnitude of banks and financial institutions' 
failure in the country. An attempt is made in the second section to identify the major 
causes of bank failure in Nigeria, and the regulatory and judicial reactions to the 
phenomenon of bank failure are analysed in the third section. The conclusions are 
contained in the fifth section. 
9: 2 The Deluge of Failed Banks and Financial Institutions 
The presence of distressed banks first became noticeable in 1989 when the 
supervisory authorities commenced fire fighting resuscitation programmes for them901 
especially through lender of last resort support and loans from the NDIC. Neither the 
generous lifeboat operations by the CBN and NDIC, nor the reformed policies and rules 
902. See Mvankwo, G. 0., Prudential Regulation of Nigerian Banking. University of Lagos Press, Lagos. 
(1990), p. 57. 
903. See NDIC, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1992. pp. 44 - 45. 
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was able to stem the tide of banking distress. Indeed, the number of distressed banks904 
that was 8 in 1991, rose geometrically to 16 in 1992, preluding cataclysmic banking crises 
that engulfed the Nigerian banking system like a ranging summer infemo defying all ill- 
attempt solutions. The year 1993 witnessed an increaSe905 in the number of the distressed 
banks to 27, representing a quantum leap of 68.7 per cent increase over the number in 
1992 
The distress in the banking system however remained unabated with a rise in the 
number of the distressed bankS906 to 42 in 1994 and as at the end of 1995, the figure 
peaked at 51 distressed bankS907. The NDIC on the other hand presented a more alarming 
picture stressing the "increase in the number of distressed banks from 55 in 1994 to 60 in 
1995 11908. This means that half or 50% of the 120 banks which constitute the Nigerian 
banking system were in distressed at the end of 1995. The CBN909 found that 21 licensed 
banks were technically insolvent as against 13 of such banks in 1994. In 1997, the 
number of distressed banks stood910 at 47. 
The banking distress although wide ranging and damaging is smaller in comparison 
to the ravaging financial distress that plagued the whole financial system. In 1994, 
31 distressed financial companies and 32 distressed community banks were identified, while 
118 other finance comparues were in default of matured obligations9l 1. The financial 
904. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1992, p. 153. 
905. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1993. p. 6. 
906. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1994. 
907. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1995. p. 166. 
908. See NDIC Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1995. p. 47. 
909. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 199-5. p. 5. 
'910. See CBN. Annual Rcport and Statement of accounts. 1997, p. 4. 
911. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1993. p. 18. 
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crises continued in 1995 with 200 distressed and potentially distressed community banks, 
and the revocation of the licences of 14 finance houses while the value of the reported 
cases of default in honouring matured obligations by finance companies increased from 
N 1,634.7million in 1994 to N2,0 10.1 million912 . In 1997 the licences of 353 community 
banks and 97 primary mortgage institutions were revoked913. The Deputy-Governor of 
the CBN, Victor Odozi, aptly summarises the state of the Nigerian banking and finance 
industry thus- 
Indeed, the finance sector is in deepening distress which manifested 
in the large number of technically - insolvent and , in some cases, failed institutions; liquidity problems; defaults in meeting depositor / creditor 
obligations; large portfolio of non-performing credits; and shareholder/ 
Boardroom conflicts914. 
9.3 Bank Failure : Some Rationalisation 
A number of varied and diverse reasons have been posited for the financial crises 
which enveloped the banking system. Some of the causes identified by the regulatory 
authorities are micro-economic instabilities, policy -induced shocks such as withdrawal of 
government deposits, uses of stabilisation securities, merging of banks' forex and trading 
accounts, hiking of minimum paid-up capital, poor and deteriorating asset quality arising 
from large portfolios of non-performing credits, mismatch of assets and liabilities, over 
trading , 
bad management and insider abuses915. 
912. See CBN. Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1995, pp. 19 & 168 
913. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1997. p. 4. 
914 
. 
See Odozi, V. A.. " Keynote Address " in Restructuring The Nigerian Financial System For Stability 
And Development , (Papers and 
Proceedings of the Bank Directors' Seminar. FITC. Lagos, Nigeria, 1994) 
P. XvIi. 
915 
. 
See CBN. Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1992. p. 6. see also CBN. Annual Report and 
Statement of accounts. 1993, p. 18. 
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The interviews conducted reveal other significant causes. Mr Adeyerni Osinubi, 
the former chief legal officer of the defunct National Bank of Nigeria , answering a 
question on the causes of bank failures, contends - 
Political system is the major cause of bank failure. Emphasis placed on 
political influence in Nigerian polity affected the banking system. Most of the 
banks were headed by indigenes within the last quarter century. Nigerians 
believe they should get whatever they can get in such position. Since there is no 
security of office, officials compromise their positions to their bosses who 
passed instruction on phones. Political parties influenced their members who 
are board members who will in turn influence the management which has a 
linUted ability to refuse to carry out such instructions. Hence, funds and loans, 
overdraft are given or allowed without strict compliance with the conditions 
for ensuring the repayment of the loans ............. . 
Bank officials are not in 
position to resist management officers because of job insecurity ........ 
916 
This view received credence from the fact that of the seven banks taken over by the CBN 
at the inception of the financial crises, six were state- owned banks. Indeed, most state- 
owned banks and even some Federal Government owned banks are either acquired by 
CBN or in deep distress now. The don-ýnance of political influences and underpinning 
factors like prebendalism, patrimonialism, clientelism and cronyism are prominent among 
the underlying causes of the failure of these government-owned banks. 
The NDIC917indeed identified ineffective management as one of the major causes 
of financial distress of the state government owned commercial banks in 1990 . 
According 
to the NDIC, "(S)ome of these banks were characterised by inept management whose 
tenure of office were unstable. Appointment to the board and top management positions in 
these banks were usually based on criteria other than merit ................ 
Board members 
were found to be more interested in the benefits and privileges conveyed by board 
membership than in the affairs of the bank"918 
916. Private niteniew in Lagos on 1/6/97. 
917. See NDIC Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1990, p. 27. 
918. Loc. cit. 
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In a reply to a question on causes of bank failure, Mr Justice M. A. Ope-Agbe, the 
presiding judge of the Failed Bank Tribunal Zone 11, Lagos, avers : 
There is internal factor. Internal abuse by employees of the bank - from 
the M. D, G. M, to the managers. The one pronounced is granting un- 
authorised credit facifity. In most cases, some banks have limits for credit 
which form bank policy .............. . One finds that in many cases, those 
without authority grant credit far beyond their limit without approval919. 
The learned tribunal chairman characterises the problem as the "human factor" and opines 
that the factor must be addressed while the environment must be sanitised. This opinion 
was corroborated by a high-ranking official of the CBN who identifies " internal 
mismanagement within the banks, mismanagement of funds, and internal wrangling " as 
the key causes of bank failureS920. Another top-ranking CBN official in a separate 
interview bemoaned the corruption in the banking system asserting that " (W)e have two 
departments -. Supervision and Examination . 
There is corruption in the two departments 
which give clean report to a bank even though there is a problem 
"921 
. The President of 
the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria and former Executive Director of the NDIC, 
Dr Wole Adewunrn-i although attested to the integrity of the NDIC supervisors during his 
tenure at the NDIC, however berated the competence and capabilities of the supervisors 
both at the CBN and NDIC and confirms that "(T)hey (supervisors) collect bribes. Both 
NDIC and CBN"922 
A discernible fact from these assertions is the prevalence of human factor either 
due to internal abuses of banks or regulatory conruvance of supervisors in the distress 
919. Private interview in Lagos on 13/6/97. 
920 1 ff- eniew on a 
. 
Private interview Nvith Dr X at Abuja on 11/6/97. This CBN o icer granted the int 
conditloii of strict anonymity. hence described throughout this Nvork as " Dr X ". The fear of reprisals by 
the ruling military junta underscores the request for anonymity. 
921. Private intmiew with Chief Z in Lagos on 22/5/97. This CBN officer also granted the interview on 
the condition of strict anonymity. hence described throughout this Nvork as "Chief Z ". The fear of 
reprisals by the rnilitarý- government equally inforined this request. 
922. Private inteniew in Lagos on 17/6/97. 
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pervading the financial landscape. The underlying reason for this cancerous human factor 
has been located in the motivating spirit of some bank investors. In the words of Allwell 
Umunnaehila in his 'Bank Failures In Nigeria', "For such investors, access to credit was 
easily guaranteed for them, their businesses and that of their friends and acquaintances 
especially in Nigeria where laws or controls are hardly obeyed . Even government 
functionaries favoured such investors in exchange for loans"923. 
Perhaps this explains the reason for the predominance of insider abuses in the new 
private banks since it stands to reason that bank officers would strive to satisfy their 
benefactors, and bosses - the investors and their cronies. It must be underscored that the 
job security of many bank officers also depends on their rapport with investors. An 
uncooperative bank officer stands no chance of retaining his job for long. Indeed, the 
study of sampled cases concluded by the Failed Bank Tribunal Lagos Zone 11 confirms the 
roles of investors' overbearing influences, and cronyism in destabilising some of the failed 
banks. A good illustration is provided by an analysis of one of the important caseS924 
In the criminal case of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Vs. Lord Chief Udensi 
Ifegwu &3 OrS925' the second, third and fourth accused persons while being the managing 
director and managers of the defunct AJpha Merchant Bank granted an unauthorised 
credit facilities of the sum of $2,962,062.99 equivalent to N242,889,156.98, to a company 
owned by the first accused person , Dubic Industries 
Limited. The facilities were granted 
923. See Umunnachila, Allwell., op. cit., p. 18. 
924. See Suit No. FBFMT/ L/Z 11 /7/ 95 (Unreported Decision of the Failed Bank (Recoven, Of 
Debts)And Financial Malpractices In Banks Tribunal Lagos Zone II of 8 of November 1996). In the 
second case, Nigeria Deposit Insurance corporation Vs. Marissa Investments Limited &3 Ors, in which 
judgment in the sum of N24,625,814.23 and interest was awarded against the Ist and 2nd respodents. and 
a further sum of N20,000,000.00 and interest was granted against the Ist, 2nd, and 4th respondents, the 
cNidencc revealed that the unsecured facilities were granted based on business arrangement and personal 
communications between the second respondent who is the chairman of the first respondent and the Alpha 
Merchant Bank's managing director. 
925. See Appeal No. SAT / FBT / 273 / 96 ( Unreported Decision of the Special Appeal Tribunal. Lagos 
dated 29 of May 1997 ). 
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by permitting the first accused person to over-utilised foreign exchange for which he did 
not provide equivalent Naira to cover the amount. The most interesting revelation 
however is that the first accused person is the largest shareholder and a non-executive 
director of the defunct bank. The second accused person, who was the managing director 
of the defunct bank at the material time, was also the loan relationship manager of the first 
accused person. 
There were no documents showing that the first accused person applied for any 
loan and the bank's account did not reflect the true state of the first accused person's 
account. Indeed, it was discovered that the defunct bank's management policy was to 
11926 falsely alter its account books and "tell lies to CBN or NDIC the regulatory authorities 
The accused persons were found guilty by the Failed Bank Tribunal and sentenced to three 
years imprisonment each without an option of fine. The morale of this case is that with 
the highest shareholder and the managing director of the defunct bank as the leading 
11participes crimines"927, it is inferable that no officer of the defunct bank can challenge or 
prevent them from carrying out their nefarious activities. Several other cases underscore 
the role of insider abuse928 and cronyiSM929 in Nigerian bank failure. 
926. Ibid., p. 8. 
927. Meaning parties to a crime. 
929. Some of the cases on insider abuse may be cited. one Alhaji S. Bello Abubakar, the managing 
director of Gani. 1i Bank, was convicted for fraudulently misappropriating the bank's fund amounting to 
N57.5 million naira. ( Unreported judgement of Justice R. lkqie dated 14/9/95)-l Also, the Failed Bank 
Tribunal convicted Dr Onwochei Odog%), -u, the chairman of the liquidated Kapital Merchant Bank for 
inassive insider abuse of the bank, and he was sentenced to a total of twenty and half years imprisonment. 
(Unreported judgement of Failed Bank Tribunal, Benin Zone, dated 26/2/96 )-, In yet another case, a 
director of Group Merchant Bank, Mr Christopher Anyaegbunam., was found guilty of fraudulently 
authorising the grant of a loan of the sum of NII million naira to his company, Cobik Supplies, without 
disclosing his interest in the said company. (See The Guardian On Sunday. March 24.1996, p. B3 
929. See Suit No. FBFMT /L/Z 11 / 02 / 96 (Unreported Decision of the Failed Bank (Recovery of Debts) 
And Financial Malpractices In Banks Tribunal Lagos Zone 11 of 22 of August 1996). In the first of the 
cases. Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation Vs. Lion Investments Ltd &5 Ors. wherejudgement was 
entered against the Ist, 2nd. and 3rd respondents for the sum of N8,342.131.14 being debt owed to the 
Alph, i Merchant Bankja failed bank ) it was revealed that the unsecured outstanding loans were granted 
to (lie first respondent company because of the personal relationship bct, %N-een the then managing director 
of the defunct bank and the 2nd respondent NNho, is the chain-nan and a director of the first respondent. 
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The magnitude of the human factor manifested in the various insider abuses in the 
banks can be gleaned from the variety and high incidence of fraudulent practices 
perpetrated in the banking system. A detailed information on the scale and level of fraud 
in the Nigerian banking system is contained in Appendix VIII herein. These practices 
include unauthorised overdrafts, posting of fictitious credits, diversion of unutillsed 
foreign exchange, fraudulent transfers and withdrawals, cheque kiting, alteration of 
cheques, blotting of account numbers on cheques and forging signatures, presentation of 
forged cheques, inflated expenditures, suppression of loan applications or accounts, 
withdrawal and suppression of cleared cheques, fraudulent manipulation of CBN clearing 
cheques, and transfer of customers' lodgement to staff account930. 
The total amount involved in the frauds and forgeries concerning commercial 
banks increased from N788,798.1 in 1990 to N351.93 million and N2,655.71 million in 
1992 and 1994 respectively931. The total amount respecting frauds and forgenes at 
merchant banks rose from the aggregate N15.4 million in 1990 to N59.82 million and 
N743.68 million in 1992 and 1994 respect ively93 2. The total amount of frauds and 
forgeries in respect of the two categories of banks dropped in 1995. The amount fell 
significantly to N1,006.28 million with regard to the commercial banks, and an incredible 
N5.08 million in respect of the merchant bankS933. (see Appendix VIII). 
The precipitous fall in the total amounts involved in banking frauds and forgeries in 
1995 has been attributed to the implementation of the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) 
Indeed, it emerged that the management of the deftinct bank had used some financial engineering to 
camouflage the indebtedness of the I st respondent and some other companies having similar problem. 
930. See NDIC, Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1992, p. 4 1. See further NDIC, Annual Report 
and Statement of accounts, 1995, p. 39. 
IC ( 1992 ). Ibid.. 9ý 1. See NDIC Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1990, p. 50. see further ND 
p. '17, NDIC ( 199-5 ). Ibid., p. 18- 
93 
. 
See NDIC (1990). Ibid.. p. 5L see further NDIC(1992). Ibid., p. 38; NDIC(1995). Ibid.. p. 39. 
933. See NDIC (1995). Ibid.. pp. 38 - 39. 
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And Financial Malpractices In Banks Decree in 1995 through the activities of Failed Bank 
Tribunal in prosecuting and punishing apprehended bank fraudsterS934. In the words of 
the CBN : 
In less than one year of its implementation, the Decree made a significant 
impact as substantial debts and properties were recovered, while some 
culprits were brought to book and sanctions in accordance with the 
provisions of the law imposed on those found guilty. More importantly, 
the actions had sent clear and strong signals that gross insider abuse 
and breach of fiduciary duties would be dealt with in accordance with 
the laW935. 
A deduction from the above discussion is that the two major factors precipitating 
bank failures in Nigeria may be located in the political system and in the human factor. 
The political system underlines the politicisation of the banking activities of the 
government owned banking institutions that failed in the country, while the same political 
exigencies are responsible for the policy induced shocks that caused the illiquidity and 
insolvency of some failed banks. 
It is a recorded fact that the withdrawal of government deposits from banking 
corporations imposed liquidity crises on many banks and "people say it was the last straw 
that broke the camel back of some banks e. g. National Bank of Nigeria, although there 
have been underlying long term causes"936. The issuance of stabilisation securities to mop 
up excess liquidity originating from government's fiscal rascality and monetary exuberance 
had equal effects of destabilising the liquidity of some banks and foisting a situation of 
illiquidity that may result in bank failure937. 
Furthermore, the same political factors ensured the total emasculation of the 
regulatory authorities, since all final decisions on discipline and control of failing banks 
934 
. 
Ibid.. p. 38. 
935. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1995. p. 168. 
936. Private intemeNN Nvith Dr Wole AdeNN-unmi on 17/6/97 in Lagos. 
937. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 199-5. p. 162. 
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and erring officers and investors are vested in the political authorities - the Head of State 
and Minister of Finance. This point may be underscored by the legal reality that no bank in 
Nigeria can be assumed, closed, divested or liquidated without the express approval of the 
Head of State9l' 
Section 34(l) of 1991BOFID provides in this respect inter alla that " the Bank 
may, with the approval of the President, assume control of the whole of the property and 
affairs of the bank, carry on the whole of its business and affairs or assume control of such 
part of its property, In addition, section 36 of the same law stipulates inter alia that 
"... the Bank may, with the approval of the President... " apply to the Federal 1-figh Court 
for an order of purchase, acquisition, or winding up of a failed bank or revocation of its 
licence. The revocation of banking licences, and disciplinary measures against abusive 
bank managers must also be authonsed by the Head of State939 
Thus., where the Head of State as the case in Nigeria, refuseS940 to approve the 
closure of unviable and distressed banks, the regulatory agency is simply powerless. A 
Deputy-Govemor of the CBN, Victor Odozi, put succinctly that - 
The issue was raised whether, in fact the CBN has adequate 
regulatory and supervisory capacity. I say that on the basis of 
the laws that existed we had inadequate capacity, we had 
inadequate powers because we had to get the approval of the 941 
President to liquidate a terminally distressed institution 
Indeed, it is this valid fact of the regulatory subservience of the CBN to the 1. 
political authorities in Nigeria, that made it inappropriate to attribute the bank 
failure in 
the country to institutional failure. Institutional failure may occur where a regulatory 
938. See SS. 34 & 36 of 1991 BOFID as amended. 
939. See SS. 33 &36 of 1991 BOFID as amended. 
940. See The Punch, 16 May 1997. p. 11. 
Y'l 
See Odozi, Victor.. " Proceedings ". in Ayua and ONN-asanoye (eds. ). op. cit.. p. 0. 
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agency had been unable by act of commission or omission to discharge its functions under 
its constitutive law or other enabling instrument. It seems however, as in Nigerian case, 
that where the decision making powers for a regulatory agency's functions are vested in an 
exterior body over which the regulatory agency has no control, and which extenor body 
refuses to take necessary decisions conditional for the regulatory agency's functions, the 
regulatory agency should be absolve of any blame for the consequences of the decision 
making failure. 
The CBN in the Nigerian case could therefore not be blamed for the non-closure of 
terminally distressed banks, or absence of disciplinary measures against abusive managers 
and the non-resolution of the financial crises in the country. The decision making powers 
for all of these actions are vested by law in the Head of State, who must not only authorise 
these regulatory actions but possesses the power to overrule 942 any decision by the CBN. 
Specifically, section 37(3) of BORD provides that an order by the CBN against a failed 
bank or its director, manager or officer "may either be confirmed, modified, altered, varied 
or replaced by the President". Perhaps it may be added that the same political factors 
underline some of the obvious lapses of the supervisory functions of the CBN. 
Indeed, the failure of CBN supervisors to detect distress signals in some of the 
failed banks despite periodic examinations and take remedial actions has been condemned 
by many commentatorS943. Although, personal corruption of the supervisors may be 
blamed, the predominance of political corruption cannot be discountenanced. The political 
nature of the banking regulatory powers allowed political influence to dominate the 
regulatory and supervisory functions of the CBN. Furthermore, the politicisation of 
banking regulatory power, deprived the CBN official and supervisors of their regulatory 
leverage over bank owners and managers, since the bank owners and managers could 
942 
. 
See S. 37 (39 of 1991 BOFID as amended. 
943. See Ekundayo. Fenu.. (former President of Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria). The Guardian 
On Sundav. 10 March 1996. p. A. 15 
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bypassed the CBN, and obtained favourable regulatory decisions from the political 
authorities944. 
These facts are reinforced by the political structure of bank ownership and control 
in Nigeria. Many banks in the country are /were owned by high-ranking military 
officerS945, and influential politicians. This structure enabled the bank owners to put direct 
pressure on the political authorities responsible for banking regulations. A number of 
exampleS946can be cited in respect of many failed banks. 
These examples demonstrate the political relationship between bank owners and 
client, and the political authority that regulated banks, underscoring the effects of such 
relationship in shielding the named banks from prompt regulatory actions. The banks in the 
examples and many other, were assumed by the CBN only when General Babaginda 
departed from the Nigerian presidency. Many of the bank owners and debtors like Senator 
Adewunmi and Chief Nzefibe were detained or arranged before the Failed Bank Tribunal 
after the tenure of General Babaginda. 
Perhaps, it may be highlighted that those bank closed, and whose owners and 
debtors were punished, were those out of political favour with the then Nigerian ruler, 
General Abacha941. The regulatory actions against them were more of political reprisals, 
944 
. See lyanda. Olukunle., op. cit., p. 5. 
945 
. See Appendix XI herein. 
946 
. 
One of the failed banks, the Century Merchant Bank had as its chairman, Alhaji Bashir Othman Tofa, 
Nflio was one of the two presidential candidates for the 1993 Presidential elections in Nigeria. (See NDIC, 
Annual Report And Statement of Accounts, 1992. p. 86). Alhaji Tofa was also stooge and political 
henchnian of General Babaginda, who allegedly sponsored him. The result of this political nexus was that 
Century Merchant Bank was not declared as a failed bank until General Babaginda left off ice. Another 
ex, iniple is that of Chief Nzeribe, one of the greatest debtors to the Alpha Merchant Bank. Yet. the said 
Chief Nzeribe was a political stooge of General Babaginda, and founded and financed the Association For 
13etter Nigeria, that engineered the annulment of the 1993 Presidential elections by General Babaginda. 
'I'hus. Chief N/. eribe was a close political ally of General Babaginda. The judicial fact that Chief Nzcfibe 
obtained funding for his political activities from his indebtedness to Alpha Merchant Bank. ensured that 
Chief Nzeribe used his political influence to protect the defunct bank from an), regulatory action by the 
deposed General. 
947 See The News, 25 March 1996, p. 31-, see also Thisday. 17 March 1996, Vol. 2, No. 0. p. 9. The 
penetrative influence of political factor in bank failure in Nigeria is further demonstrated by the fact that a 
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than corrective measures. Hence many insolvent banks and abusive owners remained948 
within the banking system protected by General Abacha . 
The banking political scenario has an implication for the CBN official and 
supemsors. The CBN officers were/ are intimidated by the political influence of bank 
owners and clientele, with the result that many fraudulent acts and regulatory lapses of 
politically connected bank insiders are ignored or suppressed. Additionally, the knowledge 
that the bank owners can neutralise any adverse supervisory reports against their banks, 
must have encouraged passivity from the CBN officers. 
Indeed, passivity may be a rational course of action for two valid reasons. First, 
the Nigerian experience suggests that political authority will not act on a damaging 
supervisory report against any bank with political backing. Thus, the CBN officer may 
reasonably question the utility of any incriminating report, when it would not procure any 
positive result. Second, a confrontational CBN officer may lose his job for gross 
insubordination to a political heavyweight. The significance of these points is that political 
corruption and control dominated the supervisory lapses of CBN, and the regulatory and 
supervisory quagnure of the CBN should be seen in its political context rather mere 
institutional failure. 
The human factor lies in insider abuses and corrupt supervisors. The incentive of 
many bank promoters to use their banks as avenues for cheap credits or subsidies fuelled 
the spiral of criminal lending, frauds, and forgeries often masquerading as "financial 
engineering" in the Nigerian banking system. The cankerworm of insider abuse is so 
infectious that it has entangled even the model bankers of the bygone era. Hence, many 
foremost traditional ruler in Nigefia, the Sultan of Sokoto. Alhaii Dasuki was removed from his throne for 
niany reasons including his roles in failure of some banks. 
948. See Senator A. Adesanva. " Yoruba Nation Endangered'? ". Sunday Concord, 15 February 1998, p. 
13. 
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past presidents of the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria and leading authorities on 
Nigerian banking are languishing in prisons for alleged insider abuses of their bankS949. 
The number of banks' owners, shareholders, directors and managers detained, 
prosecuted, convicted, imprisoned, or removed and blacklisted signifies a high level of 
sophisticated misconduct and moral decadence existing in the banking system. Indeed, the 
reality of the banking dilemma is as postulated by Mr Adeyemi Osinubi thus "when you 
look at bank failure in Nigeria, the problem is not the absence of knowledgeable bankers, 
but lack of commitment which may be a product of dishonesty or political system 
itself'950. 
One may assert that while political corruption and opportunism fuelled the collapse 
of most government owned banks, the human factor manifested in the massive insider 
abuses and corrupt regulatory supervisors facilitated the capitulation of the new 
generation private banks. And in both instances, the role of political ineptitude and 
regulatory inertia remains decisive as a constant factor. 
9.4 Regulatory and Judicial responses to Bank Failure 
The CBN reacted to the development by reforming the policies and rules on capital 
adequacy and prudential guidelines for the banks9l'. The prudential guidelines were 
necessitated by the increasing market risk and exposures which attended banking 
949 
, The incarceration of 
Dr Femj Adekanye and Mr Ralph Osayameh, both past presidents of Chartered 
Institute of Bankers of Nigeria. for alleged banking malpractices is a vivid example. see in this respect 
"The Fall of the Banker ", The Guardian on Sunday. 24 March 1996, pp. 31 - 33. 
95(). Private interview of 1/6/97. 
951. In March 1990, the CBN adopted the Basle Committee's recommended international standard of 
measurement of capital adequacy. The Nigerian apex bank further prescribed new prudential guidelines 
for the licensed banks in November. 1990. The Nigefian Accounting Standards Board ( NASB ) in 
October 1990, also issued the " Statement Of Accounting Standard : Accounting By Banks And NoN- 
Bank Financial Institutions ( Part I)" for use by preparers and users of published financial statement of 
banks. The Statement stipulated standard to be obsen-ed in financial statements preparation in three key 
areas namely income recognition. loss recognition, and balance sheet classification. The licensed banks 
ývere directed to comply with the dictates of the Statement which was designed to ensure rcliabilitN, 
factuality and comparability of banks' financial statements. 
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deregulation, and the need for protecting depositors and the financial market952 fTOM 
imprudent banking operations. The prudential guidelines stipulated minimum requirements 
for asset classification, provisioning, disclosure, treatment of accruable interests, and off- 
balance-sheet engagementS953. 
In an ill-fated attempt to rescue the distressed banks from financial distress, the 
CBN in 1993 enunciated measures of regulatory forbearance such as re-admission of 
distressed banks into the foreign exchange market subject to periodic performance review, 
waiver of monetary penalties on non-compliance with statutory minimum capital 
requirement by distressed banks, and imposition of a uniform rate of 35 per cent per 
annum on the overdrawn accounts of all distressed bankS954 
In addition to the regulatory forbearance measures, the CBN also constituted 
Interim Management Boards (INIBs) to undertake the management affairs of 7 (seven) 
distressed banks consisting of six state owned banks and one pfivate bank955. In pursuant 
to the authority of the Head of State who is the sole authofity956 on the termination of 
banking operations of a banking corporation in Nigeria, the CBN assumed the control of 
the management of 8(eight) commercial and 9(nine) merchant banks out of a total 22 
(twenty-two) approved distressed banks for take -over action by the Head of State. 
The CBN957 in September, 1995, assumed the management and control of 
17(seventeen) commercial and merchant bankS958. Three distressed but Federal 
952. See NDIC. Annual Report And Statement of Accounts. 1990, p. 11 
953. See also CBN Circular No. BSD/ CB/2YVOL. 1/8 of 15 May 1991. 
4. See CBN, Annua I Report And Statement of Accounts. 1993, p. 164. 
955. Loc. cit. 
956. See S. 12 of BOFI D 199 1. 
957 
- 
See CBN, Annual Report And Statement of Accounts. 1995. pp. 166 & 168. 
9". Amicable Batik, Credite Batik. First African Trust Bank. Lobi Bank. Nigena Universal Bank, North - 
South Batik 
, 
Premier Commercial Bank and Progress Bank of Nigeria . and the 
listed merchant banks viZ 
Abacus Merchant Bank, Century Merchant Bank, Great Merchant Bank, Group Merchant Bank. lvorý, 
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Government owned merchant banks namely Continental Merchant Bank Limited, Nigerian 
Merchant Bank Limited, and ICON Limited - Merchant bankers were slated for merger by 
the Bureau of Public Enterpfises959. Two other banks comprising Garqji Bank Nigeria 
Linýted and Metropolitan Merchant Bank Limited that had commenced self-restructunn, e 
and recapitalisation were given grace of time to conclude the exercise960. 
Prior to these assumption and take -over control measures, the liquidation of five 
banks had been undertaken by the CBN. In 1994, four banks consisting of Kapital 
Merchant Bank Limited, Financial Merchant Bank Limited, Alpha Merchant Bank Plc, and 
United Commercial Bank Limited had their licences revoked, and in June 1995, the 
Republic Bank Limited961 joined this growing list of defunct banking corporationS962 
The NDIC had commenced the payment of insured deposit claims to the 
depositors of the above -mentioned five liquidated banks. In 1994, the NDIC paid a sum 
of N20.6 million to 877 depositors, and with improved awareness of the deposit insurance 
payment activities, the sum of N49.05 million was paid in 1995 to 2,660 insured 
depositors of the five liquidated bankS963 
It must be underscored that the bank failures and distress had persisted with the 
NDIC964 reporting the existence of holding actions imposed as at the end of 1995 on 22 
Merchant Bank. Merchant Bank of Africa, Nationwide Merchant Bank, Prime Merchant Bank and 
Victory Merchant Bank. 
959 
. 
See CBN, Annual Report And Statement of Accounts. 1995, p. 19. 
960 
. 
Loc. cit. 
961. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts. 1995, p. 166. 
962. The CBN also obtained a High Court order in 1995 to acquire the named banks : African 
Continential Bank, Pan African Bank, Merchantile Bank. Cooperative and Commerce Bank, and NeN% 
Nigerian Bank 
. 
These banks were all acquired at a nominal fee of NLOO each, in addition to the oldest 
indigenous bank in the country. the National Bank of Nigeria which had earlier been acquired in 1994 by 
the CBN. All the acquired banks were slated for sale to interested investors and the regulatory authorities 
had commenced the review of the bids at the end of 199-5. 
963. see NDIC. Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1995, p. 49. 
964. Ibid.. p. 48. 
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(twenty-two) commercial and 15(fifteen) merchant banks , while 
"Twenty - three (23) 
other banks were being monitored closely as a result of signs of potential distress shoxvn 
by them during the year"965. The CBN had taken steps to curb the high incidence of insider 
abuses. In this respect, the CBN conducted a comprehensive review of insider credits in 
the banking system and at the end of the review imposed wide ranging punishment on 
abusive insiders including the removal or blacklisting of 178 directors (serving and ex- 
directors) and blacklisting of 75 other insiderS966. Indeed, the CBN removed the Board of 
Directors of Commercial Trust Bank Ltd for insider abuse967, and further mandated all 
insiders with non-performing credits to liquidate such debts by end of December, 1995 or 
968 be removed, blacklisted and reported to the police for investigation and prosecution . 
These facts put into sharp perspective the underlying reason for the high volume of 
cases pending before the Failed Bank Tribunal in Lagos which is reflective of the serious 
financial crisis that engulfs the Nigerian banking system. 
It must be emphasised that each Tribunal has civil and criminal Junsdiction969 and 
all the civil matters are brought in respect of debts owed to failed banks by their 
liquidators or receivers, and the criminal matters commenced by the government in respect 
of banking frauds against failed banks. The Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and 
Financial Malpractices in Banks Decree970 empowers the Head of State to constitute such 
number of Tribunal as he deems necessary to be known as the Failed Banks (Recovery of 
965. Loc. cit. 
966. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1995. p. 168. 
967. Loc. cit. 
968. Loc. cit. 
969. See S. 1(3) of the Failed Banks ( Recovcrv of Debts ) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Decree 
No. 18 of 1994 as amended b,,. Decree No. 18 of 199-5. 
970. See Decree No. 18 of 1994 as amended bv Decree No. 18 of 1995. 
221 
Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks TribunaI971 ( Tribunal). Each Tribunal shall be 
presided by a single judge who shall hear and dispose of all criminal and ciVil causes or 
matters before the Tribuna1972. A Tribunal is vested with exclusive junsdiction to recover 
outstanding debts owed to a failed bank973 and powers to try offences under its 
constitutive Decree, the CBN Decree and the BORD974 
The awesome powers of the Tribunal which include the interlocutory authority to 
prohibit the disposition of any movable or immovable property of a debtor or accused 
person or confiscate such property or freeze bank accountS975, and the final powerS976 to 
order the levying of execution on the properties pledged as collateral and all other 
properties of a debtor in case of a shortfall are intimidating to all debtors, and erring 
officers of failed and failing banks. Failure to comply with an order for payment of loan 
and interest within the time specified by the Tribunal is a punýishable offence 
977 
The data collected978 reveals that between 1995 and May 30,1997 when the data 
was collected, the total number of civil cases concerning the recovery of failed banks' 
debts has risen from 13 in 1995 to 739 cases in May 1997 within a period of less than two 
years. It further shows the great preponderance of civil over criminal cases since within 
the same period only 2-33 criminal cases have been brought before the Tribunal despite the 
great fraudulent and criminal havoc which had been experienced by the failed and viable 
97 1. See S. 1 (1) ibid. 
972. SCC S. 1(3) ibid. 
97-1. See S. 9 ibid. 
974. SCC S. 3(l)(b)(c) ibid. 
975 
. 
See S. 7 ibid. 
976. See SS. 11(2) & 15(5) ibid. 
977. See S. 19(4) ibid. 
978. Research conducted at the Registry of the Failed Bank ( Recovery of Debts ) And Financial 
Malpractices In Banks Tribunal. in Lagos during the nionths of May and June 1997. 
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banks alike in Nigeria. The small number of criminal cases before the Failed Banks 
Tribunal may suggest reluctance of the regulatory authorities to invoke criminal sanctions 
against abusive bank insiders and their colleague. This study has only shown the position 
regarding Lagos Zone of the Tribunal since other zones of the Tfibunal exist in different 
parts of the country979. It however reveals the scope and extent of the bank failure saga in 
Nigeria and the unabated rise in the civil and criminal cases. 
Another important respect in which the Failed Bank Tribunals have not helped the 
course of banking deregulation in Nigeria is the treatment of bank fraudsters and abusive 
insiders. The role of the tfibunal /court is important because cfiminals tend to gravitate 
towards the banking system where white collar crimes are prevalent. The prosecution and 
just punishment of banking crimes are essential to deter criminals and ensure banking 
stability by preventing fTaud-induced bank failure. The NDIC980 at a time lamented the 
non-custodial sentencing of the prosecuted bank criminals, and indicated its determination 
to appeal against such malevolent criminal justice. 
However, the most scandalous judicial treatment of bank criminals is represented 
by the most recent case of Lord Chief Udensi Ifegwu and others Vs. The Federal Republic 
of Nigeria981, where the Special Appeal Tfibunal in Lagos affirmed the convictions of the 
three bank criminals and abusive insiders, in respect of offences conceming unauthorised 
credit facilities in the sum of $2,962,062.89 (Two million, nine hundred and sixty-two 
thousand Dollars, eightv-nine cents), equivalent to N242,889,156.98 (Two hundred and 
forty-two million, eight hundred and eighty-nine thousand, one hundred and fifty-six 
Naira, ninety-eight kobo). 
979. There are Zones of the Tribunal in Benin, Enugu and Kano. 
98(). See NDIC. Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. 1995, p. 3. 
98 1. Appeal No. SATIFBT/2 73! 96. See also Post Express, Thursday, 12 June 1997. 
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The judicial odyssey of this case however is that the Special Appeal Tribunal felt 
the Lower Tribunal was in error in sentencing the accused persons under a stricter law982, 
than the BOFID, a more liberal law under which they were charged. The Appellate 
Tribunal thus substituted its sentences of a fine of N100,000 (One Hundred thousand 
Naira), equivalent to $2,000 (Two thousand Dollars) by each of the accused persons, for 
the custodial sentences of 3 (Three) years for each of the accused persons by the Lower 
Tribunal. The substituted sentences by the Special Appeal Tribunal represent, a monstrous 
and disastrous criminal justice, more alarming than the banking crimes involved in the 
case 
The appellate judges had the options of imposing a custodial sentence of 3 years 
or fine of N100,000 (One Hundred Thousand Naira) on each of the accused persons, 
under the BOFID983, which it applied, but curiously chose the fine of a paltry sum of 
N 100,000 each for bank criminals who stole over N200 million. The clear message to the 
numerous Nigefian bank cfiminals therefore is that banking fraud is profitable. It is 
submitted that the appellate judges exercised their discretion unjudicially and offered no 
reasons whatsoever for the imposition of fine rather than custodial sentences which they 
could have imposed. They failed to consider and apply the sentencing rules having regards 
to the amount involved in the crime, the gravity of the crime, the rampancy of the crime, 
the public interest in discouraging the crime, the peculiar circumstances of the accused 
persons, and that no amount of fine under the law can adequately punish the crime. These 
are the considerations that influenced the lower Tnbunal's sentences, and the appellate 
judges could have applied their considered correct law, and still retain the custodial 
sentences. One wonders the circumstance under which the appellate judges would impose 
the custodial sentences, if it could not do so in the present case. 
98d. i ancial Malpractices in Banks Decree No. 18 ". See S. 20 of Failed Banks ( Recoverý- of Debts ) and Fin 
of 1994 as amended. 
983. See S. 18 of BOFID No. 2-5 of 1991 as amended. 
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Another disgraceful aspect of the case is that the appellate Tribunal remembered to 
apply the less stricter provisions of BORD in imposing the obnoxious fines, but judicially 
forgot to invoke the clear mandatory stipulation in BOFID that "and in addition, any gains 
or benefits, accruing to any person convicted under this section by reason of such 
contravention, shall be forfeited to the Federal Government, and the gains or benefit shall 
vest accordingly in that Government"984. No such orders of forfeitures were made against 
the accused persons. It is very painful that the Appellate Tribunal committed this act of 
judicial travesty in the full knowledge that its decision is final985 
In our interview with the Chairman of the Lower Tribunal who decided this case, 
he was reticent as judges are on the issue but contends that "I do feel for myself The 
Honourable members of the Special Appeal Tribunal would feet that the sentence under 
BOFID is inadequate for the gravity of the offence. Many of the accused persons who are 
millionaires, if they know that N100,000 would be the punishment, they would not be 
afraid. The law may be amended and the punishment made stiffer ...... 
"986. We salute the 
learned Chairman's courage in imposing custodial sentences on the influential accused 
persons, and appreciate his judicial candour in commenting on the appeal on his decision. 
However, unlike the Chairman, we blame the appellate Tribunal, and not the law for this 
judicial aberration. The law gave them some discretion, they misapplied themselves to the 
law and facts, and set a calamitous precedent. 
This type of perverted judicial reasoning987 has undenruned the purpose of the 
Failed Bank Tnbunal Decree, and the essential need of deterring banking fraud in the 
984. See S. 18 (2). Ibid. 
985. See S. *3(2) of Failed Banks ( Recovery of Debts ) And Financial Malpractices In Bank Decree No. 18 
of 1994 as ameMed. 
996. Private lntcrvieýv with Justice M. Ope-Agbc. Chainnan. Failed Bank Tribunal. Zone 11. Lagos on 
1.1/6/97 
987 -as handed . 
See Guardian On Sundaý. 24 March 1996. p. B3. A similar catastrophic judgement %N 
down in the case of banking fraud involving Alhqji S. Bello Abubakar. the managing director of Garnýji 
13ank. Despite the fact that the he %%as found guilt), of misappropriating the surn of N57.5 million naira, 
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country. A very serious objection to the Special Appeal Tribunal which hears appeals from 
the Failed Bank Tribunal is its composition which leaves much to desire. The Special 
Appeal Tribunal is made up of two persons which in the case under review consisted of 
one retired judge and one practising lawyer. This structure removes the Special Appeal 
Tribunal judges from any possible disciplinary measuress or reprissal for perverted 
decisions and makes them susceptible to greater influence than serving judges. The same 
objection applies to Failed Bank Tribunal presided by retired judges. It is subnutted that 
Special Appeal Tribunal and Failed Bank Tribunal should be presided by serving judges 
who are still accountable for their decisions and subject to strict code of judicial conduct. 
The resolution of the banking distress has become elusive to the regulatory 
authorities. The distressed banks, despite their infectious financial ailments, have 
continued to co-exist with healthy and viable banks, leading to fears of market pollution. 
The sanctions and remedial actionS918by the CBN and NDIC had failed to rescue most of 
the distressed banks from their financial abyss. The recent threat989 of liquidation by the 
CBN of the distressed banks that are not recapitalised before the 31 st March, 1997, has 
been revealed as empty protests of a frustrated powerless regulator in the face of the 
intransigence of the Head of State990 
the Tribunal chairman, Justice Roseline IkcJe, refused to sentence him on the ground that the accused had 
niade solid arrangement to get the money back to the bank coffers, and it was not necessary to send him to 
jail. 
988. See NDIC Annual Report and Statement of accounts, 1992, p. 44. See also NDIC Annual Report 
iiid Statement of accounts, 1995. p. 47. The sanctions include suspension from banking activities in 
clearing houses and foreign exchange market. holding actions, cease and desist orders, appointment of 
IMBs. and handsome financial hand-outs and bail -outs. 
989. See CBN, Monetan-. Credit. Foreign Trade And Exchange Policy Guidelines For 1997 Fiscal Year. 
L p. 13 Monetary Policy Circular No. 11 
990. See The Punch. Business News. Friday. 16 MaY 1997. p. 11. 
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At last, the Head of State in January 1998, authonsed by an Orclei-991, the 
liquidation of the 26 distressed banks, and the CBN announced992 the revocation of their 
licences on the 19th of January, 1998. It is hoped that this gratitude by the Head of State 
signalled a new political will to sanitise the ailing banking system. The financial position of 
the liquidated banks is illustrated in Appendix XII herein. 
9.5 Conclusions 
Deregulation " has exposed the banking industry to the jolts and shocks of the unstable 
economy "993 that Nigeria possesses. The banks have experienced acute liquidity crises, 
financial fragility, financial crashes, and outright bankruptcies. Indeed, the banking system 
is now in deep distress. The causes are diverse and varied. However, politicisation of the 
banking regulation and supervision as well as adverse human factors loomed large as the 
significant causes of bank failure in Nigeria. The remedial measures to stem the tide of 
bank failure have been inadequate and ineffective due to their political coloration and 
intransigence of the political authority. It seems the judicial measures appear effective, but 
they have also been rendered suspect by a recent dubious decision and the possibility of 
political influence. 
A critical insight into the specific factors that undermined successful deregulation 
of the Nigerian banking system shall form the basis of our enquiry in the next chapter. 
99 1. See Banks And Other Financial Institutions Decree 199 1. Revocation of Banking Licences Order. 
Federal Government Gazette No. 4. Vol. 85 of 16 Januarv 1998. 
992. See News-watch. 2 February 1998. p. 24-1 The News. 2 Februar), 1998. p. 29. and, Tell. 2 Fcbruar) 
1998. p. 27. 
993. See Uniunnaeliila. Allwell.. Op. cit.. p. 30. 
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PART V: ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION 
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CHAPTER X 
DEREGULATION OF THE NIGERIAN BANKING SYSTEM: A CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
10.1 Introduction 
The analysis of the consequences of deregrulation of the Nigerian banking system 
has revealed its mixed results and the cataclysmic failure of a substantial number of the 
banking institutions. Indeed, the banking system is in deep and deepening distress. A 
potent summation of financial deregulation of the country's banking system is that the high 
goals of banking deregulation have become unattainable with devastating effects on the 
financial system and the Nigerian economy . 
An issue that comes to fore is the distillation 
of the factors that militated against a successfill deregulation of the Nigerian banking 
system. The critical inquiry into the fundamental factors that undermined the deregulation 
programme is the pivotal focus of this chapter. 
Our approach evaluates the mechanism and methodology of financial deregulation 
of the Nigerian banking system considering the prognosis of the Mckinnon-Shaw concept 
and theory of financial deregulation, and the experiences of other countries that have 
undertaken comprehensive deregulation of their financial systems . 
This chapter contains seven sections. The introduction is the first section. The 
second section identifies the Nigerian political realities and peculiarities, as the greatest 
tindermining factors to the country's financial reform programme. The powerlessness of 
the financial regulatory agencies is analysed in the third section, whilst, the fourth section 
chronicles the voluminous inconsistent re ulatory and policy measures that precipitated 9W 
the banking collapse and financial crisis. The fifth section critically highlights the role of 
defective law in promoting macroeconomic instability and fiscal imbalance in the 
derailment of the Nigerian financial deregulation. The sixth section underscores the 
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implications of the Nigerian financial deregulation experience for the Bretton wood 
institutions - IMF and World Bank. The seventh section contains the conclusions. 
10.2 Nigerian political dialectics and financial deregulation: A configuration of 
incompati es 
The Nigerian financial deregulation programme like most reforms has been chiefly 
executed throup-h regulatory and legal imperatives contained in banking laws and policies, 
which in the main reflect the political preferences of the ruling class and the personal 
inclinations of the vested interestS994. This is not surprising as ideological biases and 
personalities of political leaders as well as economic factors usually influence reforms and 
their regulatory underpinrungS995. Indeed, Richard Posner996 has postulated that legislative 
process is usually buffeted by interest-group pressures denying statutes of sound policy 
judgement. The content, character and nature of legal imperatives are greatly influenced 
by "political, self-interested, traditional , 
habitual or other truth - independent 
considerationS"997 and the "ultimate premises of legal doctrines are political"998 
The interest - group theory has emphasised that lawmaking process is usually 
dominated by redistributive desires of narrow coalitions which negatives any public 
interest euphemism as the basis of legislation999. In fact, regulation has been characterised 
as an indirect instrument for wealth redistnbution'000 and government interventions cannot 
994. See Canova, ideni. p. 134 1. 
995. See Jose Edgardo Campos and Hadi Salehi Esfahani. " Why and When Do Governments Initiate 
Public Enterprise Reform'. ' ". ( 1996 ) The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, p. 477. 
996. See Posner. A. Richard., Overcoming LaNN. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, ( 1995) p. 393. 
997. Ibid., p. 37. 
998. Ibid., p. 83. 
999. [bid., p. 400. 
100'. Sec Campos and Esfahani. op. cit.. p. 455. 
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"be divorced from issues of redistribution, because it is partly through redistribution that a 
regime sustains itself"001. More emphatically, Benston'001 contends that financial 
regulation "is imposed to redistfibute wealth to those with political powers" 1003. Thus, in 
political settings marked by interest group hegemony, the official government policies all 
too often venerate the private interests of the politically powerful individuals and 
groups'004 
it is the recognition of this political reality of laws and regulations that Posner 
posits that it is naive in the present world to think of laws and regulations "as typically, let 
alone invariably, the product of well meaning efforts to promote the public interest by 
legislators who are devoted to that interest ... "1005. The public interest conception of law is 
thus revealed as a political farce and legal anti farce. This is particularly so in authoritarian 
1006 regimes that are often subordinate to vested interests that sustain their political offices 
and since politicians, military or civilian constantly aspire to consolidate their powers, the 
predominance of vested interests in laws and regulation may be accepted as axiomatic in 
dictatorships without democratic or plausible controls. It is against the background of the 
above intellectual paradigm that the Nigerian political dialectics during financial 
deregulation will be analysed. 
lool. [bid.. p. 454. 
1002. See Benston. George. J.. " Does Bank Regulation Produce Stability ? Lessons from the United States 
" in Forrest Capie and Geoffrey E. Wood ( eds. ), Unregulated Banking, Chaos or Order ?. Macmillan, 
England, (199 1) p. 207. 
1003. Ibid., p. 229. 
1004. See Canova, Timothy. A., " The Transformation Of U. S. Banking And Finance: From Regulated 
Competition To Frce-Market Receivership " (1995) 60 Brooklyn Law Review No. 4.1295 at 134 1. 
11105. See Posner, op. cit.. p. 400. 
1006. See Ames. Barry.. Political Sunival : Politics and Public Policy in Latin America. BerkeleN 
University of California Press. (1987). 
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The basic fact that Nigerian financial reform is over-politicised is best reflected in 
the banking and related laws and policies enacted during the deregulation programme. A 
remarkable feature of the legal dictates is that the Nigerian military President or Head of 
State is made the final authority on monetary and banking policies in the countryI007. All 
the regulatory bodies with financial supervisory or related responsibilities are under the 
direct control of the President or Head of State. 
The financial regulator, CBN, requires presidential approval for virtually all 
monetary and banking policies including routine supervisory operations over banks'008 w 
Section 8 (3) of CBN Decree'009 provides " The Head of State after due consideration 
may, in writing, direct the Bank through the Minister as to the monetary and bankin 9 
policy pursued and the directive shall be binding on the Board which shall forthwith take 
all steps necessary or expedient to give effect thereto". Section 9 (1) of BOFID states that 
" The President on the recommendation of the Bank shall, from time to time, determine, as 
he may deem appropriate, the minimum paid-up share capital of each category of banks". 
Additionally, Section 12 of BOFID stipulates in respect of revocation of banking 
licences that "The Governor, may with the approval of the President by notice published in 
the Gazette, revoke any licence granted under this Decree ...... and of course under section 
37(3) of BORD any order by the CBN against a failed bank or its director, manager or 
officer "may either be confirmed, modified, altered, vafied or replaced by the President". 
The ministerial direct oversight by Finance Minister over banking regulation and 
supervision by the CBN has most recently been legislated'010. Section I(l) of BOFID as 
amended'011 provides " The Central Bank of Nigeria .............. shall 
have all the functions 
1007 
. 
See S. 8 of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as amended. 
1008. See SS. 9,12,33.34 & 36 of BOFID No. 25 of 1991as amended. 
1009. CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as amended by Decree No. 3 of 1997. 
1010. Re S. 1 (1) of BOFID No. 2-5 of 1991 as substituted bNl BOFID (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1997. 
1011. Decree 25 of 1991 as amended by Decree No. 4 of 1997. 
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and powers conferred and the duties imposed on it under this Decree subject to the overall 
supervision of the NfirUster". 
Similarly, the Bureau of Public Enterprises, the agency in charge of the 
privatisation. of public enterprises including public banks, is an arm of the Presidency'012 
and requires Presidential approval for all its core privatisation. or commercialisation 
activities'013. Section 3(5) of Bureau of Public Enterprises Decree'014 states that "The 
Bureau shall repor-t to the Federal Government through The Presidency", and under 
section 4(2) of the same Decree the President "may, at any time, remove a member of the 
Board from office ........... 
Additionally, the created Failed Bank Tribunal and its appellate body, both charged 
with the judicial functions of adjudicating civil and criminal matters concerning failed 
banks, are also under the office of the Presidency'015. Section I(I) of Failed Banks 
(Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Decree'016 provides that "The 
Head of State ........... shall constitute 
for the purposes of this Decree such number of 
Tribunals as he may deem necessary to be known as the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) 
and Financial Malpractices in Banks Tribunals 
The NDIC 
, the 
bank insurance agency with some supervisory duties, is subject to 
ministerial approval in respect of its functions and equally under the supervisory hegemony 
of the Finance Minister'011. In this respect, section 7 of the NDIC Decree'018 provides 
1012. See S. 1 (3) of Bureau Of Public Enterprises Decree No. 78 of 1993. 
101-1. See Ibid., S. 3.3(2). 3(4). 3 (5), 17 (3). & 24 . 
1014. Decree No. 78 of 1993. 
10 15. The Tribunal is directly under the office of the Presidency. This fact is however not stated in its 
constitutive la%% save that the Tribunal is constituted by the Head of State. see S. I (I) of Failed Banks 
(Recovery Of Debts) And Financial Malpractices In Banks Decree No. 18 of 1994 as amended. 
1016. See Decree No. 18 of 1994 as amended by Decree No. 18 of 1995. 
1017ý See SS 4& 24 of NDIC Decree No. 22 of 1988 as amended. 
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that "The Minister may give to the Board directives of a general or special nature with 
regard to the functions of the Corporation and it shall be the duty of the Chairman, the 
Board and the Managing Director to comply with the directives". The NDIC is also 
require by section 23C (2)(a) of NDIC Decree'019 to "apply to the Head of State ..... 
fo r 
consent for the liquidation of the insured institution;.,, " 
These facts underscore the reality that the President is the political and regulatory 
bulwark of financial deregulation or reforms in Nigeria. The second most influential 
regulatory and supervisory authority over banking deregulation is the Finance Minister, 
who reports directly to the President. These enormous powers over monetary and banking 
matters are accorded the President in personarn, and the Finance Minister. Additionally, 
the Nigerian military President or Head of State represents no person and is accountable 
to no one. Hence, the monetary, banking and financial misadventures by this political 
Leviathan are beyond reproach and above scrutiny . 
It seems the concentration of financial regulatory powers by the military President 
or Head of State in himself as the lawmaker is motivated by pure political and personal 
interests. These powers establish the President as the chief distributor of political largesse 
and patronage and enables him to dispense benefits and punishment at will to political foes 
and stooges alike. The President is able to keep himself in power through the exercise of 
the financial regulatory powers. The direct control and oversight of the regulatory 
agencies ensure that their regulations and regulatory activities serve the interest of the 
reigning political rentier class on diverse issues as bank ownership and share holding, 
appropriate interest and exchange rates, lending opportunities, safety nets for politically 
favoured borrowers, and general protection of the financial interest of the political class. 
1018. See Decree No. 22 of 1988. 
1019. See DecrecNo. 22 of 1988 as amended by Decree No. 5 of 1997. 
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The dominant position of the President, and to a lesser extent the Finance Minister, 
in financial deregulation, in contrast to the impotence of the technical experts at regulatory 
agencies, lends credence to the assertion that dictatorial, personalistic and patrimonial 
objectives underline banking regulation and deregulation in Nigeria. This assertion is 
further buttressed by the 1997 amendments1020 to the Nigerian banking laws. The sole 
beneficiary of the regulatory changes is the Finance Minister whose political and legal 
powers are enhanced at the expense of the technical experts at the regulatory agencies. 
A closer examination of the Nigerian society since financial deregulation reveals 
that the military President's almighty financial regulatory powers have benefited the 
military ruling class, the most. A Nigerian Magazine, Tempol. 021' in an edition captioned 
'The Billionaire Soldiers - How The Military Hijacked Nigeria, chronicles the phenomenal 
financial successes that had been experienced by serving and retired military officers since 
financial deregulation. 
According to Lewis and SteinIO22,, the financial services in Nigena attracted the 
military elites with the conspicuous " presence of retired officers on managing boards, and 
the more covert interests of government leaders and other active-duty officers in the new 
institutions, constituted the strongest business concentration among high nuilitary 
echelons" 1023 .A 
list detailing the pattern of military control of the Nigerian financial 
system by indicating the ownership and controlling interest of multitude of high ranking 
military personnel is contained in Appendix XI. The list underscores the capture of the 
Nigerian banking and financial industry by the n-fflitary class as the "golden industry". 
1020 
. 
Sce Dccrcc Nos. 3.4. &5 of 1997. 
14 November 1996. Vol. 7, No. 18. 
'('22. See Peter Lmis and Ho%vard Stein, op. cit., p. 7. 
1023 
. 
Loc. cit. 
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In this connection, Nigerian financial deregulation actually emphasises the notion 
that political power is all about gaining access to rents'024. The government changed the 
mechanisms for rent seeking during deregulation by legalising the process of rent 
allocation through the allocation of foreign exchange and banking appointments, thus 
preserving the patronage system "in a more legal and therefore more lucrative form" 1025 
The financial deregulation era produced its own illegitimate sources of wealth1026with the 
auctioning of banking charters to the military and civilian members of the ruling class. The 
possession of a banking licence affords legal route to subsidised foreign exchange which 
can be recycled with enormous arbitrage gains for personal enrichment and political 
funding. Indeed, Nigerian financial liberalisation " was quickly captured by a clientelist 
state as a means of reallocating rents to strategic constituents 111027 
Perhaps the most damning political problem affecting deregulation is the 
continuation of military rule which is regarded by most Nigerians as serious 
misfortuneIO28. The lack of credibility and reckless mismanagement and corruption of the 
military rulers greatly undern-ýned the financial deregulation programme. Both General 
Babaginda and his successor, General Abacha, retained dual exchange rates of Naira to 
favour political friends1029, and further committed other acts of fiscal and financial 
impropriety with impun, ty1030. It may be mentioned that whilst past civilian political 
1024. See Bevan et al, op. cit., p. 65. 
1025 
. 
Ibid.. p. 68. 
1026 -II . 
See Okigbo, Essa., s in the Public Philosophý of Development. Vol. 3. op. cit.. p. 250. 
1027 
- 
See Peter LeNvis and Hovvard Stein, op. cit.. p. 5. 
1028 
- See Micheal Holman, Financial Times. 16 March 1992. p. 
1. 
102'. See Ncwmýatch. Nigerian News Magazine. 23 January 1995. p. 6. 
1030 
- General Babaginda established the 
infamous' Dedicated Accounts' through which oil revenues were 
diverted to dubious extra budgetai), programmes and prqjects. The present military ruler, General Abacha 
pronused fiscal prudence, but simultaneously created " two ministries to make his wife happy ". see 
Akinrinade. S., Nc%Nswatch, 23 January 1995. p. 6. On the mismanagement of oil revenue %NIndfall in 
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leaders had been summoned before judicial inquiries'011 for alleged banking 
mismanagement and abuses, no military leader in the country has been investigated despite 
their alleged abusive acts in some banks. 
The greatest malady of military govemance is its inherent political instability which 
orchestrates policy and regulatory instabilities damaging to the Nigerian financial market. 
The existence of a stable and viable political environment has been prescribed as crucial to 
econon-uc management and stability'032. Thus, politics cannot be divorced from 
economics'033. The Director of CBN Research submits correctly that the "design of 
economic policy must take into account appropriate socio-political dimensions for its 
effectiveness" 1034 
The features of the military regimes marked by intermittent and sudden change of 
government as well as rapid shuffling of government structures and functionaries are 
antithetical to regulatory predictability, policy credibility and stability of financial 
deregulation. It has been observed that changes in government with new officials have 
frequently precipitated the review of economic policies and abandonment of erstwhile 
rational policy and regulatory stance1035. The leading authonty on Nigenan Constitutional 
law, Professor Nwabueze, affirms that it is "true that the penod of military rule has 
witnessed even worse instability" 1036 
Nigeria, see Financial Times. 16 March 1992. see also " Pandora Box ". in Newsvvatch. Nigerian News 
Magazine, 16 Janu,, m, 1995. 
103 1. See the Foster-Sutton Tribunal Report (London, Hmso. Cmnd. 51,1957). see also Coker 
Corrunission of Inquiry Report (Lagos, Federal Ministry of infonuation, 1962). 
1032. See Ojo, M. O., (Director of CBN Research) " The Challenges For Economic Management In Nigeria 
it, (1995) CBN Economic & Financial Review. Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 104. 
1033. Loc. cit. 
1,0C. cit. 
1035. Ibid.. pp. 104 - 105. 
1036. See Nivabueze. B. 0.. Military Rule And Constitutionalism in Nigeria, Spectrum Law Publishing. 
lbackin. (1992), p. 288. 
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Several other nugatory vices and features of the miEtary government in Nigeria 
include the centralisation of economic and financial decision making powers, abridgement 
of regulatory agencies' powers and authorities, personalisation of regulatory 
mechanisms1037, restriction of most economic and political rights, hegemony of financial 
regulatory mediocrity, restriction or absence of judicial review, and complete absence of 
checks and balances against abusive political powers. These characteristics of the Nigerian 
military governance appears to indicate that the country's political structure conspires 
against the viability of a deregulated financial SySteMI038. 
In fact, the Director of CBN Research, Dr Ojo concludes rightly in our view that 
in "final analysis, the point to emphasise is that the political foundation for sound 
economic management in Nigeria is yet to be laid 111039. He recommends the restoration of 
democratic government and viable political structure for the success of Nigeria's 
economic and financial reforms'040. An Oxford professor of economics, Paul Collier, lend 
credence to the political undercurrents of Nigerian economic reforms, and observes that 
economic 11progress in Nigeria ...... 
have to await political revolution" 1041 
This call for democratic system of government has been echoed1042 throughout the 
country as a crucial underpinning to a credible and viable financial and economic reforms. 
The demand has come to the fore with the recent neutralisation of the promised political 
1037. Ibid.. pp. 7-10. 
1038. See Diaz-Alqjandro, C.. " Good-bye Financial Repression. Hello Financial Crash ", in Andres 
Velasco (ed. ), op. cit., p. 379. 
1039. See Ojo (1995) op. cit., P. 10-5. 
1040. Ibid., p. 107. 
1041 11 Institutions For Economic GroNN-th . See Paul Collier. 
" Living Down The Past : Redesigning Nigerian II 
(1996) Affican Affairs. Vol. 95. No. 380,325 at p. 327. 
1042. See Punch, Nigerian Newspaper. 16 May 1997. p. 11. See also Newswatch. Nigenan News 
Magazine, 23) January 1995, p. 30. 
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reforms by the military'043, precipitating serious civil and political anarchy which cause 
"the greatest damage to the economic reform process especially the elements of 
deregulation" 1044. Candidly, the Nigerian experience has eloquently demonstrated the 
dangers of financial dere lation in a politically charged and institutionally unstable 911 
1045 setting 
10.3 Regulatory Agencies' Powerlessness: The Legal and Political Subversion of the 
CBN and NDIC 
The apt inquiry to make in assessing financial deregulation in Nigenia as in much of 
Africa has been rightly formulated by Annibale'046 as the verification of whether the 
regulatory institutions involved in such deregulatory venture are effectively empowered, 
competent and independent, and are supported by a dynamic legal and regulatory 
framework which can provide the degree of supervision and intervention necessary to 
facilitate and sustain the development of a resilient and open market economy. The 
evidence in respect of Nigeria presents an irrebutable negative conclusion to the issues 
raised in the formulation. 
With respect to monetary and banking policy, after a period of five years of 
regulatory ambivalence over financial deregulation, the government enacted the CBN 
Decree of 1991 under which the Governor of CBN is required to keep the President 
informed of the Bank's monetary and banking polICyIO47 subject to the qualification that 
1043. General Babaginda annulled the result of the Nigerian Presidential elections of 12 June 1993. In 
No%'ember 1993, General Abacha took over power and dismantled all the civilian political structures that 
had been erected at the State and local Government levels. 
1044 
. 
See Ojo ( 1994), op. cit., p. 30. 
1045 
. See Peter Lew-is and Howard Stein. op. cit., p. 17. 
1046. Sce Annibalc, Robert. A.. " The need for a regulatory framework in the development and 
liberalization of financial markets in Africa " in Faundcz. J. (ed. ), Good Government and Law- Legal and 
Institutional Reform in Developing Countries. Basi ngstoke. Macn-fi Ilan (1996). 
1047 
- See Section 8 (1) of the CBN Decree 1991 
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the President "after due consideration may, in writing, direct the bank as to the monetary 
and banking policy pursued or intended to be pursued" 1048 . The Presidential directive is 
binding and must be implemented forthwith1049. This provision was applauded as an 
improvement'050 on the pre-1991 law under which the CBN monetary and banking policy 
proposals were passed to the Federal Executive Council through the Federal Nfinistry of 
Finance for integration into the Federal Government Budget1051 . 
Notwithstanding the 1991 regulatory change, the final authority concerning the 
Nigerian monetary and banking policy is the President or Head of State and not the CBN. 
This regulatory structure is inherently flawed because it perrnýitted the untoward situation 
in which the President or Minister of Finance "often imposed their own policies. The CBN 
Governor hears the changes over the news on radio" 1052. A high ranking CBN official 
condemns the vesting of final authority on monetary and banking policy in the President or 
Head of State asserting "it would have been okay if the President is well educated, but 
here the President is a dummy. I do not feel comfortable with the arrangement" 1053. This 
unsatisfactory regulatory structure that however allowed direct access of the CBN 
Governor to the President has most recently been reversed to the pre-1991 regulatory 
structure. 
1048 
. 
See Section 8 (2) of the CBN Decree 199 1. 
1049 
. 
Loc. cit. 
1050. See Kembi. 'Kayode., Review Of Developments In The Legislation. Regulation And Supervision 
Of Banks In Nigeria (unpublished paper of the office of the Board Secretary and Legal Adviser, Nigeria 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Lagos, 1991) p. 18. see also Osunbor, 0.. " Legislative And Institutional 
DeN-clopments In The Banking Industry " in A Decade of lnnovatiý-e Bankers Training (Financial 
Institution Training Centre. Lagos. Nigeria, 1992) p. 80. 
1051. See Odozi (1995). op. cit., p. 3. 
1052. Private intemew N%ith Chief Z. CBN official, in Lagos on 22/5/97. 
1051. Loc. cit. 
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The 1997 Central Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Decree'054 now requires the 
Head of State to be kept informed of CBN monetary and banking policy through the 
Minister of Finance'055. Section 8(l) of CBN Decree as amended1056 provides that "The 
Governor shall keep the Head of State informed, through the Minister, of policy pursued 
or intended to be pursued by the Bank". The essence of this 1997 Decree is the 
subordination of the CBN to the Ministry of Finance, and deprivation of the Bank of any 
semblance of freedom that the 1991 CBN Decree had accorded it. The President of the 
Chartered Institute of Nigerian Bankers, Dr Adewunmi aptly captures the impotence of 
the CBN thus - 
CBN is not independent anymore. Not that it has great latitude before. 
But it is worst now than it had ever been because there is absolutely 
nothing it can do without reference to the Minister of Finance, if things 
get as bad to such an extent that the Finance Minister can suspend the 
Deputy-Governor of CBN without reference to CBN Governor. Hence, 
CBN is a department of Finance Ministry. It is a big pitV1057. 
A deleterious effect of the untoward legal and regulatory framework in Nigeria is 
that most monetary and banking policies do not emanate from the CBN. In fact, an officer 
of the CBN asserts that "(W)e do not agree with these mandated requirements and 
policies. These are due to politicisation of everything in Nigeria"1058. This assertion is 
corroborated by the President of the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria : 
My view is that the CBN is not responsible for anything and 
consequently is not accountable for anything . You cannot ask 
the CBN why general level of interest rate is high9, why inflation 
is high9, why money supply is out of control", or why there is 
1054. Dccree No. 3 of 1997. 
1055. See Section 8 of the CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as amended bN, CBN (Amendment) Decree No. 3 of 
1997. 
1056. See Decree No. 24 of 1991 as amended by Decree No. ', of 1997. 
1057. Private inteniew in Lagos oil 17/6/97. 
1058. Private inteniew N%ith Chief Z. CBN official. in Utgos on 22/5/97. 
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little or no growth in the economy. The CBN cannot take any 
monetary decision and has been extended to administrative 
control and control of the personnel. It is a unique situation and 
thoroughly bad'059. 
The limitations on CBN administrative and personnel control are illustrated by the 
fact that the Governor and Deputy Governors of CBN are all political appointees of the 
President solely'060 with the terms and conditions of their appointment stated in their 
respective letters of appointment1061 and not in legislation. Section 9(l) of CBN 
Decree'062 provides that the Governor and Deputy Governors of CBN ....... shall be 
appointed by the Head of State by instrument under the public seal and on such terms and 
conditions as may be set out in their respective letters of appointment". 
These key CBN officers therefore remain in their respective offices only at the 
pleasure of the President or Head of State since there is nothino that prevents the --5 
President from removing them at will. There is no secufity of tenure or any safeguard 
against political and abusive actions of the President or Head of State. This centralisati 111) 11 ion 
of powers of appointment and removal put the highest CBN officers directly under the 
political control and pressure of the Presidency. 
Indeed, the readiness of the military government to discipline any critical banker 
had been demonstrated much earlier by the sacking of Chief Olashore'063, managing 
director of the First Bank of Nigeria Plc, and Dr Ayagi , managing 
director of the 
1059. Private inteMew with Dr Adewunmi in Lagos on 17/6/97. 
1060 
- 
See Section 9 (1) of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as amended bv CBN (Amendment) Decree No. 3 of 
1997. 
1061. Loc. cit. 
1062. See Decree No. 24 of 1991 as amended by Decree no. 3 of 1997. 
1063 
- Dr Okigbo, describes the sacking of this eminent 
banker as " most undeserved " and "a dissen, ice to 
die community to try to silence him or to reduce him to the status of Nour humble and obedient servant 
see Okigbo, Essays in Public Philosophy of Dc%, clopmcnt. Vol. 3. op. cit. 
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Continental Merchant Bank, both for making comments on the policies of financial 
deregulation which the goverment regarded as offensive. 
The appointing and disciplinary powers over the CBN officers could have been 
more cosmetic by vesting such powers over CBN officers in the military government's 
legislative or executive body'064. It seems however that in arrogant display of naked 
dictatorial power, the Nigerian military President or Head of State made himself the 
custodian of enormous powers over the CBN officers. 
The negative impact of this political centralisation of powers over CBN officers is 
best exemplified by the most recent political reprisals suffered by the CBN Governor and 
his deputies because of discrepancies between the Budget statistics published by the CBN 
and those of the Ministry of Finance1065- The Head of State regarded the actions as 
uncooperative and antagonistic, hence statutorily relegated the CBN officers by enacting 
the 1997 Central Bank of Nigeria (Amendment) Decree1066 and 1997 Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions (Amendment) Decree1067 
Pursuant to some critical provisions of these Decrees enacted in 1997, the 
Governor of CBN has been divested of his power as the main formulator and executor of 
Nigerian monetary and banking policles1068, and became deprived of his ex-officio position 
1064. In the case of Nigeria , the 
highest decision making body is called Provisional Ruling Council. and 
the executive body is known as the Federal Executive Council. Indeed. the Provisional Ruling Council is 
the approving aut hority for the exchange rate of Naira. See Section 16 of CBN Decree 24 of 1991 as 
amended by CBN ( Amendment ) Decree No. 3 of 1997. 
1065 
. It seems the discrepancies 
between the Budget statistics of the CBN and the Ministry of Finance. 
were regarded as antagonistic of the ruling government by the CBN officers. see The Punch, Nigerian 
Ne%%spaper, 16 May 1997, p. 11. 
1066. Sec Dccrce No. 3 of 1997. 
1067. See Dccrec No. 4 of 1997. 
c cc No. 3 See Section 6 (4) of CBN Decrec No. 24 of 1991 as substitut d b,, CBN (Aniendment) Decr 
of 1997. This new provision indirectly repealed paragraph 7 (a) of the Schedule to the CBN Decree No. 24 
of 199 1. 
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of the chairmanship of both the CBN1069 and NDIC1070 Boards. The Governor and the 
CBN became subordinated to the Nfinister of Finance whose supervisory and hegemonic 
powers over CBN received legal sanction' 071 . The powerful presence of CBN officers 
in 
the CBN Board was downsized and two Deputy Governors of CBN lost their membership 
of the CBN Board1071 and powers over policy formulation. The CBN also significantly lost 
073 its power as the sole authority for the determination of the exchange rate of the Nairal 
The much more vexed issues concern the alarming regulatory impotence of the 
CBN regarding its core banking regulation and supervisory duties. The CBN either lacks 
necessary powers or such available powers are grossly inadequate and politicised. Indeed, 
it is remarkable that under the 1997 regulatory dispensation, the CBN can neither grant 
banking licences nor vary or revoke any conditions attached to licences except with the 
approvalI074 of the Finance Minister who is the overall supervisor'075 of the CBN in 
respect of banking regulation and supervision. 
Concerning the grant of banking licences, section 3(5) of BOFID1076provides that 
"An application for a licence shall be forwarded to the Governor and all licenses to be 
issued shall be with the prior approval of the Nfinister". Section 5(1) of the same law 
1069 
. 
Sec Section 6 (3) of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as substituted by CBN (Amendment) Decree No. 3 
of 1997. 
1070. See Section 2 (3) of NDIC Decree No. 22 of 1988 as inserted by NDIC (Amendment) Decree No. 5 
of 1997. 
107 1. See Section I( 1) of BOFID No. 25 of 199 1 as substituted by BORD (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 
1997. 
1072. See Section 6 of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as substituted by CBN (Amendment) Decree No. 3 of 
1997. 
1073. See Section 16 of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as substituted by CBN (Amendment) 
Decree No. 3 of 
1997. 
1074. See S. 5 or BOFID No. 25 of 1991 as substituted by BOFID (Amendment) Decree 
No. 4 of 1997. 
1075. See S. 1 (1) of BOFID No. 25 of 1991 as substituted by BOFID (Amendment) Decree 
No. 4 of 1997. 
1076. Decree No. 25 of 1991 as amended by Decree No. 4 of 1997. 
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further provides that " ....... the Governor may, With the approval of the Minister, vary or 
revoke any condition subject to which a licence was granted or may impose fresh or 
additional conditions to the grant of a licence". 
Supplementary to the above, the CBN's other regulatory powers have been W 
virtually eclipsed by Presidential or ministerial approvals that are pre-conditions to the 
exercise of such powers by the CBN. Thus, the CBN cannot exercise any disciplinary 
measures over a bank without presidential approval. Indeed, the president must approve 
the revocation of a banking licence'077, the assumption of control or sale of a bank1078, and 
the removal of managers and officers of failing banks'079 . The President exercises 
appellate authority'080 over some disciplinary measures of the CBN and possesses the 
extensive power to overrule'081 CBN disciplinary orders. Of course, the PresidentIO82, not 
the CBN, determines the minimum paid up capital of banking institutions. Section 9 (1) of 
BOFID states that " The President on the recommendation of the Bank shall, from time to 
time, determine, as he may deem appropriate, the minimum paid-up share capital of each 
category of banks". 
Presidential powers over banking regulation and supervision are so encompassing 
that it is apt to describe the Nigerian President or Head of State as the sole authority in 
financial regulation of the banking industry. The NDIC , the banking 
deposit insurance 
agency, is even in a worse predicament since its powers of take-over, assumption, control, 
1077. See S. 12 of BOFID 1991 as amended. 
1079 
. 
See S. 34 (1) of BOFID 1991 as amended. 
IU79, See S. 33 (2) (c) of BOFID 1991 as amended. 
1080. See S. 14 & S. 37 (3) of BOFID 1991 as amended. 
- 
See S. 37 (3) of BOFID 1991 as amended. 
1082. See S. 9 of BORD 1991 as amended. 
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examination, special examination, and closure of an insured bank are subject to the 
approval of the Mirýster for FinanceIO83 
The overt politicisation of the banking regulatory powers effectively emasculated 
the CBN and NDIC. An official of the CBN has asserted that the TBN is a toothless 
bulldog. The Bank of England closed the offices of BCCI and Banco Ambrosiano. The 
CBN lacks such powers. The CBN should have power of closure" 1084. It is equally 
significant that the presidential intervention in banking regulation compron"Used the 
regulatory agencies since "neither the Central bank nor the NDIC were able to perform 
effective supervision and enforcement" 1085. Additionally, the high incidence of regulatory 
inaction due to the need to obtain prior Presidential approval precipitated an increase in 
the number of distressed banks, while the eventual closure of two or three distressed 
banks out of about 29 such banks exposes the CBN to accusation of political favours and 
selective treatments of privileged banks'086 
Succinctly, the requirement of presidential approval for the disciplinary and 
terminal actions against distressed banks has been attackedIO87 as the cause of both the 
phenomena] rise in number of ailing banks and the intransigence of the bank failure 
problem in Nigeria'088. 
In fact, the ability of the CBN to impose sanctions on ailing state-owned banks or 
those floated by high-ranking retired military officers has been serious doubted'089. Dr 
1()8-1. See SS. 4& 24 of NDIC Decree No. 22 of 1988 as amended. 
1084. Private intmicAN, NNith Chief Z in Lagos on 22/5/97. 
1085. See Peter Lmis and Howard Stein. op. cit.. p. II- 
1096. See Ekpenyong. David. B.. " Financial Distress In Banks - Nature And Implications ". The Nigerian 
Banker, Journal of the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria, April - June, 1994, p. 21. 
1087 
. 
See Pascal Dozie. President of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Nemwatch- Nigerian Magazine. 29 
Nlav 199i, P. 34. 
1088. See Bankole Falade. Deputy News Editor. Punch. Nigerian Newspaper. 16 May 1997, p. II 
1089. See Upenvong (1994). op, cit.. p. 21. 
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Adewunmi characteristically underscores the issue that "the fact is also undeniable that 
there is quite a good number of influential people with equity in banks and can influence 
political decision. If a general has an interest in a bank, it would be difficult to shut it down 
by another general" 1090 
Indeed, some of the failing banks are owned by top retired generals, other ranks, 
and influential persons. In truth, the decisions concerning banks in Nigeria are more 
political than economic accounting for the non-resolution of the failed banks problem 
since many of the ailing banks would have been shut down by a freer regulator acting on 
economic rationale'091. The President of Chartered Institute of Nigerian Bankers laments 
the politicisation of failed banks' problem, and contends that " the involvement of 
government at that level is undesirable when it comes to dealing with erring and unhealthy 
banks" 1092 
It is in the light of above political and legal factors complicating the regulatory and 
supervisory duties of CBN and to some extent the NDIC, that demands for an 
autonomous and independent CBN have attained a higher crescendo with specific calls for 
de linking the CBN from all non- parliamentary forms of political controls'093 and the 
institution of parliamentary control over the appointment and removal of key CBN officers 
upon the inception of a democratic govemance1094. The Governor of CBNI095 also 
advocates empowerment of the CBN with necessary powers to deal with recalcitrant 
10')0. Private intervicxý in Lagos on 17/6/97. 
1091. Loc. cit. 
1092 
. 
Loc. cit. 
1093. See Bankole Falade. op. cit., p. 11. See also Odozi (1995). op. cit p. 11. Osa-Afiana. op. cit.. p. 39. 
1094. See Osunbor, 0.. " Legislative And Institutional Developments In The Banking Industry ". in FITC. 
A Decade of Innovative Bankers Training. (Financial Institutions Training Centre, Lagos. Nigeria. 1992) 
P. 80. 
1095. See Ogvvmna (19931). op. cit., pp. 156 - 157. 
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banks, and its endowment with full independence, underscoring that "no legislative 
initiative has been taken in that direction" 1096 
The lack of efficacy of CBN's regulatory and supervisory powers is further 
demonstrated by the fact that the apex bank only regulate a fraction of the banking system. 
The primary mortgage institutions are regulated and supervised by the Federal Mortgiage 
Bank, a parastatal of the Federal Nfinistry of Works and Housing1097, while another 
category of banks, the community banks, are regulated and supervised by the National 
Board for Community Banks'098. Suffice it to assert that the CBN is much of a passive 
observer of the activities of these banks and financial institutions, since the law exempt 
their activities from the general regulatory powers of the CBN under the BOFID1099. This 
fact explains the inability of the CBN to account in any major degree for the turmoil in the 
Nigerian financial system. 
The revelation of the complete impotence of the Nigerian financial regulators and 
its effects on the banking crises that engulfed the nation confirms the thesis that 
widespread failure of development programmes due to programme functionaries simply 
not performing their roles and the success of vested interests in fostering corruption and 
cornering benefits has made these two issues "the core concern of development programs 
worldwide"' 100. It has been rightly argued that "no set of program policies, alone could 
underwrite any program's success, unless supported by responsive performance of 1) 
1096. Ibid., p. 157. 
1097. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. 1995, p. 52. 
10". See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. 1995. p. 19. 
1099. See SS. 51 (1) (c). & 52 of BOFID No. 25 of 1991 as amended. 
1100. See Jain. Pankaj. S.. " Managing Credit for the Rural Poor: Lessons from the Grameen Bank 
(1996) World Development. Vol. 24. No. I, p. 80. 
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functionaries"' 101 with appropriate policy mix that ensures and assures the development 
and empowerment of the functionaries. 
The absence of these concerns and suitable policy measures in the financial 
deregulation programme of the Nigefian banking system allowed powerful and corrupt 
political functionaries, their political allies and coerced regulators to undermine the 
programme. Indeed, the malignant disease of banking deregulation in Nigeria has been 
correctly diagnosed by Lewis and Stein' 102 in locating "the main failure of Nigeria's 
financial deregulation in the political and institutional setting of reform" 1103 and 
emphasising that the "institutional mechanisms needed to supervise and regulate banking 
under the new system was absent"' 104. The absence of the regulatory institutional 
mechanisms and the presence of political interventionism precipitated the wide ranging 
banking and financial crises witnessed in the country in the aftennath of financial 
deregulation. 
10.4 Regulatory distortions and Policy inconsistencies: Deregulation asunder 
The regulatory and policy confusion that accomparfied financial deregulation of the 
Nigerian banking system has led to a rational conclusion that the policies and rules were 
not products of informed research' 105. Neither the tenets of the Mckinnon-Shaw financial 
deregulation theory nor expefience of other countfies was reflected in the financial policies 
and their sequences. A quick reflection on some of the most controversial regulatory and 
1101. Ibid.. p. 87. 
1102. Peter Lewis and Howard Stein, op. cit . 
1103 
. 
Ibid., p. -5. 
1104 
. 
Loc. cit. 
1105. See Kusaniotu, A. S. ( Mrs Questions And Comments " in The Nigerian Banking And Finance 
Indtistry In Transition : Shaping The Future. 1992 Bank Directors Seminar Papers And Proceedings, 
(Financial Institutions Training Centre, Lagos , 
Nigeria, 1992 ) p. 57. 
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policy directives and their effects will put the magnitude of the issue into a better 
perspective. 
Although, the Mckinnon-Shaw theory of financial liberalisation, as well as the 
experiences of countries like Chile' 106, Argentina' 107, and U. S. Al 108, ) cautioned against 
complete deregulation of interest rates in a country with macroecononuic instability, and 
underscored the importance of having in place adequate regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks before deregulation, Nigerian policy makers were unpersuaded. Interest rates 
were prematurely and completely deregulated in August, 1987 despite the earlier warning 
in January of the same year by the CBN1109 against such liberallsation in the country's 
peculiar circumstances. The interest rates were not only deregulated, but the Minimum 
Rediscount Rate (NIRR. ) was set very high indicating to the market the high rates to be 
charged" 10. It was not surpfising that the market responded positively and interest rates 
skyrocketed. 
Furthermore, no legal or regulatory framework was provided for financial 
deregulation at all" I I. Although financial deregulation commenced in 1987, new banking 
1106. The countn' began financial reform in 1973, but in 1981 -was engulfed bNF Nvide spread financial crisis 
with failure of banks and financieras. see for indepth discussion Andres Velasco. " Liberalization, Cnsis, 
Inten, ention : The Chilean Financial SN, stem, 1975 - 85 ". in V. Sundararajan and Tomas J. T. Balino 
(eds. ), Banking Crises : Cases and Issues, International Monetarv Fund. WashingtonJ 199 1), p. 113. 
1107. Financial reform in the counay commenced in 1977, and resulted in endemic banking crisis in 
March 1980 N%liicli later pervaded the financial system. see for greater details Tomas IT. Balino, " The 
Argentine Banking Crisis of 1980 ", in V. Sundararqjan and Tomas J. T. Balino (eds. ), Ibid. p. 58. 
1108. The financial deregulation in U. S. A was undertaken in stages and a time table was set for the 
libcralisation of the depository interest rates between 1982 and 1986. yet bouts of financial cnsis captured 
the country with a reported failure of 184 U. S. banks in 1987. and another set of 362 U. S. banks failed in 
1989 and 1990. see for fuller analysis generally. Canova, op. cit.. see also Benston, op. cit. 
1109. See CBN, Credit Policy Guidelines For 1987 Fiscal Year. Monetarý- Policy Circular No. 2 1, p. 9. 
110. See Olashorc. 0.. Perspectives on Finance. Banking and Economic Policy in Nigeria. op. cit.. p. 7 1. 
see Ekpen%, ong. David. B.. " The I nipact Of Regulation And Deregulation On The Banking Sector: 
Role of Regulators And Operators ", The Nigenan Banker, Journal of the Chartered Institute of Nigeria. 
Januar) -June 1995, p. 11. See further Umunnaehila. AIINN-ell.. Bank Failure in Nigeria - History, Causes 
and Remedies, op. cit., p. 6 1. 
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and financial services law was enacted only about four years later in 1991. Additionally, 
the regulatory agency, CBN was not equipped with necessary regulatory and supervisory 
powers, conditionally as they are until 1991. The finance companies benefited mostly from 
this regulatory ambivalence since they operated virtually without any form of regulation 
until 1991, subjecting the banks which were still encumbered by the old repressive banking 
laws to destructive competitive disadvantages. 
Curiously, the CBN engaged in administrative subversion of the CBN and BOHD 
Decrees of 1991 when it imposed interest rate control on the banks in 1991 and 1994. It 
also continued to prescribe sectoral and directed allocation of credit by the banks to 
preferred sectors and persons, contrary to these Decrees that had divested' 112 it of both 
the powers of interest rate regulation and mandatory directed credit. 
Similarly, Prudential Guidelines for banks, a Capital Adequacy Standard, and a 
General Statement of Accounting Standard were introduced only in 1990 after the first 
bouts of banking failure had become noticeable. In fact, neither regulatory framework nor 
prudential guidelines were in existence until banks started collapsing. 
Yet most bank failures in Nigeria were caused by direct policy and regulatory 
stipulations. It is on record that the Federal Ministry of Finance Circular' 113of 1989 which 
directed the transfer of accounts of Federal and State Governments, and parastatals from 
the commercial and merchant banks to the CBN precipitated liquidity crises' 114 among 
banks from which many did not recover. The circular caused a massive run on the banks 
by their largest depositors, and simultaneously denied banks the pfivilege of set-off against 
1112. The 1991 CBN and BOFID Decrees did not grant the CBN powers of interest rate regulation and 
directed credit. 
1113. See Circular Letter Ref. Noc/ 27(X)/%, /226 of 26 May 1989. 
1114. See Qjo ( 1994 ). op. cit p. 16. see also Yahaya. M. L" The Changing Roles And Functions Of The 
Banking Industn, In A Developing Economy ". in The Nigerian Banking And Finance Industry In 
Transition - Sliaping The Future. ( 1992 ) op. cit., p. 89. The private intemcw with Dr Adc%Nunmi. the 
President of the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria on 17/6/97, further confimied this assertion. 
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some of the indebted parastatals. Both the CBN and NDIC had to undertake generous 
lifeboat operations to rescue many leading banks' 115. These liquidity crises were 
complicated by pre-emptory issuance of compulsory stabilisation securities to banks by the 
CBN as liquidity mopping operations' 116, although the major source of excess liquidity, 
the Federal Government, was unstoppable. Suffice it to say that by sterilising the banks' 
funds without any interest, the stabilisation. secufities accelerated the liquidity squeeze on 
many banks. 
Additionally, some other measures designed as prudential regulation or monetary 
policy measures backfired essentially because they were introduced almost simultaneously 
as the banks were experiencing liquidity crises. Thus, the hiking of minimum paid up 
capital by banks in 1990, the abolition of foreign guarantees of Naira denominated 
loan' 117, the requirement of Naira deposit for foreign exchange operations, and the 
merging of banks' forex account with current accounts at CBN as from June 19,1989, all 
combined to accelerate the financial collapse of many banking corporations. Professor 
Nwankwo concludes that the "Illiquidity, the tendency to disintermediation, increasing 
securitisation, high short-term interest rates, the reverse yield curve, and resort to the 
capital market, all stem from the withdrawal of public deposits and other public policy 
instruments mopping up excess liquidity in the market" 1118. 
Indeed, one of the greatest distortive policies of the Nigerian financial deregulation 
programme was the premature liberalisation of the capital account and foreign exchange 
1115. See NDIC Annual Report and Statement of Account. 1990. see also Adewunnii, Wole., " Discussant 
of in I imovations, Technology & the Nigerian Finance Sector. Papers and Proceedings of the Bank 
I)irectors Seminar. 1990, (Financial Institutions Training Centre, Lagos, Nigeria, 1990) p. 27. 
1116 
. 
See CBN, Monetan. Policy Circular No. 24 (Amendment No. 1) of August 2,1990 which re- 
introduced stabilisation securities for mopping excess liquidity in the banking sý-stem. see Qjo (1994), p. 
17. 
1117. See N%%-ank%N-o, G. O.. Money and Capital Markets in Nigeria Today, University of Lagos Press. 
I'agos, (199 1) P. 19. 
Ibid., pp. 31 - 32. 
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market at the onset of the liberalisation programme. This contradicted the prognoses of 
the Mckinnon-Shaw theory of financial liberalisation and other pundits who have argued 
that capital account should be deregulated only at the last stage of financial reform' 119 . 
It 
was not surprising that all the vices that may accompany premature liberalisation of the 
capital account like exchange rate fluctuations, appreciation of the exchange rate of 
domestic currency, foreign exchange speculations and illicit capital movements, occurred. 
It must be underscored that the banks were also under intense regulatory 
interventions and controls that had nothing to do with prudential purposes, but were 
purely redistributive. Whilst the Mckinnon-Shaw theory of financial deregulation preaches 
reduction of financial repression during liberalisation' 120. the Ni efian deregulation 9 
exercise appears to have increased financial repression. All the financial repressive 
measures such as directed credit, sectoral allocation of credit and credit ceilings were 
retained' 121 . In 
fact 
, new 
directed credit programmes were introduced as banks were 
directed to provide mandatory funding for the National Housing Fund programmel 122 as 
well as mandatory credit facilities for privatisation' 123 exercise of the government, even 
though most privatised ventures were economically unviable. 
Many more instances of regulatory and policy shortcomings undermining financial 
deregulation may be cited. The Mckinnon- Shax-v hypothesis recommends gradual opening 
of bank entry' 124 and recapitalisation of the undercapitalised government banks' 
125 before 
1119. See Sebastian. Edwards, op. cit. 
1120. See Mckinnon (1973). op. cit.. p. 8. 
1121. See Adewunnii. Wole., " Distress In The Financial System ". in The Nigerian Banking And Finance 
hidustry In Transition : Shaping The Future, (1992). op. cit., p. 102. 
1122. see National Housing Fund Decree No. 3 of 1992 which requires banks to pay 25% of their loan 
portfolios to the National Housing Fund. 
1123. See CBN, Motictan- Policy Circular No. 23 ( Amendment No. I of January 1989 
112-1. See Mckinnon (199 1). op. cit., pp. 7& 533. 
1125 
. 
Loc. cit. 
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instituting financial market competition. Nigerian financial policy makers however rejected 
this rational course. Mass entrance of ill-conceived banks was permitted, even though the 
upsurge in banking applications was motivated by the "need to secure adequate monetary 
reserves for political and personal purposes"' 126 from the lucrative foreign exchange 
subsidies afforded by bank charters. In fact, almost all leading politicians in Nigefia 
established their own banks and the two presidential candidates that contested the 1993 
Presidential elections in Nigeria, Chief M. KO. Abiola and Alhap Otman Bashir Tofa have 
substantial interests in two banks' 127 
In the circumstances, the political elite of the Nigerian society and their banking 
pundits invaded the banking industry often with their less than honourable financial 
pursuits. The non-recapitalisation of the old public banks while exposing them to frenetic 
financial competition led to the demise of old banks such as NBN, ACB, PAN AFRICAN 
BANK and others. In the same vein, the privatisation aspect of the deregulation 
programme was thrown into commotion by the presidential fiat' 128 of August 1992, which 
in a remarkable regulatory tumabout changed the existing law on pfivatisation by 
mandating the privatisation of public banks hitherto prohibited' 129. The sporadic and 
unplanned nature of the presidential privatisation order permitted acrimonious and 
fraudulent ownership of the privatised banks' shares' 130 
1126. See Adercnii, Adedamola. 0., " Legal Framework For Establishing A Bank In Nigeria :A Critical 
Appraisal " (1991) 14 The Gra%itas Revie-w of Business & Property Law. No. 15. p. 57. 
Chief Abiola is a director of Habib Bank Nigeria Lin-dted, and Alhaji TofaA, as the Chainnan of the 
Ccntm)- Merchant Bank until 1992. The Century Merchant Bank has now failed. 
1129. See Bernard B. A. Vcrr, " Post - Privatisation Appraisal Of Control And Management In Privatised 
Banks: The Need For A Golden Share " in Avua 1. A. and Owasanove B. (eds. ) Privatisation Of 
Government Owned Banks And The Issue Of 0\,, -nership And Control ( Legal And Economic 
Perspectives ). op. cit.. p. 66. 
1129. See Schedule I Part I of Privatisation And Coniniercialisation Decree No. 25 of 1988 now repealed 
by Decree No. 78 of 1993. 
1130 
. 
See Bolaji Owasanove and T. A. T. Yagba. " Legal Framework For Privatisation Of Banks In 
Nigeria"in Avua and Owasanove ( eds. ). op. cit.. P. I 
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Perhaps, the greatest travesty of the policy and regulatory inconsistencies and 
favouritism of the Nigerian financial deregulation is the financial crises and banking 
distress that had been allowed to enveloped the country's financial system by the political 
authority. Although failing banks had been identified in the system as back as 1989, the 
CBN was not granted the regulatory powers to deal with failing and failed bank until 
199 1. Eventually when the powers came they were Inadequate and ineffectual, and 
conditional upon the Presidential approval. Now, the Head of State has refused1131 to 
grant the approval for the liquidation of some distressed banks that both the CBN and 
NDIC felt are polluting the system. 
It may be asserted that the whole financial deregulation programme had been 
riddled with confusion and uncertainty by the government's policy intransigence, instability 
and inconsistency. The military government has persistently refused to abolish the dual 
rate exchange mechanism which allows foreign exchange subsidies to the political class, 
even though distortive of the foreign exchange market and destructive of the country's 
external equilibrium. The deregulatory policy measures had always been unstable with 
interest rate deregulation in 1987, reimposition of interest rate control in 1991, another 
liberalisation of interest rate in 1992, followed by reinstatement of interest rate control in 
1994, and finally, the liberalisation of interest rate in 1996. 
During the years, the policy stance of the govemment had varied intermittently. 
Between 1987 and 1993 there was deregulation, but in 1994 a control regime was adopted 
which later changed to guided-deregulation since 1995 till present time. Additionally, the 
regulatory stance that was aimed at gradual independence of financial regulator in 1987 - 
1993, has changed since 1994 to active curtailment of the financial regulator's 
independence and powers. The 1997 financial legislative measures' 132 formalised the 
1131. See Punch. Nigerian Newspaper, 16 May 1997. p. 11. 
I of 1997. BORD (Amendment) Decree No. 4 of 1997, and See CBN (Amendment) Decree No. 
NDIC (Aniendnient ) Decree No. 5 of 1997. 
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subjugation of the financial regulator, the CBN. It is therefore not surprising that a 
Deputy Governor of CBN asserts that "generally, there have been difficulties of 
implementation and serious policy misali. gnments which have undermined the objectives of 
the reforms and introduced uncertainty about the sustainability of the entire macro- 
economic policy framework"' 133 
10.5 Legal Recipe for Macroeconomic Instability: The Bane of Deregulation 
The most fundamental preconditions for a successful financial deregulation have 
been postulated by Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis as macroeconomic stability and fiscal 
balance of the reforming economy' 134. These preconditions are crucial underpinnings to a 
deregulatory programme and their absence portends doom for any financial reform 
involving deregulation. Yet the Nigerian economy on the eve of financial deregulation, 
and during the reforming programme was characterised. by considerable macroeconomic 
instability and acute fiscal irresponsibility' 135 
Perhaps the greatest disaster of was the corruptive' 136massive fiscal deficit 1137 
incurred by the Nigerian government through its perennial financing by volun-ýnous 
1133. See Odozi, V. A., "Kevnote Address ", (1993) CBN Economic and Financial RcNie"N'. Vol. 3 1. No. 4. 
Dec. p. 254. 
1134. See Shaw. op. cit. p. 168; Mckinnon (1991). op. cit.. pp. 4- 10. & 112. see further Fry (1991), op. 
cit., p. 42-5. 
Research Department. Central 1135. See Twenty Years Of Central Banking In Nigeria : 1959 - 1979. 
Bank of Nigeria. Lagos. 1979 ) pp. 125-127. see also CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 
1992, p. 15. 
1136. The earnings from crude oil sales were diverted to some fraudulent' dedicated accounts' and thus 
precluded from being paid into the Federal Accounts, thereby aggravating the financial woes of state and 
local governnicrits. see Okurounmu. T. O.. ( Deputy Director of CBN Research and Head of Fiscal 
Analysis Division ), " Fiscal Operations of the Federal Government since 1986 : Policies and Strategies 
( 1993 ) CBN Economic & Financial ReNiew. Vol. 3 1, No. 4, p. 269. See also NCNN swatch, 16 Januarý 
1995, P. 9. 
1137 ve white . 
The Nigerian government's readiness to devote substantial public resources to unproductiý 
elephant prqjects even during the era of deregulation has been assailed by the World Bank's public 
nianagenient report as irresponsible public investment. Indeed, the Nigerian goverriment between 1987 
and 199 1. masterminded a megalomaniac fiscal recklessness by which " (P)ublic capital expenditure. 
which had probably been the main vehicle for corruption because of the negotiation of large contracts 
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borrowings from the CBN and the banking system. Financial repression undertaken 
through government borrowing and the fiscal operations of the government have been 
underscored as the major destabilising factors' 138 in the Nigerian deregulation programme 
propelling high rate of inflation and persistent depreciation of the Naira exchange rate 
during deregulation pefiod' 139 
It may be underscored that the characteristic large fiscal deficit' 140 of the Nigerian 
government encumbered the financial deregulation programme with apparent 
inconsistency and obvious conflicts since restrictive monetary policies were catapulted by 
expansionary fiscal operations' 141. Indeed, the fiscal deficit of the Nigerian government 
had been persistently large and expansive since 1986, thus it has been rightly concluded 
that for "a great part of the deregulatory era, government had been running budget 
deficits" I 142. The Governor of the CBN put the issue succinctly thus - 
The greatest problem which has severely constrained the effectiveness 
of monetary and banking policies in Nigeria in the last few years has 
.......... 
increased by around 50 % ". see Rashid Faruqee, Nigeria: ownership abandoned, in Ishrat Husain 
and Rashid Faruqec (eds. Ad ' 
justment In Africa: Lessons from Countq Case Studies, ( The World Bank, 
Washington, D. C., 1994 pp. 250 - 25 1. 
1138. See Ojo, M. 0., ( Director of CBN Research ), The Economics Of Controls And Deregulation : The 
Nigerian Case Study, ( CBN, Research Department Occasional Paper No. 10, Lagos, October 31,1994 ) p. 
16. see also Oke, B. A., ( Chief Research Officer. CBN ). " An Oven, iew of the Shift from Direct to 
Indirect Approach to Monetary and Credit Control in Nigeria 19933 ) CBN Economic & Financial 
Revie%%, Vol. 3 1, No. 4, p. 317. 
11-19. See CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1992. pp. 13 - 14. 
1140 
* The overall fiscal deficit of the government rose to 8.5 % in 1988 and 
declined to 7.9 % in 1989. In 
1990. a fiscal deficit of 10.1 % was recorded which increased to 11.1 % in 199 1, before descending to 9.8 
% in 1992. These variations are against the norm of 3-4 per cent of the real GDP- The CBN financed an 
a%cragc of 77.0 % of the overall deficit between 1988 and 1991. and fully financed the fiscal deficit of 
1992 to the time of 110.0 %. The CBN financing also constituted 64.0 per cent of the credit extension to 
the goN-ernment in 1993. (sec Appendix IX ). 
1141 
. 
Sec " Suniniam. Executive Staff Seminar. CBN 1993 ) CBN Economic & Financial Review, Vol. 
1. No. 4, p. 258. 
1142 
. 
See NDIC Annual Report and Statement of Accounts. 1992. p. 65. 
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been the persistence of large government deficits and its mandatory 
financing by the CBN. The financing of government deficits by the CBN 
increases the monetary base and the level of excess liquidity of the 
banking SySteMI 143. 
The CBN is severely handicapped in controlling the financing of the massive fiscal 
deficit of the Nigerian government by legal and political hindrance. The legal dictates of 
mandatory financing of government deficit by the CBNI 144 and its mandatory role in 
underwriting of primary issues of government securities' 145 that constrained the Bank's 
ability to regulate reserves have been stigmatised as the major delimiting factors' 146of the 
CBN. The relevant provisions are contained in Sections 27(l)( f) and(g), 33 and 34 of 
the CBN Decree as amended' 147 
Section 27(l)(f)and (g) of CBN Decree empowers the CBN to purchase, sell, 
discount and rediscount specified treasury bills, treasury certificates, project-tied bonds, 
and securities of the government. Section 33(1)of CBN Decree authorises the CBN to 
finance the budget deficit of the Federal Government and provides that ...... the Bank may 
grant temporary advances to the Federal Goverriment in respect of temporary deficiency 
of current budget revenue.. ". A mandatory obligation on the CBN for underwriting 
publicly issued Federal Governement loans is imposed by section 34(l) of CBN Decree 
which provides that "The Banks shall be entrusted with the issue and management of 
Federal Government loans publicly issued in Nigefia, upon such terms and conditions as 
may be agreed between the Federal Government and the Bank" 
1143. See Ogwurna. P. A., ( Governor, CBN ), " The Role of The Central Bank of Nigeria in Monetary and 
13miking Policy Mcasurcs ". ( 1993 ) CBN Economic & Financial ReNiew. Vol. 3 1. No. 3. p. 156. 
1144. Sec Section 13 of the CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as amended. 
1145 
- 
See Section 27 of the CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as amended. 
1146. See Ogwunia (1993). op. cit., p. 156. 
1147 
. see Decree No. 24 of 1991 as imended bv 
Decree No. 3 of 1997. 
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These provisions have been complicated by the recent amendment to the said 
Section 33 by CBN Decree 19971 148which now allows the Federal Government to borrow 
from the CBN at a negotiated rate of interest rather than market rate. Section 33(l) of 
CBN Decree as amended permits the CBN to grant advances to the Federal Governement 
in respect of budget deficit "at such rate of interest as the Bank may negotiate with the 
Ministry" 
The major constraint of deregulation in Nigeria has been located in the failure of 
the government' 149 and the public sector to adhere strictly to their defined 
responsibilities' 150. Although, the Nigerian government at the inception of financial 
deregulation accepted the ideals of balanced budget and zero borrowing from the banking 
system during the programme' 151, however, "none of the desirable objectives was 
achieved and the failure to achieve fiscal viability disrupted the achievement of the 
objectives of monetary and exchange rate policies"' 152 
Indeed, the CBN1 153 and commentators' 154 on the banking system have held the 
Nigerian government firmly responsible for the inflationary spiral that had ravaged the 
Nigerian economy due to expansionary fiscal operations by the government. The 
dominance of the Nigenan govemment in monetary expansion throu h its monetisation of 9 
1148. See Section 33 (1) of the CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991. 
1149. See Brautigam, Deborah, " Substituting for the State : Institutions and Industrial Development in 
Eastern Nigeria " (1997) World Development, Vol. 25, No. 7,1063 at p. 1066. 
1150. Scc Ojo ( 1994). op. cit. p. 24. 
1151. Ibid.. p. 28. 
1151. Loc. cit. 
1153 
- 
See CBN Brief. op. cit. p. 3. See also CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Account. 1992, pp. 13 - 
14. and other various issues of the CBN. Annual Reports. 
1154. See Nwank-wo. G. 0., Money and Capital Markets in Nigena Today. University of Lagos Press. 
Lagos. (1991), p. 35. 
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oil receipts or borrowing from the CBNI 155 necessitates the demand by the Governor of 
CBNI 156 for the delineation of the govemment's and CBN's responsibility for the 
maintenance of an acceptable rate of inflation . The Governor also advocates the grant to 
the CBN of "the freedom necessary to act in such ways and employ such instruments as it w 
considers best to achieve the desired monetary targets"' 157. 
In a contribution to this debate, a Deputy-Govemor of CBN1 158 underlines the 
positive correlation between central bank independence and economic performance in 
Germany, USA, Switzerland, New Zealand and Canada and posits for the CBN a 
considerable degree of autonomy. This suggestion had been echoed' 159within the country 
with further recommendations of constitutionally mandated balanced budget' 160 t0 curb 
fiscal irresponsibility of the goverment. 
The Nigerian scenario illustrates the truth of the aphorism by the econornist, Dr 
Milton Friedman, that the "major source of inflation, this time as every time , 
has been that 
the government has spent too much and printed too much"' 161. Dr Friedman also opines 
that "the problem of stopping inflation is political, not economic. The problem is having 
the political will to take these measures"' 162. This contention is graphically apposite to the 
Nigerian macroeconomic debacle chronicled above. 
1155. See OgA, -uma, Paul, " The Control of the monetary and Banking System by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria", (1994) CBN Economic & Financial Rexiew, Vol. 32, No. 1. p. 8. 
1156. Ibid., p. 10. 
1157. LOC. Cit. 
See Odozi. V. A., " The Conduct of Monetary and Banking Policies By the Central Bank of Nigeria", 
(1995) CBN Economic & Financial RcNiew. Vol. 33, No. 1. pp. 11-12. 
1159 vstem ". in 
. 
See Osa-Afiana. Laiwence. 0.. " Structural Changes And Conflicts In The Financial S, 
Restructuring The Nigerian Financial System For Stability And Development. Papers and Proceedings of 
(lie Bank Directors' Seminar. 1994, ( FITC. Yaba. Lagos. 1994 ) p. 39. 
1160. Ibid., p. 38. 
1161. See Friedman, Milton.. Free Market for Free Men. University of Chicago. Chigaco. (1974). p. 16. 
1162 Ibid.. p. 19. 
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Indeed. while some inflation rates are tolerable' 163. stagflation of the phenomenal 
proportion which has become intractable in Nigeria is economically suicidal to any 
nation' 
164. Yet the ability of a central bank to curb inflation and the limits of such 
responsibility depend on its position in the overall political system and on the policy 
instruments available toit1165. In fact the hypothesis of a positive correlation between the 
central bank's legal basis and the degree of monetary stability achieved in an economy has 
been confirmed by a range of intemational comparative studies' 166. 
The independence of the central bank and its officials from undesirable fiscal 
deficit financing has been postulated as necessary conditionalities for monetary and 
macroeconomic stability' 167. These crucial desiderata, of an effective central bank are 
patently absent with respect to the CBN. 
10.6 IMF, World Bank and Nigeria : Reforming a Borrowing State 
It is necessary to appraise the roles of IMF and World Bank in the financial 
deregulation of the Nigerian banking system. While it is generally conceded that the 
financial deregulation programme was designed and implemented by the Nigerian 
government and its officials' 168, it is also acknowledged that the programme had the usual 
1163. See Andres Vclasco ( ed. ). Trade, Development and the World Economy. Selected Essays of Carlos 
Diaz-Ale. landro. Basil Blackwell Ltd, Oxford, (1988) p. 384. 
1164 
. 
The inflation rate was 61.4 per cent in 1993, and climbed to 72.8 per cent in 1995. See the CBN 
Annual Reports and Statements of account, 1993 and 1995. 
1165. Sce Issing Otmar. " Central Bank Policýy - Goals and Reality " in Philip Arestis ( ed. ). Money And 
Banking Issues for the Twenty-First Century, Essays in Honour of Stephen F. Frowen, Macmillan Press 
Ltd, London, 2nd edition, (1993), p. 41. 
1166 v ". in S. F. , 
Ibid., p. 5 1. see also Issing. 0.. " The Role of the Central Bank and its Responsibilit. 
Frowen and F. P. Mchugh (eds. ). Financial Decision-MAing and Moral Responsibility. ( London: 
Nlacnifflan, New York-, St Martin's Press ). 
1167 
- 
Sce Issing, (1993). op. cit.. p. 44. 
1168. See " Report on the Seminar on Macro-Econon-Lic Policy Analysis for CBN Executive Staff. 
November 15 - 19.1993 "( 1993 ) CBN Economic & Financial Review. Vol. 3 1, No. 4, pp. 258 & 26 1. 
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trappings of the IN4F and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme(SAP), and was 
undertaken with the active pressure and support of the two international financial 
institutions'169 
A relevant conundrum however is whether the EMT and World Bank programme 
could have been successful having regard to the static political and social milieus of 
Nigeria and the elitist corruption and hostility to both the IMF and World Bank's reforms. 
It has been said that the failure of SAP in Nigeria would weaken the influence of the IMF 
and World Bank in Africa' 
170. 
The seeming intransigence which surrounded the negotiation of SAP 
conditionalities between the Nigefian Government and IMF may be attfibuted to an 
established policy bias against the IMF's powers and procedure. Nigefia, regarded most 
conditionalities of the INIF as inappropriate, figid, and extremely harsh. Hence some years 
before the Nigeria-IMF controversy, Nigeria advocated "the need for the Fund to show 
111171 greater flexibility in its adjustment policy prescriptions ....... 
The country further expressed serious scepticism about the ability and capacity of 
IMF to exercise "firm surveillance" over sensitive members' 172. In the words of IMF, 
"Nigeria's economic policy stance over the past two decades has been charactensed by 
resistance to comprehensive structural adjustment"' 173 This was the policy setting in 
which the sensitive Nigefian Govemment challenged the application of both the 
conditional ities and fin-n surveillance of IMF to its territorial jurisdiction. 
1169. Loc. cit. 
1170. See Financial Times, November 18,1986. p. 24. 
117 1. See Twenty Years Of Central Banking In Niger-ia. op. cit p. 198. 
1172. lbid p. 195. 
1173 See IMF Sun, cv. Vol. 2o. NO. 6. %larch 24,1997, p. 88. 
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The factors which underpinned the failure of IMF/World Bank conditionalities 
such as financial liberalisation may be highlighted here. In the first respect , the nexus 
between politics and economics has been neglected by the Bretton Wood institutions 
which perceived economics in isolation of its political circumstances' 174 even though 
market the domain of economic theories is a political, social and legal construct' 175 . The 
attempt to prescribe economic reform policies in isolation of its political and legal aspects 
had often invested the IMF/World Bank programme with failure in different countries. 
It may be emphasised that "disregard for human rights has not in general 
constituted a bar to access to the Fund, " 1176 and of course the World Bank. The 
importance of this assertion assumes urgency with the recent argument by the General 
Counsel to the World Bank, Ibrahim Shihata that: 
Countries which join the Bank as borrowing members expect it to 
behave in the manner prescribed in its charter, as a source of 
development finance which is required not to interfere in their 
political affairs or to judge their domestic political behaviour, 
177 
rewarding or punishing them accordingly' 
This argument that advocates the maintenance of the status quo of separating 
economic reforms from its political undercurrents, is antithetical to the lessons of financial 
reform in countfies like Nigena, and perhaps explains the antagonism and disenchantment 
with the IMF and World Bank, by the Nigerian population' 178, which regard the Bretton 
Wood institutions as financiers of corrupt and inept governments. 
1174. See Polak, Jacques.. The Changing Nature of ITMF Conditional ity. ( Essays in International Finance. 
No. 184, Princeton University. New Jersey. 1991 ) p. 30. 
1175. See Underhill. Geoffrey. R. D., " Conceptualizing the Changing Global Order " in Richard Stubbs 
and Geoffrev R. D. Underhill., ( cds. ), Political Economy And The Changing Global Order. (The 
Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1994 )p. 18. 
1176. See Polak, Jacques., op. cit p. 3 1. 
1177. See Shihata, lbrahim. F. I., " Democracy And Development ", (1997) 46 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly. July. 635 at pp. 642 - 643. 
1178. See Collier, P, op. cit.. P. 330. 
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It has been argued that the protection of political fights are not within the purview 
of World Bank and IW, hence "Violation by a member country of the political human 
fights of a citizen or citizens is not per se a matter that requires a certain action or 
omission by the Bank"' 179 This opinion although justifiable under the World Bank 
Charter I 1110 is based on the fallacious premises that political and legal rights can be 
separated from the economic rights. This is highly contentious. Every political and legal 
right has its economic content. 
Indeed, no economic agent will operate fully under persistent threats to his life or 
his corporation, or restnctions to commercial information, and activities. The detention 
without trials of economic agents, seizure of their properties, unfair dismissals, physical 
harassment, restrictions from associations vvith other economic agents and denial of 
freedom of movement which are prevalent' 181 in Nigeria, are neither conducive to 
sustainable economic activities, free enterprises, nor economic reforms. The economic 
agents in varying degrees and circumstances, require these fights and freedom for 
successful pursuit of economic goals. Political liberalism institutes the essential conditions 
I tor personal liberty and economic prosperity, and facilitates the operation of free 
markets' 182 
The question may however be raised that since the political nature of economic 
reform is of paramount importance and has been recognised by EMT officials and the 
World Bank, why is it that such political conditions are not accorded prominence in 
IMF/Bank SAP. The reality lies in the truism that as a matter of law, political issues are 
1179. See Shihata., op. cit., p. 640. 
118(). See Article Ill. section 5(b )of the IBRD Charter. 
See for a comprehensive discussion of the Nriolation of rights in Nigeria. Ajomo. M. A., and 
Owasanoye. B., (eds. ), Individual Rights Under The 1989 Constitution, Nlgenan Institute of Advanced 
I. cgal Studies, Lagos, ( I 993). especially chapters 2-8. 
1182 See Posner. op. cit.. pp. 24 - 25. 
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beyond the jurisdiction of both the EMT and the World Bank. The IMF is specifically 
mandated by Article IV section 3 of its Agreement to "respect the domestic social and 
political policies of members.. " and pay due regards to their circumstances in applying its 
surveillance powers. The same limitation had been imposed on the IMF in respect of 
designing adjustment policies for member- states by its Executive Board' 183. 
Regarding the World Bank, Article III section 5 (b) of its Agreement' 184 imposes 
an obligation on the Bank to pay due attention only to economy and efficiency "and 
without regard to political or other non-econon-iic influences or considerations". Thus, 
both the IMF and the Bank are effectively precluded from political considerations. Yet 
domestic political and legal factors loom large in the failure of economic reform 
programmes. 
It has been posited' 185 that the major economic de stabilising f 186 actor in Nigeria' , 
inflation, is a political problem, and requires a political solution. According to a World 
Bank expert the "political context of reform in Nigeria proved to be more complex than 
the World Bank ...... expected"' 
187. Some IMF experts who studied SAP in Nigeria 
contend that the country's "experience confirms that inconsistent and unpredictable 
policies generate internal shocks that translate into extreme volatility in economic and 
financial variables"' 188 
1183. See IMF Executive Board Decision No. 6056- ( 79/38 ). op cit. 
1184 
, See Articles of Agreement of the International 
Bank for Development and Reconstruction. Dec 27, 
1945, (1947) 2 U. N. T. S. 20. 
1185. See Ffiednian. op. cit. 
1 IN6 
* 
See Nloser, Gary. G.. "The Main Determinants of Inflation in Nigeria", (1995) 42 IMF Staff Papers 
No. 2,270 at p. 285. 
1187. See Faruqcc. Rashid.. "Nigeria, ownership abandoned"in Ishrat Husain and Rashid Faruquce (eds. ) 
Adjustment In Africa, Lessons from County Case Studies. The World Bank. Washington. D. C.. (1994), p. 
2 3) 8. 
11881 See Gary Moser, Scott Rogers. and Reinold van Til.. Nigena: Experience with Structural 
Adjustment. 1980-94. INIF Occasional Paper. Washington D. CD.. 0 997), 148. 
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It may be undescored that the inconsistency and volatility observed in Nigeria can 
be traced to the political and legal instability that dominated the countrv's polity. Political 
stability is regarded even by the most conservative of economists as indispensable 
requirement for econormc reforms and sustainable growth, yet the military regimes 
according to the secretary-general of the Commonwealth of nations, Chief Emeka 
Anyaoku"89, have a long record of inconsistency and inbuilt instability. Incredible, as it 
may sound, the World Bank and AV, have failed to appreciate the nugatory effects of 
military government induced political instability on economic reform measures and 
programmes in Nigeria. The legal and political environments of reforms are as important 
as the economic factors. 
The IMF and World Bank must shed their organisational and legal dogmatism and 
face the reality that in the real world as in Nigeria politics can neither be separated from 
economics nor law. A former chief economist of the IMF, Jacques Polak' 190, endorses the 
call by Richard Feinberg' 191 for the inclusion of some elements of political conditionality in 
IMF/ World Bank programmes. Indeed, the example of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) charter' 192 is cited which commits the 
organisation to "the fundamental principles of multi-party democracy, the rule of law, 
respect for human rights and market economics"' 193. Most recently, the INIF Managing 
1189. Quoted in Soyinka. op. cit.. p. 136. 
1190. See Polak. Jacques.. op. cit p. 51. 
1191. See Feinberg. Richard E., The Bretton Woods Agencies and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s : 
Facing the tough Questions, ( Country Economics Department Working Paper No. 661. Washington, D. 
C., World Bank, 1991 ). 
1192. See Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, (1990) 29 
I. L. M. 1077. 
1193. See Preamble to EBRD Agreement. ibid, p. 1083. See also Polak, Jacques.. op. cit p. 5 1. see for a 
lucid discussion of the EBRD position on political conditional it ies - John Fleming. " Economic Reform in 
Fastern and Central Europe ". lecture given to Oxford University International Political Economy Society, 
11rasenose College. 26 October 1992 
. see 
however Stephen Gill. " Knowledge, Politics, and Neo - Liberal 
Political Economy " in Stubbs. R. and Goeffrey R. D. Underhill., Political Economy And The Changing 
Global Order. ( The Macmillan Press, London. 1994 ) pp. 83- 86. 
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Director, Michel Camdessus, rightly asserts, "the key to development is outside the scope 
of economics. It is peace and dernocracy"1194. 
The Bretton Wood institutions have no effective means of supervising the 
implementation by member-states of the political, social and even their areas of purview, 
the economic programmes of adjustment. The mechanism for implementation of 
IN4F/World Bank economic conditionalities require major overhauling, and both 
institutions we submit cannot directly and effectively take cognisance of political and 
social aspects of SAP' 195or conduct effective surveillance without the amendment of their 
present Treaties or Agreements. 
It may be reiterated that the implementation and supervisory limitations of the IMF 
and World Bank and the in discipline observable in most SAP countries had made the 
failure of SAP in Nigeria a high possibility even before the programme was initiated. The 
likelihood of SAP failure in Nigeria may be attributed to a combination of "demonstration 
effect" and "peer group influence". In this respect, it has been observed that the difficulties 
experienced by such African nations as Zambia, Ugandan, Gambia, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia which took IMF loan may been traced to the inability of those countries to 
exercise the required discipline' 196 and there "is nothing to suggest that Nigefia will 
behave differently" 1197. Olashore underlines the high failure nsk of the INIF programme in 
Nigeria because of 
the inability of Nigerians to exercise the required financial discipline 
which could ensure the optimum results from an INff stabilization 
package. If past experience is a measure of our ability to be 
fastidious to detail and resolute in our commitment to stated public 
1194. See Michel Caindessus, IMF Survey, 17 July 1995. p. 220. 
119-5 
* The IMF has introduced external evaluation of its 
Ehanced Structural Adjustment Facility(ESAF). 
See I N1F Survey. Vol. 25, No. 2 1, Nov. 11.1996. 
1196 
. 
See Olashore. op. cit p. 235. 
1197 
. 
Loc. cit. 
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objectives, it appears highly unlikely that we would be able to adhere 
to a stabilization package conscientiously. In that event, the nation 
would stand to be discredited far more than in the present situation' '91 
Considering this state of affairs, the IW and the World Bank are not totally 
blameless in the failure of the Nigerian financial reforms. The two institutions as the 
consultants to the Nigerian government knew the economic., political and legal defects in 
the designed programme. However, the M and World Bank neglected the economic, 
political and legal imbalances in the Financial deregulation programme, and supported it 
whole- heartedly. 
It is damning that the lessons from international liberalisation experiences in the 
1970s and 1980s were ignored, when the Nigerian financial deregulation was designed 
with the IMF and World Bank support. Both institutions encouraged and financed the 
liberalisation of the capital account as a first step of financial deregulation in Nigeria, 
despite the recorded disastrous effects of such premature act of liberalisation. It has been 
observed also that the IMF, World Bank, and other western partners "have been prepared 
to turn a blind eye to policy failures"' 199 in Nigefia due to commercial interests, naive trust 
of Nigerian govemment, and avoidance of the de stabil'sation of the most populous 
African natton1200 
Nigeria was characterised by administrative, institutional and policy credibility 
problems which were further compounded by grossly inefficient and corrupt leadership 
and civil service that were antagonistic of the SAP programme because it may curb rents 
and profiteering1201 . 
The capability of these disenchanted groups to derail SAP was so 
1198. Loc. cit. 
1 ""'. See Financial Tinics. 16 March 1992. p. 1. 
1200. wc. cit. 
1201. Sce Financial Tinics. Novenibu 18.1986. p. 24. 
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formidable that Paul Mosley and others1202 suggested that a pay-off or compensation of 
such groups be built into any SAP programme. 
Inspite of these credibility problems, IMF and the Bank have no well defined 
credibility test hence once a government appends the letter of intent or loan 
documentation and indicate willingness to undertake IMF/ World Bank programmes, the 
credibility of implementation or veracity of implementation commitment fades to 
insignificance1203 . Indeed, the utter emptiness of IMF stand-by arrangement is aptly 
underscored by Professor Richard Edwards in this manner - 
The IMF's approval of a stand-by arrangement does not guarantee 
that the country will in fact pursue all of the policies stated in its letter 
of intent. Most of the policy intentions are not even made performance 
criteria. Further, there is no guarantee that the policies, even if pursued, 
will be successful in solving the particular country's problems. 
With respect to performance cfiteria, which have clear implications on 
the country's right to draw from the IMF, there have been enough 
cases in which countfies failed to meet the criteria that this possibility 
must be assessed whenever a governmental or private creditor places 
reliance on the debtor country's stand-by arrangement with the IMF. 
The only certainty is that consultations will continue between the IMF 
1204 and the country 
Many reasons may be identified for the tendencies of I-MF and World Bank to 
grant financial assistance to member-states despite their credibility and corruption 
problems. It appears that the IN4F has a legal obligation to provide financial assistance to 
1202. See Mosley. P.. ct al, op. cit. pp. 102 & 307- 308. 
1203 
* The futility of an IMF Agreement has generated a 
long list of recidivist debtors who are perpetuallY 
rescliedifling their debts with the IMF assistance. A studv has shown that between 1960 and 1980, only 42 
nicnibers accounted for 78 per cent of all stand-bv and extended credits, while 24 countries received IMF 
credits for more than 10 consecutive years. See Walters, Alan., Do we Need the IMF and the World 
Bank'?, (Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1994 ) p. 12. See also Vaubel, R.. " The Political Economy 
of the International Monetary Fund " in R. Vaubel and T. D. Willett ( eds. ). The Political Economv of 
International Organizations :A Public Choice Approach, ( Boulder, Col.: WestvieNv Press, 1991 ) pp. 204 
-244. 
1204. See Richard W. Edwards, Jr. Is An IMF Stand -By Arrangement A" Seal Of Approval " On 
Which Other Creditors Can Rely" " 1985 ) 17 International Law And Politics. 57-3) at 588. 
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its members with financial difficulties. Under Article I(v) of the IW Agreement1205, one 
of the purposes of the IW is "To give confidence to members by making the general 
resources of the Fund temporafily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus 
providing them with opporturuty to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments 
without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity" 
Furthermore Article V section 3(a) of the said Agreement provides that "The 
Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources, including policies on stand-by 
or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies for special balance of payments 
problems, that will assist members to solve their balance of payments problems in a 
manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate 
safeguards for the temporary use of the general resources of the Fund" 
It is submitted that under the above Articles of the Agreement., the IMF has a legal 
obligation to make its resources available to a member-state with balance of payment 
problems provided such a member is willing to adopt policies prescribed by the IMF in this 
respect. Thus, it would have been ultra vires of the IMF if it had denied Nigeria access to 
the IMF resources when the country had indicated her willingness to adopt policies 
mandated by IMF. The grounds of ineligibility for the use of IMF's resources are stated in 
Article V section 5 of the IMF Agreernent1206, and the said section did not stipulate 
potential or actual lack of performance credibility of a member as a ground of ineligibility. 
Under Article V section 5., a member can become ineligible only if the "member is using 
the general resources of the Fund in a manner contrary to the purposes of the Fund". 
There was no evidence of this kind of behaviour on the part of Nigeria, and suspicion of 
governmental corruption is not a ground for ineligibility. 
1205. Sec IMF Article of Agree nient. Supra. 
1206. Supra. 
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Additionally, both the IMF and World Bank have been accused of offering 
member-states huge financial assistance so as to encourage such countries to embark on 
SAP. The World Bank in the particular case of Nigeria granted the country huge volumes 
of loan reportedly " the largest amount ever given to an African country by the Bank 111207 
to persuade the government to embark on economic reforms. 
This is despite repeated warnings by econon-ýists and specifically Professor 
Mckinnon1208 that IMF and World Bank should stop offering bribes to third world nations 
to engage in adjustment since such "countries have been cavalier in their use of foreign 
capital although a puritanical approach would have served them better 111209. Finally, the 
corporate interests of IMF and World Bank as lenders often appear to influence their 
tendencies to lend because without lending activities, the Bretton Wood institutions may 
become redundant and unprofitable. 
Perhaps the greatest problems of IMFAVorld Bank programme in Nigeria may be 
the monitoring and implementation limitations of the IMF and World Bank in the face of 
the refusal of the Nigenan Government to submit to any form of surveillance, monitofing 
and control by either the IMF and the World Bank. The celebrated ingenuity1210 of 
Babaginda regime in agreeing to INIF stand-by without drawing the funds was a 
disingenuous mechanism designed to reopen international credits to Nigeria and 
simultaneously prevent IMF ftom exercising figorous monitoring and supervision of 
Nigeria under the SAP. The Nigerian Government effectively retained its freedom of 
reckless actions. 
1207. See Olukoshi. Adebayo.. op. cit p. 97. 
1208. See %Ickinnon. Ronald., ( 1981 ). op. cit pp. 116 - 117. see also on the same issue of bribery, FrN 
Maxwell J.. MoncN-. Interest, And Banking In Econorruc Development. op. cit p. 345. 
1209. See Mckinnon. Ronald.. ( 197, ). op. cit p. 176. 
1210. See Mosley. Paul.. et al op. cit p. 6l. n. 6. 
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It has been correctly asserted that unlike most developed and developing countries 
with different forms of agencies of restraint either internal or external, the Nigerian 
governments have consistently failed to embrace the idea of agency of restraint whether 
internal or external 
1211. Perhaps it may be emphasised that unless the INff and World Bank 
ensures that borrowing states like Nigeria institute legally viable internal agencies of 
restraint"" such as independent central bank, judicial controls and parliamentary or other 
credible supervision into economic reforms, the SAP and programmes of such nature will 
continue to be nugatory until individual countries voluntarily establish the necessary 
restraint agencies. It is also crucial that the Articles of Agreement of IN/tF and World Bank 
are amended to give these institutions some authorities over political and legal 
conditionalities that would ensure effective surveillance over debtors. 
10.7 Conclusions 
A critical insight into the financial deregulation of the Nigerian banking system 
reveals the core destabilising factors as the regulatory powers and political corruption of 
the ruling class and its induced political instability, the legal and political subversion of the 
CBN and the NDIC, as well as the regulatory, policy and legal distortions of the 
programme. The conclusion is that deregulation happened too quickly and all at once, 
while the problems of directed lending, sectoral allocation and credit ceilings were 
neglected. 
The role of law that motivated fiscal recklessness and macro-economic instability 
by the ruling class must also be underscored. These issues converge into one factor of 
legal and political imbalance in the Nigerian banking deregulation. This is the lesson from 
the Nigerian experience which the IMF and World Bank must appreciate. A programme of 
1211. See Collier, Paul., op. cit p. 310. 
1212 
-1 . 
See Collier. P.. op. cit., p. 3' 1 
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financial liberalisation must be multidimensional, pragmatic and functional. The legal 
imperatives are as important as the economic and political elements. There should be 
macroeconomic stability and fiscal balance and mirumum standard of public accountability 
and honesty by public officials. 
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PART VI: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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CHAPTER X1 
CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the conclusion of this work and its proposals for reform. It is 
divided into eight sections. The first section is the introduction. The second third and 
fourth sections contain some remarks, the findings on research issues, and a review of the 
hypotheses. The fifth, sixth and seventh sections discuss the regulatory, institutional, 
political and legal reforms proposed in this work. The lessons of Nigerian financial 
deregulation for the theory of financial liberalisation are examined in the eighth section. I 
11.2 Remarks 
The bank failures and compounded economic cnses that have attended financial 
deregulation in many developing countnes have combined to make the issue of financial 
regulation and deregulation of the banking system the 'Issue du jour'. Yet most enquifies 
on the issue have been dominated by economic discipline because the subject is regarded 
as largely one of economics. The legal scholarship makes no significant direct presence in 
the debate. The economic approach to the issue however has been inadequate and 
incomplete. Finance traverses the boundary of economic discipline, and crucial 
understanding of the issue of financial regulation and deregulation requires a multi- 
disciplinary enquiry that highlights the interface between economics, law., politics and 
history. 
This thesis employs a pragmatic approach to the issue, while emphasising the role 
of law that is other,, vise neglected in existing discourse on the subject-matter. The 
centrality of economics to the issue of financial regulation and deregulation compels an 
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examination of the econonuc theories underpinning banking laws. Hence, the thesis 
considers the Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis and classical theory. 
The influence of Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis on exposition of the problem of 
financial and regulatory repression of the banking system, and its prognosis of financial 
liberalisation has been underscored. Additionally, the interventionist orientation of banking 
regulation has been traced to the Keynesian and classical theofists. The influences and 
prognoses of these theories have been examined on the practice and impact of financial 
regulation and deregulation of the Nigerian banking system. 
A number of research issues were formulated and examined in conducting the 
enquiry to banking regulation and deregulation in Nigefia. It is apposite to summafise the 
findings of this thesis in respect of the research issues . 
11.3 Findings 
i) The nature and modes of financial regulation in Nigeria 
This work finds that the nature of financial regulation in the country was originally 
laissez-faire that subsequently changed first to minimalist regulation, and later to liberal 
reeulation respectively. The regulatory nature became stfictly interventionist in 1968, and 
maintained this characteristic until 1986 when financial deregulation attained regulatory 
ascendancy in Nigeria. During laissez-faire era, there was virtually no regulatory 
prescriptions for banks. The pefiods of minimalist regulation and liberal regulation 
introduced liberal prudential requirements. However, the interventiorýst era occasioned 
the introduction of full comucopia of regulatory prescfiptions and market restnctions on 
banks. The modes during financial deregulation have vaned between attenuation and re- 
iinposition of regulatory demands and their complete abolition. I 
The changes in the regulatory approaches of the Nigerian banking system 
The Thesis identifies changes in regulatory approaches of the Nigerian banking 
system as demonstrated in (i) above. It discovers vaned factors that influenced these 
91 liberal regulation chan es. The change from laissez-faire to minimal regulation and i 
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respectively, were influenced pfincipally by the calamitous and perennial failure of banks 
during these periods. The movement from liberal regulation to interventionism was 
motivated by diverse reasons including the growth of economic nationalism after Nigerian 
independence, financing needs of Nigerian government, ideological romance with 
socialism, intellectual influences of western scholars, and the Nigerian civil war. A very 
great underlying factor was the socio-political milieux of the Nigerian society. 
ill) The impacts of the banking regulation on the Nigerian banking system 
It is found upon reflection on the interventionist era that interest rate regulation 
generated low rates, discouraged savings, scared away depositors, and encouraged capital 
flight. The credit regulation through credit ceilings and sectoral credit allocation 
succeeded only in diverting credit to inefficient industry and influential Nigerians who 
squandered such credit. Most banks were unable to recover such misapplied loans and 
thus became invested with large poor performing loan portfolio and decapitalisation. The 
indigenisation regulation converted the banking system into government department with 
attendant political control, corruption and non-commercial interference. It also scared 
away foreign banking investors. 
The exchange control law diverted foreign exchange to influential groups, created 
artificial scarcity, overvaluation of naira and capital flight. The deficit financing mandatory 
law encouraged financial profligacy by Nigerian government, fuelled inflation and crowded 
out efficient borrowers. The interventionist regulatory structure ensured that Nigerian 
banks were politicised, corruptive, repressed, uncompetitive, decapitalised and distressed. 
Yet, no bank was allowed to fail throughout the period and massive distortion of the 
economy ensued. 
iv) The reason for financial deregulation of Nigerian bankine system and its effects 
This work finds two inter-related major reasons for banking deregulation. The first 
reason was that the Nigerian economic problems and mounting debts became worfisome 
to the international creditors. The second reason was the ngid insistence of INIF and 
277 
World Bank that the Nigerian government must deregulate its economy before any 
financial assistance would be forthcoming from international creditors. Thus, financial 
deregulation in Nigeria was not bome out of genuine rethinking or repentance by the 
Nigerian government. It was foisted on the government by its economic circumstances and 
determined international financial institutions. The effects of banking deregulation have 
been mixed. It has produced growth of the financial sector and savings, privatisation of 
Federal Government-owned banks, financial innovation, interest rate escalation, foreign 
exchange speculation and an army of failed banks and financial institutions. The banking 
sector is now in distress. 
v) This thesis discovers the Politicisation of banking regulation and supervision, and 
human factors as two major factors that precipitated and elongated bank failures in the 
country. It further found the core destabilising factors of the banking deregulation as the 
regulatory powers and political corruption of the ruling class, political instability induced W 
by the ruling class, legal and political subjugation of the CBN and NDIC, regulatory and 
policy distortions, and the laws motivating fiscal recklessness and macroeconomic 
instability. 
11.4 Review of Hypotheses 
Some research hypotheses have been formulated to guide us in analysing the 
issues. The hypotheses are that , 
1. The nature of financial regulation of a banking system has a primarily significant 
influence on its efficiency, effectiveness and performance. 
2. The character and ethics of the political, social and bureaucratic classes and the 
governance structure of a nation influence the nature of financial regulation and 
deregulation of the banking system. 
The modes of financial regulation and deregulation of Nigerian banking systern were CI 
repressive, corrupt, exploitative and ruinous. 
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4. A suitable socio-political environment and conducive legal frameworks are critical pre- 
conditions for the success of a financial deregulation programme. 
Conceming the first hypothesis, a comparison of the impacts of the period of 
regulatory interventionism on the banking system with the effects of banking deregulation 
reveals the influence of the nature of financial regulation on these results. Dufing banking 
interventionism, the banks were few, inefficient, ineffective and distressed. The Nigerian 
economy demonstrated these features of the banking system. The liberalisation era on the 
other hand, produced massive growth in banking and financial institutions, financial 
innovation, liberalised banking which enhanced banking efficiency, and growth of savings. 
This hypothesis is accepted to the extent that the Nigerian banking system was more 
versatile, virile, efficient and productive dufing financial deregulation despite the on-going 
distress and failures. 
A constant feature of both eras of regulatory intervention and deregulation is the 
influence of socio-political milieux of the Nigerian society. The nature of financial 
regulation was influenced predominantly by prebendal and clientelist politics of the 
COUntry. Rent seeking and economic acquisition motivated interest rate regulation, credit 
regulation, exchange control measures and repressive borrowings. This political nature 
ensured direct control over financial regulation and subjugation of financial bureaucrats. 
The financial deregulation also encountered the problems of political milieux of 
the Nigerian state which has been engulfed by predatory politics. AJI financial regulatory 
powers are centralised in political office holders who utilised them for rent-seeking and 
political purposes. Financial experts are subjugated. The dorriýination of banking 
deregulation by politicians instigated policy inconsistencies, regulatory ambivalence and 
instability, regulatory capture, corruption and defective laws. The second hypothesis is 
also accepted as correct. 
The era of regulatoB, intervention utilised direct control instruments such as 
interest rate, exchange rate, and credit control regulations. These measures resulted in 
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massive government financing by banks and CBN, financial irresponsibility., inflation, 
corruption, exploitation of savers by banks and distortion of the economy. During the 
deregulation era, the direct control instruments were retained in different forms and 
produced disastrous effects. The deficit financing by banks and CBN continued, the 
exchange rate and interest rate liberalisation was manoeuvred for corr-uption purposes., 
banking privatisation was captured by the political and ruling class, and the regulatorv 
framework was made unstable and inconsistent for purely rent-seeking and kleptomaniac 
purposes. The third hypothesis is accepted. 
During the financial dere lation programme, the government of the country was gU a 
characterised by political instability, administrative fluidity, public office insecurity, tension 
and absence of political credibility. These factors facilitated the regulatory instability and 
confusion that engulfed the banking system. The autocratic nature of military regime that 
govern the country bequeaths financial deregulation with centralisation of authority, 
absence of checks and balances, sporadic regulation, policy inconsistencies, lack of 
credibility, and relegation of financial expertise. 
The nature of military law making which vests the military Head of State with 
supreme legislative authofity in personarn ensures that financial legislation is bereft of 
deliberation, consultation and expert opinions. It is not surprising that the banking laws in 
such circumstances are personalised, widely discretionary, and grossly defective. A stable 
and credible Political system with constitutional checks and balances and due 
parliamentary process would have provided crucial foundation for financial deregulation. 
The fourth hypothesis is therefore established. 
280 
11.5 Proposals for reform1213 
11.5.1 Background to reform proposals : Comparing the Old Order with the New 
Order 
A comparative insight into the pre-liberalisation financial regulatory regime in 
Nigeria and the present liberahsation regulatory era reveals certain common critical 
features of the two distinct eras. The two regimes are characterised by the following 
features : 
Legal norms that mandate unrestricted deficit financing by the CBN of the Nigerian 
govemment budget deficits. 
ii. Fiscal recklessness and unbridled deficit financing by the Nigerian government have 
always been responsible for persistent inflation and macroeconomic instability in the 
country. 
Legal norms that subordinate the CBN to the direct authorities of the Head of 
State/Presi dent, and Finance Minister in monetary and banking matters. 
iv. Legal norms which vests final authority in all monetary and banking regulatory and 
policy decisions in the Head of State/President or the Federal Executive Council. 
v, The CBN has always lacked final and effective regulatory powers, and its officials also 
lack independence of action. 
vi. Financial regulation had/is still predominantly influenced by self-seeking and corruptive 
political considerations. 
N'11. Financial regulation remains centralised, dictatorial, personalistic and excessively 
political. 
viii. Military regimes with omnipotent powers remain the decisive political structure. 
I &'13. This section contains a number of suggestions for the reform of the identified critical problems of the 
Nigerian financial system. The suggested reforms are informed by a careful comparison of the pre- 
libcralisation era with the liberalisation regime which rc%-cals some endemic problems in the Nigenian 
financial rcgulator)- structure. Supplementary to the above. the proposed framework for reform is based 
oll comparable solutions from international experiences of some &N-cloping countries. and the developed 
countries that have significantly influenced the Nigenan laws. 
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ix. There had been complete absence of judicial and parliamentary oversights over 
financial regulation in the country. 
These characteristics are the common and constant factors of the banking interventionist 
era between 1968 and 1985, and the present banking deregulation era of 1986 till date. 
It must be emphasised that some significant changes are noticeable between the 
two eras. The theoretical and technical framework of financial regulation in Nigeria 
changed from the classical interventionist to liberal regulatory regime. Specifically, the 
Mckinnon-Shaw approach induced the movement of financial regulation from the control 
measures to liberal measures. Hence, liberalised foreign exchange rules have replaced 
exchange control laws, deregulated interest rates displaced the interest rate control rules, 
government -owned banks have been privatised, and banking entry is liberalised. 
Additionally, directed credit and restfictive foreign bank ownership rules have been 
scrapped, while banking operations witnessed some liberalisation. Thus, it has been rightly 
asserted that financial deregulation in Nigeria was "economic revolution 
111214 
Despite these liberalising measures., some rules and institutions that determine the 
nature, content and characters of financial regulations, as well as their timing, sequence, 
iniplementation and execution remain constant, and their untoward existence undermine 
the financial deregulation programme. The economic revolution was not accompanied by 
political and legal revolution . 
The basic problem with the programme in Nigeria has been 
posited as misalignment of policies and the fact that policy measures were not adequately 
and efficiently executed. In this connection, the following reforms are suggested to change 
the identified common and deleterious features of the Nigerian banking and financial 
system. 
1214 See Oki. gbo. (1993) op. cit.. p. 82. 
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11.6 Regulatory, Institutional and Political Reforms 
11.6.1 Delimitation of Central Bank Credit to Nigerian Government 
The Nigerian government has been shown to have a cavalier quest for central 
bank. credit to cushion the perennial excessive fiscal deficit of the govemment. Yet, this 
financing method has serious inflationary repercussions that aggravate the macroeconomic 
instability of the country. A constitutional provision mandating a balanced budget has 
been advocated1211 by some bankers. We submit that this ma--,, not be politically 
feasible1216, and the intellectual appropriateness of the suggestion has even been 
doubted1217. A better solution in our view to curb the inflationary bias of the Nigerian 
government is to restrain constitutionally or legally the central bank credit to the 
government. 
The preferred course to us is a complete legal prohibition of all forms of central 
bank credit to the government except in case of war. This is the position in Chile, a 
country that experienced financial crises similar to the Nigerian saga. The Chilean 
Constitution1218 prohibits overdraft on current account, fixed- term loans and advances to 
the government by the central bank. The said Constitution further prohibits purchase of 
government securities at both primary and secondary markets by the Chilean Central 
Bank 
1215. See Osa-Afiana. op. cit p. '18. For the original proposition of legal or constitutional restraint of 
fiscal deficit, see Friedman, M., A Program for Monetary Stability. Fordham University Press, New 
York, (1960). 
1216. The politicians may argue persuasively that such a constitutional provision would hinder the 
executive ability of a government to discharge its duties cffectively by curbing its spending powers without 
corresponding limits on governmental services and functions. 
1217. See Issing (1993). op. cit.. p. 45 where it is contended that economic theory has abandoned such 
notion of restraint. 
1218. See 1979 Constitution. Sec also 1989 Central Bank Law ( Law No. 18840 published on October 10. 
1989). 
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It is submitted that the historical financial and fiscal recklessness of succeeding 
Nigerian governments, and their unrepentant calamitous inflation bias with its attendant 
current macroeconomic instability and financial system disaster, compels the 
recommendation of a legal arrangement akin to the Chilean law. Hence, we suggest the 
abrogation of the present CBN laws that authorises central bank credit"19 to the Nigerian 
government at negotiated rates1220 and mandates the underwriting of the goverrunent 
securities by the 
CBN1221. The abrogation of these laws is not negotiable if the Nigerian 
financial crises and macroeconomic instability are ever going to be resolved. The second 
suggestion is a replacement of the abrogated laws with a new constitutional provision 
prohibiting CBN credit to the Nigerian government either in the fon-n of overdraft or fixed 
term loans and advances or acquisition of gover-nment securities at primary and secondary 
markets. This prohibition may be enacted in the ordinary law although a constitutional 
provision is preferable. 
Although, the above recommendation is our optimum choice, we advocate 
alternative legal provisions similar to the legal positions in USA1222, Venezuela1223, and 
Peru1224, which prohibit central bank overdraft and fixed term loans and advances to the 
their respective governments as well as purchase of government securities in primary 
niarket, but permit discretion to the central bank to acquire government securities on the 
secondary market. We suggest these legal arrangements as the second best for Nigeria, 
1219. See S. ' )3 of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as amended. 
1220. S. 33 (1) of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as substituted by CBN ( Amendment ) Decree No. 3 of 
1997. 
1221. S. 27 (1) (g) of CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 as amended. Equally. S. 34 of CBN Decree No. 24 of 
1991 as amended should also be repealed to the extent (if anv) that it requires financing by the CBN. 
1222. See Federal Resen-c Act of 1913 and its amendments. 
1223 1 zu be . 
See Ley dc Refonna Parcial dc la Lcý del Banco Central de Vene, cla. published on Deccm r4 
1992ý 
12 2 4. See Ley Organica del Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, published on December 30.1992. 
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and a third best option we recommend is a legal prohibition of overdraft and fixed term 
loans and advances to governments, but allows a discretionary purchase of government 
securities at both primary and secondary markets by the central bank. This is position in 
Argentinal225, Austnal226, Brazi11227, Japan1221 and some newly emerging states1229 
A compelling fact is that most countries throughout the World now prohibit 
certain form of central bank credits to their govemments. The pro-govemment credit in 
UK is sui-genefis]230, and will change if Britain joins the EMU1231 . 
Even then, the Bank of 
England credit to the British government is at market rate1232 and not negotiated rates. 
This proposal of a legal restraint on CBN financing of the Nigerian government deficit is 
fundamental, and it has been emphasised that "in Nigerian circumstances the removal of 
the inflation tax would be the single most important restraint" 1233. 
11.6.2 Independence and empowerment of the Central Bank of Nigeria 
The mere restraint of central bank credit to the government may however not 
absolve the central bank from intense political pressure. Indeed, the effectiveness of the 
credit restraint measures depends on "a set of rules guaranteeing central bank 
independence, including those affecting the central bank mandate; its financial 
1225. See Carta Organica del Banco Central ( Lev 24.144. October 1992 ). 
1226. See Statute of the Austrian National Bank and National Bank Law. No. 184/1955. as amended by 
Federal Laws Nos. 200/1967 and 276/1969. 
1227. See 1988 Constitution 
. 
1228 
. 
See Finance LaNN and Bank of Japan Law. 
1229 
. For examples Romania. Portugal and Slovak Republic. 
12 "). The arranPement is based on convention tradition and bilateral agreements. 
123 1. European Monctary Union. see Maastricht Treaty which restrains central bank credit to member 
states and prohibits overdraft on current account, fixed-term loans and advances, and purchase of 
securities on primary market . 
1232 
. 
This applies by tradition. 
1211 
136. . 
See Collier, op. cit.. p. .' 
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independence; the compositions, appointment; and duration in office of its managers., and 
the control on other policy instruments, such as the discount rate and reserve 
requirements" 
1234 
It is proposed that the 1991 CBN Decree as amended, be further amended to 
provide clearly for the independence of the CBN and its officers from the Nigerian 
government. In this respect, the appointment and removal of the officers of the CBN must 
be made subject to parliamentary control, and the security of tenure of their offices be 
granted. The autonomy of the CBN should be enacted into a law and made subject only to 
parliamentary control. Additional, the recent law that made the Finance Minister the 
supervisor of the regulatory and supervisory duties of the CBN is recommended for 
abrogation as anachronistic and untenable. 
Indeed, neither the Federal Reserve System (FED) in USA nor the Bundesbank in 
Germany is subservient to its Treasury or Finance Nfinistry. The Treasury Secretary had 
been routed1235 from the FED since 1935. Even , 
in UK, although the Bank- of England is 
theoretically subordinate to the Treasury, in "practice, the Treasury and the Bank work in 
harmony and on a basis of effective equality" 1236. Thus, the present subservience of the 
CBN to the Finance Nfinistry has no precedent in civilised financial world. 
A supplementary recommendation to the earlier proposals is a legal provision I 
stipulating the clear and unequivocal monetary and banking policy responsibilities of the 
CBN. The inflationary bias of the Nigerian government compels the attribution of 
monetary responsibility to an independent CBN which must be insulated by legal 
provisions from political pressure, and equipped with "considerable discretion in the 
1234 
. 
Cottarelli, Carlos.. Limiting Central Bank Credit to the Government : Theon, and Practice, ( fNV. 
Washington D. C., Occasional Paper. December 1993 ) p. 4. 
1235. Sec Banking Act of 1935. 
1236 See E. P. Elliniur and E. Lornnicka, Modem Banking Law. Clarendon Press : Oxford. 2nd ed.. (1994) 
p. 3 0. 
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determination and operation of monetary pol, *Cy"1237. It is therefore suggested that the 
current legal provision which makes the Nigerian President or Head of State the final 
authority in respect of monetary and banking policy be abolished. Neither experience nor 
merit supports the provision. A replacement law that endows the CBN with final 
authority for the formulation and implementation of monetary and banking policy subject 
to parliamentary control be enacted. The proposed law should accord the CBN with a 
clear mandate to reach price stability, and holds the central bank managers strictly 
accountable for their actions and inaction. 
We endorse a provision sin-fflar to the New Zealand provision1238 under which the 
central bank Governor is required at the beginning of his appointment to indicate to the 
parliament the monetary policy and targets he intends to pursue and attain during the 
duration of his term of office, and the attaim-nent or otherwise of the monetary target is 
used as the yardstick to measure the performance of the central bank. The Federal Reserve 
System in USA has independent monetary responsibility subject to Congressional control, 
and most recently even the UK has embraced the move for an independent central bank 
with the relinquishment of monetary responsibility by the Treasury to the Bank of 
England1239. South Affica1240 also has an independent central bank. The current Nigefian 
monetary policy practice has no precedent in the jurisdictions that most influenced its 
existence. 
1237. See S%%inbumc, Mark. and Marta Castel lo-Branco. " Central Bank Independence and Central Bank 
Functions ", in Patrick Downes and Reza Vaez-Zadeh (eds. ). The Evolving Role of Central Banks, IM-F, 
Washington D. C., (1991) p. 418. 
1238 
- See Issing (19939. op. cit., p. 44. 
1239 
. 
See Bank of England Act Chapter II of 1998. 
1240. See j. Lcape. "Independence and Accountability: the Role and Structure of the South African 
ReserNe Bank", LSE CREFSA Q. Rev.. Jan. 1995. p. 2 
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11.6.3 Deregulation of the CBN and NDIC from Political Interventions and Controls 
The greatest problems confronting the CBN and to an extent the NDIC are the 
politicisation of their functions, and their complete powerlessness regarding their core 
banking regulatory and supervisory responsibilities. Since the politicisation and the 
impotence of these regulatory agencies are legal realities, similar countervailing legal 
actions are required to rectify the regulatory and political anomalies. 
It is submitted that all the legal provisions contained in both 1991 CBN Decree and 
1991 BOFID, to the particular extent that they mandate presidential approvals for routine 
banking regulatory and supervisory duties, or vest in the President banking regulatory 
discretion are irrelevant, unnecessary, corruptive, and lacking any rational, technical, or 
functional utility except personal aggrandisement and political empowerment of the 
Nigerian President. This assertion applies with equal force to all the provisions in 1997 
CBN Decree, 1997 BORD Decree and the NDIC Decree as amended by 1997 NDIC 
Decree, to the same extent that they prescnbe ministerial approvals for certain routine 
banking regulatory and supervisory duties of the CBN and the NDIC. Indeed, the otiose 
nature of the ministefial approvals is revealed by the fact that such approvals had been 
previously abrogated1241 and out of use since 1991 with favourable effects until the 
clamour for powers by the present Finance Minister, Chief M. Ani. 
The facts that the Bank of England enjoys complete autonomy in respect of its 
banking regulatory and supervisory functions1242 which have been transferred to the 
Financial Service Authofity1243 (FSA), and that both the FED and FDIC are 
unencumbered1244with irrational presidential or ministerial authorisations in respect of 
1241 
- 
See CBN Decree No. 24 of 1991 before the 1997 amendment. 
242 
-See Banking Act of 1987. 
v and super%risory functions in respect of banks are nowvested in The Bank of England's regulator, 
Financial Semce Authority See Bank of England Act Chapter II of 1998. 
1244 
- 
See Scott. Hal. S. and Wellons. Philip. A., International Finance. Transactions. Policy. And 
Regulation, The Foundation Press. Inc. Westburý-. New York, 3rd edition, (1996). 
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their banking duties, suggest that such requirements in Nigeria serve no techrucal and 
functional purposes than political corruption. Indeed, the mandated presidential approvals 
have not prevented financial cnses and sporadic failure of banks in the country, hence 
could not be regarded as safeguards or safety nets. In fact, the presidential approvals have 
had the effects of permitting the pollution of the Nigerian financial system by dubious 
generals and politicians masquerading as bankers, and terminally ill banks surviving on 
generous subsidies. 
A fundamental objection against the centralisation of monetary and banking 
decision making powers in the Nigerian military Head of State, is its nauseating effect of 
investing such policies with utter mediocrity and ghastly incompetence. The military ruler 
ship in Nigefia has been charactefised by economic and political ignorance. Indeed, most 
Nigerian and Affican n-iilitary dictators have been described as "the proven idiots of our 
post-colonial experience" 1245. Yet, the most fundamental economic policies of the country 
lie solely in the hands of these unqualified persons "who, against all natural laws, appear to 
rise to the top"1246. It should not be surpfising the end-products of such ill-conceived 
policies as in Nigefia are calamitous. 
Additionally, since neither the President of USA, nor the Prime Minister of UK 
enjoys similar presidential nor executive approvals over banking matters, the Nigerian 
situation becomes suspect since the approvals have nothing to do with the powers and 
privileges of the Headship of a State or Government. Indeed, the Nigefian President has 
neither the powers nor prestige of the President of USA or Pfime Minister of UK, who 
exercises no presidential or nunistefial approvals over their respective financial systems. 
1245 
. 
See Spyinka, Wole., The Open Sore Of A Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis. 
Oxford Univusity Press, New York. (1996). p. 139. 
1246. Loc. cit. 
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The direct involvement of the Nigerian Head of State in such extraneous issues signifies 
his remarkable indolence, and undemanding state duties. 
The immediate abrogation of all presidential and ministerial approvals, statutorily 
required under the 1991 CBN Decree, 1991 BORD Decree, 1988 NDIC Decree, and 
their 1997 amendments, is recommended as crucial legal pre-condition to a successful 
financial reform programme in Nigeria. It has been rightly observed that "the CBN should 
be deregulated. If the CBN, the regulator- is not dereaulated then all the deregulation is 
half measure and regimented" 1247 
11.6.4 New Political Structure: A Necessity 
Perhaps, it must be stated from onset that most of our proposals above may, and 
indeed, could be implemented by a willing and honest military government save that where 
parliamentary oversight is recommended, the powers for the oversight be vested in the 
ruling government's highest decision making collegiate body such as PRC in Nigeria. 
However, since the proposals involve the divestiture of many presidential powers, it is 
most doubtful that a military Head of State will take such delimiting legislative steps. 
Thus, the proposals are only feasible insofar as they provide legal and regulatory 
frameworks that a military government may bequeath its democratic successor or may be 
adopted by a democratic government in Nigeria. Thus, a democratic government is crucial 
to our proposal for financial reforms in Nigeria. 
The intellectual commun-ity appears divided as to the ability of democratic politics 
to institute economic reforms due to the large predominance of redistribution relative to 
efficiency gains. Yet in recent times, the most successful reforming states are democratic 
societies'248. Indeed, recent studies have found a correlation between democratic 
1247. See Akin Disti. " Questions And Comments " in The Challenges & Management Of Change In The 
Nigerian Financial System 
. 
Papers and Proceedings of 1993 Workshop for Bank Directors. (Financial 
111stitutions Training Centre, Lagos, Nigeria. 1993) p. 13. 
1248 
. 
For examples USA, UK., Chile, Argentina, and Ghana. 
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government permitting civil liberties and positive government performances on one hand, 
and authoritarian governments suppressing liberties and poor government performances 
on the other' 
249. It has been asserted based on rigorous study that increasing citizen voice 
and public accountability through both participation and better governance can lead to 
1250 greater efficacy in government action 
The case for democracy as a fundamental condition for viable financial and 
economic reforms in Nigeria is made here on pragmatic grounds. The nature of the 
military government, its conunand structure, absolutism, and centralisation of powers are 
antithetical to financial deregulation which preaches decentralisation of economic powers, 
freedom of choice for economic agents, and independence of regulators. The military 
structure abhors independence to any organ even judiciary in Nigeria. The decentralisation 
of powers runs counter to the very base of military hegemony. 
Furthermore, the executive lawlessness, absence of restraints and complete 
disregard for legal norms that marked military governance in Nigeria deny such 
government any credibility that its financial regulations and policies would be respected 
even by the government itself The usual exclusion clauses"" which abrogate nghts to 
judicial remedies in a court of law against military goverriment's actions mean that abusive Z) I 
regulatory acts cannot be contested, and the rampant disobedience of court orders by 
military rulers and their agencies confirms that even when judicial access is available, 
enforcement action against military government is generally difficultI252. The remarkable 1 .1 
1249. See Isham, I Kaufman, D. and Pritchett. L. H., " CrOl Liberties. Democracy, and the Performance 
of Government Projects " (1997) The World Bank Economic Review. Vol. 11, No. 2,219 at 237. see also 
Arup Baner. ji and Hafez Ghanem Does the Type of Political Regime Matter for Trade and Labor 
Nlarket Policies" 
( 1997 ) The World Bank Economic Revievv. Vol. 11, No. 1.171 at 188. 
1250 
- 
See Ishain ct al, Ibid. p. 237. 
1251. See for example S. 1 (2) (b) of The Federal Nlilltajý- GoN, cmmcnt ( Suprcmacy and Enforcement of 
Powers ) Decree 1984. 
1252. See Stnt No. M/348/90 of 19/2/91. Glona MoNvarin V. Nigenan Army and ors. 
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ease of lawmaking procedure and the personalisation of the lawmaking powers1253 in the 
President of Head of State indicates that financial regulations and policies would be fluid, 
personalistic, inchoate and unstable. This is further complicated by the provision that the 
1254 mere oral pronouncement of the military Head of State is law 
These characteristics of the military governments conflict markedly with a 
deregulated financial market that requires carefully structured checks and balances to 
work in a harmonious way. Hence, it has been argued most appropfiately by the late 
professor of economics, Carlos Diaz Alejandro that the requirements of parliamentary 
oversights over regulatory agencies and the existence of checks and balances made 
"... democracy, whatever its more fundamental virtues,.. an important technical input for 
healthy domestic financial system"1255 
With particular reference to Nigeria, the point has been underscored that an 
independent central bank cannot act as an agent of restraint on a Nigerian military 
government, and emphasising that without "a trusted democracy with demonstrable 
defences for those who defy the wishes of the government, it is difficult to imagine a 
central bank governor refusing the wishes of a president and surviving" 1256. This is one 
salient reason that democracy is a crucial underpinning to financial reform in Nigeria. A 
leading Nigerian economist also contends that in the absence of clear democratic choice, 
"there is a strong temptation to convert the State into personal property with its attendant 
consequences in the absence of public accountability, in the growth of monumental 
corruption and in a decay of moral values" 12 
57 
1253. See Nwabueze, B. O.. MilItanI Rule And Constitutionalism in Nigeria, Spectrum Law Publishing. 
kigos, (1992), p. 7. 
1254 
. Sce Dccree No. 104 of 1993. 
1255. See Diaz- AlCiandro. op. cit.. p. 380. 
125ý'- See Collier Paul, " Living Down The Past : Redesigrung Nigenan Institutions For Economic Gro%Nih 
(1996) 95 African Affairs No. 380. '125 at 332. 
1257. See Okigbo, Essays in the Public Philosophy of Development. Vol. 3 op. cit p. 278. 
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We recommend democracy as technical input to financial reform in Nigeria. No 
other form of goverment is conducive to inviolate private activity, free enterprise, 
personal liberty , economic prosperity and the govemance of large educated groupS1258, 
than democracy with active parliamentary and judicial oversights. The lesson of the failure 
of military regime in Nigeria according to Professor Nwabueze, is "that there is no really 
viable alternative to a government freely elected by the people and limited in its powers by 
a supreme constitution" 
1259. The contrary evidence often cited in respect of financial 
liberalisation in Ghana under the military regime of Rawlings, and the authoritarian states 
of South East Asia can be distinguishedl260 
In the final analysis, we conclude as did, Sir Daldry, in 1965 that "the future of the 
banks like that of Nigeria depends on the maintenance and exhibition to the World of 
sensible and democratic political policies .......... 
111261 
11.7 Reforms of the Banking and Related Legislation :A Summary 
This section contains the summary of the reform proposals that have been 
suggested in respect of the defects in the banking and related laws. The reforms are - 
12ý'. See Galbraith. I K.. The Good Society. The Humane Agenda, Si nclai r- Stevenson, Great 
Britainj 1996) p. 72. See also Richard Posner, op. cit., p. 25. 
1259. Sec NNN-abueze. op. cit. p. 330. 
1260. The military regime in Ghana under Rawlings had a near platonic leadership since Flt. Lt. Rawlings 
%%as the first and still the only military Head of State in sub-Sahara Africa with university education at the 
tinie of accession to the State Headship. Furthermore, Rawlings was not a foot-soldier like his other 
111111tan- dictators in the area. he was an air officer Nvith flair for science and technology. Perhaps, these 
qtialities marked Rawlings apart. With respect to South East Asian states, one important feature is 
noticeable. The absolute concentration of political and economic powers in one single individual as 
obtained tinder militat), regimes in Africa, has been absent in South Korea, Singapore. Malaýsia, and 
Taman. These countries have always had decentrallsed political sý stems Nvith Presidents and Prime 
iiiinisters. 
1261. See Sir Leonard Daldn-, " Nigena " in Crick, W. F. (ed. ). Commonwealth Banking Systems, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford. (1965), p. 362. 
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1. The enactment of a provision mandating the co-ordination. of regulatory actions 
between the CBN and the NDIC. 
2. The enactment of a provision specifying the clear circumstances for regulatory actions 
of liquidation, conservation, and rehabilitation of failing banks by regulatory agencies, and 
equipping such agencies with necessary powers and duties in this respect. 
3. An amendment to the banking law specifying the time limit for the liquidation or sale of 
an assumed or acquired bank. 
4. The enactment of a provision prohibiting banks from granting loans to, or Investing in 
securities underwritten by their subsidiaries, or granting loans on the security of such 
subsidiaries' shares. Alternatively,, the provision may require that a parent bank's loans to, 
or investment in, its subsidiafies, be deducted from the parent bank's capital. 
5. The enactment of a mandatory ' fit and proper ' person test to be satisfied by 
prospective bank owners, managers, and controllers. 
6. The enactment of a provision that "at least two individuals effectively direct the 
business of a banking corporation". The non-observance of this provision should be a 
ground for the revocation of a bank licence. 
7. An amendment to the banking laws extending the permissible scope of banking 
activities in Nigeria, to include banking activities regarded as traditional under the EU 
Second Banking Directive. 
8. With respect to No. 7 proposal, the necessary safety rules, firewall provisions and 
capital adequacy requirements must be enacted to minimise the associated fisks. 
An amendment to the banking law or policy which will permit Nigerian banks to hold 
first rated foreign assets to minimise fisk concentration of assets, and enhance profitability. 
10. An amendment to the banking law defining the term representative office, its permitted 
activities and the grant of fight of examination of such office to the CBN. 
II. Incorporation to the banking law, of a right of judicial review in a court of law by 
aggrieved banks or persons against the decision of the financial regulators. 
294 
12. An amendment restonng high level of financial competence as qualification for the 
posts of chairman, governor and directors of CBN and NDIC. The chairmanship and 
directorship should be on full-time basis. 
13. The enactment of a provision mandating public information disclosure in a newspaper 
by the CBN of the financial condition of each bank in the country. The disclosure should 
be made three times in a year, stating the CBN's opinion on the state of affairs of each 
bank 
14. The enactment of a provision permitting private credit rating of banks by at least two 
private appraisers. 
15. The enactment of a provision granting the court of law the power to reopen 
extortionate credit or loan agreements , and do justice between the parties. 
16. The promulgation of a competition or anti-trust law. 
17. An amendment to the Money Laundering Decree abolishing the prohibition of certain 
cash transactions. 
18. An amendment to the Money Laundering Decree requiring NDLEA to have 
reasonable suspicion before conducting investigation or surveillance on a bank account, 
and further mandating a prior court order for stoppage or blockage of a suspect's bank 
account. 
11.8 Curbing Human Factors: Some Suggestions 
The role of human factor in bank failure in Nigeria has been underscored. The 
human factor lies in abusive insiders, corrupt supervisors and fraudulent customers. 
Attempts must be made to curb the human factor. Banking sector has a very high 
propensity to criminal activities. As Long observes "Finance is clearly a sector to which 
crooks gravitate. It is a convenient place to comnut white collar cnmes. Countnes need a 
legal systern and a regulator,,.,, framework to o,,,, ersee financiers to prevent banking 
fraud" 126ý 
Long. Millard- "Financial Reforms- A Global Perspective" in Shakil Faruql(cd. ). op. cit. p. 64. 
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Measures to curb human factor must address the political, institutional and 
regulatory dynamics of human factor. Human factor in banking has been greatly facilitated 
by political corruption, favouritism and inaction which ensure that banking criminals with 
political influence are shielded from arrest and prosecution. This protection is effective 
because all the agencies responsible for the arrest and prosecution of banking criminals are 
under direct political control which influences their actions and inactions. 
Indeed an example may be cited to illustrate the role of politics in promotion of 
human factor. The former managing director of Royal Merchant Bank, Mr Henry 
Imasekha was being investigated for financial misconduct by the Failed Bank Inquiry 
branch of the poliCe1263. The managing director of Nigerian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC), Mr John Ebhodaghe allegedly wrote to the police in respect of the 
investigation of Mr Imasekha that "I have instructions to request you to stop further 
investigation.... until further notice" 1264. The police refused this request and a high ranking 
superintendent was sent to effect the arrest of Mr Imasekha. Suffice to say that the 
superintendent was not only prevented from effecting the arrest but he (the 
superintendent) was arrested himself on the order of the Chief Security Officer to the then 
Head of State, General Abacha. 
The CBN, NDIC, Nigeria Police Force and Federal Ministry of Justice report 
directly to the Presidency. It is our view that if the recommended de politicisation and 
reforms of CBN and NDIC are implemented, the political undercurrents of human factor 
will be minimised. The CBN and NDIC may be able to instigate direct action against 
criminals without recourse to the political authofities. 
The institutional underpinnings of human factor lie in the gross inadequacy, 
corruption and inefficiency of Nigeria Police Force that is responsible for the investigation 
See Tell, Nigerian Magazine of 21/9/98 No. 38. pp. 19 - 22. 
lbid p. 19. 
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and apprehension of criminals. Professor Akanle, a former Director General of the 
Federal Ministry of Justice asserts -. 
Bank frauds and banking malpractices generally are highly technical 
and sophisticated. Without impugning our police force, investigation 
and prosecution of banking malpractices are not jobs for a Police 
officer whose basic educatiotial backgroutid is a West African School 
CertificateI265 or even less. Again, the investigation of such activities 
requires expert knowledge of banking, accounting and other related 
disciplines. Furthermore, the police lack the necessary gadgets and 
1266 logistics to respond to the demands of this important sector 
Althou ha special branch called Failed Bank Inquiry was established for dealing 9 
with banking fraud, the institutional drawbacks of the Police Force permeate the whole 
system. The result is that banking criminals can predict with a degree of certainty that 
crimes will neither be detected nor will they be prosecuted and punished. A suggestion to 
minimise this problem of adequate policing is the creation of an Office for Special Fraud 
(OSF) which will be staffed with adequately qualified, specially trained, well remunerated 
and credible investigators and lawyers to investigate and prosecute banking criminals. 
The SOF should be independent, financially autonomous, and reports directly to 
the parliament. The CBN, NDIC, banks, and other financial institutions must have a 
mandatory duty of disclosure of financial fraud to the OSF. The OSF should also have a 
mandatory duty of prosecuting banking fraud and aggrieved persons should be 
enipowered to apply to the Court for an order compelling SOF to prosecute in cases 
where they are personally affected or public interest issue is at stake. 
The regulatory incentive of human factor which may be located in the gross 
inadequacy of penalty for banking crimes is best exemplified by the case of Lord Chief 
1265 
. This is equivalent to GCE'O'Lc-%, cl in 
UK. 
See Akanlc, Oluwolc.. " Legal and Institutional Framework for the Control and Prevention of Crime 
in the Banking Industry" in Ajibola. Bola and Kalu. Awa. U.. (eds. ). Banking and Other Financial 
Malpractices in Nigeria. Federal Ministn- of Justice, Lagos (1990). p. II- 
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Ifegwu and Others VS. Federal Republic of NigefiaI267where banking criminals who stole 
the sum of US $2,962,062.89 (Two million, nine hundred and sixty-two thousand 
Dollars, eighty-nine cents equivalent to N242,889,156.98 (Two hundred and forty-two 
million, eight hundred and eighty-nine thousand, one hundred and fifty-six Naira, ninety- 
eight kobo) were given a fine of the paltry sum of N100,000.00 (One hundred thousand 
Naira) or 2 years each under section 18 of BOFID. This sentence of fine is alarming 
considering the gravity and sum involved in the crime. The BOFfD and CBN Decrees 
should be amended so that punishment will fit the crime. It is submitted that fines of fixed 
sums should be replaced with scale of fines with graduated punishment and higher tariffs 
according to the gravity of the crime. Mandatory prison sentences without options of fine 
for banking fraud above specified threshold should also be enacted. 
A most radical suggestion will be a legislation which grants a right of private 
prosecution of banking cfiminals to affected banks, customers and persons, and a fight of 
civil prosecution with treble damages to customers and persons affected by banking cfimes 
against both the criminal and the bank. These measures will provide alternative remedies 
to the present government/public only approach to mitigating banking cnmes. The 
creation of a Banking Ombudsman may also be useful in this respect. 
Additionally, this work has highlighted the problem of credibiliov that now affects 
the Failed Bank Tribunal that deals with civil and cnrninal cases concerning failed and 
failing banks. It is submitted that in order to restore the credibility of the Tribunal and its 
judicial integrity the following measures should be implemented. First, the Failed Bank 
Tribunal should be removed ftom the direct control of the Presidency. The Chief Justice of 
the Federation should be the proper overseer of the Tribunal. Second, the appointment of 
judges of the Tribunal and its appellate body should be from the core of serving judges 
with inipeccable record. Third, a time limit for the arrest, detention and prosecution of 
1267. SUpM. 
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suspects should be enacted. The present situation under which about 250 persons are in 
detention and in some cases for more than three years without tria11268 is a mockery of 
criminal justice. 
Perhaps an area that requires very urgent attention is the recovery of bank debts 
from defaulting customers. The law at present only addresses the recovery of debts owed 
to failed banks. It appears to have ignored the recovery of debts owed to other banks and 
financial institutions and the attendant effects of non-recovery of such debts. We 
recommend in this respect the establishment of special tribunals that will deal with 
recovery of bank debts. These special tribunals have been established recently in IndiaI269 
and Sn Lanka1270 to curb the phenomenal rise in bad performing loans and unproductive 
assets of banks and financial institutions due to defaulting borrowers1271 C) 
The solution to human factor in Nigeria inevitably has an international dimension 
because of the trend among suspected bank criminals of absconding from the country to 
1272 from investigation, possible prosecution and punishment. It is essential to stem escape 
the tide of escaping criminals that efforts be made to extradite some of the fugitives from 
foreign countfies. This will require massive diplomatic and legal efforts in cases of foreign 
countries that have extradition Treaties with Nigeria, however, in cases where there are no 
Treaties, it may be necessary to enter into such Treaties. 
1268. See Tell, Nigenan Magazine of 21/9/98 op. cit p. 22. 
1269. See The Recoveiýl of Debts Due To Banks & Financial Institutions Act 1993 (India). 
1270 
. 
See The Debt Recovery (Special Pro%isions) Act No. 2 of 1990 (Sri Lanka). 
1 '117 1. See Abevratne. Sonah. G., Banking And Debt Recoven': A Comparative Study of the Law and 
Practice In India, Sn Lanka and Malaysia, Ph-D Thesis, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, University of London, (1998). 
1272 Sec Tell. Nie 'an Magazine of Nov. 2.1998. No. 44, pp. 25 -29. en 
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11.9 Implementation of Reform Proposals: A Comment 
A menu of reform proposals has been suggested in this Thesis. The proposals that 
are central to this work consist of delimitation of government borrowings, and 
independence, de politicisation and empowerment of the CBN and the NDIC. The other 
suggested amendments to the banking laws are, however, crucial for an integrative and 
effective financial reform and a political reform is fundamental for a sustainable reform. 
We suggest a holistic reformative approach. 
Our model of financial regulation is a framework that is exclusively concerned with 
issues regarding the safety and security of depositors, institutions and the financial system. 
As Llewellyn rightly subn-tits, "If social objectives are set these should be pursued through 
means other than financial regulation for this is difficult enough in itself without 
encumbering it with objectives it is unsuited to attain" 1273 
The question, however, arises regarding the feasibility and practicability of the 
proposals. It is our view that the proposals are feasible and practical insofar as they are 
based on approaches in countries which laws have influenced legal developments in 
Nigeria and other countries at similar stages of development. Indeed, "regulation in the 
financial system cannot now be regarded as exclusively a national issue, with national 
regulatory arrangements framed without any reference to those in other major financial 
centres" 1274 
International legal regimes have also offered useful guidance on reform proposals. 
We advocate the Second Banking Directive of the European Union as a model for 
universal banking or banking desegmantation in Nigefia. The Investment Services 
Directivel275 of the European Union concerning investment services may also be adopted 
1273 
. 
See Llcwcllyn. D. T.. op. cit. p. 7 1. 
1274 
. Ibid. p. 46. 
75 1, -e 93/22/EEC of May 10.1993 on Investment Services in the Secuntles Fic d See Council Directi% 
1993 O. J. (L 141/27). 
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in respect of banking conglomerates and finance companies. The provisions of the 
directive regarding scope of activities, fitness r-ule, capitalisation, operating conditions and 
protection of customers and third parties will provide a useful framework for designing 
effective regulations for banks and other financial institutions dealing in investment 
services. The directive is specially relevant in view of the magnitude of failure affecting 
other financial institutions and community banks. 
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision's recommendation on Capital 
Adequacy Standard (Basle Accord) influenced Capital Adequacy Standard of the Nigerian 
banking system. Most recently, the Basle CommitteeI276 on Banking Supervision 
recommended core principles for effective banking supervision that are to be adopted by 
member states as "minimum requirements" 1277. The provisions of Basle Committee on 
"Core Pfinciples For Effective Banking Supervision" provide a useful framework for 
financial reform. The core pfinciples consist of 25 (twenty-five) principles which in the 
main concern preconditions for effective banking supervision, licensing and structure, 
methods of ongoing banking supervision, capital adequacy requirements and information 
requirements1278 
The Basle Committee's core principles1279 have parallel recommendations with this 
Thesis regarding independence and empowerment of regulators, 'four eyes' test and fit and 
proper test. However, there are marked differences in the two separate recommendations 
1276. The Basle Committee on Banking Super%ision is a Comn-dt-tee of banking supen'Isory authorities 
which was established by the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries in 1975. It usually 
inects at the Bank for International Settlements in Basle, where its permanet Secretariat is located. 
1277 
- See Basic Committee on Banking Supervision. 
Notes for editors on Core Principles of effective 
banking supervision, April 1997, p. 2. 
1278. See Core Principles For Effecti,,,., c Banking Supenision, Consultative paper issued by the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision. Basle. April 1997. 
1279 
- The recent interest by Basle Corninittee and the 
international coniniunity in setting conipi-chcrisiVe 
bank, ing standard has been traced to the idea of International Banking Standard rnooted bý- Moms 
Goldstein. See Goldstein, Morris.. The Case for an International Banking Standard, Institute for 
International Econoniics, Washington. D. C.. (1997). 
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in some areas. The Basle Committee recommended extensive principles conceming 
operating plan, intemal organisation, market risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, capital w 
adequacy, risk management, ongoing examination, banking acquisition and cross border 
banking1280. The banking reforms in Nigeria will benefit tremendously by adopting the 
core pfinciples in these areas in respect of which this Thesis did not contain 
recommendations. 
This Thesis however contains specific recommendations to rt-ýitigate the effects of 
macro-econon-ýc clestabilisation of banking system, politicisation of banking regulation and 
supervision, political and personal corruption, negative human factor, absence of financial 
information, abusive interlocking ownership, absence of competition and inadequate 
protection of customers. Additionally, this Thesis underscores the role of the judiciary in 
banking reforms. The Basle Committee's core principles did not contain any 
recommendation in respect of these issues at all. It seems in these areas this Thesis offers 
useful guidance to Nigeria and other countries plagued by similar problems. 
The importance of these issues in banking reforms cannot be over emphasised in 
view of recent developments in South East Asia and Russia. Indeed a comparison of the 
Nigefian banking cfisis with the banking crises in South East Asia reveals some identical 
underlying factors. The Indonesian banking crisiS1281 owed much to the legendary 
corruption of General Suharto and his cronies, politicisation of banking supervision, 
episodic crisis, and inadequate regulations. The Japanese banking system was 
characterised by defective banking laws, regulatory inaction, repressive measures, insider 
abuse and political intransigence. An executive director of Bank of Japan, Tadayo Homma 
confesses that " There must be problems in the way the Ministry of Finance and Bank of 
1280. See Sections 111, IV and VI. ibid. 
1281 1 -press, Wednesday May 20. - 
See IMF Survey. Nov. 17,1997 Vol. 26 No. 2 1. p. '54 -. see also The Ex 
1998 p. 25. 
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Japan conduct inspections" 1282. Japan has now embarked on comprehensive financial 
legislation"" with a promise of tremendous reforms. 
The banking problems in South Korea1214 also reflect inadequate banking laws, 
repressive banking regulations, corruption, regulatory inaction and inside abuse. The same 
characteristics marked the banking crisis in Russia1285 that is plagued by massive 
corruption1286, defective banking laws, insider abuses, politicisation of banking regulation 
and supervision, Mafia gangsters, episodic crisis and grave political instability signified by 
frequent change of government1287. Indeed the IMF managing director, Nfichel Camdessus 
has concluded that "many of the problems that lie at the heart of Asia's difficulties are 
bound up with poor governance" 1288. The parallel nature of the causes of banking crises in 
South East Asia, Russia and Nigeria makes the analysis and recommendations of this 
Thesis apposite to comprehensive banking reforms in those countfies. 
A major issue with our reform proposals concerns its implementation. The fact that 
most of the reform proposals will divest the political authorities of their powers, control 
and rents may act as a disincentive for the implementation of reform. The leading financial 
sector expert at the World Bank, Millard Long has correctly asserted that the reason 
to it is so hard to get financial reform going is that finance is so close to the political 
1282. See Financial Times, Wednesday Nov. 26,1997, p. 8. 
1283. See Katayarna. Tatsu and Makov. Richard., "Deregulation of Financial Markets in Japan", 119981 
International Journal of Banking Law, p. 128. 
1284. See Financial Times, Wednesday Nov. 26,1997. p. 8. 
1 M. Scc IMF Survey, Februan- 23.1998. Vol. 27, No. 4. p. 49. 
'I ý86- See World Bank Polic,, - And Research Bulletin. Oct. -Dec. 1997, Vol. 8. No. 4. p. 4. 
1287. The seriousness of govcrnnicrital instability in Russia has such a point that President Bons Yeltsin 
agreed recently to a curb on his constitutional poNker to dismiss the cabinet. He undertakes to consult the 
parliament and ca, binet before exercising such poN%cr in future. See BBC Teletext Service, 6/2/99, p. 142. 
1288 1 Sec IMF Sun-cv. Februan- 9.1998. Vol. 27, No. '. p. 37. 
301 
process. Ever-y government has skeletons in its closet: things they have done with finance 
to favour political friends. They understand that looking too closely at the banks and the 
banks' portfolio will reveal these things, so they prefer not to undertake reform" 1289 
This problem of lack of incentive may, however, be overcome or mitigated by the 
following factors: 
a) The current prolonged economic and political crisis which threatens the stability of 
Nip-erian state may force the government to undertake reform. 
b) The massive failure of banks and other financial institutions with the attendant effects 
on the financial system and economy may coerce the government into further fire-fightingy 
reform measures. 
c) The international creditors, IMF and World Bank may exert considerable leverage on 
the Nigerian goverriment to undertake reform before any financial assistance will be 
forthcoming. 
d) The need to implement the Basle Committee's recommended 'Core Principle For 
Effective Effective Banking Supervision'to ensure the compliance of Nigerian banking law 
with international standard. 
e) The quest for reform by CBN and NDIC officials, Chartered Institute of Bankers of 
Nigeria (CIBN), depositors, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Opposition 
politicians and intellectual community may act as impetus for reform. 
It seems the IMF andWorld Bank represent the most potent force that may 
pressurise the Nigerian government into undertaking reforms. Indeed, some of the present 
economic measures of the Nigerian government are allegedly influenced by the IMF1290. In 
this respect, our proposed reforms (excluding democracy) or similar ones may be 
recommended by the IMF and World Bank to the Nigerian government. The reform 
12,49. See LIcwdlyn, op. cit.. p. 63. 
-3 1999. p. 12. , ", o. See The Guardian On Sunday, Nigenan Nem-spaper. Januar- '. 
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proposals comply with the INT and World Bank Treaties and the recent INff Code of 
Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency1291 
11.10 The Theory of Financial Liberalisation : Some Lessons from the Nigerian 
Experience 
It is widely acceptedJ292 that the main intellectual influence of the recent waves of 
financial reforms in many developing countries is the Mckinnon-Shaw theory of financial 
liberalisation which has been adopted and prescribed by the international financial 
institutions, the IMF and World Bank in particular1293. The theory forms the core 
intellectual and conceptual paradigm of this work. We have analysed and exanuned it in 
the light of the practical realities of the Nigerian financial system, and economy. A 
fundamental observation is that the theory's basic diagnoses of the critical problems of 
financial systems in third world countries, and the consequences of such problems on the 
countries' economies bear close resemblance to the pre-reform Nigerian financial system 
and economy. 
The essential hallmark of the theory of financial liberalisation lies however not in 
locating the problems, but in proposing credible and viable solutions to the financial 
qLiagmire of most developing countries. Perhaps, with respect to Nigeria, it may be 
highlighted that the theory's catalogue of solutions as remedies for repressive financial I 
systems, offer nothing new to the country since an array of international economic 
reports' 294 , commissioned works1295., intellectual treatise1296 and review committees1297 
12'), 
, 
See Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund- Code of Good 
Practices on Fiscal Transparency- Declaration on Principles of April 16,1998. (1998) 37 I. L. M. 942. 
1292. See Fry. Maxwell. J.. (1991) op. Cit. P. 341. 
129-1. Ibid. p. 245. Sec also Sikorski. op. cit. p. 91. 
1294. See The Economic Development Of Nigcfia, IBRD. op. cit.. p. 354. 
1295. See hickcr-Flectwood. op. cit.. pp. 266-267. 
1296 1 
- See Agu, op. cit.. p. 167.. Olashore. op. cit., P. 116. Okigbo. Essays. op. cit.. p. 235. 
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had as far back as 1954 and early 1960s.. recommended similar reform measures to 
successive Nigerian governments which characteristically refused to heed such 
recommendations. Thus, most financial liberalisation measures are rational and pragmatic 
solutions which devoid of intellectual hostility and dogmatism, compel careful examination 
and application. 
The Nigerian experience of financial deregulation however reveals that the 
Mckinnon-Shaw theory of financial liberalisation suffers from two apparent defects that 
we called legal and political imbalances. The theory although abhors government's 
irrational interventions, appears to assume that the government will honestly embraced 
financial reforms and implement measures faithfully. It was an idealised vision of the 
government reforming efforts, and voluntary renunciation of fiscal and financial 
recklessness. It also seems to have assumed the creation or existence of appropriately 
equipped, legally efficient and politically independent regulatory and supervisory agencies. 
Furthermore, while the theory recognises the personal and political rent seeking 
that underlines regulatory interventionism and control, it appears to have discounterianced 
its strength of continuity , which may undermine 
financial liberalisation, and thus failed to 
provide a framework for viable political and legal mechanisms that would neutralise or 
m1mmise such political extemalities. With benefit of hindsight, the Mckinnon-Shaw theory, 
fails to underscore the importance of true democracy in politically unstable societies, to 
provide the necessary parliamentary and judicial checks and balances, and politically stable 
and credible polity, conducive to a liberalised financial market. 
These apparent failures of the theory made it vulnerable to elasticity of political 
and legal surprises, and dented its potency. Indeed, the Mckinnon-Shaw theory recognises 
the role of fiscal viability and macroeconomic stability to financial liberalisation, and the 
1297, See the White Paper on the Okigbo Financial Svstern Review Committee of 1976. the decisions of 
(Ile Federal Exccutivc Council on the Mckenzie Report of 1977, and the White Paper on the Onosode 
Commission on Parastatals of 198 1. 
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presence of galloping inflation in most developing countries, but did not propose the legal 
restraint of central bank borrowing by the government. Neither did it underscore the 
independence of the central bank and financial regulators as essential conditionalities to 
successful financial reforms, nor advocate the importance of their security of tenure. Thus, 
no regulatory framework for the independence of central bank was proposed. In the 
classical version of the separation of politics from econon-ks, the dangers of autocratic 
governments to financial reforms was neglected, and its political and legal reforms 
onýtted. Legal checks and balances against rent-seeking and abusive regulatory behaviours 
were ignored. 
The theoretical failures indicate the partial and incomplete nature of the Mckinnon- 
Shaw theory of financial liberalisation. While, the key economic issues were addressed, the 
legal and political indices were overlooked. Indeed, the legal , political and economic 
remedies to the major economic difficulties confronting many financially repressive 
countries - fiscal imbalance and inflationary dilemma , were neglected. It is submitted that 
financial reform to be effective must be comprehensive, multidimensional and holistic. The 
Nigerian expefience has underscored the essentiality of incorporating legal, political and 
institutional variables into any model of financial reform1298 
1298 
. 
See Lewis and Stein, op. cit.. p. 5. see also Collierk. op. cit.. p. 325. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Ownership of the Nigerian domestic public debt 1963 - 85 
Million naira 
Year Central bank Comm. banks Non- bank public Total 
1963 36.4 3.4 87.6 127.4 
1964 40.6 11.8 121.9 174.3 
1965 63.1 14.1 139.1 216.3 
1966 100.4 27.3 160.5 288.2 
1967 155.8 33.4 176.2 365.4 
1968 90.5 218.5 183.1 492.1 
1969 185.4 314.6 274.0 774.0 
1970 231.7 459.0 380.1 1,070.8 
1971 342.6 328.0 447.7 1,118.3 
1972 194.3 387.4 419.0 1,000.7 
1973 222.4 387.8 451.0 1,061.2 
1974 22.2 766.0 478.4 1,266.6 
1975 313.7 801.3 563.9 1,678.9 
1976 459.7 1,196.8 973.5 2,630.0 
1977 1,683.1 1,685.2 1,267.7 4,636.0 
1978 3,197.3 1,096.5 1,689.3 5,983.1 
1979 2,549.2 2,416.4 2,316.7 7,282.3 
1980 2,859.3 2,978.9 2,080.3 7,918.5 
1981 6,046.6 2.155.2 3,243.7 11,445.5 
1982 8,022.5 3,168.5 3,656.5 14,847.5 
1983 11,347.4 5,459.7 5.417.2 22,224.3 
1984 10,701.4 8,998.2 5.9 7 -5.4 25,675.0 1985 11,521.9 10,669.1 5,761.0 27,952.0 
Sources : CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts - various years. 
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Ownership of the Nigerian domestic public debt 1963 - 85 
Percentages of total debt 
Year Central bank Comm. banks Non- bank public 
1963 28.6 2.7 68.8 
1964 23.3 6.8 69.9 
1965 29.2 6.5 64.3 
1966 34.8 9.5 55.7 
1967 42.6 9.1 48.2 
1968 18.4 44.4 37.2 
1969 24.0 40.6 35.4 
1970 21.6 42.9 35.5 
1971 30.6 29.3 40.0 
1972 19.4 38.7 41.9 
1973 21.0 36.5 42.5 
1974 1.8 60.5 37.8 
1975 18.7 47.7 33.6 
1976 17.5 45.5 37.0 
1977 36.3 36.4 27.3 
1978 53.4 18.3 28.2 
1979 35.0 33.2 31.8 
1980 38.0 32.5 29.5 
1981 52.8 18.8 28.3 
1982 54.0 21.3 24.6 
1983 51.1 24.5 24.3 
1984 42.0 35.0 23.0 
1985 41.2 38.2 20.6 
Source: CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Account - Various years. 
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Requirements for Minimum Paid-up Capital in Nigeria 
(N) 
Year Commercial Banks Merchant Banks 
Indigenous Expatriate 
1952 25,000 200,000 
1958 500,000 400,000 
1969 600,000 1,500,000 
1979 600,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 
1988 10,000,000 6,000,000 
1989 20,000,000 12.000,000 
1991 50,000,000 40,000,000 
1997 500,000,000 500,000,000 
Source: CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts - various years. 
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Deposit, Total Assets and Number of banks in Nigeria 1960 -1995 
Year Number of Number of Total Deposit Total Assets 
Banks Bank (N' Nfillion) (N'Wlion) 
Branches 
1960 13 193 137.0 235.8 
1965 18 225 298.3 3 439.8 
1970 15 277 630.4 1,159.8 
1975 23 442 2,902.5 49494.0 
1980 26 752 109295.1 17,348.0 
1985 40 1,323 19,445.7 36,999.0 
1986 42 1,494 20,478.6 68,024.1 
1987 50 1,545 26,469.7 62,108.4 
1988 66 1,711 339882.7 769429.8 
1989 81 1,904 30,990.6 87,641.4 
1990 107 29001 43,869.0 111,551.3 
1991 119 2,171 59,476.7 155,456.9 
1992 120 2,364 87.738.2 232.2 78. -5 1993 143.853.0 341.743.5 
1994 116 2,541 166,1 310.5 393,979.1 
1995 115 2500 208,850.3 
-5 -5 -5,4 
72.7 
Sources: CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts - various years. 
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OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF BANKS WITH FEDERAL GOVERNME-NNT 
PARTICIPATION 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE (%) 
S/ Federal State Private Foreigners Total 
No Commercial Banks Govt. Govts. Nigerian 
1. Afribank PIc 50 - 10 40a 100 
2. Allied Bank of Nig. PIc 51 -9 40 100 
3. First Bank of Nig. PIc 44.8 - 17.2 38 100 
4. FSB Inter. Bank PIc 100.0 -- - 100 
5. Nigeria-Arab Bank Ltd., 60.0 -- 40 100 
6. Savannah Bank of Nigeria PIc. 51.3 - 18.5 30.2 100 
7. Union Bank of Nig. PIc- 51.7 - 48.3 - 100 
8. United Bank for Africa PIc. 45.8 14.2 40 100 
Merchant Banks 
9. Continental Merchant 51 9 40c 100 
10. Icon ( Merchant Bankers 90b 10 100 
11. Int. Merchant Bank 60 - 40c 100 
12. Merchant Bank of Africa 4.45 55.5 40 100 
13. NAL Merchant Bank 47.3d 10.3c 16.4 26 100 
14. Nigeria Merchant Bank PIc. 60 40f - 100 
a= Foreign Technical Partner in voluntary withdrawals, shares warehoused pending sale to suitable 
partners. 
b= Nigerian industnal Development Bank owns 60% while NICON owns 30% 
c= Warehoused pending sale 
d= This includes NICON's shareholding 
e= Proportion owned bNr New Nigerian Development Company Limited 
f= UBA own 40% 
Sources: CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, 1992 & 1993. 
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SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL SAVINGS AT BANKS AND NON-BANK 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. 
Sav. & Time Dep. 
(N'Million) 
1985 1987 1991 1992 1994 1995 
i) At Commercial Banks 9994.9 15,088.7 30,359.75 42,438.8 76,128.0 93,327.8 
fi) At Merchant Banks 1145.1 2,822.8 7007.0 8,342.5 
23,731.3 22.476.7 
National Provident Fund 524.7 614.0 650.0 719.8 757.8 731.4 
Mortgage Institutions 113.9 133.7 433.7 729.4 1,135.8 894.9 
Life Insurance Funds N/A N/A 1,242.2 1,411.3 1,392.7 1,928.5 
Other Dep. Institutions 
TOTAL 
8.2 
11786.8 
N/A 45.6 
18,659.2 37,738.2 
341.8 
53.983.6 
BANKING SYSTEM CREDIT TO THE ECONOMY 
MONTHLY AVERAGES (N'Million) 
Year Total To Private To Government 
Sector Sector 
1985 31,335.5 13,070 18,265.0 
1986 33,920.0 15,247.5 18,672.5 
1987 38,531.7 18,317.6 20,214.1 
1988 52,771.4 27,326.4 25,445.0 
1989 54,488.8 30,403.2 24,085.6 
1990 -50,179.9 
33,547.7 16,632.2 
1991 83,823.7 45,325.2 38,498.5 
1992 14 1,735.7 61,020.3 80,715.4 
1993 271,350.9 92,501.6 178,849.3 
1994 312,268.0 113,519.2 198,748.8 
1995 383,821.4 154,579.1 229,242.3 
Sources: CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts- various years. 
2,988.9 1,666.9 
106,134.5 121,026.2 
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RETURNS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS ON FRAUDS AND FORGERIES 
Year No Of Reported Amount Involved Actual/ Expected Proportion Of 
Fraud Cases (N') Loss Actual/Expected 
In Banks (N') Loss To Amount 
Involved 
1989 62 98,223.6 15,341.0 15.6 
1990 91 788,798.1 22,449.1 2.9 
1991 79 360.19m 25.50m 2.9 
1992 89 351.93m 64.8m 18.4 
1994 152 2,655.71m 883.55m 33.26 
1995 127 1,006.28m 226.38m 22.49 
RETURNS OF MERCHANT BANKS ON FRAUDS AND FORGERIES 
Year No Of Reported 
Fraud Cases 
In Banks 
Amount Involved 
(N') 
ActuaU Expected 
Loss 
(N') 
1989 6 6,744,132.00 100,000 
1990 10 15,398,784.08 33,392.23 
1991 17 28.39m 1.18M 
1992 19 59.82m 8.3 1m 
1994 18 5.08m 2.75m 
1995 14 743.68m 67.10m 
Million 
Ncgligible. 
Sources: NDIC, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts- various years. 
Proportion Of 
Actual/Expected 
Loss To Amount 
Involved 
0.2 
0.2 
13.9 
9.02 
54.13 
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Ownership of the Nigerian domestic public debt 1988 - 95 
Million naira 
Year Central Bank Commercial Merchant Non-Bank Total 
Bank Bank Public 
1988 27,682.7 7,714.5 181.5 11,452.4 47.03 1.1 
1989 38,391.3 3,670.6 98.2 14,891.0 57,051.1 
1990 56,564.1 8,917.3 355.8 18,255.9 84,093.1 
1991 89,412.6 6,847.0 679.4 19,261.2 116,200.2 
1992 122,028.3 5,881.2 1,027.0 32,963.7 161,900.2 
1993 189,773.4 29,346.8 9,451.1 32,522.3 261,093.6 
1994 241,567.5 39,184.2 8,644.8 51,869.8 341,266.3 
1995 340,471.0 18,007.6 2,105.3 49,014.1 409.598.0 
Sources: CBN, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, - various years. 
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SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF CREDIT: BEFORE LIBERALISATION 
COMMERCIAL BANK 
Sectoral Distribution Of Bank Credit 
Percent 
1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 
A. Preferred sectors/sub-sectors 
(1) Production 48 48 50 
Agriculture 6 6 6 
Mining 2 2 2 
Construction 10 10 10 
Residential (5) (5) 
Others (5) (5) 
(Ii) Services 10 10 10 
Public utilities 2 2 2 
Transportation & Conununication 8 8 8 
Total A 58 58 60 
B. Less Preferred sectors/sub-sectors 
(iii) General Commerce 30 30 30 
Exports 6 6 6 
Imports 10 10 10 
Domestic Trade 12 12 12 
Bill discounted 2 2 2 
(W) Other 12 12 12 
Credit & Financial Institution 3 3 3 
Goverrument 2 2 2 
Personal & Professional 4 4 4 
Miscellaneous 3 3 
Total B 42 42 40 
Total ( A&B 100 100 100 
MERCHANT BANK 
Scctoral Distribution Of Bank Credit 
Percent 
1976/77 1977/ 78 1978/79 
A. Preferred sectors/sub-sectors 
(1) Production 60.0 60.0 64.0 
Agriculture 6.0 6.0 4.0 
Mining 2.0 -). 0 -). 0 
Manufacturing 36.0 '16.0 40.0 
Construction 16.0 16.0 18.0 
, 50 
Residential (5 0) (5.0) 
Others (11.0) (1-1.0) 
(il) Services 10.0 10.0 10.0 
Transportation & Communication 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Public utilities 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Total A 70.0 70.0 70.0 
B. Less Preferred sectors/sub-sectors 
(Iii) General Commerce 23.0 23.0 23.0 
Exports 5.0 5.0 5.0 
1 mports 11.0 11.0 11.0 
Domestic Trade 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Bill discounted 
(1v) Others 7.0 7.0 7.0 
Credit & Financial Institution 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Government 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Miscellaneous 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Total B 30.0 30.0 30.0 
Total ( A&B ) 100 100 100 
SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF CREDIT AFTER LI]BERALISATION 
Sectoral Allocation Of Bank Credit For 1987 - 1989 
( Per cent ) 
Sector 
Commercial 
Banks 
A. High Priority Sectors 50.0 
(i) Agricultural Production (15.0) 
(ii ) Manufacturing Enterprises (35.0) 
Merchant 
Banks 
50.0 
(10.0) 
(40.0) 
B. Other Sectors 50.0 
-50.0 
Total "A" +"B 100.0 100.0 
Note : Percentage shares of "A" (i) and (ii) should be regarded as minima. 
Sectoral Allocation Of Bank Credit For 1992 - 1996 
( Per cent ) 
Sector 
A. Priority Sectors 
(a) Agricultural 
(b) Manufacturing 
(c) Exports 
(d) Solid Minerals 
B. Others Sectors 
Total (A+B ) 
Comm. Merchant Comm. Merchant COMM. Merchant 
Banks Banks Banks Banks 1994 Banks Banks 
1992/93 1992/93 1994 1995/96 1995/96 
50 50 60 58 75 75 
5.0 10.0 18 13 18 13 
35.0 40.0 42 45 42 45 
- - - 10 12 
5 5 
50 50 30 30 25 25 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note : The Percentage shares in A(a). (b). and (c )Nvere prescribed as minima, while those in B were 
deemed maxima. 
Sources: CBN, Monetary and Policy Guidelines, - vanous years. 
352 
APPENOX 11 
PO 
'At the Lips of Dawn F 4 , , h' ra tary nn is sc: Ii oo Is 0 ia t ar c ru ii cl I s<) ii Vj It schools. dicy could be rectruited directly into die fcirceý aner byparents ajLmous rarstwidard educa- procced to the Nigerian Defence Academy or attend 
ýr)r. and die right cotulections; for their kids. public umversitics to tam a degree wid seek corninis- -Pic splendour ofa inifitary parade , 
die siniis as officer-s 
precision wid synchrony in'. the inoverricifts' Apart from the likelihood of a fuhire career iii the 
in. &scipbricd mass i!. all endi tring a6rert fýw die arm cd military, die parents oflen assume that die schools will 
f,,, M, cridjessly. effective ui conjuiing adiYar-abon, offer Vicir wards. the required militziry traliung for the 
sometimes even t. No worideir parlides draw Its c 
fiihert as weU as iriculcate die essental disciplilic wid 
- - 
" c 
crowd, oferithus-b, Youth :*i In 
n radity ilito Oinse clukireii. 1 he adequate prolectori 
MifftjyschooLs 1mve come close tollieparade intlic givciilo the students byinilitarypersonnel also ciicoirr- 
eyes ofmony civilians in 
Nigeria. Every parent wants age 
Is 
Hit parents. 
' 
his child to school in Mc0r th c nukiý , Uuutll6olis rull 
Some military part -nts prefer their childreri to be in 
17Y the army, navy arld the airforce. 'nic itubtary nuis 
tho&c schools to perpetiatt the family's martial creden- 
' 
Iw is that cantrain a child 
from thel, Ch 
i7s ofdawn right 
fials. T heyalso believe that Hit interactio-ri between the 
, zp to when fit cains a 
first deface. " . kids could strengthen their Riturt relationsNps if)di-y 
Admission into ruch schools as: bic Command get 
to the threshold orpower, the kids help bring the 
!;, v, ridary Schools (CSC), Nigeriamilevy Secondary 
Parents together. 
ý, Jmh (ýTNSý, the Nigerian AirforbtMititary School 
Beside the adv-, mtagts derivable from attending the 
Vid theNigerimi 
Mihtwy Schocý " 'is corn btive. Z"- 
IT parents battle fur Hie admissiorn of Qlýir war 
sc hools, the parents are always happy each time they 
see their kids clad in mibtwy uruform and this often 
R,: Oft- when Oic forms are obtAitc! to whenthe propels 
them into encourapig ffic children- 5 participa- 
cltffvj, wr, into thme schools we o6MUcted, the tele- 
bon in military clubs -P-12RY -the cadet corps, a 
phmr lines ofthe commandantsofthi*hools artbusy 
paramilitilry otgariisation. 
while fleet, orcarr we parked at thittafool prcrru . ses as 
peents; lobby for. their wards' admis; sibm. Mostofthe 
Due to these advwdages, parents do everything to 
get their wwds adrnýitted into tfie schools. Parents 
- 
ctndvlAte! ý we Krought in mibtary vibicles for idenbfi- 
without rriilitiuýbackpvind put iýfincssures aii 
cation and personal rer-ogrution. 
ii " parents'desptrabonis prrmiied-on the fBcttlt at\ 
military officers. 
Students in the-rnifitary schools tam respectable 
. , 1,,. mihtiuy schools we wcll-stzffiýd wid equi ed , " 
ý esidts in national examinabons. 1hose who warlt a 
the 
T 
To them, the future of Nigeria is fidd to that . 
A6 DfOic Ni eiiii oftorn OITO`ýr is ib' ' - ` e ` 
degree can march into the military univermty, Hit 
NigcHwi Dcforýt Amdemy in Kaduna, where strikes 
M g iety 
where every child nceds thilt 7. - nib 
ra`fi 
zt d 
Psoc: x 
rnifitiry coiLnectiorns for their develýpmcrit and future 
never break out. 
In today's Nigeria, it is Possible for R child to do all 
aclarvements. 
Ilissocialisafion surrounded byuniforms, soldiersand 
At die Nigeria military School, ZALfin, 04 students, 
thcjnckboot- Ht can attetid a rnibfarýschool right from 
are gToumd as luture venemls- potclititill hends ofstrite 
nursery W. He gmws to love the fifeand even venerate 
ApRO from the academic work, iuostýcfdicir activities 
itas Hit onlytype desimblr, or rvrnpossible. Thatisthe 
are Purely Military ill form as the triijiting Vivelt to their 
dmM)ack of the military schools. They could create 
is undiffmiltill(ed froin the ones giv; i to iicw recruits 
peolile who view everythilig non-millitary with dis- 
illjo [lit Force. 'I'lle students Hicre &c clad in milit" 
aplyarel M everyday regulation wcu. 
dain. 
Reported by A YODELE ALE. 
Afler the faildnalimi of students from the militmy 
to be fortifying the comstituency safer for 
Ititurr, r; oldier-statesmen. Traditiontil 
Irmpakers by rridoisiingsoldiers as kings 
nppear also to be pastJng the signals that 
in Uie twilight of the 20th century in 
Nigeria, rioldirrn, nrc the most favourtd 
110mo-sapievis. 
Considerable presctice orgcnend. -i (rr- 
tired) is tilso noticcablc In the current 
regime. Already, Major Gencrni 
Moliftnunadu Buhari is hending the Pc- 
Imleum, lTriLst Fund while his ýforrncr 
dq)ut), "ijor Genend Tundr, Idirigbon is 
side over flit proposed heing wooed to pm 
ritiled rximitntrils triburud 
With the %v M, Cnts are sh; lpirig u'n 
Nigeria, it wi7not be impossible iPby 
2(W, Lhe cnLire Nigeria. including the 
mcdin is Fumly under the wi-sps of die 
J. ackboot. 
-Namnber 14,19% 
OVER. I. I-- -1 1 I The MogIA Go6nerals TORY 
First theywere soldiers, then they made business their 
battle-r 
field. rrapiV conquests all the -4cy 
leateriant Generof Tbc%ý Yalrobw 
churchp" 0-IMP 
He sisto his cc-nadersible 
"es in Cmrff*--Pl" 
Met 
PAMIUMS 
chanaBank zndPrtmeMerchnnLBsw%k- 
In addbm W121helkis 
Former chier of Army otiffissadu the 0bu- italic ChittrinsinorIndercontinental AzImi'll"Im 
Line"OTY"11 
L 
rr,, 0JseIrgr,,, Amy 
Bailding Scw=ty and Urbart Shehff B&%hdW% 
30cWY TIO 
(In October 5.1979 long dlb4G,,,, rZl ob. 1- lag two beJenRed to the rwtk or ths, rare, waive xbortFW 
anic2nd Sýiru Musa Yw'jkduawiLh Lhehoglowff ofpovm iniartiltions that blossomed 
dox-ing the tinse of I I == 
Ic, Lhe SAP - mod=vLbd ecmomic pobcsss. 
Thryhsrv# 
Ott- Since he shed the Khahji-afcorin offtemmy. 
Darpmz 
has become an act . pl"r on the wifiew 'a economic Brfodler-Gez" David Mark 
CL d lan sý'ý an Dsrýrid MWt was far a Icr4 tanse 
Lic nw he didhians 
'tihisettnmapats"hedThowdsýy. 
"allioft'*ý4ýýhreýepwovmocbll'e- touted w one orLh* vo-c"d -Babsaigi& 
Bays- becume of 
"ceptiori ofGenaals Swu Abischis nd§WgpjwsB. hCnp his sx1pposed rJosimiew to the formair pZ=. 
D 
the richest ew (rid) he is ar imbl han ld twD kh - . y l p o Babagin d3L days Mar Dtinjurrm's inve - 
P; V=l 
iig His 
we, the Go verricirithm of", 4m State (Rabeacidias 
Rom 
-iNT investmitnt profilý reads. 31miatim Ngeris- "e) and ift-wairds Mirý for Cornimmoscilborm 
Mark 
American line, ChainnsetUniveme[Tirineak FiritLhii- was behevedto hwe býqgged thewpowiticats 
beciameoffisir 
Steel& T&fi , vtfnl Bank Union DICON S&RM Lfriwased oserbeiz to Babstr4pda- He tr sho amid to 
hx" used No 
Hc, trlsý Jos and dcrecWr, Gtiomess mention ýoverieits to the formitr prendent u well ass his poartim to 
just " few 
Aside from the chrithyreariattip posiliassewa*wre trons- 
Wný ]3nTMCn= WtOkh- 
Asa reanill ciMisinin we*KYL Mark lact so many 
-mentionedcomptrumDunarrialsit aijoidbea, recarrIng In"'ong th" l`ý bo'"r9tois class as adopted "'ry "Pt"', decimal us director onthe boards oftcatualffift_, se. nost tivt iscreshcrmi habift such u polo and golf on which they 
-P-k compirtic, Among dhffx hefwasýdsnecLor of spland ex"roow winotints ofmoney. He is said to 
be a golf 
SCOA. ldral Flow mills. Diagwre, is dissiglosir, me of C buff and owns a lot of txcluxive golf coursies in Biropc 
and C Construction crwned by the lil&ssaaaa farnily. th, 
He is 21*0 pwt cwmwofthe§lmlhreed and Lhe 
Maj. Gets- Ab-disl Vsrrým Adls2 
A Peryrng officti who cwne to prormsbawit whass 
he 
. nest ftenari Econornisit -agan becarris Ckrvernoroftl=ld 0yo State undexIBB. Since Ehe 
LL Gen rYanjorni's rxtenave bnzineamigampeg exposition ofhiv Governorithsp stint. Adies her Twurfeced -- am 01i, 
. .- IM. Ine Lhat 
he hag a finger in vistatilly every - -eauai in d has been minis ed vizibie as it ritinseLer. Fie cesoviistly economic Flaces him in it pontion to bestridt, theft headsthe min'stryof'Worksand Houmsig that]= dam Incre 
andrcspe like a colowma- 
LA- Gen Maharnmed IntrwaWarthaloelid) 
demolition jobs than bmaillm& 
dLssisiTnmofcoraiderablemewig, ThcyttFhhe entw- 
Anotherretrrrd general whom bemnmmw-- sts the 30m e rrstrwnta, UIE appairrinix etwol for this is becatise 
nation's econornic t- L Rill can be rrfm'Wlkým oclopoidal he is still a wa-Ving orlicer. is Gen InuwR VA-hislis (rtd). L. Bor CcriTTINses"umý he is 
, 
Recently. he opened Adiss also owns a farm. Dralcitborg 
RI'm fOrme, chief or Army Staff, who us qt6ding the a resort called Moindirrm in florin. The resoTt has gm" 
military establishment in Iq87 hiei go, vr Yj, chaJets, rwinuning p0oL a gyrm reoosoirdý ccrnfiffucw 
Vital sectors 
racilities and a atipesmatirkirt- The Snenkl is going place@. His 
, now, Links toReksindirrisis roopentiulteverybodyinIloruly 
Of the eýOncmY, He it the chairman of ConUtlental 
and Chszrmzn of the gtpntLc 
about it. For thr wall-hotled viritm to llc, &L. Belopodmin is REinvurance Com an y p the place to be. 
MILITARY CONTROLLERS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
U Gen T, Y Danjuma, Universal Trust Bank Chairman Airr-dre. Benim (Ionia Lberty A--sura rice Director 
LI. G", TY Donjuma nrst Unrye(sal Chairman Air Vice Marshal AD Bello Globe RL4nsjjrnnc* Director 
Ij. G(, n T. Y. 130111LIMA Continental Reinsurance Director Colonel Odunsi Duvm Cashpoint Saviings and Loans Director 
Capt With Gowon United Bank for Africa Da-tor Comm. M_, A. 1Dayoz Apple Finance and Securities Diroctcý 
Capt. Isiah Gowon Greenfield Mortgage oupcioi Ak Cdra-Koda Fe" Classic Homo 6AL Lid Director 
Mill 6110 M ShlrlyU InteinAtional March Bank Chsimrian Ehig-Hasnisa Eghagha Dayne Finance & investment! Director 
Mai Gon J. Oluleye Gulf Bank Chahman lvlsýGon David Efoor Public Finance Group Director 
Mal-Gon Abduliahi Shollong Solid Morigage, Lid Chairman Mal. Gen. l)e%rid Ejoor Alpha Insurance Director 
Mal-Gen Ato-dulahi Shotleng Forturwo Mortgage Chairman Air CcIrs. Kow1ralope, Classic Home Sayings & Loans Director 
Mil-Gon AbduinhVShollong Multi Trust Bancshares Chairman U. Col A. G. -Ere Target International Finance Director 
Maj-Gon AbdulLAIrl Shollon MBC0M -Securities Diieclor Victi-AcIm"I V. 0, Kao Tfandox Mortgage Bank Director 
MAI Gen. C'. 0. Eppa MnnnyBank Dirrictor Col. M. B. Keliel Nigeria Reinsurance Co Director 
Mal-Gori Ahmadu Riml Royal Merchant Bank Di: ectDr Rear Aclm. -14dubotsl Kanu Dependable Finance Director 
Alh. Mohammed Gambo Highland Bw* Chairman (Lato)Mil-Gon. Hnsw Katsina Prime Merchant Bank Fair Chairman 
Mril. Gon D Jornibeywon Ivory Merchant Bank Vice - Chasrnrun &, ig. Georgr Kurubo African Pri. Kk-nhal Chairman 
Mml. (3on. DJombewon Assel & Liabillty, Ins. Corp Chairman Brig. Abba Kyari Creative Finance Director 
LI-Gon MI Churchpato Group Chni: mnn Mal-Gen Zemanl Lerkwot Prudent Merchant Bank Diredor 
U Gen. M %VuV,, GhJ Chartered Bank . - -Chairman Maj-Gen 
G(undayo Cpaleye Devc= Merchant Bank Director 
LI-Gen M, Wushishl Continental Reinsurance ChalTman MsýGan Marnman Konle" Carciinal Mortgage Bank Chairman 
1-1-Girin M. 1 Wtj&hlshi Inlet. ConlinontnI Assurarictý Ctuitimarn MaýGmon Bogudu Marnman Global Deýl Morlgago pic Chaýrrnan 
LI-Gon M. I. Wo5hi5hi *Uibisn Sheller Bkig. Society Chairman MojýGený M. Mogoro Irrier-Continantail Ausursnce Chairman 
LI-Gon M. I. Wushishi Union Trust Bidg. Socioly Charrman AV`M Mouldar. Mohammed Group Merchant Bank Chairman 
Li-Gen M. I. Wushlshl Prime, k4orch.,. ml Bank Kinjor Stinrohoider AVM Mouktor Mohammed Moltopollien General Insurance Chairman 
U-Ge4i M. I. Wushishi Conl, o-Pr4nt Meichant Bank. Mglow Shareholder MaFGen AbrIullahl Mohammad Trade Bank Chairman 
U, Gon Gibson Jaki Societe eoricairc Nigeria Chaim= MxjýGen C. B. Ndionru Er"Slone Finance Boaro Member 
Lt. G en G ib%on Js lo WorIcIgnto Bldg Society Chairman LiCol. David NeInIkhare Great Matýhsnt Bank Director 
. Ll. Gon G. Jaic, SRvAilrust Insurance Brokers Chairman . . LLCoLpaui Ogbk)&f - Great Merchant Bank Cbeim-W 
U. 0on, GthsDr, Jolo ImpcýW Finance and Secuties Di(ecior Brig. 0.0durmlya Deýserv Finance House Director 
Ll Gen Gibson Jalo First lWorswe MOrzhant Bank Ex-Difector Cbtogunýlvvo Crossland Sayings A Loans Director 
U-Gon. Gtbison Jalci Alpha Mei cha-ri I Ilank Ex Direcior LLCoLBoin Ogwsamvo S18*0e SavirVs and Loans Director 
colsani r1olic, Broad Renk *. chairrw P61iine Ccmm. Mýk01Ljok-_, n Peak Merchant Bank Chairman 
C, 0I. Sarri Bello CdntrwW Merchant Bank Chairman AýNll Artý)orry Ok6ere C0rxratP Alliance imd Gren. Ins Chalmnsin 
ý01 Sani Bello Globe Rernsura, ýco ChAirman AVM Ok&Me . 
Feqceworks Nomln, &es Director 
Cot sanl Bono Lsvý Union rnd RcK* ChiFman KqZY4306 ofi. -leml-arbys ZIncpace Fin and Securritiers Chairman 
Gol. Sa rý &0 M IrJand E3&, )k Ak-. Cd. 9 SaGirnorush N; pGnc Merdiam Ba_nik Director 
Col. Stini EW10 Nicml lnwmrizýe 
. 
0i, Act of W*r; o, S. Kamojokun Roorli Semrities and Fir-rance Director 
Col S861 F100 1ý71. usf I. ýý Specie ventur" Diractcw 
Chief Etirn Inyang(frnr IGP) CR-, A, Mwctwt Bank Bar-wýark Inveistmem Director 
wV", MA; S , hal U, MjA-u 
drrmd M, -A( A%W-G, Sk0shc, Norman Irryft-tirreco Directot 
lytel-. Gon or-o'go l4rlih 6wd Bank [ý, ectow 
AVM b_S A10sho Duncan Mongage Ltd Directoir 
Mal-Gen George Inni" Flirvvýce [Amdor CoLMý0 Othimiryn Abdairn Home Savirtge & Loans Director 
Ak-Cdre Dan SOýtvl' Nom'i ý sckml N -rk 'ChsHion ILLGIcil-Tunde Qyt-deia NitnORAvid Maericnat B*nk Dinector 
Mal Gen Musd Yimý, sjofl Ha', I,. Bank Cýiskrriqq Ltcomrdsi (3yedcris Natilofrwde Secuntiars Dkvcto( 
Lt. CcrI. Huw. Ir Abdulnll' Hikmit Nilawrchnt Ba ýk Discf or Aw I 0, ayis Snake Guarown Trust S&YVVs and Loarw Dlirectow 
%ili6ýAd[r, VrrlH_AbdUU! 1lL- ' ., 
A_-_irwn'fjomv Sn, rnV% a Lrwrrs ý Nýý Mert-Gan 04,. S -; hcsNis African Aiftnce insurance Dwe" 
ýýmc, jo, ry ýP,, 1,1 1 twtv V., S., anm 
' 
E* oc--x commod" aozoun Lawds Seoutiel 
GerrimcKiye S-Akir)o M Dhod or Mai-Goin Pauf Tarts C UnKlersel Trust Bar* Dire" 
Brig B-KM I Alok"flo'. ptatýhart'rWri, & Ert, , no. F1 jr Paul Tea R14 UnK*rW Ins BOkws Dinscior 
Cokirrwl AciaJivo Dýýor , Cznncdi,, no ewu nr &ocW9 Bancerv Nigeria Director 
Evio, 13-11"Rbi-Itair's 
:. *., ý_*w lair"itv4 ý. . 0_. , - 
Diftax A%FýA John Yl&*-Doko Idercity Bar* vic Dinector 
Lt Gwi Dor*%! 665 1 .1 0'"Itil, Bar*. -- .. 
Uiairmen [I_C-NP_z_wyorr, -- Rima MOrrihant Bank Director 
Lt CQ,, r, L) 
4xv F`0rTwhW Amuw" MaýGsin AK Adital-V), Alorpa Cýorrirnuiijty Bw* Charmstrit 
'Ali kAArshpJ lbrahim A. 'a FViUnd Gsr "y*" Adpbd yo knic" k4ardwii Ba, -jk Director 
kul rvok "-okiLl uLkkvjrl om-ý Fin wid Se-- 
Sýo ýi4laitrý 
Brig C)JIN-id P4MMAJbL-)M Nevy Air kraw and Poke 
it# rw hority err aftivasod ut! Aw bickgbvv a/ atio O a V, 7 p c rl wy co it? 
*Ds, wid Nfark 
. ............ 
A................... 
-Joe Gilrbs 
APPENDIX It, 
z 
z 
ob 
QQ 
.> -0 bu 
1 
cr 
m 
2 c 9 ;r CL 
a 
Cl% %0 
8. -6 %4 ý2 Z b. A Ab fý v 
.e ti 
b" 
iý b-a 
43 
. o 
cr% 
b-ä 
1, 
"j 
1 
%0 ' -ý, j 1 0.. ä M %-A >A 2 11 - - 
2 E2 91 . 
K. i b-a %0 > 
b-ß 
tn 
ch 
CY% CD cm 
%0 
- 9 
1 
ab . tn 
1ý- 
(Y% 
1 
6. -4 
1 
ie CY% 
e kj ýc CD 
--bb cy, -. 
-1 r- ýi - 
t 
Cj% 
b-a m -. 'Z ý& 0" b. A 
;s ;s 
.. 
b" , > Cy% b. - .* sý - iw (. n w- - %0 cr, 
.> t ýe 
b- N. - w b" 
I 
3sif 
APPENDIX 11, 
4 pý tA t! tj 2 b-a 0-& ,.. 
1 cm a 
ý2 
.. 
2 
K 
g r- - ', --V ob 2 3 12 * .x eb ob 90 K 
K ' r LU 1 11 ýi e pr . 2 pr > 2 Z, -" ý 
ro 2 iv 
Z3 
f» O> e CD b. %0 clo 
b" 
sý & Co %0 ro 
K tu 
6-1 
tý -A %0 e n ýa cx% a. " Nd 8 ui 0" %0 u 6. 
. 
vi 
li gy% k3 
cm 4 w 
w 4, b-a 0.. & 
. -al 0.4 8 
ýA a *8 
CD 
cz 
Z b»A a 
1 
CM - 
(0 n. li (A) 8 
- 
in 
- 
U, 
- 
4 b-ä w 
. 
cu 
w 
0. -6 q> 0 
. 
ýi 3-4 
%_o b" 
. CD 
ch 
rD 
xn 
cr 
Co 
C 
355 
